OUTSOURCING HUMAN SECURITY: THE PROS AND CONS OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN PEACEKEEPING by Straub, Daniel G.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2013-03
OUTSOURCING HUMAN SECURITY: THE PROS
AND CONS OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES
IN PEACEKEEPING
Straub, Daniel G.















Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
OUTSOURCING HUMAN SECURITY:  THE PROS AND 









Dissertation Supervisor: Thomas Bruneau 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for 
reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and 
reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of 
information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and to the Office of 
Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2013 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Dissertation 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  OUTSOURCING HUMAN SECURITY: THE PROS 
AND CONS OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN PEACEKEEPING 
 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S):  Daniel G. Straub 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING 
       AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number NPS.2012.0004-IR-EP7-A.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The United Nations is an international organization that acts in world affairs with the proclaimed aim of ending 
“the scourge of war” and promoting world peace. The UN often uses peacekeeping to further this goal. This 
dissertation considers the potential for private security companies (PSCs) to make a contribution to peacekeeping 
missions.  PSCs claim to offer a flexible capability that can be used to assist organizations and states toward 
improvements in human security. PSCs offer services ranging in scope from protecting diplomats to providing 
security for major corporations, NGOs, and the UN. They also claim that their services can be performed better, 
cheaper, and faster than states or organizations like the UN. For example, supporters of PSCs claim that they could 
have prevented atrocities such as occurred in Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Congo. Opponents of the increased use of 
PSCs raise a host of concerns, including cost, morality, legitimacy, loyalty, fraud, accountability, and political 
will. In an era when states often lack critical capabilities to protect the peace or prevent war, PSCs may offer a 
temporary solution to fill these gaps. What are the advantages and disadvantages to the use of PSCs for 
international peacekeeping?  The analysis in this dissertation focuses on the ability of PSCs to perform not just 
specific tasks, but on their ability to conduct of peacekeeping with legitimacy, accountability, and impartiality, 
while protecting human security.  Since ending the scourge of war is the most important goal of the UN, then 
human security must be the guiding principle upon which all structures of integration, communication, and 
interrelationships in peacekeeping are based. Using the concept of human security as a guiding principle, this 
dissertation evaluates the pros and cons of the use of PSCs in peacekeeping and finds that PSCs should be used in 
peacekeeping operations as a hybridized force where their demonstrated strengths, generally speed and flexibility, 
are used to maximize effectiveness of instituting UN Security Council-mandated peacekeeping. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Private Security Company     Private Military Company     Private Military 
and Security Company     Military Service Provider     Armed Security Company     Armed 
Humanitarians     Peacekeeper     Peacekeeping Operations     United Nations Peacekeeping    Sierra 
Leone     Bosnia     Angola     Responsibility to Protect    R2P    Pros and Cons     Human Security   
Mercenary     Mercenaries     United Nations      Protection of Civilians
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
393 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
OUTSOURCING HUMAN SECURITY:  THE PROS AND CONS OF PRIVATE 
SECURITY COMPANIES IN PEACEKEEPING 
 
Daniel G. Straub 
Commander, United States Navy 
A.S., City University of Seattle, 1991  
A.A., Mt. San Antonio College, 1992 
B.A., Pennsylvania State University, 1996 
M.A., Boston University, 2003 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 








     Daniel G. Straub 
Approved by:  
 _______________________________________________________ 
     Thomas Bruneau 
     Professor of National Security Affairs 
     Dissertation Supervisor 
 
______________________ _______________________ 
Anne Clunan Arturo Sotomayor 
Associate Professor of National Assistant Professor of National 
Security Affairs Security Affairs 
 
______________________ _______________________ 
Jeff Knopf Nicholas Dew 
Senior Lecturer of National  Associate Professor  
Security Affairs Graduate School of Business 
 and Public Policy 
Approved by: _________________________________________________________ 
Harold Trinkunas, Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 
Approved by: _________________________________________________________ 
Douglas Moses, Acting Provost for Academic Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The United Nations is an international organization that acts in world affairs with the 
proclaimed aim of ending “the scourge of war” and promoting world peace. The UN 
often uses peacekeeping to further this goal. This dissertation considers the potential for 
private security companies (PSCs) to make a contribution to peacekeeping missions.  
PSCs claim to offer a flexible capability that can be used to assist organizations and states 
toward improvements in human security. PSCs offer services ranging in scope from 
protecting diplomats to providing security for major corporations, NGOs, and the UN. 
They also claim that their services can be performed better, cheaper, and faster than states 
or organizations like the UN. For example, supporters of PSCs claim that they could have 
prevented atrocities such as occurred in Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Congo. Opponents of 
the increased use of PSCs raise a host of concerns, including cost, morality, legitimacy, 
loyalty, fraud, accountability, and political will. In an era when states often lack critical 
capabilities to protect the peace or prevent war, PSCs may offer a temporary solution to 
fill these gaps. What are the advantages and disadvantages to the use of PSCs for 
international peacekeeping?  The analysis in this dissertation focuses on the ability of 
PSCs to perform not just specific tasks, but on their ability to conduct of peacekeeping 
with legitimacy, accountability, and impartiality, while protecting human security.  Since 
ending the scourge of war is the most important goal of the UN, then human security 
must be the guiding principle upon which all structures of integration, communication, 
and interrelationships in peacekeeping are based. Using the concept of human security as 
a guiding principle, this dissertation evaluates the pros and cons of the use of PSCs in 
peacekeeping and finds that PSCs should be used in peacekeeping operations as a 
hybridized force where their demonstrated strengths, generally speed and flexibility, are 
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The world’s peoples will judge us by our ability to perform specific tasks. 
Not by the resounding speeches we make, or the number of decisions we 
reach, but by the quality of those decisions, and of the service we provide. 
For the sake of all those whom we hope to save—whether from terrorism, 
from war, from poverty, from disease, or from environmental 
degradation—let us resolve that only the best is good enough. 
And let us equip ourselves so that, in future, the best is what we give.1 
       Kofi Annan 
 
The United Nations is an international organization that acts in world affairs with 
the proclaimed aim of ending “the scourge of war” and promoting world peace. The UN 
often uses peacekeeping to further this goal. This dissertation considers the potential for 
Private Security Companies (PSCs) to make a contribution to peacekeeping missions.  
PSCs claim to offer a flexible capability that can be used to assist organizations and states 
toward improvements in human security. PSCs offer services ranging in scope from 
protecting diplomats to providing security for major corporations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and the United Nations (UN). They also claim that their services 
can be performed better, cheaper, and faster than states or organizations like the UN, 
African Union (AU), or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For example, 
supporters of PSCs claim that they could have prevented atrocities such as the ones that 
occurred in Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Congo. Opponents of the increased use of PSCs 
raise a host of concerns, including, cost, morality, legitimacy, loyalty, fraud, 
accountability, and political will. In an age in which states often lack critical capabilities 
to protect the peace or prevent war, PSCs may offer a temporary solution to fill these 
gaps.  
                                                 
1 Kofi Annan, “The Secretary-General Address to the General Assembly” (New York: United Nations, 
10 November 2001). 
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This study uses human security as a lens for evaluating the use of PSCs.  In the 
so-called narrow definition, human security emphasizes protecting individuals from 
violence.  Human security is a primary concern of the UN, but it is not discussed and 
rarely considered in the standard literature on the pros and cons of the use of PSCs for 
peacekeeping. What are the advantages and disadvantages to the use of PSCs for 
international peacekeeping?  The analysis in this dissertation focuses on the ability of 
PSCs to perform not just for specific tasks, but on their ability to conduct of 
peacekeeping with legitimacy, accountability, and impartiality, while protecting human 
security.  Since ending the scourge of war is the most fundamental goal of the UN, then 
human security must be the guiding principle upon which all structures of integration, 
communication, and interrelationships in peacekeeping are based. Using the concept of 
human security as a guiding principle, this dissertation evaluates the pros and cons of the 
use of PSCs in peacekeeping and finds that PSCs should be used in peacekeeping 
operations as a hybridized force where their demonstrated strengths, generally speed and 
flexibility, are used to maximize effectiveness of instituting UN Security Council-
mandated peacekeeping. 
Private Security Companies offer a full range of security services, from personal 
protection to convoy escorts for the military, from protecting governments from 
overthrow to protecting UN officials and peacekeepers.  PSCs have been employed 
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globally in diverse capacities.2  In recent years their employees have driven trucks to 
move war materiel and supplies from Kabul to remote fire bases in Afghanistan.   They 
have battled insurgents in Iraq while protecting convoys of U.S. soldiers. They have 
trained soldiers and police in Bosnia and Kosovo. They have protected firms engaged in 
resource extraction worldwide. They have ensured the security of NGOs conducting 
humanitarian aid in conflict-torn environments. They have protected VIPs, dignitaries, 
and diplomats in conflict zones all over the world.3  And they have protected United 
Nations personnel. PSCs have conducted every known security mission except for one:  
UN peacekeeping.4 
PSCs have lobbied extensively to participate in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations. They have been hired by the UN for protection of UN personnel, offices, 
                                                 
2 “They offer strategic, tactical and technological advice, training expertise and logistic and support 
services as well as core military combat functions for governments, (transnational) enterprises, 
international organizations, non-governmental organizations, relief agencies and other non-state actors.” 
Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel, Private Military and Security Companies : Chances, Problems, 
Pitfalls and Prospects, 1. Aufl. ed. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 9. See 
generally Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors : The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Cornell 
studies in security affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Deborah D. Avant, The Market forForce 
: The Consequences of Privatizing Security  (Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005); Laura A. Dickinson, Outsourcing War and Peace : Preserving PublicVvalues in a World of 
PrivatizedForeign Affairs  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011); David Isenberg, Shadow Force : 
Private Security Contractors in Iraq  (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009); Molly Dunigan, 
Victory for Hire : Private Security Companies’ Impact on Military Effectiveness  (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
Security Studies, 2011); Thomas C. Bruneau, Patriots for Profit : Contractors and the Military in U.S. 
National Security  (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011); Simon Chesterman, Angelina 
Fisher, and New York University. Institute for International Law and Justice., Private Security, Public 
Order :The Outsourcing of Public Services and its Limits  (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009).  
3 Alexandre Faite, “Involvement of Private Contractors in Armed Conflict: Implications under 
International Humanitarian Law,” ed. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Geneva: ICRC, 
2004), 1. 
4 PSCs have been involved in a wide range of international security activities such as training security 
forces in Iraq, civilian police in Bosnia and Kosovo, and flying gunships in Sierra Leone, DRC, and 
Colombia. For an example of some of the tasks PSCs have taken on or the efforts representative of the 
lobbyists’ arguments, see the collection of essays by Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker, and Marina 
Caparini, Private military and security companies : ethics, policies and civil-military relations, Cass 
military studies (London ; New York: Routledge, 2008), essays 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, and 14. Also, from the 
president of the International Stability Operations Association (formerly the International Peace Operations 
Association), Doug Brooks, “Supporting the MONUC Mandate with Private Services in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo,” in United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(International Peace Operations Association, 2005). Doug Brooks and Xavier Renou, Peacekeeping or 
pillage? : private military companies in Africa, Africa Institute Occasional paper (Pretoria, South Africa: 
Africa Institute of South Africa, 2001).   
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equipment, transportation security, support and training. However, to date the UN has not 
authorized the use of PSCs or PSC personnel as peacekeepers or peace enforcers in peace 
support operations (PSOs).5   
The UN has considered using PSCs for peacekeeping, especially when 
peacekeeping troops have not been available, or the speed of troop contributing countries 
(TCCs) has not been quick enough to get boots on the ground and stop violence as 
authorized by the Security Council (SC).6 But the UN has not used them for actual 
peacekeeping. On one side of this issue are those who advocate for their use, arguing that 
states have already lost the monopoly of violence, so why not hire corporate volunteers 
on a “contract-fee basis for the United Nations?”7  On the other side are those who 
oppose their use arguing they are irresponsible mercenaries who are difficult to hold 
accountable for any misdeeds they might commit. PSCs have lobbied to act as 
peacekeepers for the UN, claiming that had they been used, they could have prevented 
genocides in places like Rwanda or restored order to places like Somalia.8   
The arguments for and against PSCs engaged in peacekeeping are many and 
varied. The two sides of the debate have disputed the efficiency, effectiveness, 
accountability, legitimacy, morality, transparency, impartiality, and neutrality of PSCs in 
order to support their stance. What does the evidence tell us about the validity of the pro 
and con arguments?  The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the data so that 
policymakers can make informed choices about whether or not to employ PSCs and in 
                                                 
5 Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding peacekeeping  (Cambridge, UK; 
Malden, MA: Polity Press; Blackwell Pub., 2004), 209. 
6 Robert Mandel, Armies without states : the privatization of security  (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 
2002), 17; Ibid. Annan has stated that, “Without the use of private forces, the United Nations still lacks the 
capacity to implement rapidly and effectively decisions of the Security Council calling for the dispatch of 
peacekeeping operations in crisis situations.” Although Annan also added that the world may not be ready 
for privatized peace. 
7 Alvin and Toffler, War and anti-war : survival at the dawn of the 21st century, 1st ed. (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1993), 273. Cited in Mandel, Armies without states : the privatization of security: 16. 
8 Singer, Corporate Warriors: 182–87; Ibid. Toffler and Toffler. See also Tim Spicer, An unorthodox 
soldier : peace and war and the Sandline affair : an autobiography  (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1999); Doug 
Brooks, “Write a Cheque End a War Using Private Military Companies to End African Conflicts,” Conflict 
Trends 6, no. July (2000). 
 5
what circumstances their use may be appropriate, and possibly more importantly, when 
their use is not appropriate. As human security, protection of civilians (PoC), prevention 
of responsibility to protect (R2P) atrocities, and ending the “scourge of war” are the 
stated aims of the UN, every potential asset or resource should be carefully reviewed in 
order to accomplish these goals. This dissertation starts from the premise that human 
security is the fundamental element by which PSCs must be measured for their use in 
UN peacekeeping operations.9  After an analysis of the pros and cons of their use, this 
dissertation finds that PSCs should be used as a part of a hybrid mix of organizational 
responses in peacekeeping under a UN mandate. 
The use of PSCs to conduct peacekeeping is not a new idea. The UN has 
considered it on numerous occasions.10  In fact, “…even former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan has admitted that, without the use of private forces, the United Nations ‘still 
lacks the capacity to implement rapidly and effectively decisions of the Security Council 
calling for the dispatch of peacekeeping operations in crisis situations.’”11  Use of PSCs 
was also considered in the midst of the Rwanda genocide, but “member states were 
horrified by the idea.”12  There is a common theme among those supporting the use of 
PSCs for peacekeeping that the genocide in Rwanda or the ongoing mass atrocities in 
Congo could have been prevented or stopped, saving millions of lives.13 
The UN has, in fact, hired PSCs to protect their own personnel from violence in 
the midst of peacekeeping operations on numerous occasions.14  For instance, just 
months after the Lomé Peace accords between the Revolutionary United Front [of Sierra 
Leone] (RUF) and the government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), the RUF resumed their 
violent attacks on citizens, public officials, aid workers, and peacekeepers. For their own 
                                                 
9 Each pro and con must also be evaluated using the measure of human security. 
10 Mandel, Armies without States : The Privatization of Security, 17.   
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See David Shearer, “Privatising Protection,” The World Today 57, no. 8/9 (2001); Brooks and 
Renou, Peacekeeping or pillage? : private military companies in Africa; Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier; 
Eeben Barlow, Executive Outcomes: against all odds  (Alberton, South Africa: Galago Books, 2007). 
14 Singer, Corporate Warriors: 182–87. 
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protection, the UN hired Lifeguard Services, a PSC. Ironically, the UN had “publicly 
excoriated” the private military company, Executive Outcomes (EO), for its activities in 
Sierra Leone and elsewhere, yet many employees “shift[ed] back and forth” between EO 
and Lifeguard while protecting UN personnel and offices.15  The UN currently hires 
PSCs to perform many functions including aviation and transport, as well as armed and 
unarmed protection of UN officials, buildings, and equipment.16  If the mission is a 
Security Council (SC) mandated mission, peacekeepers can perform many of the security 
tasks to protect UN officials, experts on mission, buildings or equipment. If it is not an 
SC mandated peacekeeping operation, peacekeepers cannot provide security for UN 
personnel, diplomats, or observers.   
Although the UN is increasingly using armed and unarmed PSCs in peacekeeping 
operations, there is no comprehensive policy statement or guidance by the UN for the use 
of PSCs in peacekeeping operations.17  The fact that there is no clear guidance on 
contracting raises suspicion that the UN may be trying to disguise its increased use of 
PSCs for fear it will lose legitimacy, or maybe it is because the UN knows that member 
states would never approve the use of PSCs in the widespread manner they are now being  
 
                                                 
15 Jack Kelly, “Safety at a Price,” Pittsburgh Post Gazette, 13 February 2000. Cited in Peter Singer, 
“Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents: Implications of the Privatized Military Industry for the 
Humanitarian Community,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 13, no. 1 (2006): 114. 
16 Adam Smith, “Interview with Adam Smith, Researcher, International Peace Institute” (New York, 
19 June 2012); UNDPKO Official #1, “Interview with Senior United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations Official #1,” ed. CDR Daniel G. Straub (United Nations complex, New York, NY22 June 
2012); Lou Pingeot, “Interview with Ms. Lou Pingeot, Program Coordinator, Global Policy Forum” (Phone 
interview, 25 May 2012). 
17 Åse Gilje Østensen, “UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies,” 
ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi (The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF), 2011); Lou Pingeot, “Dangerous Partnership: Private Military & Security Companies and the 
UN,” (New York: Global Policy Forum, June 2012); Lou Pingeot, “My interview with Ms. Lou Pingeot, 
Program Coordinator, Global Policy Forum.” 
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used.18  It may also be that this current ad hoc nature of contracting PSCs is similar to the 
U.S. usage of PSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan—that is, use of PSCs is outpacing doctrine or 
policy governing their use.19 
By drawing on case studies, interviews, data on operations conducted by the UN 
and PSCs in peacekeeping operations, as well as data from contracts, government 
documents, UN mandates, and regulatory mechanisms, this dissertation will compare the 
capabilities of UN-sanctioned troops with those offered by PSCs. In order to lay out the 
pros and cons of each side of the issue, a number of obstacles to compiling, reviewing, 
and drawing conclusions from the data collected had to be overcome. For example, 
institutional resistance to the use of PSCs for peacekeeping is not spelled out in official 
UN literature or statements by UN officials, but the fact that the UN has not done any 
extensive study on the potential privatization of peacekeeping is an indication that the 
idea has not been seriously considered by the UN.  
Other indicators may be found in the organizational structure of the UN, 
specifically, the idea of path dependence and the notion that the UN may be resistant to 
use PSCs because of its own embedded practices, norms, and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs). In this case, the adherence to specific organizational structures and 
rules may actually impede the ability of the UN to fully do its job, for example, to protect 
people from the scourge of war, even though adherence to these principles or standards 
may enhance the UN’s legitimacy. In the case of the UN with regard to PSCs for 
peacekeeping, it may be that “[f]ormal structures that celebrate institutionalized myths 
differ from structures that act efficiently…Categorical rules conflict with the logic of 
                                                 
18 UN reports and documents from their contract procurement site confirm a substantial increase in the 
use of “security services” after 2008, the year that coincides with the UN report “Towards a Culture of 
Security and Accountability.”  United Nations Global Marketplace, “Annual Statistical Report on United 
Nations Procurement,” United Nations, https://www.ungm.org/Info/annual-statistical-report-UN-
sustainable-procurement.aspx; Lakhdar Brahimi, “Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability,” in 
The Report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide 
(New York: United Nations, June 2008). 
19 Østensen, “UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies.”  See also 
Stuart W Bowen, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience  (Charleston: CreateSpace, 2009). In 
Hard Lessons, Bowen discusses the lack of resources, including Contracting Officer Representatives 
capable of monitoring and controlling the massive growth of the private security industry. 
 8
efficiency.”20   For instance, are there certain norms that proscribe behavior and reduce  
the options available, even if alternative routes are cheaper and more effective?  
Legitimacy falls largely within a normative context which can be legal, moral, and 
political. 
In order for peacekeeping operations to be successful, peacekeepers must be 
accountable and legitimate (which includes being neutral and impartial21), have the 
essential physical and logistical capacity and the necessary resources, plus be capable and 
effective in providing human security.22  Lack of any one of these elements is sufficient, 
but not necessary, to be a cause of failure. Other factors which have nothing to do with 
the actions or capabilities of the peacekeepers themselves may also lead to failure of a 
peacekeeping mission. For example, a lack of consent of the parties, lack of desire to stop 
fighting, or weak political will of the Security Council might all negatively affect the 
outcome of the mission or mandate.23  These are vital discussions that this dissertation 
addresses, since, in order to understand the how pros and cons apply, it is necessary to 
understand not only what peacekeepers do, but what makes for successful peacekeeping. 
Success is most likely when there is consent, clear lines of accountability, a well-
written and comprehensible mandate, a responsive framework, and an exit strategy, as 
well as iterative and interactive learning throughout every phase of peacekeeping and at  
 
                                                 
20 John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony,” in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, ed. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. 
Powell (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 55. 
21 Impartiality/neutrality and consent of the parties are not necessarily components of successful peace 
enforcement missions; however, if not met, they may be sufficient conditions for failure. Lise Morjé 
Howard, UN peacekeeping in civil wars  (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 8.  
22 Global Peace Operations Initiative, “Principles of UN Peacekeeping,” in Peacekeeping Operations 
Contingent Commanders’ Course, ed. What are the “Critera [sic]” for Successful Deployment (Monterey, 
CA: Center for Civil-Military Relations, 2012). See also United Nations Secretariat, “United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” ed. Jean-Marie Ghehenno (New York: United 
Nations, 2008). 
23 Howard, UN peacekeeping in civil wars. Howard argues that consent of the parties, and “consensual 
but only moderately intense Security Council interest are both necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
success.” 
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every level. 24   Evaluating advantages and disadvantages will provide another tool for 
use in deciding whether or not privatization of security or any aspect of peacekeeping 
should be undertaken by the UN.   
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF DISSERTATION 
Oldrich Bures has asked a key question: “Are private military companies capable 
of taking on some of the proliferating international peacekeeping functions in a way that 
would be consistent with the primary objective of the UN Charter, ‘to save the future 
generations from scourge of war?’”25  Private security companies can be small and focus 
all of their attention on physical security, or they can be large organizations, offering 
comprehensive services from laundry and food preparation to diplomat protection and 
combat operations.26  PSCs provide protection for government personnel, IGOs, NGOs, 
and international organizations conducting operations in other dangerous environments.27 
                                                 
24 Ibid.; Virginia Page Fortna, Does peacekeeping work?: shaping belligerents’ choices after civil war  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, Peacekeeping in East 
Timor:  The Path to Independence  (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Ramesh Chandra 
Thakur, The United Nations, peace and security : from collective security to the responsibility to protect  
(Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); John Paul Lederach, Building peace : 
sustainable reconciliation in divided societies  (Washington, DC.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
1997). 
25 Oldrich Bures, “Private Military Companies:  A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?,” International 
Peacekeeping 12, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 533. 
26 Singer, Corporate Warriors: 92–100; Avant, The market for force : the consequences of privatizing 
security: 16–22. Although Singer refers to “firms” and Avant prefers “contracts,” both Singer and Avant 
use the analogy of a spear to represent the different services that PSCs offer, with combat-oriented services 
near the tip, consulting and training services along the shaft, and logistic and support services toward the 
rear; the closer to the “tip,” the closer to the battle. This analogy has been commonly cited when discussing 
PSC typology. J. Eric Fredland, “Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the Role 
of Military Companies,” Defence and Peace Economics 15, no. 3 (2004): 217–19. Fredland also discusses 
the broad range of PSC types and references Doug Brooks’s typology which categorizes by types of 
activities; see Doug Brooks, “Private Military Service Providers: Africa’s Welcome Pariahs.,” in Guerres 
D’Afrique, Noveau Mondes 10, ed. Laurent Bachelor (Geneva: Centre de Recherches Entreprises et 
Societes, 2002)..   
27 Doug Brooks and Matan Chorev, “Ruthless Humanitarianism: why marginalizing private 
peacekeeping kills people,” in Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, policies and civil-military 
relations, ed. Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
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They also provide combat support and physical security pre-, during, and post-conflict.28  
It is argued that PSCs see their next “pot of gold” market in humanitarian operations, 
working with NGOs and IGOs (primarily the UN), to include stability and reconstruction 
operations, security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR), and humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery (HA/DR).29  However, to date 
in the realm of international peacekeeping operations, they are limited to training, 
logistics and technical assistance.30 Although PSCs have not conducted peacekeeping for 
the UN, they have conducted peacekeeping in one form or another for states and 
alongside regional peacekeepers. This study analyzes data gleaned from all known cases 
of PSCs in peacekeeping from the end of WWII to the present, but focuses predominantly 
on the period of time following the end of the Cold War to the present when PSCs began 
their explosive growth. 
Because the scholarly literature contains no clear consensus on either objectives 
or measures for evaluating peacekeeping operations, specific roles, missions, mandates, 
and capabilities are compared on a parity basis within relevant case studies to the greatest 
extent possible.31  Four types of peacekeeping have been distinguished: peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, peace-building, and peace enforcement. In individual cases, measurements 
of success or failure will be related to the type of peacekeeping in question. 
                                                 
28 There are numerous examples of PSCs actively involved in all phases of conflict supporting combat 
units, and often engaging with the enemy themselves. See Singer, Corporate Warriors: 101–18. A number 
of recently published books documents much of the work of PSCs from different perspectives, but all find 
them engaged in support of or alongside military troops at one time or another. For example, Robert Young 
Pelton, Licensed to kill : hired guns in the war on terror, 1st pbk. ed. (New York: Three Rivers Press, 
2007); Shawn Engbrecht, America’s covert warriors: inside the world of private military contractors, 1st 
ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011); James Ashcroft, Making a killing : the explosive story of a 
hired gun in Iraq  (London: Virgin Books, 2010); Gerald Schumacher, A bloody business : America’s war 
zone contractors and the occupation of Iraq  (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006); Jeremy Scahill, 
Blackwater : the rise of the world’s most powerful mercenary army  (New York, NY: Nation Books, 2007). 
29 Singer, Corporate Warriors: 82–83. See also Nathan Hodge, Armed Humanitarians: The Rise of the 
Nation Builders  (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2011). 
30 Brooks, “Ruthless Humanitarianism: why marginalizing private peacekeeping kills people,” 118–
21. 
31 Bures, “Private Military Companies:  A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?,” 533, 40. Bures cites 
Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, Understanding peacekeeping: 272. 
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The analysis concludes that PSCs do offer advantages that the international 
community cannot provide, specifically, speed, innovation, cost-effectiveness and 
efficiency in the short-term. However, this study also finds disadvantages to the use of 
PSCs, to include legitimacy, accountability, long-term efficiency, cohesion, and 
command and control. Not surprisingly, each of these disadvantages can undermine the 
potential expediency and utility of their use. PSC assertions of “superior feasibility, 
availability, professionalism and lower costs,” and “better, cheaper, faster,” might 
ultimately serve to improve human security, and may also improve national security, 
international security, and global security.32  However, evidence has not consistently 
borne out these assertions. If the extensive use of PSCs in the U.S. interventions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan serve as representative examples, then it is clear that regulatory 
structures, transparency, and clearly delineated contracts are necessary for the successful 
use of PSCs and privatization in general. Ad hoc contracting of private security by the 
UN under unclear guidelines will yield similarly spotty results. If ending the “scourge of 
war,” protecting civilians, and achieving human security are truly the aims of the UN, 
careful consideration will have to be given to the benefits and hazards posed by hiring 
private security. Although this dissertation suggests that PSCs should be used in UN 
peacekeeping, it also contends that it is necessary to fully understand the pros and cons of 
using PSCs before making decisions to use them in any capacity and that any decision to 
use PSCs is done so with a clear contract in place and the capacity to manage that 
contract for efficiency, control, and effectiveness.33 
Until now, the primary factors of the debate on whether to privatize peacekeeping 
or supplant armed forces for contracted personnel have been primarily in the realm of 
                                                 
32 Mandel, Armies without states : the privatization of security: 17–18; Singer, Corporate Warriors: 
183; Mary Kaldor, Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention  (Malden, MA: Polity 
Press, 2007), 182–97. 
33 Bruneau, Patriots for profit : contractors and the military in U.S. national security: 28–49; Moshe 
Schwartz, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: 
Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress,” in CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 13 May 2011). 
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cost savings, innovation, and capability;34 however, there are many more factors that 
should weigh into this equation, such as legitimacy, human security, and political will to 
stop or prevent violence to people.   
Other studies often focus on failings of PSCs in non-peacekeeping roles to project 
how they will likely behave in peacekeeping. However, PSCs have never been used in 
peacekeeping under the UN with the requisite controls and structure that the UN places 
on peacekeepers; therefore, these projections are based on flawed comparisons. In order 
to properly evaluate aspects of PSCs’ capability to conduct peacekeeping, cases must be 
compared where they were used for peacekeeping, either by states or regional 
organizations, or where they supported peacekeeping operations but did not actually 
conduct peacekeeping. The three most definitive cases where PSCs either acted solely as 
peacekeepers (in one form or another) or worked with other peacekeepers are represented 
in three plausibility probes found in Chapter V (Angola, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia). 
The primary gap in the literature lies in conducting empirical analysis of a broad 
scope of examples, rather than relying only on specific cases in order to draw singular 
conclusions. For example Angola and Sierra Leone are cases where PSCs claim that the 
use of a PSC (Executive Outcomes) to stop violence is proof positive that they can 
accomplish peacekeeping missions given the latitude and authority. Others, opposed to 
PSCs in peacekeeping use the same examples to show that EO violated human rights, 
committed theft on a grand scale, and only delayed violence and human suffering from 
occurring, resulting in an overall reduction of human security.  The following analysis 
will make it possible to highlight similarities and differences across a broad range of 
examples in order to provide greater data from which to draw conclusions as to the 
relative advantages and disadvantages in the use of PSCs in peacekeeping.  Reviewing a 
                                                 
34 For examples of these arguments, see: Allison Stanger, One nation under contract : the outsourcing 
of American power and the future of foreign policy  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 12–29; 
Brooks, “Ruthless Humanitarianism: why marginalizing private peacekeeping kills people,” 120; Doug 
Brooks, “Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future of International Private Military Services,” International 
Peacekeeping Vol. 7, no. No. 4 (2000): 140; Singer, Corporate Warriors: 7, 17–18, 49–70; Charles C. 
Moskos, Peace soldiers : the sociology of a United Nations military force  (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1976), 4–11; Fredland, “Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the Role of 
Military Companies,” 207–19. 
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broad scope of literature and answering specific questions may bear out variables which 
may not matter as much as previously thought or it may identify others that are more 
important than had previously been thought, e.g., legitimacy, impartiality, neutrality, 
consent of parties, protection of civilians, or use (or non-use) of force.  Particularly, this 
study, in contrast to others,35 finds that human security has not been given enough weight 
in determining pros and cons of PSCs’ use in peacekeeping. This study also seeks to 
evaluate the merits of the claim that simply stopping the violence quickly can sometimes 
be enough to separate the parties until the international community has time to respond.   
The question of whether or not private security companies actually reduce or 
prevent violence to persons and improve livelihoods across a spectrum of humanitarian 
missions and cases, e.g. HA/DR, SSR, or DDR, and especially peacekeeping, has not 
been studied in depth or in any comprehensive fashion. Individual research has focused 
more on specific successes or failures, and more often than not, private security 
companies have garnered criticism and negative attention for their failures and little 
                                                 
35 Other studies which analyze PSCs and UN peacekeeping  often take a normative stance on their 
fitness for accomplishment of peacekeeping duties based upon capabilities, for example, see Christopher 
Spearin, “UN Peacekeeping and the International Private Military and Security Industry,” International 
Peacekeeping 18, no. 2 (April 2011). Or scholars and analysts of PSCs and peacekeeping focus on 
accountability, cost, or legal control in order to make their determinations, see for example, Laura 
Dickinson, “Book Discussion “Outsourcing War and Peace”: The Rise of Private Military Contractors and 
the Importance of Public Values,” (Washington, DC: Opinio Juris, 15 May 2012); Benedict Sheehy, 
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, and Virginia Newell, Legal control of the private military corporation  
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008); Eric George Azeez O 
Olaniyan, Thembani Mbadlanyana, Chris, M A Kwaja, and Dan Kuwali, “From Market For Force to 
Market for Peace: Private Military and Security Companies in Peacekeeping Operations,” in Monogragh 
Series, ed. Sabelo Gumedze (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 1 November 2011); Surabhi 
Ranganathan, “Constructing Governance, but Constructive Governance?  The Emergence and Limitations 
of a Dominant Discourse on the Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies,” in Asian Society 
of International Law Young Scholars Conference (Singapore: Cambridge University, September 2008). The 
aforementioned are examples of the bulk of the literature on PSCs and peacekeeping. None analyze the 
various pros and cons of PSCs in peacekeeping using human security as the measure and final determinant 
of the value of each advantage or disadvantage. 
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recognition for their value or successes.36  But are these failures indicative of their overall 
performance and impact, or are many of these failures isolated or sensationalized 
examples that only work to create misperception?  It may be that private security 
companies are suited only for specific roles and missions not tied to improvements in 
human security or peacekeeping, and if this is the case, then clear lines might be drawn 
delineating their use and boundaries, as well as what functions should remain solely the 
purview of the state and international community. 
Another area that makes this a puzzle worth researching, one that is relevant 
especially today as militaries downsize and troops for peacekeeping are becoming harder 
and harder to find, is that the current market for peacekeepers is exactly that, a market. 
During the 1990s, a growing “culture of protection” and the “responsibility to protect,” 
led to increased intervention by the international community across sovereign borders. 
However, during this same time, “there was also a shift away from Western states as 
prominent troop providers, towards developing nations largely taking over the task.”37 
One consequence of this market for peacekeepers is that lesser developed 
countries (LDCs) conduct 90% of the peacekeeping duties.  This has led to heavy 
economic reliance on the UN to pay these troop contributing countries (TCCs) for their 
troops.38  Additionally, states such as India and Pakistan have found prestige and power 
in positions throughout the UN hierarchy.39   Not only does a position at UN 
                                                 
36 Dickinson, Outsourcing war and peace : preserving public values in a world of privatized foreign 
affairs: 3–4, 17, 191–95; Mervyn Frost, “Regulating Anarchy: the ethics of PMCs in global civil society,” 
in Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, policies and civil-military relations, ed. Andrew 
Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini (New York: Routledge, 2008), 43–44. Also, Doug 
Brooks, the president of the International Stability Operations Association, the largest PSC trade 
association, has claimed that the media has intentionally mischaracterized PSCs for a sensationalist impact  
but does not seem to report as robustly on all the good that private companies do; see Doug Brooks and 
Mackenzie Duelge, “Ethical Lessons On Maximizing Private Contractor Value In Afghanistan and Iraq,” in 
Conflict Management and “Whole of Government”: Useful Tools for U.S. National Security Strategy, ed. 
Volker C. Franke and Robert H. Dorff (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012). 
37 Østensen, “UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies,” 19. 
38 United Nations, “Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/june12_1.pdf. 
39 “A country like Indonesia now has a goal of becoming one of the top 15 TCCs, which is about 
prestige—being seen as an international peacemaker.”  Smith, “Interview with Adam Smith, Researcher, 
International Peace Institute.” 
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headquarters carry great responsibility, reflecting positively on the official’s home 
country, but it carries a great deal of power in making recommendations on what states’ 
troops are provided, where, and how many. In cases where TCCs are receiving millions 
of dollars in payments for providing peacekeepers, recommendations by these officials 
can have economic, political, and social ramifications. Consequently, any consideration 
of PSCs in peacekeeping not only raises the necessary (and common) questions of 
accountability, legitimacy, impartiality, and neutrality, but the use of PSCs can have 
political, economic, and social ramifications for certain governments. If predominantly 
Western private companies begin to take millions of dollars that previously went to LDCs 
for peacekeeping troops or resources, this could potentially affect human security, and 
ultimately the ability of the UN to conduct its fundamental mission, in ways that have not 
yet been fully analyzed. 
It is not likely that the UN will allow PSCs to conduct peacekeeping any time 
soon; however, PSCs are making significant strides into the peacekeeping market.40  A 
sharp increase in ad hoc contracting of PSCs to protect UN personnel, offices, and 
equipment was spurred by deadly attacks on UN personnel in Baghdad and Algiers, and 
there does not appear to be any reduction in the use of PSCs in UN missions on the 
horizon.41  PSCs may not be conducting actual peacekeeping, but they are deeply 
ingrained in the process of international peacekeeping. When PSCs become this deeply 
enmeshed in UN missions and UN projects, there is a strong likelihood that they will be 
                                                 
40 A high ranking UN official made it very clear to me in our interview that the “UN will never use 
PSCs for peacekeeping”; however, the same official also justified the use of PSCs as protection to support 
UN operations when peacekeepers are not authorized.  #1, “Interview with UNDPKO Official #1.”  
Indicators that the UN is increasingly using PSCs can be found on the UN website; see, for example, data 
from UN Procurement Division (UNPD) which provides data for contracts and purchase orders (POs) for 
each mission; United Nations Procurement Division (UNPD), “Contract Awards for UNPD,” United 
Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/award_contract_pd.htm.; see also, Annual Statistical Report on UN 
Procurement. Marketplace, “Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement.” website, accessed 
29 July 2012. One report found that from 2006 to 2011there was a 250% increase in the use of security 
services by the UN, see Pingeot, “Dangerous Partnership,” Appendix II. 
41 See Brahimi, “Towards a Culture of Security.”; Pingeot, “Dangerous Partnership.”  22 UN staff and 
visitors killed in Baghdad in 2003; 17 UN personnel killed in Algiers in 2007—both of these incidents 
instigated a major report aimed at increasing the security of UN personnel. 
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perceived as part of the UN project by those whom the UN is there to help.42  The use of 
PSCs in any international capacity can be complex and have ties to many other aspects 
that can impinge upon peace and security. Understanding the full gamut of pros and cons 
associated with PSC use in peacekeeping will help sort out these complexities and assist 
in determining future policy and guidance. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This study primarily employs an exploratory qualitative research strategy, tracing 
historical processes, and analyzing the content of both existing work and original 
interview data. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with industry professionals, 
UN officials, government employees, academics and researchers in order to create 
inference and draw conclusions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of PSCs in 
peacekeeping.43  Because there are numerous actors evaluated when determining 
advantage/ disadvantage—in this case, UN state-sponsored forces, other armed forces, 
and PSCs—multiple methods are combined with a structured focused approach to 
discovery.44  Another set of tools used (used loosely, but used nonetheless) to evaluate 
the data are John Stuart Mill’s method of agreement and difference combined with 
process-tracing. Mill’s method applies to comparisons of cases and evidence since there 
are cases presented where only UN peacekeepers were used, where only PSCs were used, 
and where both were used together, and since one circumstance has presented itself as 
                                                 
42 Brahimi, “Towards a Culture of Security,” 57. 
43 Interviews include: Doug Brooks, president of the International Stability Operations Association 
(ISOA), a lobbying group representing international contractors and private security companies; the 
Honorable Joseph Schmitz, former DoD IG and former COO for Blackwater Worldwide; a Director at 
UNDFS; two Security Coordination Officers with UNDSS; Adam Smith, International Peace Institute; 
James Cockayne, Co-director, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation; Major General (Ret) 
Patrick Cammaert, former UN Force Commander to Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Eastern Democratic Republic 
of Congo, and UN military adviser UNDPKO; Col (Ret.) Tim Byrne, Director, Global Peace Operations 
Initiative, Center for Civil-Military Relations; Ms. Lou Pingeot, Program Coordinator, Global Policy 
Forum, and others. 
44 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social 
sciences, BCSIA studies in international security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005); Tanya Cook, 
“Dogs of War or Tomorrow’s Peacekeepers?: The Role of Mercenaries in the Future Management of 
Conflict,” Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies 5, no. 
1 (2002). 
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common to all circumstances, Mill’s method applies here. To wit, “If two or more 
instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, 
the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the 
given phenomenon”; e.g., in the case of PSCs and peacekeeping, whenever PSCs were 
charged with peacekeeping (albeit what would be considered “enforcement”), they 
effectively reduced violence to persons while they were present—this is certainly not the 
case with peacekeepers.45  Because tasks or circumstances were not exactly the same, 
inference is necessary to draw comparisons between the cases and find common 
elements. Process-tracing is used to some extent to complement the comparative case 
study method used here by ruling out intervening variables, attributing causal 
significance to the other variables that have not gotten enough attention in other 
literature.   
The first step in this research project was to collect and define each of the 
arguments either for or against PSCs. For example, one argument contends, “PSC 
personnel commit human rights abuses for which there are no mechanisms to punish 
them; therefore, in an area where protecting human security is vital, PSCs should not 
conduct peacekeeping.”  Another argues, “PSCs can bolster the UN’s capability to carry 
out the responsibility to protect (R2P); therefore, in the interest of human security, PSCs 
should conduct peacekeeping.”  Once primary arguments were collected, they were 
sorted into categories such as “accountability,” “legitimacy,” and “impartiality/ 
neutrality.”  There were also other categories to consider. For example, academics have a 
different perspective from practitioners on the importance of legitimacy or effectiveness. 
These categories were then analyzed for links between or among arguments. As per the 
examples used above, in cases of criminal acts perpetrated by PSCs or UN peacekeepers, 
there were certainly questions of accountability; however, criminal acts may also impact 
legitimacy (or perceptions of legitimacy). Therefore, linkages necessarily needed to be 
explored in order to fully analyze the data which supports or disputes positions in favor 
                                                 
45 Ibid., Mill’s methods are discussed in George and Bennett’s book, citing Bruce Pirnie et al., 
Assessing requirements for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief  (Santa Monica, 
Calif.: Rand, 1998). 
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of or against PSCs in peacekeeping. Once the arguments were presented and collated, a 
final review was conducted to ascertain that the major arguments had been addressed, and 
just as importantly, that the ties had been explored so that the data collected was applied 
to each argument in proper measure. Following determination of the primary arguments 
for and against PSCs in international peacekeeping, an exhaustive data search on PSCs 
and traditional, state-sponsored peacekeepers became necessary in order to collect 
evidence relevant to evaluating the various arguments.   
In order to accomplish the task of reviewing the pros and cons for PSCs in 
international peacekeeping, it was necessary to collect data about PSCs as well as 
traditional, state-sponsored peacekeepers. The research involved collecting several types 
of data.  First, I sought information on actual costs, in dollars, as well as consideration of 
political and social costs (where this data could be found). Second, documented abuses 
committed by both PSCs and state-sponsored peacekeepers were considered; these 
included fraud, human rights abuses, and other criminal activity. Finally, issues such as 
effectiveness, legitimacy, accountability, and capability were addressed; however, “data” 
in this realm involve a degree of subjective judgment that could not be avoided. 
Therefore, in cases where specific or empirical data did not enable definite conclusions, 
inference was drawn from a preponderance of information collected. 
In order to arrive at the conclusion that consideration of human security is an 
essential element in effective peacekeeping, Mill’s method of elimination was used, in 
part, to enable exclusion of elements that did not cause the outcome, that is, the capability 
to conduct peacekeeping. Using this method, multiple peacekeeping missions were 
compared (as well as elements within a peacekeeping mission), each with different 
outcomes. When it was found that there was a condition that existed across multiple 
cases, for example, participation in peacekeeping efforts by major powers, then through 
Mill’s method of difference, major power presence cannot necessarily account for the 
different outcomes. 
Process-tracing and within-case analysis has also been used because of the 
problem of multiple causes, that is, there are different causes for peace within each case. 
PSCs claim that their speed, efficiency, cost, and flexibility are directly linked to the 
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achievement of peace, while the UN claims that legitimacy, long-term support, 
international attention, and the three basic principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use 
of force except in self-defense lead to peace. Simply comparing each case against a list of 
standard questions does not adequately address all of the pros and cons of PSC use in 
peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations and mandates almost always change over time, 
requiring different resources, capabilities, levels of intervention, and support.46  Even 
clear-cut cases do not follow one specific path throughout the entire operation and often 
exercise various tactics, techniques, and procedures (or modifications to the mandate) 
which change as the situation on the ground progresses. Process-tracing takes these 
changes over time into account by considering and reviewing the alternative causes of the 
outcome (peacekeeping success or failure, in other words, peace or no peace) and what 
capabilities may have led to that outcome.47  Process-tracing combined with structured, 
focused comparison “provide different and complementary bases for causal inference.”48 
Causal inference is also drawn between cases involving UN peacekeepers and 
PSC personnel. The differences have been reviewed in detail, but certain key 
considerations were tested in order to draw these inferences; this is the value of 
employing both methods to determine causality. For example, impartiality or neutrality is 
questioned of PSC personnel; how do questions of impartiality or neutrality apply to UN 
or regional actors?  Did impartiality or neutrality have an effect on ability to fulfill the 
mandate?  Was human security a factor in considering capability to conduct the mission?  
What about legitimacy?  Is this a correctible concern?  Can groups conducting 
peacekeeping gain legitimacy? Hypothetical questions like these draw out alternative 
processes that lead to outcomes within each case and which also have relevance to, but 
different impact, in different peacekeeping cases. 
Short case studies, called “plausibility probes” in this dissertation, were used to 
evaluate the pros and cons discussed against real cases of UN peacekeeper and PSC 
                                                 
46 Howard, UN peacekeeping in civil wars: 6–7. 
47 George and Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences: 207. 
48 Ibid., 208. 
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involvement. These plausibility probes were also used to test claims of what causes peace 
or peacekeeping success (or failure) against actual peacekeeping or peace enforcement 
events using both PSCs and UN peacekeepers. Cases were selected for their ability to 
show the capabilities of UN peacekeepers as well as PSCs in conflicts in which they both 
conducted similar tasks. These cases were also chosen because they are representative of 
the very few times both PSCs and UN peacekeepers conducted similar missions. In two 
of the cases, Sierra Leone and Angola, PSCs and UN peacekeepers did not work together; 
in the final case, Bosnia, UN peacekeepers and PSCs worked together, yet still failed to 
produce sufficient human security effectively (or in time to prevent mass atrocities). 
These cases offer excellent examples for comparison because each has been called both a 
success and a failure for different reasons, over short or long time periods, and with 
reasons and causes given for each.   
This study uses a mix of the methods described above to quantitatively and 
qualitatively review primary and secondary source data developed and acquired through 
case studies, government and UN records, and research on PSCs and their shifting modus 
operandi toward new profit-seeking opportunities. Measurements of human security will 
be based upon the UN’s narrow definition of human security:  “the protection of 
communities and individuals from internal violence.”49  Through reviewing case studies 
that show private security company successes and failures and evaluating them against a 
predetermined standard of human security, this dissertation tests theories that argue 
against further expansion of privatization of security into the peacekeeping realm, as well 
as those that claim that privatization saves lives, and by implication, improves human 
security.50    
In this investigation, I review primary documents relating to cost expenditures for 
privatization of security services, as well as contracts (where available), in order to 
establish verifiable costs for services and make value comparisons to the costs of not 
                                                 
49 Human Security Report, 2005, VIII. 
50 Brooks and Chorev, 116–130. 
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privatizing peacekeeping.51  Recognizing that human rights abuses, fraud, corruption, and 
criminal activity must necessarily play into the “costs” I dedicate research to evaluate 
these costs when considering value of privatization of security. Although this is clearly 
qualitative research, it can serve to illuminate patterns from which inferences are drawn. 
C. DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
Chapter I discusses the increased use of PSCs by the United Nations, raises the 
question of UN use of PSC employees as peacekeepers, and introduces the concept of 
human security as a baseline measure of the pros and cons of using PSCs in 
peacekeeping.   The UN is an international organization that acts in world affairs with the 
proclaimed aim of ending “the scourge of war” and promoting world peace.  The UN 
often uses peacekeeping to further this goal. Human security and protection of civilians 
(PoC) are fundamental to successful accomplishment of peacekeeping. Private security 
companies claim to offer a flexible capability that can be used to assist organizations and 
states toward improvements in human security and in establishing peace. The advantages 
and disadvantages of use of PSCs in peacekeeping have not yet been fully determined. 
Chapter I also reviews the significance of this dissertation and the means used to support 
conclusions drawn. 
Chapter II provides a review of the key concepts used throughout peacekeeping 
operations by the United Nations and regional organizations such as the African Union 
(AU), Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There is also a 
discussion on the typologies of peacekeeping, what the requirements are, who conducts 
peacekeeping, and the conditions for success and failure. 
Chapter III provides a literature review of peacekeeping and PSCs, covering the 
elements of the debate, and provides definitions used in this dissertation. Chapter III 
                                                 
51 For example, Congressional Budget Office, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq,” 
(Washington, DC, 2008). 
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finishes with a compilation of the commonly held arguments on the pros and cons 
regarding PSCs in general and with regard to peacekeeping in particular.    
Chapter IV discusses human rights and human security in detail with a focus on 
definitions of the narrow view and broad view of human security. The narrow view of 
human security is a fundamental requirement for successful peacekeeping, in that, quite 
simply put, if civilians are not safe from violence in either the short or long-term, then no 
form of peacekeeping is performing its intended function. If UN peacekeepers cannot 
prevent responsibility to protect (R2P) crimes and abuses (war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
genocide, crimes against humanity), or protect civilians, then should the proposals 
presented by PSCs be something that should be considered by the international 
community?   This research finds that PSCs’ proposals should be considered. This section 
reviews human security and addresses arguments concerning various actors and 
peacekeeping but allows for future research and potential empirical evidence not 
currently available to answer the question as to whether or not PSCs should be an option 
for UN peacekeeping. Chapter V also includes a discussion on legitimacy and details how 
the foundations of legitimacy or how it can be acquired. 
Chapter VI presents the specific data on peacekeepers and on the use of PSCs, to 
include cost data, where available, as well as documented abuses, fraud, and criminal 
activity. Databases maintained by public action groups, governmental commissions, 
international watchdog agencies, and criminal records provide information for tracking 
PSC misconduct. On the side of peacekeepers, the UN has been maintaining a database of 
misconduct by peacekeepers since 2005. This information and these statistics provide a 
comprehensive look at peacekeepers versus PSC personnel for evaluation and 
comparison of types and severity of abuses by various actors in conflict and post-conflict 
zones. 
Chapter VII includes case studies on Angola, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH), the three most extreme cases where UN peacekeepers, regional 
organizations, and PSCs have all attempted to bring peace in vastly different ways. Each 
of these missions is diversely problematic in the approach taken by states, regional 
powers, private actors, and the international community. None were clear successes for 
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either peacekeepers or PSCs; all three used regional and UN peacekeepers as well as 
PSCs in attempts to achieve peace and stability. Human security and human rights were 
both negatively and positively affected in all three cases, creating a good basis for 
evaluation. What these case studies do is provide a broad scope plausibility probe into the 
nature, tasks, functions, capabilities, and abuses of PSCs and UN peacekeepers in 
practice, exploring the pros and cons through actual cases.  
Chapter VII evaluates the arguments for and against the use of PSCs in UN 
peacekeeping to include accountability and oversight, legitimacy, outsourcing, speed and 
flexibility, outsourcing costs and benefits, and intervention—the effects of PSC 
employees on local populations versus UN peacekeepers when Chapter VII missions 
have become the norm. The chapter also discusses the potential negative effects to states 
as well as to the “peacekept” when coercion or military force must be used to prevent 
aggression or to threats to breach of peace. 
Chapter VIII presents some conclusions that could be drawn from the data and 
this study as well as some policy implications for the use of PSCs in UN peacekeeping. 
This dissertation suggests that PSCs should be used in peacekeeping, but that any 
consideration of the use of PSCs in peacekeeping must be accompanied by a critical view 
and the understanding that human security and protection of people and communities 
from violence and harm are fundamental to the mission of the UN and peace. The pros 
and cons presented in this paper are not an exhaustive list; rather, along with human 
security as a foundational comparative tool, they present a starting point for analysis and 
discussion. Chapter VII also discusses some of the future research opportunities on the 
subject of PSCs, peacekeeping, human security, and privatization of previously public 
functions. 
D.  RESEARCH GOAL 
Using human security as a guiding concept, this dissertation evaluates the pros 
and cons of the use of PSCs in UN peacekeeping operations by reviewing the claims on 
both sides of this issue. Arguments evaluated are based on interviews with industry 
professionals, UN officials, and scholars, as well as primary and secondary source data 
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on PSCs and peacekeeping. Human security, protection of civilians, and the 
responsibility to protect are all primary motivations for UN action;52 therefore, human 
security has a fundamental role in determination of the positive and negative aspects of 
the use of PSCs for peacekeeping. If ending the “scourge of war” is the goal of the UN, 
then finding the most efficient and effective means of doing so necessarily includes a 
review of every option. 
What this dissertation does not do is answer the normative question of whether 
PSCs are capable of conducting peacekeeping for the international community, since 
sufficient empirical evidence does not exist to support a claim that they can conduct 
peacekeeping for the UN. Although PSCs have performed peacekeeping roles for states 
and regional authorities, PSCs have never performed actual peacekeeping for the UN. 
However, there is value in assessing the arguments for and against PSC use in 
peacekeeping since the UN faces a decreasing budget, while the global need for 
peacekeepers appears to be increasing and the supply of state-sponsored peacekeepers 
has been diminishing.53  UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, commented that, “[t]oday 
we face mounting difficulties in getting enough troops, the right equipment and adequate 
logistical support…Supply has not kept pace with demand.”54  It is not only getting 
enough troops that is the problem; there is also the problem of getting properly trained 
troops who understand and can carry out the mission. In some cases, developing 
countries, in an attempt to provide a troop contingent quickly (or seeking additional 
payments from the peacekeeping budget), send poorly trained troops to UN missions. 
                                                 
52 Secretariat, “Peacekeeping Operations: Capstone Doctrine,” p. 28.  
53 Much of the swing away from major power support of peacekeeping began with humiliating failures 
such as occurred in Somalia where U.S. troops were dragged through the streets by bare-footed Somalis. 
Recently, killings of peacekeepers in Darfur and questions over security have led some nations to pull 
troops or support, see Benjamin Kahn, “Don’t Paralyze the Peacekeepers,” New York Times 9 February 
2012; Sky News Australia, “UN aims for big cut in peacekeeping bill,” Sky News(9 February 2012), 
http://www.skynews.com.au/politics/article.aspx?id=716593. Peter Gantz of Refugees International wrote: 
“If nations with first class militaries refuse to put their troops in harm’s way in remote locations, and if the 
UN is saddled with troops from developing nations that are not up to the task, then perhaps the UN should 
hire the private sector to save the day.”  Cited in Azeez O Olaniyan, “From Market for Force,” 25. 
54 Cited in UN News Centre, “UN to Strengthen Peacekeeping Efforts amid Rising Demand, Says 
Ban,” UN News Centre, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=31383&Cr=Secretary-
general&Cr1=peacekeeping. Accessed 4 March 2012. 
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Often, it is these very troops who end up committing human rights abuses placing the UN 
mission at odds with the local community they are attempting to assist. Both PSCs and 
traditional UN peacekeepers come with issues that must be dealt with and managed 
effectively in order to maximize human security in the communities in which they find 
themselves. Regardless of whether peacekeepers are on mission as military soldiers, 
police, staff, or civilians, they are still responsible for upholding the core values and 
competencies of the UN: integrity, professionalism, and respect for diversity—and they 
“should act in accordance with international human rights law and understand how the 
implementation of their tasks intersects with human rights.”55 
My argument is that if the UN’s goal is promoting peace and reducing human 
suffering, then actions that achieve human security are the fundamental elements by 
which PSCs (as well as all peacekeepers) must be measured for their use in UN 
peacekeeping operations. The ultimate aim of this dissertation is to inform policy 
formation, legal processes, and initiatives relating to the use of PSCs in peacekeeping 
efforts toward a more secure and peaceful world.   
                                                 
55 United Nations Learning and Development (DM/OHRM), “UN Core Values and Core and 
Managerial Competencies,” United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/staffdevelopment/viewPage.asp?selMenu=unc.asp; Secretariat, “Peacekeeping 
Operations: Capstone Doctrine.” 
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II. KEY CONCEPTS FOR ANALYSIS 
This chapter discusses the different roles that peacekeepers have played over the 
years since the establishment of the UN as well as different types of peacekeeping in 
which they have been engaged. It also gives an overview of other groups and 
organizations that have conducted peacekeeping in various forms, to include individual 
states, regional organizations and private companies. This chapter also gives an overview 
of different definitions of success and failure for peacekeeping missions and holds that 
not only must there be a clear, achievable mandate with available resources, but that there 
must be full backing of the Security Council and all levels of the UN working together as 
a learning organization in order to protect human security. Finally, and not least 
important, consent, impartiality, and non-use of force are often necessary, but belligerents 
must be willing to commit to peace; without this peaceful intent, human security is not 
possible. 
A. THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACEKEEPING, AND PRIVATE SECURITY 
COMPANIES 
If member states don’t give us resources, troops available for rapid 
deployment, money to do a sound, well-organized peacekeeping job, then 
the challenge is almost impossible. 
    Maj-Gen Patrick Cammaert, Military Adviser, UN DPKO56 
 
1. Peacekeeping 
The broad term “peacekeeping” is sometimes used to describe all of the different 
missions where “peacekeepers” are used; however, the UN has never adopted an official 
definition. The International Peace Academy (IPA) provides a definition that the UN has 
used, which defines peacekeeping as the: 
                                                 
56 Patrick Cammaert, “UN Press Statement,” (New York: United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping, 29 May 2003). Accessed 18 May 2012. 
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…prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities 
between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party 
intervention organized and directed internationally, using multi-national 
forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.57 
The first peacekeeping operation, authorized in 1948, was the UN Truce 
Supervision Organization (UNTSO), whose role it was to monitor the Arab-Israeli 
ceasefire. The first peacekeeping operation to use peacekeeping forces was the United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), which positioned peacekeeping soldiers on the 
Egypt-Israeli border, and lasted for eleven years from 1956 to 1967. For nearly forty 
years, all UN peacekeeping missions essentially fell into one of three categories: observe; 
monitor; or supervise. It was not until the late eighties and early nineties that more robust, 
so-called “enforcement” missions began to become the norm.   
Bellamy and Williams describe exactly what traditional peacekeeping is and what 
exactly peacekeepers do (see Table 1). However, two types of peacekeeping addressed 
often are Chapter VI, which involves the peaceful settlement of disputes, and Chapter 
VII, which authorizes action or force to maintain or restore peace, often referred to as 
“peace enforcement.”  In the case of peace enforcement, or Chapter VII missions, the 
roles of peacekeepers are dramatically different. In these types of missions, peacekeepers 
are expected to intervene in conflicts and bring about peace, something which has proved 
much more difficult than maintaining peaceful settlements, even if tenuous. First, in 
peace enforcement operations, peacekeepers are expected to engage hostile forces in 
order to protect civilians;58 this is not always the case with Chapter VI missions. Second, 
peacekeepers are susceptible to much more risk when intervening directly in a conflict 
when the “holy trinity” (consent, impartiality, and the defensive use of force) of 
                                                 
57 International Peace Academy., Peacekeeper’s handbook, [3rd ed. (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1984), 22. This definition of peacekeeping has also been used in documents by the North Atlantic 
Assembly (NAA), Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, “Peacekeeping & international relations,” 
(Ottawa: Peacekeeping & International Relations, 1991). Cited in Wolfgang Biermann and Martin Vadset, 
UN peacekeeping in trouble: lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia: peacekeepers’ views on the 
limits and possibilities of the United Nations in a Civil War-like conflict  (Aldershot, Hants, England ; 
Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1998), 17. 
58 In accordance with the mandate and ROE agreed to by TCCs. 
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traditional peacekeeping is eroded or nonexistent.59  Third, the risk that peacekeepers 
face in Ch. VII missions can act to discourage states from contributing troops to missions 
where their soldiers have a much greater risk of being attacked and killed. Finally, 
interventions can carry much more political baggage than a traditional mission based 
upon the three fundamentals (the “holy trinity”). This political baggage can deter 
potential TCCs from intervening with their troops.60  A mandate to use force can lead to a 
“vicious circle: more enforcement—less support—more chaos in UN operations.”61  As 
can be expected, the increased complexity of peace enforcement requires more and better 
trained troops, clear and effective command and control (C2), specialized skills and 
combat training, and a thorough and functional understanding of rules of engagement 
(ROE).62 
There are also vast differences between what combat soldiers and peacekeepers 
are expected to do. These differences also apply to PSC personnel because the role of a 
peacekeeper is one that is supposed to be open and transparent, not private. ROE are 
published and shared, not secret; positions of peacekeepers are revealed and known to all, 
as opposed to concealed, as in the case of combat troops.63  Peacekeepers are also 
supposed to de-escalate situations, rather than escalate them in order to solve conflicts. 
                                                 
59 Often called the “holy trinity” of peacekeeping, it is comprised of consent, impartiality (defined by 
Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin as “being synonymous with neutrality rather than as treating belligerents 
equally in relation to their adherence to the mandate”), and minimum use of defensive force. See for 
example,  Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, Understanding peacekeeping: 96, 196–97. 
60 For example, Biermann and Vadset discuss three operational and political elements of negative 
interaction when the UN chooses enforcement operations: 1) Enforcement requires larger and better trained 
units, better command and control, and qualified specialists, something only a few nations are able to 
provide; 2) “greater risks of such operations increase national interference in UN missions by governments 
which have a legitimate responsibility for their nationals…[which] reduces the military efficiency of the 
force and can thus even increase the risks of the operation”; and 3) “greater risks increase national 
reluctance to contribute troops, which per se adds to the risks and inefficiency of UN missions.”Biermann 
and Vadset, UN peacekeeping in trouble: lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia: peacekeepers’ views 
on the limits and possibilities of the United Nations in a Civil War-like conflict. See also, John Mackinlay, 
“Successful Intervention,” International Spectator 47, no. 11 (November 1993): 659. For element 2) above, 
Mackinlay argues that protecting one’s own soldiers could create national interference which “reduces 
effectiveness by national interests,” 659. 
61 Biermann and Vadset, UN peacekeeping in trouble: lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia: 




They cooperate, not confront; parties to a conflict are partners, not enemies.  
“Peacekeepers have no right to ‘kill and destroy’ unless it is in self-defence.”64 
Table 1.   Bellamy & Williams:  Traditional Peacekeeping  
and Peacekeeping Activities65 
 
 
In 1992, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined 
peacekeeping as “the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent 
of all parties concerned.”66  Consent is still listed as a fundamental condition for 
peacekeeping; however, since the early 1990s, the term “peacekeeping” has grown to 
include types of peacekeeping where there is no consent of the parties. This lack of 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 17. 
65 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, Understanding peacekeeping: 97. 
66 Ibid., 12–13. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An agenda for peace : preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, 
and peace-keeping : report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit 
meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992  (New York: United Nations, 1992). 
Traditional peacekeeping takes place in the period 
between a ceasefire and a political settlement and is 
designed to cultivate the degree of confidence between 
belligerents necessary to establish a process of political 
dialogue.  As such, it is based on three assumptions.  First, 
that the belligerents are states.  Second, that the combatant 
units are hierarchically organized, Clausewitzian 
militaries.  Third, that the protagonists wish to end the 
conflict and search for a political resolution. 
Traditional peacekeeping activities typically vary 
from simple observation and fact-finding, to monitoring 
compliance with the conditions of ceasefires and physical 
interposition between the former belligerents.  
Peacekeepers monitor borders, patrol buffer zones, 
separating opposing forces, verify the various aspects of 
demilitarization, including weapons decommissioning and 
troop withdrawals, and attempt to create a political space 
that will facilitate a political resolution of the conflict.  
They do not devise political solutions themselves or 
enforce agreements between the competing parties. 
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consent has led to much confusion, not only for the UN soldier on the ground, but for 
policy-makers in member states or at UN headquarters. Although there is no definition of 
peacekeeping in the UN Charter, the different types of peacekeeping generally fall under 
six essential categories: 
–Conflict Prevention/Preventive Diplomacy 
–Peacemaking 




Although these are the categories used by the UN and many in the academic 
community, and will be the terms used here, they are not universally accepted. The broad 
consensus in the literature agrees that the first three of these are accomplished under 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with consent of the parties in conflict, 
impartiality of UN forces, and non-use of force.67  Peace enforcement involves 
intervention where consent is not necessary, impartiality is conditional, and use of force 
is only authorized under delineated conditions as outlined by the Security Council. Peace 
enforcement falls under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and allows for a decision by the 
Security Council to “maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a 
‘threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.’”68   
Although all categories can, and do, fall under the term “peacekeeping,” there are 
recognized divisions, especially between the first three forms of peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement. For this study, different types of peacekeeping are reviewed and compared 
when evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of PSCs in each peacekeeping role. A 
more detailed analysis of types of peacekeeping can be found in Chapter II. 
                                                 
67 The “holy trinity” of traditional peacekeeping, these three fundamental principles still apply to UN 
peacekeeping wherever possible, but the increase in intervention missions in the interest of R2P, PoC, or 
human security has led to many more enforcement missions than ever before. Toffler, War and anti-war : 
survival at the dawn of the 21st century: 7–8. 
68 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, Understanding peacekeeping: 147–48. Bellamy further cites 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace where he discusses provisions of collective security. 
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Peacekeeping is one of the main instruments in the maintenance of international 
peace and security. It is a means of ensuring the security of people and communities 
through reduction of violence and the threat of violence, i.e., human security. In order to 
accomplish this, critical elements to effective peacekeeping are necessary:69  






–cost and efficiency 
–human security  
Although there are varying degrees to which each needs to be addressed through 
different peacekeeping missions, these elements are critical to success in varying degrees 
depending upon the specific circumstances of each mission. Moreover, there is certainly a 
large difference of opinion on the value of each of these elements with regard to PSCs 
and their ability to conduct peacekeeping.72  This dissertation examines a broad scope of 
the peacekeeping literature, to include cases where only the UN was involved, cases 
                                                 
69 Various sources were used to compile this list which includes critical elements as identified by the 
UN, peacekeeping institutions, scholars on peacekeeping, and analysts. See, for example United Nations 
Secretariat, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” (New York: United 
Nations, 2008); Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor:  The Path to Independence; Boutros-Ghali, An agenda 
for peace : preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping : report of the Secretary-General 
pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992; 
Swiss Federation Council, “International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers,” (Bern: 
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 9 November 2010); Paul F. Diehl, International 
peacekeeping : [with a new epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia], Perspectives on security 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Bures, “Private Military Companies:  A Second Best 
Peacekeeping Option?.”; Human Security Centre, “Human security report: war and peace in the 21st 
century” (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
70 Secretariat, “Peacekeeping Operations: Capstone Doctrine,” 33. 
71 Ibid. 
72 See for example William J. Durch, Twenty-first-century peace operations  (Washington, DC.: 
United States Institute of Peace and the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006); Howard, UN peacekeeping in civil 
wars; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work; Stephen John Stedman, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. 
Cousens, Ending civil wars : the implementation of peace agreements  (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 
2002); Thakur, The United Nations, peace and security : from collective security to the responsibility to 
protect; Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding peacekeeping, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2010); Dennis C. Jett, Why peacekeeping fails, 1st ed. (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 2000). Each has a different idea of what exactly makes for successful peacekeeping, and 
by implication, what causes failure in peacekeeping. 
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where PSCs were the primary agents, and cases where both PSCs and the UN were 
involved, in order to evaluate the arguments in favor of and those opposed to use of PSCs 
in peacekeeping. The variables explored here are the agents used to perform 
peacekeeping; the constant is the act of peacekeeping in its many forms. This study also 
compares and contrasts many of the specific tasks performed and capabilities of both UN 
peacekeepers and PSC personnel. 
In order to better understand what, exactly PSCs are expected to accomplish if 
they are to take on the role of UN peacekeeping, peacekeeping itself must be thoroughly 
understood. As the UN’s Capstone Document explains, “Peacekeeping is one among a 
range of activities undertaken by the United Nations and other international actors to 
maintain international peace and security throughout the world.”73  While the term is 
used broadly here and in most texts, the UN distinguishes peacekeeping from other 
efforts at preventing conflict and creating or preserving peace. Although peacekeeping is 
not specifically spelled out in the Charter, five separate categories of peacekeeping are 
distinguished in the UN’s principles and guidelines manual for peacekeeping operations; 
however, rarely does any peacekeeping mission fit neatly into any one category.74  
Oftentimes, depending upon the stage of conflict, agreements in place (if any), needs of 
the parties to the conflict, or willingness of UN partners, peacekeeping is conducted in 
multiple categories simultaneously or progresses from one type to another type of 
peacekeeping.75  Although peacekeeping typologies imply that the different types 
represent separate steps, the boundaries between all of them have become blurred, and 
often, these components are used simultaneously or shifted between in order to meet 
changing situations toward the goal of securing peace.76 
What makes for successful peacekeeping is difficult to pinpoint since so many 
factors are at work, many of which alone can cause failure. Different scholars and experts 
                                                 
73 Secretariat, “Peacekeeping Operations: Capstone Doctrine,” 17. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., 24. 
76 Ibid., 19. 
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have reviewed what peacekeeping success and failure is and how it can be measured; 
however, their descriptions vary significantly. A succinct and bulletized review of a few 
conceptions of what makes for peacekeeping success or failure follows for comparison: 
–The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff state that “[t]he single most important factor for a 
PKO to have the potential for success is the consent to conduct the operation by the state 
or states involved and all significant parties to the dispute.”77 
–Paul Diehl measures successful peacekeeping by asking two questions: 1) Was 
there a “limitation of armed conflict?” 2) Was there a “resolution of the underlying 
conflict?”78   
–George Downs and Stephen Stedman also use two variables very similar to the 
above, but modify them to include the future:  “(1) Whether large-scale violence is 
brought to an end while the implementers are present; and (2) whether the war is 
terminated on a self-enforcing basis so that the implementers can go home without fear of 
the war rekindling.79   
–Lise Morjé Howard writes that the three main lines of argument for causes of 
success or failure are: 1) the “will of the warring parties to stop fighting”; 2) “Political 
will” of the Security Council; 3) adherence to the rules of peacekeeping–”consent, 
impartiality, and limited force.”  However, her research shows that those three causes do 
not hold up for each case; she believes that although Security Council interest and 
consent of the parties are necessary, they are not sufficient conditions for success. She 
adds that there is another condition for success:  “first-level organizational learning in the 
UN Secretariat.”  This final condition is exemplified in her review of different cases 
where UN peacekeepers were present, and what she found was that when the UN was a 
“learning organization,” modifying the mandate and shifting strategies as the situation 
dictated, with full involvement of headquarters, success was much more likely. 
                                                 
77 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Pub 3–07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Peacekeeping Operations,” ed. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, 29 April1994). 
78 Cited in Howard, UN peacekeeping in civil wars: 7. 
79 Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, Ending civil wars : the implementation of peace agreements: 50. 
 35
–There are some scholars in peace studies who suggest that unless underlying 
conflict is resolved, and “those directly involved [and especially senior political leaders] 
have the vision, will, and commitment,” nothing will create lasting peace, no efforts will 
be sufficient.80  In contrast, others argue that resolving the underlying issues “is not 
enough to convince the combatants to accept and implement a peace settlement.”81 
–The UN holds that successful peacekeeping requires consent of the parties to the 
conflict, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the 
mandate, adding that legitimacy, credibility, and promotion of national and local 
ownership are also critical factors.82 
It is clear that there is no consensus on what makes for successful peacekeeping, 
or for that matter, what causes failure. In the end, the preponderance of data from several 
authoritative sources shows that the successful missions had the following in common:  
consent of the parties in conflict; local and senior political involvement from civil 
leaders; an interested, responsive, and effective UN, from the Secretariat to field 
operators; legitimacy of mission/mandate; sustained political will of the Security Council; 
and resource commitment (logistics, equipment, troops) from states.83  I do not hold that 
there is one definition of requirements for success; there are simply too many variables in 
play in any one peacekeeping mission for there to be any sort of formula for success.   
Each situation in which the UN gets involved and decides to use peacekeepers 
must be evaluated on its own qualities, character, and specific nature of the conflict. The 
extent to which consent is necessary may not be critical if genocide is occurring and the 
                                                 
80 Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail O. D. Rashid, West Africa’s security challenges : building peace in a 
troubled region, A project of the International Peace Academy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 
2–3, 386–88; Daniel C. Bach, “The Dilemmas of Regionalization,” in West Africa’s Security Challenges: 
Building Peace in a Troubled Region, ed. Adekeye Adebajo (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 
64–65. 
81 Barbara F. Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and 
Commitments to Peace,” International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer, 1999): 129. 
82 Secretariat, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” 31–41. 
83 See, for example, citations from previous paragraphs which attempt to define successful 
peacekeeping. Additional authors who use similar conceptions or different combinations of the listed 
common elements to define successful peacekeeping include: William Durch, Paul Diehl, Page Fortna, 
Paul Williams, and Alex Bellamy. 
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international community has an obligation to stop it. A “hands-on” UN may create 
dependence on outside assistance which may result in loss of local/national ownership.  
However, if ending the “scourge of war,” protection of civilians (PoC), and peace is the 
goal, then the UN must recognize its role in long-term assistance of member states since 
conflicts rarely remain within a single state for long (partly due to rebels using borders as 
protection, refugee flows, and transnational crime).  Legitimacy may not matter an ounce 
if no one respects the intervening troops; the use of force under a Chapter VII mandate 
may or may not reduce violence in the short or long-term. I hold, as does Barbara F. 
Walter, that resolution of the underlying issues is not enough, a negotiated settlement 
(and peace) can only be found if credible guarantees are included in an agreement 
between parties to the conflict—and this almost always requires outside assistance.84 
Among the many competing ideas of what makes for peacekeeping success, I 
define it as protection of civilians and communities from violence in the short-term and 
sustained peace in the long-term, leading to observable improvements in the broad view 
of human security.85  Although consent, impartiality, legitimacy, ownership, political 
will, resource commitment, and a responsive UN are all important, not one or a specific 
combination is either necessary or sufficient to guarantee successful peacekeeping. 
Therefore, I contend that there are no standard methods to follow in assuring 
peacekeeping success, only general guidelines that must be constantly reviewed and 
amended as necessary in order to protect civilians in the short and long-term. 
2. Private Security Companies 
Private security companies take many forms, from large multinational 
corporations who provide a vast array of services which include security, to small, local, 
                                                 
84 Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War,” 129–30. 
85 See UNDP list of seven threats to human security: Economic security, food security, health security, 
environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report, 1994  (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 24–25. 
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or niche companies who provide specific security services.86  Peter Singer, the author of 
Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, uses a “tip-of-the-
spear” typology in his discussion of what he calls “private military firms” (PMFs).87  In 
his typology, the tip is comprised by the firms closest to combat, the military provider 
firms; the shaft is made up by the military consultant firms; and at the base of the spear 
are the military support firms.88  Deborah Avant, the author of The Market for Force, 
uses the term “PSC” to “denote the whole range of for-profit security companies because 
it both more aptly describes the range of services these companies provide.”89 
“Private Security Company” is the term used here, and although there are those 
who argue that there is a difference between private military companies (PMCs) (a term 
coined by David Shearer) and PSC, the term PSC covers the vast array of services that a 
company may provide to include both military and non-military support, as well as armed 
and unarmed security.  
The distinction between PSCs and PMCs may be one of degrees, and while all 
PMCs may be PSCs, not all PSCs are PMCs. PMCs conduct military operations and 
training while engaged in or for combat. According to Kevin O’Brien and Doug Brooks, 
PMCs can be broken down into two types: active and passive.90  Active PMCs conduct 
military operations which often include training, but also may involve contracted agents 
carrying weapons into combat alongside their newly trained or “in-training” clientele. 
Both Executive Outcomes and Sandline International conducted training, but also 
engaged in combat alongside government troops and troops from regional organizations 
                                                 
86 David Isenberg presents an excellent overview of the spectrum of PSCs, from the huge 
multinational firms to the much smaller “niche firms,” to the fraudulent firms such as Custer Battles. 
Isenberg, Shadow force : private security contractors in Iraq: 67–111. Fredland also provides a table which 
breaks down PSC types, but he notes in his appendix that categorizing firms is very imprecise. Fredland, 
“Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the Role of Military Companies,” 207, 
17–19. For further discussion on PSCs as multi-million dollar businesses, see William Reno, Warlord 
politics and African states  (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), particularly ch. 2. 
87 Singer, Corporate Warriors: 91–100. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Avant, The market for force : the consequences of privatizing security: 1–2. 
90 Brooks, “Private Military Service Providers: Africa’s Welcome Pariahs..”  Brooks thanks Kevin 
O’Brien in f/n 21 of his article for use of the terms active and passive when describing types of PSCs. 
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in places such as Sierra Leone and Angola. Passive PMCs do not accompany their clients 
to the field and do not involve themselves in lethal combat.91  An example of a passive 
PMC is MPRI. MPRI conducts consultation and training world-wide and boasts a broad 
resume of military training services from curriculum development and instructing at 
ROTC units to training combat soldiers as they did in Croatia and Bosnia.92  MPRI 
claims to have “the greatest corporate assemblage of military expertise in the world” and 
“more generals per square foot than in the Pentagon.”93   
The term “PSC” is also used throughout this dissertation to describe both “active” 
and “passive” organizations that provide security services for persons, as well as “private 
and public facilities and operations in high-risk conflict zones.”94  This approach 
combines key features of both Avant and Singer’s definitions.95  A PSC provides a range 
of services covering the full spectrum of Singer’s spear analogy; PSCs rarely remain 
within Singer’s delineated categories. Most PSCs have separate branches or divisions that 
take on different tasks, each of which may fall on different parts of the spear, from the tip 
to the fletching. From this, it can be seen that PSCs are “business organizations that trade 
in professional services intricately linked to warfare…that specialize in the provision of 
military skills, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk 
                                                 
91 Ibid., 11. 
92 It is somewhat ironic that civilian contractors have been used to train soon-to-be active duty military 
officers on military matters. 
93 Lieutenant-General Ed Soyster, retired, MPRI spokesperson. David Shearer and International 
Institute for Strategic Studies., Private armies and military intervention, Adelphi paper, (Oxford ; New 
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assessment, operational support, training, and technical skills,” not just one or another.96 
The fact is, many PSCs have gotten so large, that to categorize one of them along 
Singer’s typology spear would depict limitation where there is none. Some of the larger 
PSCs have armed security services and capabilities that would rival well-armed military 
forces. The same companies may also have a logistics wing, aviation services, personal 
protection services, and training and consulting branches. Although there are many terms 
to describe and define private security companies, the fact is that most can be considered 
“firms” and some have military capabilities, but all are private, all have a security 
component, and all are one form of a company or another. Moreover, in keeping with the 
theme of human security as a concept essential to gauging the use of PSCs in 
peacekeeping, Human Rights First’s simple, yet broad definition will be used: 
Human Rights First uses here an essentially functional definition of the 
term in light of the actual activities of…contractors…with a basic security 
mission—that is, a core mission to protect people (other than themselves) 
or things, to include guarding government (and contractors’) facilities, 
protecting government personnel (and other government contractors) and 
United Nations (U.N.) and other international organization staff as well, 
and providing security for convoys.97 
Therefore, the term “PSC” is a fitting descriptor for purposes of this dissertation. 
Two diagrams show the broad spectrum of operations or tasks that PSCs can 
undertake, demonstrating that under one company’s roof can be tip of the spear-type 
military services, while at the other end might be consulting, logistics, or even catering 
services. The first diagram (Figure 1) has been adapted from a report by Nicholas Dew 
and Bryan Hudgens and the second adapted from Tim Spicer (former president of 
Sandline and AEGIS).98 
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Figure 1.   Defining the Private Security Sector99 
The vertical axis shows what activity is taking place, according to Singer’s “tip of 
the spear” heuristic” and the horizontal axis shows where activities are taking place.100 
Although Dew and Hudgens surveyed 550 industry firms representing every sector, this 
dissertation focuses primarily on the firms that support segment 1; however, as has been 
pointed out, many companies may have capabilities in all sectors, yet all can be 
considered PSCs. 
Figure 2, adapted from Spicer, illustrates the full spectrum of Sandline’s 
services—and Sandline was considered somewhat specialized as primarily a private 
military company. 





Figure 2.   Spectrum of Sandline Services101 
Figure notes:  Boxes to left are non-combat; boxes to right include combat capabilities.  
“Support services” includes legal, commercial, public relations and lobbying.  
“Command and Control”: command, control, communications and intelligence. 
“Humanitarian Support”: convoy escorts, security for relief organizations, protecting 
refugees, mine clearance, etc.  “Support to Law and Order”: counter-terrorism, anti-
piracy, counter-narcotics, kidnap negotiation, hostage release.  “Operational Support”: 
provision of specific experts to act as ‘force multipliers’ to national governments.  “Post-
Conflict Resolution”: stability force in absence of government troops, separation of 
warring factions, disarming, integration of warring factions, election monitoring/security, 
reconstruction, refugee support, etc.102 
Sandline claimed that the above packages could be used singly, collectively or in 
any combination. Contemporary PSCs do not make these broad claims, primarily because 
none of the modern day PSCs offer combat services. However, along with Dew and 
Hudgens’s diagram, it can be seen that PSCs are not relegated to exclusive positions 
along a spear, closer to or farther from the battle-space, but may be found on all parts of 
the spear at once, or they can shift and locate themselves closer to the tip or farther to the 
rear. 
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As noted before, one area that is not represented on the spear, in  
Dew and Hudgens’s or in Spicer’s diagram is peacekeeping. This does not mean that 
peacekeeping has not been considered by both PSCs and the UN; the use of PSCs in 
peacekeeping is not a new idea. The UN has considered it on numerous occasions.103  In 
fact, “…even former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has admitted that, without the 
use of private forces, the United Nations ‘still lacks the capacity to implement rapidly and 
effectively decisions of the Security Council calling for the dispatch of peacekeeping 
operations in crisis situations.’”104  Use of PSCs was also considered in the midst of the 
Rwanda genocide, but “member states were horrified by the idea.”105  There is a common 
theme among those supporting the use of PSCs for peacekeeping that the genocide in 
Rwanda or the ongoing mass atrocities in Congo could have been prevented or stopped, 
saving millions of lives.106 
The UN has, in fact, hired PSCs to protect their own personnel from violence in 
the midst of peacekeeping operations on numerous occasions.107  For instance, just 
months after the Lomé Peace accords between the RUF and the government of Sierra 
Leone, the RUF resumed their violent attacks on citizens, public officials, aid workers, 
and peacekeepers. For their own protection, the UN hired the Lifeguard Services, a PSC. 
Ironically, it is interesting to note that the UN had “publicly excoriated” EO for its 
activities in Sierra Leone and elsewhere, yet many employees “shift[ed] back and forth” 
between EO and Lifeguard while employed protecting UN personnel and offices.108  The 
UN currently hires PSCs to perform many functions including aviation and transport, 
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armed and unarmed protection of UN officials, buildings, and equipment.109  Many of 
these PSC protective details are performing their missions outside of UN mandated 
peacekeeping missions, since until the Security Council (SC) authorizes a mission, 
peacekeepers cannot protect UN assets or personnel performing in a diplomatic or 
observer role. 
Other key issues that arise from UN consideration of hiring PSCs include 
principal-agent problems, questions of accountability, and concerns over the profit 
motivations. Principal-agent problems arise from PSCs acting in their own interest and 
diverging from the scope and intent of the international community, or more specifically, 
the aims of the contracting group.110  Out of P-A problems arise questions of monitoring 
and evaluation (M/E). The fewer the M/E personnel assigned, the more likely it is that P-
A problems will arise. However, P-A problems and self-interest or questionable profit 
motivations of UN-sanctioned peacekeepers also exist in the current system. The key 
differences appear to be legal controls and accountability. PSCs do not have the same 
institutional standards of conduct and regulatory or legal mechanisms to enforce proper 
behavior expected of soldiers—”the private military market is effectively 
unregulated.”111   As has been noted earlier, some legal scholars hold that the legal 
and regulatory schema for PSCs is a vast grey area.112  PSC advocates argue that the 
legal framework is in place at all levels and across the spectrum, from contract law, to 
corporate law, to criminal and tort law, both nationally and internationally. Those 
opposed to PSCs’ use hold that though there may be laws on the books, it is nearly 
impossible to regulate PSCs since the laws deal with individual mercenaries rather than 
companies. They also contend that PSCs often operate in conflict zones or failed states 
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where rule of law, monitoring, and legal and judicial systems are nonfunctional or 
tenuous at best.113  Finally, peacekeepers are held responsible under their national 
military code of justice, similar to the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 
whereas contract employees are accountable only to their firms and the market.114  Some 
suggest that if PSCs can overcome the accountability threshold and meet standards of 
conduct equivalent to or better than that of UN-sanctioned peacekeepers, there seems to 
be little preventing them from performing peacekeeping tasks for the UN.115  However, 
the use of PSCs for peacekeeping will not come without its difficulties and as Singer 
points out “…before the international community leaps into the privatization revolution, 
it would do well also to consider its perils…These challenges are certainly better resolved 
before peacekeeping is turned over to the private market.”116 Legal control, 
accountability, and regulation of PSCs are covered in greater detail in Chapter V. 
B. TYPOLOGIES 
1. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peace Building, and Peace Enforcement 
Charles Moskos, in his seminal work, Peace Soldiers, wrote that “Peacekeeping 
represents an effort, not immediately to promote the settlement of disputes, but to prevent 
their degeneration into violent conflicts and thus to restore the possibility that practical 
settlements may be found.”  Peacekeeping is “the containment and retardation of 
conflict…” not “…resolving the source of conflict.”117   This was written before the 
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explosion of intrastate wars and conflicts which developed following the end of the Cold 
War when almost all peacekeeping missions were observer missions. The increase in 
conflict worldwide led to an increase in UN involvement and intervention. Chapter VII 
missions became the norm and resolution of conflicts often meant giving up notions of 
impartiality for the use of force. Can one charged with protecting civilians be an impartial 
observer to genocide?  The world has changed significantly since the times of bipolar 
“security,” and as a consequence, so have the roles and missions of peacekeeping. 
Peacekeeping is defined many ways by different people or organizations. Within 
peacekeeping itself there are different distinctions based upon the type of peacekeeping 
being performed, the state of conflict or resolution, and intent of the parties-in-conflict. 
There is, however, no definition of peacekeeping within the UN Charter. Peacekeeping is 
often referred to as “Chapter six-and-a-half” because it falls in between Chapter VI, 
which is the “pacific settlement of disputes” and Chapter VII, which is “action with 
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,” allowing 
intervention and peace “enforcement.”118  Some of the definitions and distinctions will be 
briefly discussed here; however, the goal of this section is to select a specific set of 
peacekeeping terms and definitions and use them throughout the dissertation in order to 
avoid confusion. 
The Cold War was an adversarial period during which the UN was unable to 
fulfill its original promise of international peace and security.119  There are many reasons 
why the UN was unable to guarantee international peace and security, but much of it had 
to do with the fact that there were essentially two superpowers with spheres of influence 
controlling and intervening as necessary to maintain their hegemonic position. The key 
was the veto power held by each of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council—each could veto peacekeeping operations favored by another, and each tended 
to back opposite sides.  With the fall of the Berlin Wall and following the Cold War in 
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the early 1990s, the UN expanded its role in world affairs in hopes of achieving the 
“great objectives of the Charter—a United Nations capable of maintaining international 
peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words 
of the Charter, ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.’”120  In his 
seminal report, An Agenda for Peace, then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
presented recommendations on strengthening the Charter through improvements in 
preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping.121  Boutros-Ghali foresaw the 
need for multilateral peacekeeping involving multiple, flexible mechanisms for assisting 
in securing international peace. His vision for the different interconnected roles that the 
UN would play meshes well with the descriptions provided by Doyle and Sambanis in 
their book, Making War and Building Peace:122   
  Conflict Prevention/Preventive Diplomacy–generally involves diplomatic 
preventive measures and is undertaken in order “to prevent disputes from 
arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into 
conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.”  Involving 
actions such as implementation of confidence-building measures, fact-
finding, early warning and “preventive deployment” of UN authorized 
forces, this stage seeks to reduce the danger of violence and increase the 
prospects of peaceful settlement.  
 Peace Enforcement–utilizes the use of force to restore international peace 
and security.  States are authorized to act with or without the consent of 
the parties in order to ensure compliance with a cease-fire mandated by the 
Security Council acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. These military forces are composed of heavily armed national 
forces operating under the direction of the Secretary-General. 
 Peacemaking–refers to efforts, usually by states, regional organizations, or 
the UN, to diplomatically bring parties-in-conflict to the negotiation table. 
Peacemakers can be non-governmental or non-state actors. Drawing upon 
judicial settlement, mediation, and other forms of negotiation, UN 
peacemaking initiatives seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful 
settlement of their differences. 
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 Peacekeeping–involves efforts to preserve peace when fighting has 
stopped, if only temporarily. Peacekeeping includes observation of cease-
fires, the separation of armed forces, and the coordination of military, 
civilian, and security forces to “lay the foundations of sustainable 
peace.”123 “Peacekeeping” is often used to generically to describe all 
forms of peacekeeping operations. 
 Postconflict Reconstruction–organized to foster economic and social 
cooperation with the purpose of building confidence among previously 
warring parties, developing the social, political, and economic 
infrastructure to prevent future violence, and laying the foundations for a 
durable peace.124 
 Peacebuilding–generally involves post-conflict prevention of relapse into 
violence or conflict and involves a combination of military and civilian 
personnel.125  Peacebuilding is a “complex, long-term process of creating 
the necessary conditions for sustainable peace.”126  UN has recently 
adopted the stance that “everything the UN does is peacebuilding.”127 
 
Peace enforcement originally fell under “peacemaking” in 1992’s Agenda for 
Peace. However, in the 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, peace enforcement 
came under its own heading “enforcement action,” indicating the shift to an increased use 
of peace enforcement by the UN. This shift was a result of lessons learned in the early 





                                                 
123 Secretariat, “Peacekeeping Operations: Capstone Doctrine,” 28. 
124 Doyle and Sambanis point out that “The Secretary-General and the UN often refers to this as ‘post-
conflict peacebuilding.’  To avoid confusion with the wider meaning of peacebuilding we employ, we will 
call it postconflict reconstruction.” Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace : United Nations 
Peace Operations. 
125 Roland Paris, At War’s End : Building Peace After Civil Conflict  (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 37–38. See also Durch, Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations: 
8–9. 
126 Secretariat, “Peacekeeping Operations: Capstone Doctrine,” 19-20, 28-32. 
127 Smith, “Interview with Adam Smith, Researcher, International Peace Institute.”  Also see 
Secretariat, “Peacekeeping Operations: Capstone Doctrine,” 19–20. 
 48
become more prolific as conflicts tended to be within States rather than between States, 
requiring intervention and often with a lack of consent, in pursuit of achieving peace and 
security objectives.128   
Peace enforcement is also not a mission of the UN. In the latest UN Peacekeeping 
Operations Principles and Guidelines the UN makes clear that it is “coalitions of the 
willing” comprised of ad hoc croups of Member States or regional organizations 
authorized by the Security Council who conduct peace enforcement, not traditional UN 
“blue helmets.”129 
Another broader breakdown of peacekeeping categories is termed “generational” 
peacekeeping, of which there are three “generations.”  First generation peacekeeping 
refers to peacekeeping efforts that the UN undertakes after a truce has been reached. 
Second generation peacekeeping requires consent of the parties of the conflict. Third 
generation peacekeeping involves intervention and is undertaken by the UN under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter; third generation peacekeeping is different from the first 
two in that it lacks the fundamental principles of consent and neutrality.130 
Third generation peacekeeping is also known as “quasi-enforcement” 
peacekeeping and is the most intrusive type of peacekeeping to sovereign states. Another 
note is that the three “generations” of peacekeeping are not necessarily in chronological 
order of occurrence. For example, one of the largest “third generation” peacekeeping 
operations was the UN mission in Congo, ONUC (United Nations Operation in Congo), 
which took place from July 1960 to June 1964, and occurred well before a number of 
second generation peacekeeping operations that began primarily at the end of the Cold 
War.131   
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2. Private Security Companies: Scope and Roles 
The two largest lobbying groups for private security companies used 
internationally are the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) and 
the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA), previously known as the 
International Peace Operations Association (IPOA). Both groups represent a large 
number of private security firms operating internationally in conflict and post-conflict 
environments as well as all aspects of stabilization, reconstruction, DDR, SSR, and 
HA/DR. ISOA’s self-description is representative of this burgeoning industry’s desire to 
cover all bases when it comes to crisis operations:   
ISOA is a nongovernmental, nonprofit, nonpartisan association of service 
companies dedicated to providing ethical services to international 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian rescue, stabilization 
efforts and disaster relief. Member companies provide critical post-
conflict services such as helicopters, heavy lift aviation, mine action, 
medical services, logistics, disaster relief operations, security sector 
reform, training, development and humanitarian security. The association 
was founded to institute industry-wide standards and a code of conduct, 
maintain sound professional and security practices, educate the public 
and policy-makers on the stability operation industry’s  activities and 
potential, and ensure the humanitarian use of private services in support 
of international stability operations.132 
As distinct from Private Security Companies (PSCs), Private Military Companies 
conduct military operations and training while engaged in or for combat. According to 
Kevin O’Brien and Doug Brooks, both of whom write extensively on PSCs, PMSCs, and 
PMCs, PMCs can be broken down into two types: active and passive.133  Active PMCs 
conduct military operations which often include training, but involve contracted agents 
carrying weapons into combat alongside their newly trained clientele. Both EO and 
Sandline were active Private Military Companies (PMCs); both are now defunct. Both 
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EO and Sandline conducted training, but also engaged in combat alongside government-
sanctioned troops in places such as Sierra Leone and Angola. Passive PMCs do not 
accompany their clients to the field and do not involve themselves in lethal combat.134  
According to Brooks and O’Brien, an example of a passive PMC is MPRI; however, 
MPRI does not consider itself a PMC, but more of a “Recognized Global Leader in 
Education, Training, Development and Staffing Solutions.”135  MPRI seeks training 
opportunities world-wide and boasts a broad resume of military training services from 
curriculum development and instructing at ROTC units to training combat soldiers as 
they did in Croatia and Bosnia.   
MPRI claims to have “the greatest corporate assemblage of military expertise in 
the world” and that it has “more generals per square foot than in the Pentagon.”136  Based 
upon its current focus on training, education, and security, MPRI is closer to the 
definition of the modern PSC, rather than a company focusing its training on combat 
tactics, techniques, and procedures. MPRI was certainly more closely aligned to the idea 
of a “passive” PMC in the early nineties when it was responsible for training Croat 
soldiers for combat with the Serbs. Some argue that without MPRI, the Croatian forces 
could never have defeated the Serbs as decisively as they did, if at all.137  MPRI does not 
claim responsibility for directly training Croat forces for their successful offensive, 
“Operation Storm,” against the Serbs; however, many argue that there was no way that 
the Croats could have made the drastic transition that they did without combat training.  
“No country moves from having a ragtag militia to having a professional military 
offensive without some help.”138  MPRI does not conduct security as most PSCs do, but 
they do conduct security training. For all intents and purposes, MPRI is considered a PSC 
and not a PMC. PMCs, as defined, do not currently exist; this is why, as noted previously 
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in this dissertation, the term PSC is used throughout, except when specifically discussing 
the now defunct PMCs, e.g. Executive Outcomes or Sandline International.   
3. Who Else Does Peacekeeping? 
“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.”139 
    Former UNSG Dag Hammarskjöld 
 
“Carrying out civil administration and police functions is…going to 
degrade the American capability to do the things America has to do. We 
don’t need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten.”140 
    Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice 
 
 
a. Regional Organizations and States 
There are positive and negative aspects to relying upon regional 
organizations or individual states as opposed to the UN for many humanitarian and 
peacekeeping missions. Specifically, in many cases, regional organizations and states 
have more autonomy and flexibility than the UN in enforcing mandates or agreements 
because they do not generally have the same scope of international accountability that the 
UN has. On the other hand, however, regional organizations and states often accomplish 
their mission through tougher means than UN peacekeepers might employ; they may also 
be less impartial and neutrality could be called into question.   
In the case of Nigerians bringing order to Sierra Leone under the provision 
of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mandate for the 
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ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Michael Hirsh notes that, “The 
last time the Nigerians intervened in that conflict, they occupied Freetown with 10,000 
troops while ceding the rebels free run of the countryside—and the diamond trade. But 
whatever their methods, Nigerians did manage to stop the killing and limb-hacking.”141  
Hirsch argues that regional organizations are a necessary, but not the best, alternative to 
doing nothing, or worse, attempting to take action that only leads to further abuses.142  
He cites underfunding of the UN by the United States, slow response, and fear of 
potential embarrassment to the UN or major powers like the UK (or the United States) 
through human rights abuses as the primary reasons for inaction in conflict zones or areas 
of instability.143 The UN’s inability or unwillingness to provide support in light of 
failures or loss of credibility are typified by missions such as the UN in Bosnia, Sri 
Lanka, Somalia, and initially in East Timor144 and Sierra Leone, as well as the UN and 
United States’ responses in Rwanda.145  Regional organizations and local states can often 
succeed where major powers or the UN are unable or unwilling to act. 
There is another aspect to states’ and regional organizations’ ability to 
resolve conflicts more effectively than the UN alone:  They have more at stake. Nearby 
states and regions have an interest in reducing conflict because it (or refugees) can often 
spill over borders. Hettne and Söderbaum write that actors like the European Union (EU), 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) are “more efficient than multilateral mechanisms in 
                                                 
141 Michael Hirsch, “Calling All Regio-Cops: Peacekeeping’s Hybrid Future,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 
6 (December, 2000): 7.  
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid., 2. Although the UN’s mission was in East Timor, the relief office was in West Timor, where 
the bodies of three UN relief workers were burned in the streets, forcing the UN to quickly evacuate 
personnel from the region. 
145 Ibid., 8. Response was much delayed and initially too insubstantial to make a difference. For a list 
of success and failures, see also Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, Ending civil wars : the implementation 
of peace agreements: 59.  
 53
terms of closeness and commitment,”146 and that, “[t]he region has to live with the 
consequences of unresolved conflicts and cannot simply withdraw from the conflict.”147    
Though it may be true that ROs are more affected by conflicts in neighboring states, ROs 
often do not have the resources that the UN has for long-term intervention. In an ideal 
situation, ROs and the UN work together to find the best mix of support when 
intervention becomes necessary. 
Despite the fact that the use of ROs can garner a sort of regional 
ownership of problems, the UN also has an interest in regional organizations taking on a 
share of the peacekeeping burden because it defrays costs from the UN budget. In an 
interview with Major General Cammaert, he mentioned that not only does it cost the UN 
less to help support regional troops on peacekeeping missions than assuming the missions 
themselves, but he noted that regional organizations are usually closer, and therefore, 
quicker to respond when crises occur in neighboring states.148   
Aside from the cost issue, Article 52 of the Charter calls for regional 
organizations to be the first choice before referring crises to the Security Council. 
Specifically, “The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or 
constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local 
disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before 
referring them to the Security Council.”149  This can also allow the UN to concentrate on 
crises where ROs or states may not be able to assist or are hesitant to send troops. 
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b. Choosing the Peacekeepers  
Dress, think, talk, act and behave in a manner befitting the dignity of a 
disciplined, caring, considerate, mature, respected and trusted soldier, 
displaying the highest integrity and impartiality. Have pride in your 
position as a peace-keeper and do not abuse or misuse your authority.  
  Rule #1—Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets150 
When regional organizations cannot or will not undertake peacekeeping 
missions, the UN must garner the will of the Security Council to approve peacekeeping 
operations. UN peacekeepers are comprised of those soldiers selected by their countries 
to represent them in missions throughout the world. Soldiers chosen for peacekeeping are 
today quite different from their Cold-war counterparts, or at least the missions for which 
they are now used are substantially different, and thus, their training regimen and 
decision-making with regard to the use of force is by necessity very different. During the 
Cold-war, the majority of peacekeeping missions were observer missions. Peacekeepers 
involved in observer missions rarely had the authority to use force and often did not even 
carry weapons. The strategic context in which the UN had been operating had 
dramatically changed following the Cold War. Conflicts were no longer between states, 
but internal to them, and now constitute the “vast majority of today’s wars.”151  It was 
only after abject failures in places like Angola or Sierra Leone in the nineties that the UN 
found itself in a quandary:  continue to treat all parties to the conflict as equals 
(maintaining impartiality and allowing aggressors to their violent self-interests against 
agreements or peace treaties), or pick sides and use force to deter aggressors and offenses 
against persons party to the agreement. Kofi Annan addressed this issue in a speech he 
gave to the Ditchley Foundation in which he noted the shift in the progression of violence 
from combatants toward non-combatants over the past century.152  Where violence was 
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predominantly soldier-on-soldier in wars such as WWI and WWII, civilians have 
increasingly become the primary targets. This shift has required the UN to take a more 
proactive role in protecting civilians. As Annan pointed out, “Our job is to intervene: to 
prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out, or—when 
neither of those things is possible—at least to contain it and prevent it from 
spreading.”153 
During the Cold War, peacekeepers were, as Charles Moskos discussed, 
those soldiers who were “most likely to display restraint and impartiality when charged 
with peacekeeping assignments…Put in another way, the political-military milieu of the 
contributing nation has a strong bearing on the propensity to use force on the part of the 
nation’s soldiers.”154  Consequently, and contrary to the training requirements of today’s 
peacekeepers, who need to be well versed in the use of offensive tactics and weaponry, 
the Cold-war peacekeeper required “such traits as the avoidance of violence, quiescent 
monitoring, negotiation, and compromise.”155  No longer is Moskos’s model the 
standard. Today’s peacekeeper is required to have all the traits of the Cold-war 
peacekeeper when she needs to use those traits, but also the traits of a tactical soldier, 
well-versed in rules of engagement, force protection, small arms and weapons 
employment, and acceptance of violence as an occasional but necessary evil in order to 
enforce or maintain the peace. 
The peacekeeper of today exists in a vastly different world from the 
peacekeeper of yesterday. As Annan notes, “Human suffering on a large scale has 
become impossible to keep quiet. People in far-off countries not only hear about it, but 
often see it on their TV screens.”156  News travels more quickly which means that 
atrocities, human rights abuses, and conflict can be more quickly discovered and 
responded to, but it also means that there is a chance that much of that which is 
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discovered can get lost in the white noise of conflict worldwide. Public outcry can spur 
states and the UN to action, but as is often the case, the “squeaky wheel gets the grease.”  
The problem with this notion is two-fold: First, although the squeaky wheel may get the 
grease, there are many “squeaky wheels” and the many that do not get the “grease” can 
quickly add up; and second, self-interest, foreign policy objectives, and political 
motivations may also determine where the “grease” is applied. With regards to the 
former, the number of peacekeepers available for deployment by the UN at any given 
time is extremely limited. Without careful consideration of circumstances and follow-on 
effects, insufficient forces or resources can fail to produce intended results, or worse, as 
in the case of Sierra Leone, allow the situation to devolve so drastically that hundreds or 
thousands of civilians are left with little or no security. In the latter case, when states are 
unable to identify situations critical to self-interest or marry foreign policy objectives to 
actions, the will to send troops or even lend support to interventions can be absent. 
Moreover, support for certain interventions, such as the U.S. intervention in Somalia, can 
have severe negative political effects. In both cases, early diplomatic intervention and 
thorough analysis by competent observers can serve to better communicate to states the 
ramifications of involvement, or worse, inaction. 
The consequences of inaction are also no longer limited to within bipolar 
spheres of influence. Porous borders, transnational crime, refugees, and terrorism have 
broader effects and deeper implications than ever before. Improperly recognizing the 
fallout or repercussions of a specific conflict can lead to increased violence and cross-
border flows which can give rise to new conflicts.  “In many cases, the conflict 
eventually becomes so dangerous that the international community finds itself obliged to 
intervene. By then it can only do so in the most intrusive and expensive way, which is 
military intervention.”  Expansion of conflict, until quelled by robust and costly 
intervention by the international community, is what occurred in such places as Angola 
which spilled over into Sierra Leone, Nicaragua into El Salvador, and within different 
parts of the former Yugoslavia.   
Once the decision is made by the Security Council to intervene, necessary 
support has to be garnered. This is where selection of peacekeeping forces comes into 
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play. The Security Council does not necessarily decide which nation’s troops will be used 
and how they will be employed. The host nation can reject troops, or expel them after 
they are already in country, as recently happened in Sudan in spring 2011 when 
Khartoum kicked all but a few of the UN peacekeeping troops out of the country.   
“Peacekeeping missions are ‘hosted’ by the nation in trouble, not imposed by the UN. 
Whom [sic] and which ‘nationalities’ form part of the PK Force is entirely up to the host 
nation.”157 
On the other side of this coin is the fact that nations can decide whether 
they want to send their troops for certain peacekeeping missions. For example, according 
to former Ambassador and UN Mediator and Co-chairman of the International 
Conference on the former Yugoslavia (ICFY), Thorvald Stoltenberg, the only countries 
willing to send combat forces to protect the civilian population and prevent further 
atrocities during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were Turkey and Iran. Even though 
prevailing moral opinion held that something should be done, “the decision to risk lives is 
left to national governments—to the nation state—rather than to moral attitudes.”158  An 
offensive enforcement operation under Chapter VII may be approved by the Security 
Council, but states are under no obligation to send their troops as peacekeepers. 
 
 In the case of the former Yugoslavia, 
 
American and German politicians were in the forefront of demanding 
more military actions while they had not a single young woman or man as 
a UN soldier on the ground. The French and the British were called 
cowards. But they had thousands of their own people there. That’s why I 
hope that, in the future, members of the Security Council will be obliged to 
provide personnel for UN peacekeeping operations. 
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When you have personnel on the ground, your statements as a politician are 
much more balanced and responsible than when you do not have your own 
people on the ground and can afford ‘courage’ on behalf of other people, other 
nations’ young people.159 
 
What does this say about the effectiveness of the UN in carrying out SC-
approved action?  It is up to member states to support the decisions of the SC, and when 
they cannot, or choose not to, then states needing assistance, and especially their 
vulnerable populations, are left without international protection—without human 
security.   
Swanee Hunt, the former U.S. Ambassador to Austria during the Bosnian 
war, and author of a recent book, “Worlds Apart: Bosnian Lessons for Global Security,” 
states that fault has to be found when no one does anything.160  In an interview, she 
commented, “There was all of this business about, ‘Well, we have to be even-handed 
here, we have to be neutral,’ forgetting that neutrality in the face of evil is 
complicity…We had some evil, some serious evil going on.”  Both Ambassador Hunt 
and Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, talk about the failure 
of NATO to intervene, especially since it was evident who was committing the atrocities 
in Bosnia and force was the only way to stop them.161  The UN and NATO certainly had 
responsibility to act more quickly to prevent the massive loss of life that occurred. If 
states were not willing to provide the troops and equipment, was there another way?  Is 
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C. CURRENT PEACEKEEPING: UNITED NATIONS, REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 
Building peace means helping national institutions reach a point where 
they are able to maintain a sufficient level of stability and security, in 
particular through respect for the rule of law and human rights. Strong 
national ownership and leadership in the formulation of peacebuilding 
priorities is essential.162 
       Hervé Ladsous 
 
The United Nations is currently involved in 16 peacekeeping operations (and one 
special political mission (UNAMA) in Afghanistan) across four continents, led and 
managed through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).163  These 
operations involve more than 120,000 men and women serving as peacekeeping troops 
from more than 115 countries.164  Because of their long record of multinational 
involvement, the UN has the legitimacy to act as a principal actor in matters of conflict 
and dispute.165  The UN is, fundamentally, an organization which claims peace as its 
world goal.  “The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order ‘to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.’”166  Although the UN has made 
many mistakes in different humanitarian assistance missions, including all aspects of 
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peacekeeping,167 it still retains the primacy of international recognition and legitimacy. 
Moreover, both states and conflicting factions within states often seek out UN assistance 
or approval for their actions.   First, through the UN, they can often add credibility to 
their cause. Second, they may acquire international approval and support or resources. 
Third, they may find or gain the approval of coalition partners, as the United States 
attempted to do prior to the invasion of Iraq. Finally, the UN does not carry with it the 
same perceived stigma that other states (or their armed forces) or regional actors carry 
with them. One of the problems, however, is that in order for the UN to maintain its 
credibility, especially in cases where it must use force, it must continue to garner the 
necessary political will by member states to “support the United Nations politically, 
financially and operationally.”168  Despite the increase in interventions and “robust” 
peacekeeping, Adam Smith of the International Peace Institute told me in an interview, 
“There is something to be said for the backing of 193 countries. The blue helmet means 
something in terms of legitimacy.”169 
Other actors, such as regional organizations, often carry with them questions of 
bias or motivation affecting perceptions of neutrality and impartiality. For example, 
Nigerian troops made up the majority of the regional organization ECOWAS’s troops 
under ECOMOG in Sierra Leone; allegations were made that because of underlying 
hostilities between Nigerians and Liberians (many of the RUF were operating either 
covertly or overtly for Liberia), the Nigerians were exceptionally cruel to RUF soldiers, 
deepening and exacerbating the conflict. In cases of other-than-UN forces, the question of 
motive can be problematic because: 1) regional organizations can be seen as imposing 
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their collective sovereignty over others in order to achieve some gain, whether it be trade 
relations, concessions, or other geo-strategic interests; or 2) states, especially powerful 
ones, can be seen as geopolitically, strategically, or resource motivated. 
In the case of PSCs, their involvement can be seen as motivated only by profits or 
greed, or worse, extending war for private gain.170 Consequently, private militaries and 
PSC personnel have often been referred to as “mercenaries,” which has been a difficult 
label to shake in light of the international attention that abuses by PSCs have garnered.  
Given that the UN is not the only organization conducting peacekeeping and that 
different actors can achieve differing results; there are certain conditions which can lead 
to success or failure in peacekeeping.  The next chapter will discuss some of those 
conditions which can lead to either peacekeeping success or failure. 
D. PEACEKEEPING CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS 
It is a truism that the success of a peace operation depends not only on the 
security dimension, but also on the aspects of democracy, governance, 
economy and development.171 
The military resources needed to help keep the peace are being strained 
by so much peace to keep.172 
1. Conditions for Success 
Peacekeeping success can be defined in the near term or the long term. Stopping 
violence can be considered a peacekeeping success, but not a mission success. Mission 
success can be determined upon completion of a peacekeeping mandate (or, as it were, 
because of it), but if violence breaks out three months later, does it still qualify as 
peacekeeping success?  This question has been answered differently by a wide group of 
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scholars, diplomats, politicians, contractors, armed forces, and field operators. I have not, 
however, in my research found many responses or discussions from the “peacekept.”  
This section will discuss different definitions of peacekeeping success, and at the end will 
discuss one point of view from the peacekept. 
There appear to be two general views on success in peacekeeping and how to 
achieve it. One view holds that the underlying causes of conflict must be resolved before 
peace operations can be considered successful. The other view holds that peacekeeping is 
successful when conflict has stopped, the mandate is fulfilled, and states are left capable 
of dealing with the causes of conflict on their own. From these two general propositions, 
a number of determinations and prescriptions for peacekeeping success can be found. 
Specifically, Lisa Morjé Howard claims that the following three conditions must be in 
place for a peacekeeping mission to be successful: consent of the parties that they want to 
stop fighting; interest and consensus of the Security Council; and that the UN Secretariat 
be a “learning organization.”173    
Stephen Stedman writes that there are three categories of outcome, all determined 
by the ending or continuation of conflict: first, in cases such as Rwanda, Somalia or Sri 
Lanka (coded as failures), peacekeepers could not stop large-scale violence; second, in 
cases like Bosnia (coded as a partial success), peacekeepers could not leave without fear 
that the war would restart; and finally, there were the cases such as El Salvador, 
Mozambique, and Nicaragua (coded as successes) where peacekeepers were able to leave 
without violence restarting.174  International participation and support for implementing 
the peace, especially by major or regional powers, were key to successful peace 
implementation.175  Stedman notes, however, that these conditions may have as little to 
do with the UN or peacekeeping force as with the conflict itself. The counterfactual 
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arguments may be that the war would have ended anyway or that peacekeeping forces 
delayed inevitable resumption of conflict, and therefore, prolonged misery and violence.  
He goes on to discuss the fact that institutional effectiveness as well as mission type, 
mission difficulty, and environment play large roles in determinants of success or failure 
and are difficult to measure.176   
William Durch, however, argues that the underlying causes of conflict must be 
resolved before real peace can begin to realize success.177  Only when these underlying 
causes are understood and addressed does Durch find that peacekeeping can begin to 
make headway.178  He believes that identifying sources of “situational difficulty” is 
essential and that the two factors “most important to sustainable peace appeared to be the 
willingness of neighboring states to support the peace process, and the willingness of all 
faction leaders to compromise in the interest of peace, at the risk of losing power.”179  
Bellamy and Williams hold that prevention mechanisms are fundamental to 
preventing conflict and implementing peace. They do not believe that further analysis of 
conflict prevention and additional theories are necessary, but that increased capabilities 
and methods of identifying conflict before it starts and getting the international 
community to take action early are most important.180  Early warning indicators to 
identify when outbreaks of violent conflict are imminent should be met by robust, and 
what they call “thick,” prevention instead of the “thin” engagement which was evidenced 
by and allowed the genocide in Rwanda to occur.181  The UN response was slow, and 
international support and political will were weak. The warning signs were there but they 
were, by and large, ignored until it was too late.  
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Doyle and Sambanis contend that sustainable peace is made through embedding 
“external controls, such as democracy and the rule of law, and internal controls, such as 
power sharing and judicial reform, into effective peace settlements.”182  Initial peace in 
conflict situations, especially those requiring intervention, is achieved through a careful 
mixture of “consent and coercion.”  Consent is necessary but not enough because there 
are usually unstable factions or spoilers intent on gaining more than their share through 
“fear, looting, prestige, fostering conflict.”183  Coercion is often necessary to protect 
adherents to the agreement, civilians, and peacekeepers. In some cases the perception of 
coercive capability is sufficient to counter would-be spoilers or aggression. It was clear to 
the Serbs that the Dutch peacekeepers protecting the “safe havens” in Srebrenica did not 
have the coercive capability, nor did they have the mandate, to actually protect the 
civilians. Doyle and Sambanis conclude that there are three critical dimensions of 
successful peacekeeping; they call these their “peacekeeping triangle.”  The triangle is 
made up of 1) sources of unity that the UN can tap into; 2) local capacity which sustains 
economic growth and security; and 3) sufficient long-term international capacity and 
support that can make up for what post-conflict states lack in unity or capacity.184 
Lastly, the UN has also established “criteria” for successful peacekeeping 
 (Figure 3):   
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Figure 3.   Criteria for Successful Peacekeeping.185  
This simplified diagram assumes that the fundamental principles of UN 
peacekeeping, i.e., consent, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defense are met and 
understood. Unfortunately, in too many recent cases, robust peacekeeping often entails 
lack of consent and use of force beyond self-defense. As a consequence, in order to 
protect civilians, although impartiality can be maintained, neutrality has to be cast aside. 
Stopping aggressors and sustaining protection of civilians (PoC) is a core of the UN’s 
mission. As Major-General Cammaert, a former Division Commander for MONUC, 
stated, “The world will judge the UN on its ability to protect civilians.”186  As has been 
evident since the end of the Cold War, the majority of wars occur within states and are 
increasingly waged against civilians. Peacekeeping success will ultimately be determined 
by whether or not civilians and communities are sustainably protected. 
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2. Conditions for Failure 
The mission in Sierra Leone was a turning point for the UN and peacekeeping 
missions. Early abject failure by the UN to act as it ultimately did, prolonged war beyond 
what could have been a much more expedient conclusion. Over a period of ten years of 
civil war in Sierra Leone, some estimated 2.5 million people were forced to become 
refugees or were internally displaced, 70,000 were killed, 27,000 children were 
impressed into service as soldiers, and 20,000 people were maimed primarily through 
violent amputation.187  The incoherent strategy of the UN, the government of Sierra 
Leone (GoSL), and regional forces protracted the war and allowed the conflict to 
continue until British intervention, following which the UN reversed course and delivered 
sufficient peacekeeping troops and international support.188  Similar to Bellamy and 
Williams’ argument, that proactive and early engagement is key, David Keen holds that 
diplomacy and coordination could have worked before companies such as Executive 
Outcomes or Sandline International were brought in to fight the RUF rebels in Sierra 
Leone.189   
Part of the problem has been that in many cases, neither the UN nor regional 
actors want to get involved in other states’ affairs. Unfortunately it oftentimes takes 
extreme events, such as atrocities on a massive scale, to get other states to agree to 
intervene. Former U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone and IPI Senior Adviser John Hirsch, 
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commented in a recent interview that “What I remember about that period was that it was 
very, very hard to get the attention of the international community.”190 
So, while failure of the UN to act during the first ten years of Sierra Leone’s 
brutal civil war resulted in as many as 70,000 dead and many more wounded or 
mutilated, once robust engagement was supported, Sierra Leone was relatively quickly 
made safe for its civilian population who were the primary target of the RUF. Robust 
engagement and the use of peace enforcement by the British marked a turning point in 
the UN’s method of effecting peace. Although the UN itself does not conduct peace 
enforcement, it is the Security Council who authorizes the use of peace enforcement by 
“coalitions of the willing.”191  As Sierra Leone had previously been a British colony, it is 
argued that the UK felt a sense of responsibility to act to restore order and so provided a 
contingent of British troops to do just that. It was two peace enforcement missions 
conducted by the British and Indian special forces that effectively ended the RUF siege 
and provided the catalyst for the peace agreements that ended the war. Sierra Leone 
remains a stable state to this day, and is in fact thriving with a major part of its economy 
based upon a “clean,” as opposed to “blood” diamond industry. 
Failure of the international community to act early enough was also clearly 
evident in both Bosnia and Rwanda. Neither NATO nor the UN took a strong enough 
stance against the human rights abuses and atrocities that were occurring until it was too 
late. In Bosnia more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys were murdered while supposedly 
protected in UN safe havens. Murder of civilians occurred in Rwanda while there was a 
UN presence, but on a much grander scale—some reports place the death toll in the 
Rwandan genocide at more than 800,000 people. Not only did these atrocities occur 
under the not-so-watchful eye of UN peacekeepers, but the UN officials responsible for 
making the decisions not to intervene sooner (or to not respond more robustly) to protect 
innocent civilians cannot even be prosecuted for these disasters in which they played a 
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crucial role.192  UN officials and military members on mission (UNMEM) are immune 
from local accountability and prosecution, so failures to take action may have deadly 
consequences for local populations, but little effect on the UN official making the 
decision or recommendation.  
The above examples of UN peacekeeping failures all have one thing in common: 
slow response and disengagement by the international community. Recognition of crises 
and early intervention, especially when protection of civilians is at stake, is literally the 
difference between life and death. Most analysts writing on peacekeeping acknowledge 
that recognition and response is critical, but seem to define peacekeeping failure as 
essentially the opposite of the definitions of success, that is, conflict continues while 
peacekeepers are present or conflict restarts once peace implementers are gone.193  
Howard agrees that failure results most often when there is no consent of the parties, but 
adds that Security Council consensus/intensity of interest and first-level organizational 
learning in the UN Secretariat are three conditions that, unless met, any one is sufficient 
to cause failure.194  Fortna argues that peacekeeping fails when belligerents are nott 
committed to peace or ceasefire agreements.195  But it is more than either of these 
definitions. In nutshell, peacekeeping fails when civilians are not protected from 
violence, when there is no peace to keep, and when there is no one to stop the 
violence.196  In the case of observer missions, they are certainly not successful if violence 
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continues, increases, or is merely “observed.”  Finding the right mechanisms and means 
to accomplish this protection of civilians must be at the core of UN engagement.197 
3. Conclusion 
This portion of the literature review has attempted to summarize an area of 
peacekeeping that remains in debate: what are the conditions necessary for successful 
peacekeeping?  There are certainly factors which weigh into the equation, and as has 
been shown, there is contention over which of those factors (or groups of factors) is most 
important. In the end, continuous review and analysis of cases, application of lessons 
learned, and practical engagement by the international community with the primary goal 
of peace and human security tends toward achieving success by most definitions.   
Another point of view on the success of peacekeeping which is not often 
discussed is that of the “peacekept.”  Recently, there was a forum held at the Monterey 
Institute of International Studies (MIIS) on building peace amidst the crisis in Sri Lanka 
and there happened to be a number of Sri Lankans in the audience.198  The forum focused 
on the tactics of the government and the methods used by soldiers to quell the Tamil 
Tigers. The speakers were claiming that there still was no peace in Sri Lanka and that 
there was a long way to go. Disagreeing, one gentleman in the audience who claimed to 
have lived his entire life in Sri Lanka stood up and announced confrontationally to the 
speakers that their definition of peace was all wrong. His contention was that there are 
always underlying issues that need to be resolved—peace is “not having bombs dropped 
randomly or fearing that at any moment you could be shot…peace is not fearing for your 
life every day…peace is the absence of war.”199  Anecdotally I found this to be a 
compelling argument from the perspective of the “peacekept.”  It also reinforces the point 
made by Barbara Walter who wrote that resolving underlying issues is not enough to 
                                                 
197 Necessary if for no other reason than it is a fundamental purpose of the UN to protect people from 
harm. 
198 Shalini Nataraj and Krishanti Dharmaraj, “Building Peace in Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields,” in Forum 
sponsored by the Center for Conflict Studies and Conflict Resolution Association (Monterey Institute of 
International Studies8 March 2012). 
199 Ibid. 
 70
convince parties in conflict to agree to a peace settlement and actually follow through and 
implement it.200  Actually stopping the violence at the level of combatants may be the 
first step to any implementation of peace, but creating the conditions for collaborative 
adoption of policies that will ensure peace in the long run creates the “absence of war.”  
These policies may be agreeable to all parties, but they may not actually solve the 
underlying issues. Accepting that underlying issues may not be resolved can be good 
enough as long as agreed-upon measures prevent war from resuming. Political leaders 
negotiating peace apart from those who are intimately affected by the violence of war are 
negotiating in a vacuum unless they can ensure that people will have personal protection 
and security first. After security at the individual and community level, and after 
demobilization and most of the guns have been turned in as part of a systematic DDR 
program, institutional design and stability can be addressed. Military or “robust” 
peacekeeping enforcement may be necessary at the early stages to stop the fighting, but 
in the end, it is a short-term measure, albeit necessary, to get to coordinated and 
collaborative restructuring of institutions, or what Walter calls “creative institutional 
design,” by those who live there and not outsiders, to create the possibility of long-term 
peace and stability.201 
In some regards, protection from violence, i.e., human security, can be enough as 
long as there is a reasonable belief that the violence will not continue—sustainable 
protection of civilians. This view is certainly echoed by the UN as is evidenced by the 
UN Secretary-Generals’ comments on the protection of civilians in armed conflict: 1) 
“The protection of civilians…is fundamental to the central mandate of the organization. 
The responsibility for the protection of civilians cannot be transferred to others”;202 2) 
there is a “need to address the causes of armed conflict in a comprehensive manner in 
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order to enhance the protection of civilians on a long-term basis, including by promoting 
economic growth, poverty eradication, sustainable development, national reconciliation, 
good governance, democracy, the rule of law and respect for and protection of human 
rights.”203  Human security in general and protection of civilians in particular has become 
fundamental to the UN’s mission. Therefore, it is vital that protection of civilians, human 
security, and human rights be part of the equation when seeking the right tools to bring 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW:  ELEMENTS OF THE DEBATE 
The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and the 
use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of 
peacekeeping. 
   Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations204 
 
When we had need of skilled soldiers to separate fighters from refugees in 
the Rwandan refugee camps in Goma, I even considered the possibility of 
engaging a private firm. But the world may not be ready to privatize 
peace. 
    Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations205 
 
The pros and cons of PSCs engaged in peacekeeping has been debated at many 
levels and in many forums. This chapter reviews some of the most common reasons for 
and against their use, citing arguments from both sides. What this review finds is that no 
one argument stands out as consistently superior either in support of or against PSCs in 
peacekeeping. What it does find is that whatever force effectively and sustainably 
protects people and communities from violence is the one (or mix of forces) that should 
be used. 
A. PEACEKEEPING AND PSCS 
There are fundamental requirements to conduct peacekeeping. If PSCs are to be 
considered for use in peacekeeping missions, critical elements to effective peacekeeping 
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–Impartiality and neutrality 
Required in most peacekeeping missions. 
Not to be confused with neutrality or inaction, peacekeepers must 
“implement their mandate without favour or prejudice to any 
party.”206  An exception is peace enforcement missions; as a 
consequence, neutrality is primarily only a concern during Chapter 
VI peacekeeping missions; impartiality must be maintained 
always. 
 
As Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in 1999, “Impartiality does 
not –and must not –mean neutrality in the face of evil; it means 
strict and unbiased adherence to the principles of the Charter –
nothing more, and nothing less.”207   
  
–Control, accountability, oversight, and transparency 
 
These are all related in the debate over the use of PSCs because 
they are often viewed as mercenaries uncontrolled by state or 
international laws. 
 
This debate has been made more contentious by highly publicized 
abuses committed by PSCs and the resultant lack of punishment 
meted out. 
 
This debate is gaining added dimensions as the scope and depth of 
peacekeeper abuses, and especially sextual exploitation and abuse 
(SEA), are becoming increasingly uncovered and reported. 
 
Accountability and transparency are obtained when codes of 
conduct, regulatory mechanisms, and contractual obligations are 
binding and enforced. Real enforcement only occurs when the 
costs to breaking the contract result in modified contractor 
behavior aligned with the principal’s aim. However, if breaking the 
contract through various types of abuse such as overcharging or 
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criminal behavior does not result in lost contracts or lost revenue, 
then enforcement is weak or ineffective. One mechanism used by 
the U.S. that has the capability to affect contractors’ bottom lines, 
and therefore behavior, is suspension and debarment (S&D). 
However, contracting officer representatives (CORs) note that 
S&D is not meant to be punishment, but is part of administering 
standards; punishment remains the domain of the criminal justice 
system.208 
 
Control of PSCs requires effective oversight, which is argued as a 
primary mechanism for contract adherence. When proper 
monitoring and evaluation of contractors is lacking, either because 
there are not enough personnel to monitor or those doing the 
monitoring are untrained, control over contractor actions is 
diminished. Along with other critical factors, PSCs maintain that 
recognizing failures of the past provides a baseline of lessons 
learned that only enhances their potential toward careful and 





Legitimacy is derived from the international community by way of 
the UN and the Security Council.  193 Member States create 
legitimacy through agreement to act in accordance with the Charter 
and certain rules, treaties, or resolutions. 
 
According to Major General Michael Smith, the former deputy 
force commander of the UNTAET peacekeeping force, “The most 
important condition for successful intervention is legitimacy, 
which influences the other factors and significantly affects the final 
success or failure of a mission.”209  Though PSCs may be viewed 
                                                 
208 Steven Shaw, “Don’t go overboard banning military contractors,” in The Great Debate 
(Washington, DC: Thomson Reuters, 8 August 2012). S&D has had a dramatic effect on the behavior of 
contractors in the U.S. Often the effect has been negative on transparency, since out of fear of S&D, 
contractors will refuse to work with government agencies in identifying problems, rather than “putting 
themselves on report” and working together to resolve the problem(s). S&D can destroy a company, 
especially if it has only one client, e.g., the U.S. government—in order to make S&D an effective 
administrative tool, CORs should provide incentives along with clear guidelines on proper behavior and 
consequences for failing to comply with the rules in place. 
209 Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor:  The Path to Independence: 98. 
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as mercenary organizations by some, acting under contract by the 
UN or international organization may provide the controls 
required, with legitimacy to follow as the reputation of PSCs 
improve. On the other hand, the use of PSCs may act to 
delegitimize the UN and all peacekeeping efforts in a time when 
UN operations are under the watchful eyes of ex-combatants and 
vulnerable populations.   
 
In an international environment there are often few mechanisms to 
monitor, inspect, and ensure transparency of PSCs. According to 
Smith, legitimacy must be fulfilled through legality and morality, 
and when these coincide, there is “considerable international 
political support for intervention…improving the prospects for 
success.”210   
 
Gaining legitimacy has been one of the most difficult areas for 
proponents of PSCs to demonstrate advantage, since PSCs are 
often viewed as mercenaries or as unaccountable agents out only 
for profit. However, effectiveness plays a role in determinations of 
legitimacy.211 If PSCs can be effective in supporting peacekeeping 
aims their use might be considered. Legitimacy will weigh heavily 
in analysis of advantages and disadvantages of PSCs in 
peacekeeping since, as Smith notes, so many other factors are 
dependent upon it.212 
 
–Cost and efficiency 
 
Both are common arguments for and against the use of PSCs in 
general. David Isenberg notes that “[I]t is often said that such firms 
are more cost-effective and efficient than the public sector, but the 
simple truth is that nobody knows for sure.”213  Jessica Vogel, 
Director of Programs and Operations of the International Stability 
                                                 
210 Ibid. 
211 James Pattison, Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect : who should 
intervene?  (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 30–35. 
212 Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor:  The Path to Independence, Chapter 3. 
213 Isenberg, Shadow force : private security contractors in Iraq: 161; Fredland, “Outsourcing 
Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the Role of Military Companies,” 209–16. Fredland 
states that three factors play a role in determination of cost analysis that complicate comparison: 
uncertainty; asset specificity; and probity. 
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Operations Association (ISOA), notes that although PSCs claim to 
be more cost efficient and effective, “there has never been 
comprehensive and accurate data published on this topic…”214 
 
Cost and efficiency have been subjectively studied by a number of 
agencies, such as the Commission on Wartime Contracting, 
Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGIR and SIGAR), Project On Government 
Oversight (POGO), Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), and others. Their conclusions are often in direct 
contradiction, depending upon who sourced the study. 
 
Due to lack of available accurate information from governments, 
international organizations, and private companies, and because 
much of the information that could be used in cost-comparison and 
efficiency studies is confidential or proprietary, comprehensive and 
objective review has never been published.215 
 
Some argue PSCs are better suited to peace enforcement missions 
where flexibility, efficiency, and speed play a critical role in 
protecting people from violence (the “narrow view” of human 
security). PSCs will have certain comparative advantages over 
                                                 
214 Jessica Vogel, 30 May 2012. 
215 Jessica Vogel, email, 30 May 2012. See also Bruneau, who writes that, “Reliable information is 
hard to come by, for several reasons, mostly having to do with the fact that private security firms are, well, 
private.”  He also writes that “private security contractors tend to be highly secretive, for a number of 
reasons.”  These reasons included: operational security, competition, culture of secrecy shared by former 
police & military employed by PSCs, and finally, that PSCs discourage employees from discussing with 
outsiders (“researchers or anyone else”). Bruneau, Patriots For Profit : Contractors And The Military In 
U.S. National Security: 108, 12. 
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traditional peacekeepers, such as the ability to deploy quickly with 
higher levels of innovation and efficiency.216    
–Human security 
 
Under the narrow definition of human security, violence or threat 
of violence must be mitigated or removed in order for there to be 
any security. PoC, R2P, and human security have all become 
central to the UN’s focus. 
 
Peacekeepers have an obligation to effectively protect populations 
in accordance with the mandate as described by the Security 
Council.  
 
Arguments in favor of PSCs claim that they offer a flexible, 
innovative, efficient, and cost-effective force that can supplement 
troops during times when traditional peacekeeping troops are in 
short supply, either because of how rapidly they must deploy or 
because contributing nations are not willing to provide troops for 
certain missions. PSCs hold that their security personnel are better 
trained than many of their traditional state-supplied peacekeeping 
counterparts and that their ability to respond quickly could have 
made the difference and stopped genocides such as occurred in 
Rwanda or the violence which is continuing today in Democratic 




                                                 
216 See, for example the following number of books and articles that support the idea that PSCs may 
be “cheaper, better, faster,” (at least in some ways): Dunigan, Victory for hire : private security companies’ 
impact on military effectiveness: 90. See also proponents’ arguments for the use of PSCs which always 
include efficiency, innovation, and flexibility as advantages to using PSCs over state or international 
organization (regional or UN) personnel, e.g., see Doug Brooks, “The Business of World Peace: Military 
Service Providers (MSPs) Revolutionize International Peace Operations,” Canopy Magazine 2003; Don 
Mayer, “Peaceful Warriors: Private Military Security Companies and the Quest for Stable Societies,” 
Journal of Business Ethics 89(2010); TX Hammes, “Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, The 
Bad, and the Strategic Impact,” Joint Forces Quarterly 1st Quarter, no. 60 (2011). Hammes concludes that 
“[c]ontractors provide a number of advantages over military personnel or civil servants—speed of 
deployment, continuity, reduction of troop requirements, reduction of military casualties, economic inputs 
to local economies, and, in some cases, executing tasks the military and civilian workforce simply cannot.” 
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Arguments to the contrary focus primarily on fears of profit-
seeking behavior and principal-agent problems where ultimately, 
PSCs as agent create conditions where they reinforce their position 
through manipulating the system and the use of asymmetric 
information which advantages them over the principal (states or 
the UN). In turn, reliance on their use would increase (as a result of 
asset specificity),217 or worse, could expand conflict (as many fear 
they will do if used by the UN for peacekeeping). In this latter 
scenario, human security would be degraded by the use of PSCs in 
peacekeeping, not improved, as proponents of PSCs contend. 
Conclusion 
This portion of the literature review finds that peacekeeping missions require a 
“competent and professional force, long-term international commitment, and adequate 
resources”218 in order to remove the threat of violence from individuals or communities. 
Human security, legitimacy, credibility, impartiality/neutrality, effectiveness, and 
accountability are all critical elements in peacekeeping. If the advantages to the use of 
PSCs are found to outweigh the disadvantages, then these findings may be used in future 
policy decisions with regard to how, when, and if PSCs should be used as peacekeepers 
or in UN peacekeeping at all. 
B. SUMMARY OF PROS AND CONS 
In order to get to this point and fully understand the pros and cons, it has been 
necessary to cover the literature and definitions of UN peacekeeping, success and failure, 
PSCs, and responsibilities of states, ROs, IOs, and the UN with regard to all manners of 
peacekeeping. The primary arguments for and against the use of Private Security 
Companies in peacekeeping can be found in the following lists of advantages and 
disadvantages. PSCs claim to offer many advantages over traditional international 
military forces, such as RO and UN troops, in the conduct of peacekeeping. Proponents 
argue that advantages include: 
                                                 
217 Asset specificity is a condition where PSCs might create self-sustaining reliance on their services 
to the exclusion of others. See Oliver E. Williamson, “Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction 
Cost Economics Perspective,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, no. 1 (1999). 
218 Brooks, “Ruthless Humanitarianism: why marginalizing private peacekeeping kills people,” 117. 
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1. PSCs (Advantages) 
 able to create quick response teams and take the lion’s share of the 
immediate security required in crisis situations before the UN can 
mobilize troops;  
 more flexible;  
 cost less; 
 more efficient; 
 not necessarily politically aligned with any one nation;  
 quicker—can be on the ground before genocide or ethnic cleansing 
starts and be contracted to prevent it;  
 able to protect NGOs/IOs/IGOs, humanitarian organizations, etc., 
from immediate threats allowing them to prepare for their 
operations;  
 able to support security sector reform (SSR) in collapsed/post-
conflict/rebuilding states–especially until the UN gets there;  
 able to conduct initial peacekeeping/enforcement;  
 not geopolitically motivated, they are under contract–contract 
dictates the terms, not geopolitical desires;  
 no real connection to the conflict/disaster other than to fulfill 
contract;219  
 more likely to produce success since they do not get paid/do not 
get subsequent contracts from the UN or host governments if they 
fail–there is always someone else to get the next contract/do the 
job;  
 greater technological capability and level of innovation than most 
militaries can provide; 
 better trained—system of voluntary troop contributions forces the 
UN to take what it can get, and too often what it gets are ill-trained 
and poorly equipped troops incapable of stopping violence.220 
 
Opponents to the use of PSCs in peacekeeping argue the following disadvantages: 
                                                 
219 Lack of connection with cause/conflict could be viewed as positive or negative for 
neutrality/impartiality. 
220 Peter Gantz, “The Private Sector’s Role in Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement,” in Global 
Policy, GlobalPolicy.org (Washington, DC: Refugees International, 18 November 2003). 
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2. PSCs (Disadvantages) 
 only there for the money, they have no real interest in the cause;221   
 could be corrupt and paid by the other side in conflict/post-conflict 
(C/PC) situations (many refer to them as “mercenaries”);222  
 might ONLY fulfill contract and nothing more, e.g., if stopping 
genocide is not in the contract, they may stand back and watch;223   
 “merchants of death”—they want to extend conflict or disaster 
indefinitely so that they can continue to get paid;  
 could reduce numbers of personnel or use less-trained personnel in 
order to cut costs;224 
 are not politically/morally invested -–no real loss other than money 
if they fail;  
 can quit–a soldier cannot “quit”;  
 reduced accountability/lack of regulation; 
 committed serious human rights and criminal abuses for which 
there has been no accountability;  
 challenge the Weberian argument that the State enjoys a monopoly 
on the legitimate use of coercive force;225     
                                                 
221 Ibid. What prevents a PSC from pulling out of an operation if it gets to be too difficult or 
dangerous?  PSCs could also decide to strike if conditions are not to their liking or if conditions change, see 
examples of the 2006 South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) strike where private 
security personnel across the country not only did not provide security, they looted, damaged property, and 
committed violent crimes. See, for example, Fatima Schroeder, “Shops Looted as Security Strike 
Continues,” IOL South Africa News 18 April 2006.  http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/shops-looted-
as-security-strike-continues-1.274432#.UC6rUxqXfTp, accessed 17 August 2012. 
222 Since their motivation is money, perception is that PSCs will choose to offer their services to the 
highest bidder, not necessarily the one endorsed by states, regional organizations, or the United Nations. 
223 As UN peacekeepers have done when mandate was not clear, e.g., Srebrenica, Bosnia. 
224 Recent examples of PSCs unable to provide proper number of trained security include G4S’s 
debacle with the 2012 Olympics in London. G4S was only able to provide as many as 7,000 of the 
contracted 10,400 PSC personnel when time came for them to be used. As a result, the UK MoD drafted 
18,500 soldiers for the job. London’s defense secretary, Philip Hammond, admitted that “The failure of 
G4S to provide adequate staffing levels for the Olympics showed the limitations of private companies 
taking on public sector contracts.”“G4S fiasco revealed limitations of private sector, admits Defence 
Secretary Philip Hammond,” The Telegraph 14 August 2012. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9473888/G4S-fiasco-revealed-limitations-of-private-
sector-admits-Defence-Secretary-Philip-Hammond.html, accessed 17 August 2012. 
225 Max Weber, Politics as a vocation, Facet books Social ethics series, (Fortress Press, 1965); James 
Cockayne, “The Global Reorganization of Legitimate Violence: Military Entrepreneurs and the Private 
Face of International Humanitarian Law,” International Review of the Red Cross 88, no. 863 (2006). 
 82
 could be used against weaker governments; 
 support the wealthy and those in power; 
 take much needed money from traditional suppliers of 
peacekeepers (TCCs) who rely on UN funding—PSC 
peacekeepers are competition.226 
Kevin A. O’Brien notes in his article, PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries: The Debate 
on Private Military Companies, that “[t]he most sensationalist and contentious issue 
surrounding the question of PMCs is the accusation that they are mercenaries and that 
these actions exist in a vacuum; neither of these contentions are valid.”227  His main point 
is that “privatised policing is seen in most Western societies as an acceptable capability 
for a state to have…Private military operations should not be seen as being 
different…”228  “The way forward is clear: effective regulation, at both national and 
international levels, and not prohibition is the key.”229 
First, in attempting to validate their own legitimacy, PSCs tout strict codes of 
conduct and standards for behavior. On the other side, opponents to their use claim that 
they are irresponsible actors who follow the rules that suit them, and that, the rules that 
exist have no real legal “teeth.”  Second, aside from arguments that the UN has no real 
legal control over the peacekeepers it does use, the international environment offers few 
mechanisms to monitor, inspect, and ensure transparency of PSCs and their employees 
either. Third, determinations of impartiality and neutrality apply differently to Chapter VI 
and Chapter VII missions. Taking into account that the majority of PSCs are 
headquartered in or operate out of OECD countries, impartiality and neutrality can be 
argued as factors in question. That is, Western states may be seen as biased toward 
predominantly Western values or toward Western solutions to non-Western problems. 
Additionally, there are discussions on both sides of the debate over neutrality and 
                                                 
226 Deborah D. Avant, “Mercenaries,” Foreign Policy 143, no. Jul.-Aug., (2004): 27–28; James 
Cockayne, “Interview with James Cockayne, Co-Director, Center on Global Counter-Terrorism 
Cooperation” (New York, 17 June 2012). 
227 Kevin A. O’Brien, “PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries: The Debate on Private Military Companies,” 
The RUSI Journal 145, no. 1 (2000): 59–64. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid., 64. 
 83
impartiality which require further evaluation since one side holds that because PSCs are 
profit-driven, they are motivated primarily by money and not nationalistic or idealistic 
values, and therefore, not biased for or against either party to the conflict. On the other 
side, an argument can be made that because PSCs are viewed as loyal to the highest 
bidder, their impartiality or neutrality is always in question or biased only toward a profit 
motive. 
Proponents of PSCs claim that they have advantages that can be capitalized upon 
for peacekeeping: they can be used as “convenient force multipliers”230 which can 
enhance capabilities of UN–or region-sponsored peacekeepers where personnel or 
equipment support is lacking. Additionally, PSCs have a great deal of experience in 
“training, intelligence, surveillance, demining and logistics.”231  Although there is a 
considerable amount of negative attention given to PSCs primarily from their poor 
behavior and illegal actions in conflicts from Iraq and Afghanistan to the Balkans and 
Africa, there are many cases of them being used extensively (and successfully) in the 
very same places toward promoting the fundamentals of human security, especially in the 
reduction of violence.232  Other advantages touted by PSCs are the cost savings that can 
                                                 
230 Bures, “Private Military Companies:  A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?,” 543; Moshe 
Schwartz, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: 
Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress,” in CRS Report for Congress: Prepared for Members 
and Committees of Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 5. Schwartz 
writes, “Security contractors also serve as a force multiplier for the military, freeing up uniformed 
personnel to perform combat missions or providing the State Department with the necessary security 
capabilities when State’s civilian security force is stretched thin.”  In this regard, UN peacekeeping could 
use a “force multiplier”; however, PSCs also come with “force complications” which may not be a good fit 
for UN peacekeeping. 
231 For example, private companies perform a good deal of demining for the UN, see, for example, the 
UN-sponsored Electronic Mine Information Network (E-MINE), 
http://www.mineaction.org/orgs.asp?org_type=7, see also, Brooks, “Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future 
of International Private Military Services,” 140. 
232 Bures, “Private Military Companies:  A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?,” 538–39. MPRI, 
Sandline, Executive Outcomes, and Dyncorp all claim peacekeeping experience and capacity. 
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be found in hiring their services over using armed forces or the UN for security.233  Doug 
Brooks, the president of the International Stability Operations Association, an agency that 
represents more than sixty PSCs, argues that “What makes PSCs viable is their ability to 
offer military services more efficiently, more rapidly, and much more cheaply than state 
militaries or non-military companies could do themselves…PSCs can do military tasks 
for a fraction of the costs of typical UN operations.”234  Moshe Schwartz, a specialist in 
defense acquisition for the Congressional Research Service, writes: 
Contractors can often be hired and deployed faster than a similarly skilled 
and sized military force. Because security contractors can be hired and 
fired quickly as needed, using contractors can allow federal agencies to 
adapt more easily to changing environments around the world. In 
contrast, adapting the military force structure or training significant 
numbers of Department of State civilian personnel can take months or 
years. Security contractors also serve as a force multiplier for the 
military, freeing up uniformed personnel to perform combat missions or 
providing the State Department with the necessary security capabilities 
when State’s civilian security force is stretched thin.235 
Although Allison Stanger agrees that there are benefits to privatization of certain 
services for many of the reasons noted above, she argues that benefits are primarily in the 
short run and that Congressional Budget Office evidence suggests that outsourcing 
security costs more than relying on U.S. Army units.236 
The primary criticisms that PSCs face are those of accountability, regulation, and 
monitoring. Other aspects which are fundamental to their ability to conduct peacekeeping 
                                                 
233 Executive Outcomes’ (EO) total cost for 21 months service to the government of Sierra Leone was 
$35M ($1.5M monthly); UN cost was estimated at $47M per month once peacekeepers arrived in support 
of the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). EO’s cost, considering the quickness and 
efficiency with which they executed their mission seems a bargain by comparison. Toffler, War and anti-
war : survival at the dawn of the 21st century: 151–52; Singer, Corporate Warriors: 112–14; Mandel, 
Armies without states : the privatization of security: 18. 
234 Brooks, “Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future of International Private Military Services,” 131. 
235 Schwartz, “DoD’s Use of PSCs,” 7. 
236 Stanger, One nation under contract : the outsourcing of American power and the future of foreign 
policy: 90–98. Stanger cites “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq,” Congressional Budget 
Office, Washington, DC., 2008, 16–17. Figures used are subject to interpolation, and in many cases, 
different interpretations lead to different conclusions. CBO conclusion is: “analysis indicates that the costs 
of the private contractor did not differ greatly from the costs of having a comparable military unit 
performing similar functions.” (14) 
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are legitimacy and whether they improve or degrade human security; however, these two 
aspects are likely to be found directly consequential to accountability. That is, if PSCs 
can be effectively monitored and regulated, legitimacy (and the perception of legitimacy) 
and their ability to improve human security is more likely. 
There are different ways that PSCs can be held accountable, but this 
accountability generally falls in one of two categories. On one side, PSCs claim to be 
able to self-regulate through reputation and the process of competition in the free market 
(Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” 237). On the other side, when things go wrong, and PSCs 
should be facing criminal charges, “self-regulation” does not include investigations or 
criminal prosecution.238  There are myriad accusations and international condemnation of 
human rights violations and atrocities committed by PSC personnel for which there has 
yet to be criminal accountability.239  Steven Brayton also notes that it is not only the 
human rights violations which are problematic, but also the PSCs’ motives.240  
Specifically, Brayton found that many of the PSCs operating in low-intensity conflicts 
were doing so selectively and solely for economic gain where minerals were involved, 
                                                 
237 Mortimer Jerome Adler et al., Adam Smith: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, ed. Mortimer J. Adler, [2nd ed., 61 vols., vol. 36, Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1990), 217. 
238 An excellent example of how self-regulation seems to (not) work when things go wrong can be 
seen through David Isenberg’s Kafkaesque journey through the ISOA ICoC complaint process and 
reporting on noncompliant private contractors—in this case, the contractor concerned was a company 
called Mission Essential Personnel (MEP) and the accusation was that MEP was hiring unqualified 
translators, endangering the safety of American troops—see https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B-
_i0E2U1KtEQkVRLVZ1bFdkZTA/edit, accessed 17 August 2012. 
239 Examples include: 2007 killing of seventeen civilians in Nisoor Square, Iraq by Blackwater 
employees; Abu Ghraib human rights abuses and torture by CACI and Titan employees; and a child 
pornography ring by DynCorp personnel in the Balkans, found in: Benedict Sheehy, Jackson Maogoto, and 
Virginia Newell, Legal Control of the Private Military Corporation (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), also in Stanger, One nation under contract : the outsourcing of American power and the future of 
foreign policy: 92.. 
240 Steven Brayton, “Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping,” Journal 
of International Affairs, 55, 2 (Spring 2002), 303–329, 305. 
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leading to serious questions concerning ulterior motivation.241  In these cases, where 
intrastate conflicts had strategic impacts, threatening international stability, PSCs were 
not seeking resolution, but focusing on profit.242  While the UN has adopted a new 
strategy aimed at “how to stay,” rather than “when to leave,” the UN’s goal is not to 
secure more contracts or make a profit, the UN’s goal is to create peace. The only way 
that peace will become the goal of PSCs is if it is in their contract and they get paid for it. 
Whether or not peace for profit is morally or ethically a problem is outside the bounds of 
this paper, but profit and cost do weigh in to determinations of PSC use. 
While the focus by PSCs may be profit, states, the UN, or other organizations that 
hire PSCs have an obligation to exercise careful management and monitor contracts to 
ensure that abuses are not occurring.243  Until PSCs can show that they not only hold 
themselves accountable, but are held accountable “under the jurisdiction of international 
tribunals for any violations of the laws of war,”244 it seems prudent and necessary that 
they remain under scrutiny and international suspicion for their operations; and as 
Oldrich Bures notes, should “only be used with extreme caution.”245  For many, one 
question remains: “Are private military companies capable of taking on some of the 
proliferating international peacekeeping functions”246 consistent with UN policy and  
 
                                                 
241 Ibid. This claim is disputed by both former heads of the organizations  (Tim Spicer of Sandline 
International and Eeben Barlow of Executive Outcomes) accused of  operating for diamond or mineral 
concessions. Neither company has ever admitted that they have accepted mineral concessions and neither 
has ever been prosecuted for or convicted of illicit contracts. However, Spicer did mention in his book that 
he sees no problem with accepting mineral concessions or payments in minerals if it is the means by which 
a country can pay since “[h]ard currency is difficult to come by in many third world countries.”  He denies, 
however, ever accepting concessions, futures, or diamonds, for example, as payment because, as he writes, 
he simply does not “have the expertise to get involved in these transactions. A mineral concession to me is 
worth nothing; it is a liability, likely to soak up millions before any return is seen, if one ever is.”Spicer, An 
Unorthodox Soldier: 24–25. 
242 Ibid. 
243 It has been contract law where accountability of PSCs has seemed to find the most ground. Sheehy, 
Maogoto, and Newell, Legal control of the private military corporation; Dickinson, Outsourcing war and 
peace : preserving public values in a world of privatized foreign affairs. 
244 Bures, “Private Military Companies,” 544. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Bures, “Private Military Companies:  A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?,” 533. 
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guidance?  But this question can only be answered through actually using them in 
peacekeeping capacities—and before PSCs are used in peacekeeping, the pros and cons 
to their use must be addressed. 
One anticipated problem with measuring claims by PSCs that they are “quicker, 
faster, and much cheaper”247 than UN, regional, or state forces is whether or not they will 
be able to translate this claimed efficiency to peacekeeping operations. PSCs have 
performed a vast array of security tasks in the past, to include humanitarian assistance / 
disaster relief (HA/DR), security sector reform (SSR), demobilization, disarmament, 
reintegration, and reconstruction (DDRR), training of militaries and police forces, as well 
as protection of persons from violence (including UN personnel).248  PSC lobbyists argue 
that these activities demonstrate their qualifications to conduct all aspects of actual 
peacekeeping in support of the UN. With an annual budget of almost $8 billion, the 
peacekeeping “industry” is certainly one in which PSCs would like to get involved more 
directly.249  Proponents of their use for peacekeeping argue that the flexibility and speed 
of deployment that PSCs offer could oftentimes quell violence before it achieved levels 
requiring UN peacekeepers.250  Additionally, the use of PSCs to stabilize a situation 
could help to lay the initial groundwork for UN peacekeepers to better accomplish the 
mandate.251  Working with international and local authorities, those in favor of PSCs 
                                                 
247 Singer, Corporate Warriors: 183. This is also a commonly expressed claim of Doug Brooks, the 
president of the International Stability Operations Association, a “trade association” for private contractors, 
also called a lobbying group by many. 
248 PSCs have conducted various missions around the globe, from participation in combat in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to protection of NGO personnel in Bande Aceh, Indonesia. The only humanitarian mission 
they have not officially conducted is peacekeeping under UN sanction. Mandel, Armies without states : the 
privatization of security: 9–20. See also, Jan Grofe, “Human Rights and Private Military Companies: A 
Double-Edged Sword too Dangerous to Use?,” in Private Military and Security Companies: Chances, 
Problems, Pitfalls, and Prospects, ed. Gerhard Kummel Thomas Jager (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fur 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 241–58. 
249 Brooks and Renou, Peacekeeping or pillage? : private military companies in Africa; Brooks, 
“Ruthless Humanitarianism: why marginalizing private peacekeeping kills people.”; United Nations 
General Assembly, “Financing Peacekeeping,” United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml. website, accessed 12 July 2012. 
250 Brooks, “Ruthless Humanitarianism: why marginalizing private peacekeeping kills people.” 
251 However, as will be shown in a predominance of case studies is that when PSCs did “lay the 
groundwork,” for reasons which will be explored, the UN did not build upon gains made by PSCs. 
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argue that “a well-regulated private security sector can in cooperation with the police act 
as a ‘force multiplier,’ increasing the overall sense of security.”252 
3. PSCs as an Existing Market  
Because of the complexity and scope of these new and diverse missions in riskier 
environments, the UN has substantially increased its use of PSCs to protect its own 
personnel, offices, or equipment.253  This use of PSCs equates in many ways to the 
“market” for peacekeepers. This market for peacekeepers pays nations for sending troops 
to conduct missions under UN sanctions or mandate. Peacekeepers themselves are paid 
by their host nations—sometimes more, more often less, than the UN authorized amount 
for each soldiers’ service.254  In many cases, peacekeeping is primarily a money-making 
opportunity for poor states to bolster their GDP. Adam Smith of the International Peace 
Institute also argues that it is not just money, but prestige that encourages some countries 
to contribute more soldiers than others: “The prestige factor is more about being known 
as one of the top 10 TCCs to UN peacekeeping—kind of a mark of pride. A country like 
Indonesia now has a goal of becoming one of the top 15 TCCs, which is about prestige—
being seen as an international peacemaker.”255  There is also a factor of influence for 
TCCs.  “Increased posts at UNHQ (and also importantly, in the field, say as force 
commander, etc.) is where the influence comes in…having large numbers of troops in a 
mission also gets a TCC a voice in the UNSC decision-making regarding revisions to that 
mission’s mandate.”256  For example, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan hold the top spots 
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for troop contributions in the world, and as a result, the three countries hold a very high 
number of posts at UNHQ.257  Soldiers’ specific training is not necessarily taken into 
account, nor is their method of recruitment, or their specific abilities to conduct 
peacekeeping operations; moreover, there is no consideration of any biases they may 
have toward the conflict in which they will be placed.258   
Another factor to consider is the quality of the peacekeeping troops being 
supplied. In a paper by Tanya Cook, she writes that “Western states, in particular, are 
unwilling to become peacekeepers in civil wars, leading to an emerging picture of third 
world peacekeepers…This has impacted on quality, with badly trained and poorly 
equipped soldiers provided.”259  In contrast, those who favor PSCs for these missions 
claim that their employee rosters are made up of predominantly well-trained former 
military and police. What is more, because their primary motivation is money, they may 
actually be less likely to mistreat the “peacekept” than those with ideological, national, or 
ethnic loyalties to some group or regime.260 
If peacekeeping generates revenue for nations, and peacekeepers are already 
being paid to perform their duties, why then are PSCs not used to perform these 
missions?  As an example, one report states that 7% of Fiji’s GNP comes from the UN 
for their supply of peacekeeping troops; another notes that “countries like Bangladesh 
and Fiji make no secret that they profit from peacekeeping.”261  If the UN and 
peacekeepers are already engaged in what are essentially market-oriented relations and 
economic transactions, then why are PSCs excluded from these economic transactions? 
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Claims that PSCs can mobilize more quickly, are more capable, and are better 
trained than traditional state peacekeepers lead to the argument that the use of PSCs 
would ultimately result in saved lives through the prevention of conflict, human rights 
abuses, or even genocide. Two examples commonly cited by PSCs include: 1) the routing 
of the RUF in Sierra Leone by EO,262 protecting thousands of villagers from machete-
wielding rebels; and 2) Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) in the Balkans who 
advised Croatians on military tactics and who were ultimately able to turn the tide on 
marauding Serbs bent on ethnic cleansing. PSCs also contend that, had they been given 
the opportunity, they could have prevented many of the atrocities in Rwanda and 
Congo.263  In addition to a careful review of the many purported advantages and 
disadvantages of PSCs’ use as peacekeepers, claims of speed and efficiency are reviewed 
with an eye toward the utilitarian argument, that is, their use will save more lives than not 
using them; essentially, whether or not the ends justify the means when it comes to 
human security. If these arguments are valid, are they sufficient to override critics’ 
concerns with other aspects of PSCs’ performance or legitimacy? 
4. Privatization versus Outsourcing 
Privatization is not the same as outsourcing. Often used synonymously, these 
words mean two different things. Outsourcing is generally a short-term business 
relationship where responsibility for actions of the agent is borne by the principal—the 
principal has ownership for implementation of the contract.264  Privatization is generally 
a long-term business relationship where responsibility for actions of the agent falls on the 
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agent—the agent has ownership for implementation of the contract.265  These are key 
terms because accountability shifts depending upon the type of business relationship 
which defines ownership and responsibilities between principal and agent. 
If made illegal or if too much scrutiny is placed on PSCs, they may turn to more 
covert business practices and actually become more dangerous and increasingly 
“mercenary-like.”  This is similar to the argument that if abortion is made illegal in the 
U.S., and not openly regulated, many women will resort to illegal abortions, resulting in 
worse problems.266  O’Brien states that Executive Outcomes (EO) announced their 
termination of operations because they were “no longer able to operate in a climate 
conducive to doing business due to on-going negative publicity and national regulation in 
the form of the 1998 Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act,” which led to actors 
who worked for EO previously to operate without the same level of scrutiny.267  In the 
end, the larger companies, like EO, who had demonstrated degrees of self-regulation, 
accountability, and transparency, were now closing shop, giving way and opening the 
market to much shadier elements. O’Brien goes on to write that: 
[by] engaging in dialogue with these private military companies, the 
government could have successfully co-opted them into legitimate 
operations. Now, the closure of EO may well signal the end of this 
effective dialogue and the emergence of much more covert—and therefore 
much more potentially damaging—firms engaging in entirely unregulated 
activities outside of South Africa’s borders.268 
Excessive regulation can be seen as creating more actual mercenary activity, as 
the demand may remain, but the supply will not be legitimated by the legal or democratic 
character that previously allowed PSCs to operate competitively. That is, cheap and 
illegal contractors may flourish if the costs of doing business legally become too high. 
                                                 
265 Ibid. 
266 Similarly, Herbert Howe comments that “[p]rohibition of “mercenaries” would be akin to 
outlawing alcohol or prostitution: a durable supply and demand for any product will mock such 
legislation.”  Herbert M. Howe, Ambiguous order: military forces in African states  (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2001), 226. 
267 O’Brien, “PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries,” 60. 
268 Ibid. 
 92
Moreover, as Brooks of the ISOA, who represents more than 20 PSCs, noted, “If 
companies need additional licenses, permits, personnel vetting, they will be significantly 
slowed, and in the case of a Haiti earthquake or something requiring immediate response 
and services, such delays directly cost lives.”269  In cases where expediency is critical, 
wholesale privatization of an industry may lead to stovepipes of specialization, possibly 
leading to more capacity, but increases in cost (due to requirements of compliance with 
standardized regulations, SOPs, licenses, training, etc.) and reductions in the very 
efficiencies PSCs claim to offer. Outsourcing of peacekeeping or security services, as 
necessary, might provide the means for rapid deployment of security services while 
maintaining positive control through M&E (principal maintains responsibility over 
agent), but at the cost of capacity and at the risk of operating in an environment without 
standard operating procedures or regulation. A common perception of a mercenary is one 
of a soldier hired on a temporary basis, responsible only to the person or agency paying 
his salary—mercenaries are outsourced, not privatized. 
5. Mercenaries 
Morally, there can be no doubt about the repugnance of mercenary 
activity (which is ineffectually proscribed under international law), or any 
other form of private activity which makes a direct contribution to ignite 
or prolong violent armed conflict.270 
 
Many of the arguments against PSCs in peacekeeping use the term “mercenary” 
when referring to the employees of PSCs working overseas. This has had a damaging 
effect on the legitimacy of all contractors working overseas and not just those working 
for security firms. There are a multitude of definitions of what mercenaries are—almost 
as many as there are stories of mercenaries operating in Africa and attempting coups 
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sponsored by the highest bidder.271  What PSCs claim distinguishes them from 
mercenaries or the “ad hoc groupings of freelance soldiers of the 1960s and 1970s” is that 
their structure is one built upon standard corporate guidelines.272   
There are three generally cited definitions of what a mercenary is: 1) the 
“Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa” of 1977; 2) Article 47 of 
Protocol I; and 3) the “International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing 
and Training of Mercenaries.”273  The most commonly accepted definition of what is and 
what is not a mercenary can be found in Article 1 of the UN General Assembly’s 1989 
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries. It states: 
                                  Article 1 
     For the purposes of the present Convention, 
 1.   A mercenary is any person who: 
      (a)  Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
conflict; 
      (b)  Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire 
for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the 
conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or 
paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of 
that party;  
      (c)  Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of 
territory controlled by a party to the conflict; 
      (d)  Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 
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      (e)  Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces. 
 2.   A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation: 
      (a)  Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of 
participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at: 
      (i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the 
constitutional order of a State; or 
      (ii)  Undermining the territorial integrity of a State; 
      (b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for 
significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of 
material compensation; 
      (c)  Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such 
an act is directed; 
      (d)  Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and 
      (e)  Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory 
the act is undertaken.274 
 
The problem with this definition and PSCs or their employees is that all five 
conditions of part 1 must be fulfilled in order for someone (or some “body,” such as a 
corporation) to be considered a mercenary—a difficult categorization that would seldom 
apply to PSCs.275  Article 47 of Protocol I reads similarly, but adds one more condition: 
“any person who…does, in fact, take part in the hostilities,” making it even more difficult 
to define PSC personnel as mercenaries, since combat and self-defense are two different 
things. Even the most extreme cases of PSC involvement in conflicts, such as Executive 
Outcomes’ action in Angola or Sierra Leone, have skirted definition as mercenaries 
because they were integrated into the “armed forces of a Party to the conflict.” 
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The South African government passed one of the most restrictive regulations 
against mercenaries in 1998 following PMC interventions by EO and Sandline in Angola, 
Papua New Guinea, and Sierra Leone. Both EO and Sandline were known to have had 
large numbers of former South African Defence Force members in their ranks. South 
Africa’s regulation, the “Foreign Military Assistance Act,” banned citizens of South 
Africa from any involvement in foreign wars without government approval.276  The 
South African law was largely ignored by South African (usually) ex-military private 
security contractor personnel in search of work, especially after the U.S. invaded Iraq and 
hired thousands of security personnel. Former South African military personnel and ex-
combatants found themselves guarding embassies and protecting diplomats and convoys 
in violation of their nation’s law. In March 2012, fully cognizant that the law was largely 
being ignored, South Africa added a very specific section on “Mercenaries and Private 
Military/Security Companies” in its Defence Review on PSCs: 
 
47. A clear distinction must be made between mercenaries, being 
individuals availing their military skills, and private security companies 
who provide collective military services. Both categories may provide 
their services to either governments or non state actors.  
 a. The activities of mercenaries and their participation in armed 
conflicts have often been controversial, especially when they provide 
military services in violation of domestic and international law (in some 
instances they are used to sustain undemocratic states).  
 b. A further complicating factor is the increasingly blurred 
relationship between the military and non-military aspects of conflict 
resolution. As more comprehensive approaches to conflict resolution are 
adopted, it is expected that private security companies will in future 
undertake a wider range of activities, some of which were until recently 
carried out by armed forces and military personnel. These include, for 
example, civilian contractors providing services such as logistical support, 
weapons maintenance, sanitation, and laundry services to missions and 
deployed military personnel.  
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 c. Attempts to address this issue were complicated by the difficulty 
of achieving a universal and concise definition of mercenarism as opposed 
to activities of private security companies. Notwithstanding this, 
mercenarism is understood to be a manifestation of unregulated 
foreign military assistance and has the potential to undermine 
legitimate constitutional democracies, as experienced in Africa. [Bold 
mine.] 
48. Several South African private security companies continue to be 
contracted by foreign countries to operate in conflict zones, usually 
protecting prominent individuals, critical infrastructure, property and 
strategic resources. It is very probable that the global involvement of 
South African private security companies or South African citizens, 
particularly in defence transformation, peacekeeping and peace 
building in conflict and post-conflict areas will continue into the 
foreseeable future. [Bold mine.]277 
 
Despite the difficulties in defining PSCs or their employees as mercenaries, many 
within the UN system still regard private security personnel as mercenaries unfit for duty 
alongside blue helmets.278  Enrique Ballesteros, the former UN Special Rapporteur on 
Mercenaries was strongly against the use of PSCs in any international peacekeeping 
capacity (broadly defined). For example, he called PSCs the “biggest and most 
sophisticated threat to the peace, sovereignty and self-determination.”279  David 
Wimhurst, a UN Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, commented on 
their involvement in peacekeeping in the following manner: “So you get a gang of 
mercenaries in there, basically. Who do they report to?  Who controls them?  It’s a 
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nonstarter.”280  In a recent interview, Major-General Patrick Cammaert, a former UN  
Force Commander in Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as DRC, made his position very clear 
on his opinion of the status of PSCs: “They are mercenaries, that is all they are; all of 
them.”281 
Ballesteros, who had also been the former Special Rapporteur for the mission in 
Sierra Leone, referred to the idea proposed by some that there are “good” and “bad” 
mercenaries as ridiculous. He saw the idea that there are “bad” ones like Bob Denard, 
“Mad” Mike Hoare, and Jean Schramme who earned names like “the terrible ones,” or 
“wild geese” (these are the men who facilitated coups in African nations and shifted 
loyalty to wherever the money was found) and “good” ones such as EO and Sandline, or 
the newer PSCs, like MPRI or Aegis (who have corporate identities and claim legitimacy 
through democratic government contracts) as a minor detail. His contention is that just 
because these PSCs get hired by legitimate governments does not make their actions any 
more moral or their motivations any more noble—their motivation is money. The 
conclusion drawn is that, either way, they are mercenaries. Ballesteros noted that any use 
of mercenaries reminded him of the aphorism of the end justifying the means, which, to 
him, is unacceptable.  “Mercenaries do not work in the name of life or peace, but to earn 
money. And to earn money they have to be effective and being effective as a mercenary 
means killing, torturing and committing human rights violations.”282 
AJ Venter, who writes extensively on mercenaries in his book, War Dog, argues 
to the contrary, and puts it this way: “The new companies are defined, incorporated 
entities intended to continue in perpetuity. What they are not are bands of individuals 
who have been recruited to carry out a single contractual obligation. This is a 
fundamental rationale for reconsidering the definition and applicability of the term 
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‘mercenary.’”283  In the end, the legal rationale for identifying PSCs as mercenary 
corporations or their employees as mercenaries “will usually fall outside the conjunctive 
definition provided for in international instruments.”284 
6. Contracts   
Contractors generally follow the guidelines of their contracts. They want to get 
paid. In Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, the Balkans, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere, contractors 
have been criticized for their use of force in upholding their contract (or what they 
believed to be their role in meeting the contract). For example, in the case of protecting 
diplomats, one of the most notorious and infamous PSCs, Blackwater Worldwide, was 
accused of using excessive force on their missions. However, it is also one of 
Blackwater’s well-touted credits that they never lost a “principal,” i.e., the person or 
persons they were employed to protect. Assuming that fulfilling the contract and getting 
paid was their priority, it is reasonable to assume that if a PSC’s contracted mission was 
to provide human security (the narrow view), they would do so with the same tenacity 
and drive to fulfill the contract and get paid. This sort of tenacity in the face of possible 
failure (and the risk of not being paid, or worse, getting killed), might have been just the 
sort of thing needed in a case such as Srebrenica where the Dutch Commander did not 
fight against the Serbs who entered the village “safe haven” determined to kill Muslim 
men and boys. In fact, a Dutch Commander himself, Major General Cammaert, 
commented in an interview that the Contingent Commander at Srebrenica exercised 
“poor judgment, poor leadership.”285 
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On the other hand, Avant and others suggest that PSC personnel might just quit in 
the face of such adversity.286  In one example during the successful rout of the RUF by 
EO in Sierra Leone, “a small number of mercenaries chose to quit the Sierra Leonean 
conflict before their contracts had expired. This occurred, most notably, following the 
above-described ambush…where the force suffered two deaths and seven wounded.”287  
In this specific case, the mission was not affected and the RUF were defeated, but the fact 
remains that, unlike military personnel, contractors can quit or refuse to comply with 
orders. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSION 
 For the international community to respond and act in accordance with the UN 
Charter to deter aggressors and create peace may require the use of all available resources 
in an increasingly globalizing world. During the Cold War there were fifteen UN 
peacekeeping missions total; in the post-Cold War period there have been thirty-five. 
There were sixteen on-going missions as of November 2012, and there is no indication 
that the number of peacekeeping missions will decline in the near future.288  Moreover, it 
is likely that there will be an increased need for peacekeeping resources from not only 
troop contributing countries (TCCs), but especially the major powers that have shown 
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reluctance involving themselves in regional conflicts and “new wars.”289  There is clearly 
a need for well-trained peacekeepers, but where they will come from remains a difficult 
problem. Recent cuts to the DPKO budget will not only mean decreases in logistical 
support to peacekeepers, but a reduction in the numbers of troops that can be maintained 
or deployed.290  Although PSCs may be capable of actually performing the physical tasks 
of peacekeeping, it is clear that before they get the opportunity to perform as 
peacekeepers aligned with the aims of the international community, the advantages and 
disadvantages to their use must be weighed. 
There may not be one agency or organization that will effectively improve 
peacekeeping. As is evident from myriad cases, no one method is always successful, and 
by the same token, no single method guarantees failure. The answer lies in finding the 
right mix of capabilities, legitimacy, level of force, responsiveness, and scope of mandate 
in order to find success.291  As has been consistently shown, the truest measure of success 
is whether people and communities are sustainably safe and live in an environment 
secure from violence.  Because the protection of people and efforts toward human 
security and peace are at the root of all peacekeeping, the following section discusses 
human security (the broad and the narrow views) and human rights. 
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IV. HUMAN SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order ‘to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.’ Meeting this 
challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and to a very 
significant degree it is the yardstick with which the Organization is judged 
by the peoples it exists to serve. 
   Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations292 
 
While the effects of humanitarian activities may not always contribute to 
human security, both humanitarianism and human security share the 
obvious goals of the betterment and protection of human beings. 
   Christopher Spearin, A Private Security Panacea293 
 
[T]he overriding moral basis for this work is the rule: ‘Don’t kill!’  Every 
day that war goes on, there will be more massacres, more hatred, more 
ethnic cleansing. Priority number one must be ‘stop the killing!’  And 
when the killing has stopped, you can start looking for a better way for 
people to live together. 
   Former Ambassador Thorvald Stoltenberg294 
 
 
The concept of human security is fundamental to this dissertation because it is the 
underlying principle that drives all peacekeeping and goals to end war. Without human 
security as its aim, what is the purpose of the UN?  Human security and protection of 
human rights are essential to everything that the United Nations does. When UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan addressed world leaders in 2001, he “emphasized the 
strategic importance of human security and human rights to the fundamental objectives of 
the Organization,” stressing that the UN “must always stand for the rule of law” and 
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“must place people at the centre of everything it does.”295  After identifying “four 
burning issues,” in human security, two of which dealt with violence and conflict, he 
stated that the “common thread connecting all these issues is the need to respect 
fundamental human rights.”296 
Peacekeeping is a primary means by which human security and the protection of 
persons can be effected. This dissertation conducts an empirical analysis of the relative 
net effects of primarily two types of armed forces on human security during 
peacekeeping missions.297  These two types of armed forces are PSCs (and PMCs) and 
UN peacekeeping troops; however, other armed forces have conducted “peacekeeping,” 
and have worked with and alongside both the UN and PSCs.   
Human security is a concept which can be as broad as to include ensuring people 
have food and water, shelter and clothing, as well as protections from human rights 
violations, sexual assault, and violence.  However, for purposes of this dissertation, the 
definition of human security is used in a manner that focuses on armed forces and the 
specific ways that they impact human security restricted to the narrow view, that is, 
protection from violence to persons and communities.  Using this definition, the role of 
armed forces can be analyzed with respect to their ability to protect human beings in 
crisis, conflict, or post-conflict situations. These armed forces are made up of 
international peacekeepers, national militaries, militias, and other armed persons imbued 
with the responsibility to protect—this group of “protectors” must now include the 
private security industry, which has over the past thirty years grown to unprecedented 
levels, and has assumed many of the functions traditionally conducted by governments 
and state armies.298 
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It is impossible to separate human security and the protection of human rights 
from the evaluation of any aspect of peacekeeping or the agents which function to work 
to create peace. This section of the dissertation discusses human security, both the broad 
and narrow views, and makes the case that although the broad view is equally important 
for sustainable peace, the narrow view, or protection of people and communities from 
violence, is the domain of peacekeepers and security providers. If PSCs are to ever be a 
part of the fabric of whole concept of peacebuilding, the concept of human security, as 
well as its impact on determinations of successful peacekeeping, is a necessary factor.   
Consequently, the proper analysis of pros and cons to PSC use in peacekeeping and 
ending violence, human security and human rights (as they relate to peacekeeping) must 
be understood.299  
A. HUMAN SECURITY 
As noted previously, the first line in the UN Charter makes clear, the United 
Nations was founded “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war…”300  The 
UN’s primary mission is fundamentally human-centered. The goal of peacekeeping is to 
support and maintain international peace and security through “…the promotion of the 
economic and social advancement of all peoples…,” halting aggression, and protecting 
civilians from harm.301  The Charter was “issued in the name of ‘the peoples,’ not the 
governments, of the United Nations.”302  Therefore, separating the human element, and 
hence human security, from any analysis of whether or not to use PSCs for peacekeeping  
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would be irresponsible. This section discusses human security with a focus on the roles 
and responsibilities of peacekeeping and peacekeepers toward achieving the goals of the 
Charter. 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the size, scope, and number of peacekeeping 
missions have increased drastically.303  In the first forty-plus years following the United 
Nations’ (UN) inception in 1945, there had been only fifteen peacekeeping operations. 
From 1989 forward, member states increasingly expanded the UN’s agenda into 
intervention in efforts to prove that the international community could cooperate to help 
settle internal conflicts and protect human rights.304  Thomas Jäger put it this way: “The 
collapse of the bipolar world order nourished hopes for a less militarized, even peaceful 
‘One World’ in broad segments of society as well as in politics.”305  Between 1989 and 
the present—under half the time as from 1945–1989—there have been twice as many 
peacekeeping operations sanctioned by the UN.306  This expanded agenda has 
increasingly blurred the lines between recognized sovereign responsibilities and the right 
to intervene in order to prevent conflict or protect persons.307  The Security Council’s 
broadening of the reasons for collective intervention was further supported by the idea 
that the protection of individuals from violence is a higher priority than recognizing 
geographic borders simply for sovereignty’s sake. Doyle writes that, “Sovereignty was 
redefined to incorporate a global interest in human rights protection.”308  As the world 
becomes smaller through globalization and increased flows of people, technology, 
resources, and ideas, so too have conflicts more easily crossed perforated or seemingly 
non-existent borders. Civil wars and failed states are much harder to ignore when 
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refugees are pouring into states who do not want them or when criminals are venturing 
out on the oceans to attack merchant vessels. The effects of intrastate wars are felt well 
beyond borders, mandating coordinated multilateral action on the part of the international 
community. At the root of conflicts and failed states are insecure people. When 
sovereignty does not work to protect its own citizens, intervention is the last resort.309 
In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali produced his report, An Agenda for 
Peace, in which he outlined a UN that proposed to be much more aggressive toward the 
goals of peace and security. Specifically through: 1) preventive diplomacy; 2) peace 
enforcement; 3) peacemaking; and 4) peacekeeping. Rather than watch while violence 
occurred, the UN would intervene under the consent of the international community 
where it had not during Cold War years. In 1994, human security was introduced in the 
UN Development Programme Report as a more up-to-date and relevant concept of 
security.310  Within human security came a responsibility to protect (R2P) by the 
international community those who were not being protected by their own state. These 
ideas enabled a broadening of the reasons for intervention.   
Human security is a concept which some believe to be too broadly defined.311  
The UNDP’s 1994 report brought the concept of human security to the forefront, noting 
that “We need another profound transition in thinking—from nuclear security to human 
security.”312  The report lists seven categories of human security threats:  1) Economic 
security; 2) food security; 3) health security; 4) environmental security; 5) personal 
security; 6) community security; and 7) political security.313   The one thing that most 
agree on is that the focus is on security of the individual or the community rather than the 
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state.314  As the United Nations’ Human Development Report (UN HDR) notes, “Human 
security is people-centred.”315  Concepts of human security imply that protection of 
individuals is of greater importance than observance of state authority and sovereignty.316  
This new outlook on security runs contrary to the idea that states alone are responsible for 
their citizens as circumscribed by geographic borders and protected by state controlled 
militaries. In another report, the United Nations defines human security rather broadly, 
but simply as “a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not 
cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. 
Human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and 
dignity.”317  Other concepts commonly used in connection with human security are those 
of “freedom from fear and freedom from want.”318  Freedom from fear can be seen as the 
narrow view, and freedom from violence; freedom from want can be associated with the 
broad view, and freedom from things like poverty, hunger, lack of clothing or shelter, and 
etc.  These “freedoms” promote the idea that these two values are fundamental to the 
security of individuals, which by extension, promotes peace, or as the U.S. Secretary of 
State said in 1945, “No provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the 
Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security 
in their homes and their jobs.”319   
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The UN strongly supports the maintenance of state sovereignty.320  In fact, it is 
Article 2.7 of the Charter which protects national sovereignty from intervention—even by 
the UN. Article 2.7 forbids the UN from intervening into “matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”321  However, the rider is that “this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII.”322  It can be seen that even national sovereignty can be overridden by the Security 
Council’s duty to preserve international peace and security through intervention under 
Article 42 of the Charter.323 
The UN also promotes the idea that protecting human security is fundamental to 
maintaining peace and preventing conflict. As Kofi Annan has stated, “Sovereignty 
implies responsibility, not just power.”324  It is from this that the idea of “R2P,” or 
responsibility to protect, is derived. “R2P is a new international security and human rights 
norm to address the international community’s failure to prevent and stop genocides, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”325  The recent intervention in 
Libya by NATO forces was an historic event.  “It marked the first time that force was 
used under the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect…Under R2P, states must act to 
protect their citizens. If they fail, the international community must intervene.”326 
While the concept of R2P proposes to enhance the sovereignty of states through 
emphasizing their primary responsibility of protecting their citizens (and offering support 
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when they are unable), it also encourages early engagement and intervention to address 
“deteriorating situations before it is too late.”327  R2P is necessary for human security 
since early action or intervention can mean the difference between preventing and 
allowing the four forms of violence to persons noted above.   
States have been the traditional suppliers of peacekeepers, while nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO) have traditionally supplied health and humanitarian services, and 
international nongovernmental organizations (INGO) and international organizations (IO) 
have traditionally attempted to manage aid and protections to persons, generally through 
state and local coordination. The implementation of actions to reinforce human security 
and protect human rights has become a more diverse and complex challenge than it was 
thirty years ago.328  The traditional frameworks used to define relationships between 
states, as well as explanations for war and violence, have changed significantly.329  
Although  realists would argue that major powers still define and control these 
interrelationships, the vast majority of violent conflicts occur within states, not between 
them.330  Additionally, counter to traditional realist interpretations of security that would 
argue that strengthening the state ultimately makes everyone more secure, there is 
substantial evidence that shows that governments in recent history have been far more 
brutal to their own citizens than has any foreign army.331 
Human security, and not just national security, has become vital to states and 
regions; “secure states do not automatically mean secure peoples.”332  We can see that 
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this is clearly the case in recent examples, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria, 
where states that were relatively secure from the outside, were not at all secure within 
their borders. According to the United Nations Development Programme, “It is now time 
to make a transition from the narrow concept of national security to the all-encompassing 
concept of human security.”333  However, it is first necessary to identify the areas in 
which human security is affected most by militaries and other physical security forces 
and the extent of their effects. Specifically, armed forces, including militaries, militias, 
police, and private security companies have been involved in missions from combat to 
security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), 
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), and peacekeeping operations (PKO). 
These areas all have a direct effect on the two fundamental aspects of human security: 
“freedom from fear, freedom from want.”334  However, more narrowly, they also have 
direct impact on the area of human security on which this dissertation will focus, that is, 
specifically, violence to persons and communities. 
Ignoring genocidal regimes, migrating refugees, starvation, or conflict in “gap” 
countries, i.e., generally lesser developed countries (LDC), in favor of self-interested 
strengthening of national security by regional powerhouses has allowed conflicts to 
grow in regions such as the Middle East, East and Central Africa, the Balkans, or 
Central Asia.335  Mary Kaldor refers to conflicts in these places as “new wars” because 
they do not easily fall into the conventional definition of war as interstate conflict.336  
She argues that old conceptions of security no longer apply.337  Furthermore, adherence 
to old conceptions only makes matters worse, making people less secure, increasing the 
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security gap between the more industrialized regions and states and those that are either 
newly industrialized or not industrialized.338   
The role of states, especially the roles played by major powers, becomes less clear 
as boundaries become increasingly perforated by a wide range of dynamic forces, from 
civil war and refugees spilling over borders, to trade, human trafficking, drugs, crime, 
and the globalizing quality of the Internet.339   Additionally, “internal conflicts are 
frequently transformed into interstate conflicts because of their spillover effect into 
neighboring, often similarly domestically insecure states.”340  States often choose levels 
of engagement by proximity and severity of threat, and this is where selection of forces is 
critical to success. Intervening into the affairs of other states can be viewed as a violation 
of sovereignty that disallows a state from taking care of its own citizens as it sees fit, or 
worse, geo-politically driven for imperialistic aims. However, many argue that increased 
and early intervention (primarily into the gap states) protects all states, as well as 
individuals and communities from intrastate violence.341  Multi-level as well as 
multilateral intervention and varying methods of engagement have required the use of a 
variety of resources in an increasingly neoliberal and globalized world.342   
Nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, different forms of 
regime, regional organizations and institutions, militaries, and armed forces, as well as 
private entities, are included in a diverse set of resources that can work toward creating or 
reinforcing peace.343 Within this set of resources lie physical security and the protection 
of individuals from violence; however, this returns us to the question of who is doing the 
protecting, and whether or not human security is increased or diminished through their 
actions. Considering the above factors, whatever entity is conducting the peacekeeping 
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must do so keeping ever-present the idea that protection of civilians (PoC) and 
communities from violence is a fundamental goal that must have both short-term and 
long-term effects.   
Nathan Hodge has referred to the broad spectrum of persons conducting physical 
security for humanitarian purposes as “armed humanitarians.”344 However, each of the 
different elements within this classification brings with it varying capabilities, 
motivations, sanctions, regulations, and rules of engagement. Across this broad spectrum, 
and for purposes of this study, measurements of effectiveness are necessary to determine 
each force’s impact on human security (narrow definition). Additionally, each force’s 
ability to conduct peacekeeping to include the positive and negative attributes of each is 
reviewed. The impact on human security is measured quantitatively using data on 
violence to persons in comparative situations where “armed humanitarians” are present 
and fulfilling peacekeeping missions.345  The impact on human security is measured 
qualitatively through case studies and by reviewing specific incidences of violence to 
persons, taking into consideration the situations in which these incidents occur and 
comparing them to other similar incidents where other security forces were being used. 
The case studies that have been chosen reflect areas where a diversity of security forces 
have operated and where both quantitative data and qualitative information is available. 
1. Security, Human Security, and the Debate 
In order to better understand the interrelationship between human security and 
other concepts of security, it is necessary to go through the progression from security as 
protecting the state (and sovereignty) to protection of the individual. The definition of 
security is one that is debated and argued at many levels: from academics, to government, 
to policy-makers and politicians. In order for human security to be seen as a valuable and 
essential fundamental to effective peacekeeping, a proper and accepted definition must be 
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proposed. Definitions of security are broad and range from the individual to communities, 
to the national, international, and to the global level.346  The following are some 
examples of the many definitions of security which span the gamut from more of a realist 
perspective, which focuses power and security at the national level, all the way to human 
and global security where freedom and the protection of the individual are paramount:   
1) Walter Lippmann proposes that, “A nation has security when it does not have 
to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain 
them by war.” 347   
2) Giacomo Luciani writes that, “National security may be defined as the ability 
to withstand aggression from abroad.”348   
3)  Richard Ullman defines it this way, “A threat to national security is an action 
or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time 
to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to 
narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, 
nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.”349   
4) Arnold Wolfers writes, “Security, in any objective sense, measures the absence 
of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values 
will be attacked.”350   
5) Ken Booth goes further and states, “Emancipation is the freeing of people (as 
individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop them 
carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of 
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those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression, and so on. 
Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or 
order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.”351   
6) John Mroz writes that security is “the relative freedom from harmful 
threats.”352   
7) Finally, on the other end of the spectrum, Peter Hough proposes that, “If 
people, be they government ministers or private individuals, perceive an issue to threaten 
their lives in some way and respond politically to this, then that issue should be deemed 
to be a security issue (emphasis in original).”353   
As can be seen, definitions of security range from power as security to freedom as 
security. The most common argument for human security, and the one that is used here, 
holds that those who have “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear”354 are less 
likely to engage in violent conflict in order to change their condition or station in life. 
The discussion and definition of human security is relevant for this dissertation because if 
PSCs are to fulfill the fundamental requirements of peacekeepers and the fundamental 
purpose of peacekeepers is to protect individuals from violence, then human security 
must be key to the use of PSCs. In the case of PSCs conducting peacekeeping, many of 
the pros and cons relate specifically to the question of PSCs’ ability to improve or 
degrade human security. One might argue that UN peacekeepers do much more than 
protect people from violence. While this is true, their duties, first and foremost and 
fundamentally, are to protect people; everything else follows from this foundation. 
Moreover, if PSCs can be seen to protect human security at the fundamental (narrow 
view) level, the other pros and cons to their use can be focused upon for decision-making. 
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As an internal threat, neglect of either tenet of human security leads to dynamics 
that can put national security at risk.355  By extension, if outside intervention is necessary 
in order to restore or create conditions which lead to “freedom from want” or “freedom 
from fear” (or both), then the lack of human security within a state can also lead to 
impingements upon sovereignty. A problem with a single definition of security is that 
there is often little room for reconciliation with other definitions of security without 
compromise. The compromise that is made on the national security side is that the idea of 
security is broadened beyond and crosses over borders. While national security implies 
that threats are primarily external to the state (exogenous) and require defense -–usually 
military or economic -–to affect protection, human security assumes that threats are more 
frequently internal, systemic, and not generally solvable by military action or armed 
forces.356  According to P. H. Liotta, this is the challenge, the “need to recognize both the 
continuing security dilemma of states and the emerging survival dilemmas of regions.”357  
His article on the “Boomerang Effect” argues that we cannot focus on either national 
security or human security too heavily, otherwise, there will necessarily be a cost to the 
neglected side and that this “may well cause us to be ‘boomeranged’ by a poor balancing 
of ends and means in a changing security environment.”358 
Human security and national security may not be directly related to each other in 
a zero-sum fashion, i.e., resources diverted to one are an expense or detriment to the 
other, but they are related through multiple channels of effect, including transnational 
terrorism, crime, climate change, pollution, migration of refugees, violence to 
individuals, and the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction across 
borders. Although human security advocates profess that improving the lives of human 
beings supersedes bolstering the security of national borders, strong states and 
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governments remain essential to international coordination and any chance at improving 
human security, regardless of the definition chosen.359  Therefore, for purposes of this 
research (and as has been stated before), human security focuses on “violent threats to 
individuals”;360 the nexus to national security is that strong governments have the ability 
to not only protect their own citizens, but to assist or intervene when necessary to protect 
citizens of other states. The primary method by which the international community 
intervenes is through the UN and peacekeeping in order to “save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war.”361 
The idea of human security remains an area of both contention and consensus, as 
well as an area rife with debate. Much of the literature on the subject focuses on 
definitions, and attempts to identify exactly what areas of “human security” are most 
important in order to prioritize recommended action.362  As has been addressed, there are 
also those who hold that the concept of human security is simply too vague and too broad 
to focus on any particular area, which results in such weak or dispersed action that little is 
achieved in accomplishing the proclaimed goals of those working toward improving 
“human security.”363  In the end, the idea of human security is one that continues to  
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appear in academic literature, as well as in media and institutional rhetoric, ranging from 
local to global security, and on subjects as diverse as poverty and water scarcity, to crime 
and international terrorism.  
One element of human security that is agreed upon is that human security places 
individuals above all other security concerns as what is commonly called the “referent 
object” of security dialogue.364  As the referent object, individuals require protection 
before other objects of security in order for security at any level to exist. For example, 
human security theorists would hold that the nations with the highest level of security for 
their citizens are not the ones that necessarily have the strongest and most capable 
militaries, but instead are the nations who can best protect their citizenry by providing 
them with two of the fundamental elements of human security:  “freedom from fear” and 
“freedom from want.”365  Human security is defined in the United Nations Development 
Programme’s Human Development Report as that which “means, first, safety from such 
chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression. And second, it means protection from 
sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or 
in communities.”366  Archbishop Desmond Tutu wrote in 2005, “Human security 
privileges people over states, reconciliation over revenge, diplomacy over deterrence, and 
multilateral engagement over coercive unilateralism.”367 
As a concept, human security is defined in many ways, usually with variations on 
the single theme of protection of individuals; however, there are primarily two schools of 
thought with regard to threats to human security:  1) The narrow view, which holds that 
threats are generally in the form of violence to individuals or communities, and are 
usually internal to a state;368 and 2) the broad view, which holds that the concept of 
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human security should include threats to humanity such as natural disasters, poverty, 
hunger, disease, and water scarcity.369  The broad view includes violent threats to 
individuals such as genocide and terrorism, and goes as far as adding “threats to human 
dignity.”370  Herein lies one of the major problems noted by critics of human security:  
the concept is simply too broad to be of value toward minimizing any threats to security. 
Roland Paris argues that because the term human security is so vague and can mean 
practically anything, “it verges on meaninglessness—and consequently offers little 
practical guidance to academics who might be interested in applying the concept, or to 
policymakers who must prioritize among competing policy goals.”  In terms of 
securitization, “making everything a security threat in effect prioritizes nothing.”371  It is 
for this reason that scholars have focused a great deal of attention on narrowing the field 
and prioritizing threats, or, as Buzan calls them, “referent objects,” which are “things that 
are seen to be existentially threatened and have a legitimate claim to survival.”372  
Agreement in order to create a legitimate locus of opinion on what the priorities should 
be is elusive; until this happens, policy-makers do not have clear guidance on where 
improvements should be made.   
2. The Broad View 
Proponents of the broad view contend that to exclude things like disease, poverty, 
malnutrition, or the consequences of natural disasters is to remove that component of 
human security from which the greatest amount of misery or death is derived. Their 
analysis finds that many more people die from hunger or poverty than from terrorist 
attacks or genocide. The broad view began primarily with Mahbub ul Haq’s writing on 
the subject of human security in his 1993 Human Development Report, and then was 
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developed further in the 1994 Human Development Report, in which the previously 
mentioned seven types of security were added to the conventional ideas of security.373   
Over the years, writers on the subject, such as Caroline Thomas, have added 
definitions hoping to better determine the fundamental causes of human insecurity. She 
has identified first, material inequality, then development, and protection of human 
dignity, as factors all leading to overall quality of life across a global spectrum, rather 
than quantified by national haves and have-nots.374  Thomas’s argument undercuts the 
supremacy of states to reductions in poverty and development. She argues that poverty 
reduction and development must be given priority within a global social structure rather 
than under the discretion of individual states since vast inequality exists between 
states.375   
Roland Paris is one of the critics who believe that the concept of human security 
is too broad to be of any use. In his article “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” 
he writes that virtually anything that causes “unexpected or irregular discomfort could 
conceivably constitute a threat to one’s human security.”376  He addresses others writing 
in the field of human security by pointing out that the extents they go to in attempts to 
classify and categorize within the field of human security only result in broadening an 
already expansive definition. 
Paris and others argue that although these sorts of non-specific and indirect threats 
affect human security, they more often than not include such a vast array of societal 
threats (as “diverse as genocide and affronts to personal dignity”)377 that it disallows any 
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policy-making from being effective. Roland Paris, who holds that the concept of human 
security is too broad, writes that “if human security is all these things, what is it not?” 
3. The Narrow View 
Under the narrow concept of human security, the primary threat is violence to 
individuals. Kofi Annan wrote that it is “the protection of communities and individuals 
from internal violence.”378  Proponents of this view argue primarily that foundations of 
human security must be built upon a more fundamental and practical guide to action. It is 
upon these foundations, they hold, that other components of human security can be built 
and improved; and it is within these categories where differences between states and 
specific human security issues become distinguished.   
One of the arguments critical of this narrow view is that more people die from 
malnutrition and disease than from conflict and war. The point that is often missed is that 
the former problems are, more often than not, the long-term, indirect effects of the latter 
(war or conflict). Identifying and focusing on the initial and consequential causes rather 
than symptoms alone is essential in encouraging positive change that ultimately improves 
human security. 
Part of the problem is that the indirect effects of war, e.g., malnutrition and 
disease, are first, often difficult to attribute to war; second, once they do gain attention, 
the causal relationship to war, that is, distinguishing war-related deaths from “normal” 
deaths is hard to establish; and third, they do not gain the attention of humanitarian aid 
organizations (IOs, NGOs, INGOs), states, or the global community until death rates 
increase significantly.379  By the time the international community or humanitarian 
organizations respond, it is often too late to save many who may have had a chance at 
survival had intervention been sooner. One example of this “too little, too late” assistance 
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is Sudan’s Darfur region and the hundreds of thousands of people who died of 
malnutrition and disease before international attention or aid arrived.380 
One of the biggest problems of a narrow concept of human security is that it 
involves an increased level of intervention that is hard for many states to accept. Unlike 
the broad view, where actors’ attempts to help are often less intrusive and seen more as 
after-the-fact benevolent assistance, the narrow view encourages states to intervene in 
conflicts early in order to prevent the follow-on and indirect consequences of war. Under 
this view, it is better to preemptively remove the cause than to wait for its negative after-
effects. However, this view raises many questions since 1) sovereignty is often violated 
in order to intervene; 2) intervention implies that a settlement can be reached; 3) 
intervention from the international community is a slow process requiring approval of the 
UN Security Council (3–6 months), then identification and deployment of troops (> three 
months)–this process can take upwards of a year; 4) violence against persons often gets 
placed on hold while outsiders are in-country and resumes immediately upon the 
departure of the outsiders. 
Human security continues to be an area without clear definition. The most 
common argument holds that those who have “freedom from want” and “freedom from 
fear”381 will be less likely to engage in violent conflict in order to change their condition 
or station in life. This dissertation deals with the narrow view of human security, which 
focuses more on the “freedom from fear” aspect. However, as an internal threat, neglect 
of either tenet of human security leads to conditions that can put individuals at risk. On 
the other hand, if outside intervention is necessary in order to restore or create conditions 
which lead to “freedom from want” or “freedom from fear,” then the lack of human 
security within a state can also lead to impingements upon sovereignty.   
Because human security is often confused with human rights and human rights are 
also an essential part of successful peacekeeping, a discussion of human rights follows. 
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B.  PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Do not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse 
or exploitation of the local population or United Nations staff, especially 
women and children. 
  Rule #4—Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets382 
 
Will our [peacekeeping] failures and their civilian casualties just dissolve 
into unrecorded history–like 100,000 rape cases here–unexposed, 
anonymous, abandoned?   
     Kenneth Cain, Liberia, 1996383 
 
1. UN Peacekeepers, Regional Peacekeepers, Human Rights, and Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse 
Human rights violations by UN and regional peacekeepers have been highlighted 
in the media and have caused a great deal of embarrassment to the UN or the 
organizations they represent. Examples include the negative impact on NATO following 
a child prostitution ring scandal in Bosnia, AU troops in Democratic Republic of Congo 
raping women, and UN peacekeepers accused of the sexual assault of a young Haitian 
man. These peacekeeper incidents of human rights violations, which are often the sexual 
exploitation and abuse (SEA) of local civilians, or those living in conflict/post-conflict 
(C/PC) states, have become more prevalent in communities where populations are 
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have caused a decrease in UN legitimacy and credibility, two of the critical factors of 
successful UN missions.384  If the UN and UN peacekeepers cannot be trusted, who can 
be trusted? 
One result of the UN’s diminished legitimacy has been an increase of attacks on 
UN operators or peacekeepers in the countries they are purporting to help.385  As a 
consequence of UN personnel and offices being targeted and increasingly attacked, they 
have resorted to increased use of local security and PSCs for protection.386  The increase 
in security further distances UN personnel from the communities in which they are 
supposed to be working. As a result, the UN is seen less integrated as a part of the 
community and more as an outsider. Since interventions have been promoted by 
predominantly major powers, the UN has become increasingly viewed as a Western-
influenced organization.387  Perception of the UN as pro-Western (also perceived by 
some as anti-Muslim) raises questions over UN neutrality and impartiality.388  This new 
UN “culture of security” has resulted in a downward spiral akin to the classic concept of 
the security dilemma where an increase in military preparations or defensive measures by 
one side can be viewed as an “aggressive” act, spurring insecurity and possibly 
aggression as a response, which then leads to another increase in security, and so on.389  
A major difference here is that this “securitization” of the UN for reasons of protection 
and security is happening within states and within the communities they are supposedly 
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working alongside, not against or between, as in an anarchic international system. 
Creating a divide between the UN and distressed populations can negatively affect human 
security. 
When the UN separates itself from the people and communities it is supposed to 
be helping, an “us versus them” mentality can develop. If this adversarial relationship 
begins to take shape in peace support operations, it risks affecting UN officials and 
personnel in a way that creates a situation whereby it becomes easier to treat the 
“peacekept” with less respect. As this subordinate and unequal relationship is formed, 
dependency can develop, creating an increase in the “needy” and vulnerable, rather than 
one where the UN enables communities and citizens to help themselves as “viable 
partners with rights.”390  It is the function of the UNDSS and the security management 
system to “enable the conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the safety, 
security and well-being of personnel and the security of United Nations premises and 
assets.”391  Aware that the “culture of security” can lead toward “bunkerization,”392 and 
that “the ‘UN fortress’ approach […]potentially distances it from the public it was 
founded to serve,” the UN recognizes that it must maintain its connection to communities 
and people.393  In 2011, the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) created a report entitled “To Stay and Deliver” which addressed new methods of 
protecting UN personnel while remaining able to get involved in the communities they 
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are there to protect.394  “Smart protection” and not “bunkerization” is the goal.395  
Therefore, although the security of UN personnel is important for them to be able to 
conduct their mission, yet not become a “risk-averse organization,” the UN must find the 
right balance in ensuring their personnel (officials and peacekeepers) are protected from 
danger in hazardous locations while fostering an environment of cooperation, 
communication, integration, and human security among the people they are assisting.396  
In order to function effectively, “member states need to earn back the public’s trust in the 
Organization” and they will only accomplish this through proper conduct and effective 
action.397 
In seeking the right balance, and in concert with the “smart protection” approach, 
the UN has recently a policy of “how to stay,” rather than “when to leave”; the goal of 
which is to focus on development of communities, continuing protection of civilians 
(PoC), and promotion of human security, not only in the narrow sense, but broadly as 
well. The UN has taken the tack that through respecting human rights and adherence to 
human rights policies the adversarial nature of tense security relationships can be 
overcome. As one “Peacebrief” by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) notes, 
“using a human rights lens provides a different focus,” one that concentrates on 
communities and the environment in which all actors work in humanitarian crises or 
C/PC situations.398 
In the 1990s there were reported instances of regional organizations (ROs) in 
peacekeeping missions using excessive force. One example that stands out is 
ECOMOG’s involvement in Sierra Leone against the RUF. Comprised by a majority of 
Nigerian troops, ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was the driving 
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force that went in and routed the RUF from Freetown, the capitol of Sierra Leone. 
Nigeria’s General Sani Abacha had been criticized by Western states for his record on 
human rights, yet it was his leadership in the Sierra Leone intervention that allowed 
Sierra Leone’s third president, Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to return to power in March 
1998.399  His forces allegedly used excessive force and violated international 
humanitarian law (IHL) in forcing the RUF away from the city and back into the 
countryside.400 
Encouragement of the use of ROs, such as ECOWAS, to send their own forces 
and solve problems at the regional level under Chapter VIII of the Charter, requires a 
certain acceptance of the RO’s methods. Additionally, the majority of ROs do not 
“possess the infrastructure, expertise, mandate, and finance to tackle effectively a 
humanitarian crisis.”401  Consequently, RO intervention has mixed results.402  If ROs or 
states fail in their ability to end conflict, the UN can intervene under mandate from the 
Security Council. However, the decision to intervene by the UNSG can take months or 
years, resulting in continued immiseration of populations of countries involved in these 
“new wars.”403  A recurring theme in the nineties following the Cold War was less than 
robust UN peacekeeping which prolonged conflict, allowed human rights violations on a 
massive scale to continue (Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Bosnia, Angola, Liberia, etc.), and 
ultimately resulted in the appearance of the UN as a weak and ineffectual organization. 
The UN’s failure to engage early enough or robustly enough in states like Liberia, 
Angola, or Sierra Leone has been a consistent theme in discussions and case studies on 
peacekeeping failure. 
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By the 2000s, the UN began to implement important and meaningful changes in 
how they intervened in C/PC situations, incorporating the concept of human security and 
the responsibility to protect (R2P) in UN interventions and peace operations. The focus 
had shifted significantly from protection of states or factions to protection of people or 
communities. This shift in focus did not prevent human rights abuses from occurring, 
however. With peacekeepers in close contact with people in distress, e.g., refugees, IDPs, 
and accompanying issues of poverty, hunger, disease, lack of shelter, etc., certain 
peacekeepers took advantage of these distressed populations through sexual favors, 
prostitution, or other abhorrent abuses. The UN, whose reputation was still in recovery 
from the failures of the nineties, could not afford further loss of credibility or legitimacy. 
In response to these abuses, the UN set up its SEA task force under the Executive 
Committees on Humanitarian Affairs and Peace and Security (ECHA/ECPS) in 2005.404  
The task force works based upon its four pillars of protection from SEA: 
 Pillar I: Engagement with and support of local population 
 Pillar II: Prevention 
 Pillar III: Response 
 Pillar IV: Management and coordination.405 
Although there had been previous measures in place under the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) task force, the Building Safer Organizations (BSO) project, 
and others, none were quite as comprehensive or effective as the newest policy guidelines 
on prevention of SEA and gender-based violence. The new task force began an 
aggressive policy of establishing measures to address perpetrators and hold them 
accountable through thorough investigations and following up on prosecutions in 
jurisdictional states. Additionally, a resolution on criminal accountability extending 
jurisdiction was added, ensuring there was no impunity for misconduct or criminal 
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behavior by UN officials or experts on mission.406  There is also an Office of Internal 
Oversight Services (OIOS), an independent arm of the UN which investigates all 
allegations of SEA-related offenses, as well as other category I criminal offenses such as 
murder, bribery, narcotics trafficking, illegal mineral trade, forgery, assault, and 
entitlement fraud or procurement violations (see Table 1 below for a list of all 
misconduct and offenses).407  The task force also provided tools for training and a 
“strategy on assistance to victims” which serves to counsel both victims and those who 
deal with victims. In 2006 the UN also created a database of peacekeeper abuses so they 
could track their progress and gain lessons learned from the misconduct taking place.   By 
2008, the Department of Field Support (UNDFS) created the Misconduct Tracking 
System (MTS), a global database that tracks all allegations of misconduct. The UN has a 
zero tolerance policy for SEA and gender-based violence, but this does not mean that 
incidences do not occur or do not go unpunished. It means that the UN is beginning to 
work to take seriously its commitment to human rights and human security. 
The previous section discussed human rights in an effort to show that human 
rights are taken seriously by the UN.  While human security in the narrow view protects 
people from violence, human rights can be considered part of the broad view, integral to 
protecting people and a considerable part of successful peacekeeping.  The next section 
discusses the connection between PSCs, human security, and human rights; this is 
necessary since PSCs operate in the same space as peacekeepers and human rights play a 
major role in factors such as legitimacy and accountability. 
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A Serious criminal 
offenses. 
 
All sexual exploitation 
and abuse offenses. 
 Rape 
 Transactional sex 
 Exploitative relationships 
 Sexual abuse 
 Cases involving risk of loss of life to staff or 
others 
 Abuse of authority or staff 
 Conflict of interest 
 Gross mismanagement 
 Bribery/corruption 
 Illegal mineral trade 
 Trafficking with prohibited goods 
 Life threat/murder 
 Abuse or torture of detainees 
 Arms trade 
 Physical assault 
 Forgery 
 Embezzlement 
 Major theft/fraud 
 Use, possession or distribution of illegal 
narcotics 
 Waste of substantial resources 
 Entitlement fraud 
 Procurement violations 
B Misconduct that does not 
fit into Category 1. 
 
Type of misconduct that 






 Sexual harassment 
 Abuse of authority 
 Abusive behavior 
 Basic misuse of equipment or staff 
 Simple theft/fraud 
 Infractions of regulations, rules or 
administrative issuances 
 Traffic-related violations 
 Conduct that could bring the UN into dispute 
 Breaking curfew 
 Contract disputes 
 Basic mismanagement 
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2. PSCs, Human Security, and Human Rights409 
In view of the ever-expanding global scope of PSCs and in order to ameliorate 
human rights violations, there is an increased need for internationally enforceable 
regulations, or at least clear lines of accountability in order to standardize PSC training, 
procedures, legal obligations, and controls. States may not have an interest in exposing 
themselves to more international law which could be viewed as impinging upon 
sovereignty. However, it is in states’ and corporations’ best interests to become familiar 
not only with hard law and accompanying legal mechanisms of accountability, but also 
“soft law” and instruments such as the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Service Providers (ICoC) and the Montreux Document developed in concert with 
representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), NGOs, the UN, 
and PSCs (both the ICoC and the Montreux Document will be discussed in subsequent 
sections).  For states, the benefit is a potential to protect citizens and communities from 
bad actors, misconduct, and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). For corporations, there 
is the reputational benefit of being vetted as a company that does not commit human 
rights abuses or at least one that takes oversight and accountability seriously. 
States and PSCs can use the Montreux Document as a guideline of international 
legal obligations and “good practices,” using it as a functional checklist promoting only 
those contracts that reflect adherence to international humanitarian law and human rights 
law, as well as its recommendations on “good practices.” 410  This checklist can be used 
to prevent or reduce common problems encountered when hiring PSCs. Standards 
outlined in the Document could be used as guidelines for review and monitoring of PSCs 
(and contracts) so that abuses such as the one that occurred in Nisour Square, Baghdad in 
                                                 
409 For more on PSCs, human rights, and the UN, see also, John Ruggie’s concept “Protect Respect, 
and Remedy,” OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the IFC Social and Environmental 
Performance Standards, Montreux Document, and the UN Global Compact. 
410 The term “good practices” was used in the Montreux Document because the term “best practices” 
was viewed as too subjective a term. “[States] signalled [sic] that they would not agree to a document that 
established binding standards or singled some practice out as the ‘best’-or even as ‘recommended.’” As a 
result, negotiating parties settled on the term “good practices.”  James Cockayne, “Regulating Private 
Military and Security Companies:  the Content, Negotiation, Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux 
Document,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law C&S Law 2008, no. 13 (2008): 9. 
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2007 can be prevented or at least efficaciously dealt with when they occur. As it stands, 
abuses like the “Nisour Square massacre” (as it has been referred to often in the media), 
where 17 civilians were killed by Blackwater private security personnel, have not only 
brought international shame upon PSCs, but multinational corporations, and to some 
extent, the United States. PSCs are no longer just American companies; their actions have 
international and national security ramifications.411  Ultimately, the two parts of the 
Montreux Document412 serve as useful guidelines for the State, if only to clarify 
international law and responsibilities, since nothing in the Document is binding on any 
State, nor are there any enforcement mechanisms associated with it. Even so, the 
Montreux Document does provide valuable information that can be used by contracting 
bodies if only to protect themselves from liabilities associated with the use of private 
security. Discussions on germane topics such as weapons transport, licensing, vetting of 
employees, and training are all contained in the Document, providing valuable 
contracting guidelines for both PSCs and hiring states or organizations.   
The ICoC, developed primarily by the ICRC is valuable for states and PSCs alike 
because it not only builds upon the Montreux Document, but it spells out responsibilities 
of both governments and PSCs towards the “provision of security services so as to 
support the rule of law, respect the human rights of all persons, and protect the interests 
of their clients.”413  As of 1 August 2012, 462 PSCs have signed and committed to the 
ICoC, the main purpose of which is to set out “human rights based principles for the 
responsible provision of private security services.”414  Whether or not these “aspirational 
standards” will have a positive effect on human rights and human security in 
                                                 
411 The U.S. government’s failure to “establish a workable accountability mechanism” for PSCs in 
Iraq and Afghanistan led to abuses and ultimately undermined U.S. national security interests. See First, 
“PSCs at War,” iii. 
412 The Montreux Document is broken down into two sections: 1) “…pertinent international legal 
obligations”; and 2) good practices for states related to operations of [PSCs] during armed conflict.”  The 
first section is a good primer on laws that do apply to PSCs and the second section is useful guidance when 
writing contracts with or hiring PSCs. 
413 Council, “ICoC  for Private Security Service Providers,” 1-4. 
414 See “The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers Signatory Companies,” 
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Signatory_Companies_-_August_2012_-_Composite_List.pdf, Ibid. 
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conflict/post-conflict (C/PC) or peacekeeping environments remains to be seen. Because 
there are no binding mechanisms, the ICoC and the Montreux Document do not have the 
international weight to enforce “good” PSC behavior or hold anyone accountable for 
human rights violations. However, as previously noted, there is value in establishing 
standards that let PSCs develop a good reputation and the potential for the document to 
influence norms toward changing behavior and establishing “hard” law. 
An example of self-regulation failure can be found in the wake of the Nisour 
Square massacre and Blackwater in its association with the International Stability 
Operations Association (ISOA) (then known as the International Peace Operations 
Association), a self-proclaimed “trade organization” (ISOA is also commonly referred to 
as a lobbying group). Blackwater was a member of ISOA from its beginnings in 2001, 
when one of the things that made IPOA stand out was that it had its own code of conduct 
(International Peace Operations Association Code of Conduct) to which each member of 
its more than sixty member companies must commit.415    
Following the Nisour square incident in which Blackwater employees shot and 
killed 17 innocent Iraqis, IPOA was pressured to conduct its own investigation into the 
events and hold Blackwater accountable for its actions. In fact, holding Blackwater 
“accountable” simply meant that the most that the IPOA could do was suspend or expel 
them from the organization. Two weeks before IPOA launched its investigation, 
Blackwater resigned their membership in the IPOA negating the need for any 
investigation into its alleged breach of the ISOA CoC 
A common claim of ISOA is that reputation matters and that member companies 
who are “bound” by the ISOA CoC can be trusted to provide services respectful of 
human rights, human security, rule of law, and the cultures of the people with whom they 
interact.416  Blackwater’s disassociation with IPOA and subsequently ISOA, did not seem 
                                                 
415 The ISOA code of conduct continues to exist today with more than sixty signatory member 
companies (less than twenty are PSCs) and can be found at http://stability-
operations.org/files/files/S%20800%2013%20EN%20T%20-%20Code%20of%20Conduct%20-
%20English%20%28Letter%20Size%29.pdf, website, accessed 1 August 2012. 
416 Vogel, Jessica, email communication, 1. 
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to have any direct effect on Blackwater’s ability to retain and let additional contracts with 
the U.S. government. What effected Blackwater’s ability to operate, albeit briefly, in Iraq, 
was that the government of Iraq prohibited them from operating within the country. If 
IPOA’s CoC was to prevent abuses in a preventive sense, it failed; if IPOA membership 
was supposed to positively affect future potential contracts, and by implication, removal 
from membership was supposed to negatively affect the ability to gain contracts and 
serve as a sort of punishment for misconduct or breach of the ISOA CoC, this too failed.  
“Aspirational standards,” self-regulation, and international norms or “soft” law, 
such as the Montreux Document and the ICoC or the ISOA CoC are, to use a word from 
the Montreux Document, a “good” effort at taking the necessary steps toward “more 
effective regulation and improved accountability” for PSCs, which, if adhered to, have 
the potential to be one more way to improve human security and protect human rights.417  
Thus, in the interest of protection of human rights and meeting the primary mission of the 
UN, it can be seen that regulation and monitoring of PSCs, as well as peacekeepers, must 
run the gamut from hard law to soft law and cover the spectrum through both national 
and international legal systems. 
 
                                                 
417 Cockayne, “Regulating Private Military and Security Companies:  the Content, Negotiation, 
Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document.”; United Nations, “Status of the Protocols Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of armed conflicts (Montreux 
Document),” in A/63/467--S/2008/636, ed. United Nations General Assembly Security Council (Montreux, 
Switzerland: United Nations, 2008). 
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V. WEIGHING THE PROS AND CONS:  DATA AND RESEARCH 
This chapter reviews comparisons between the costs of using UN peacekeepers, 
regional peacekeepers, peacekeeping operations, and private security companies. The 
data does not support line-for-line financial or task-for task cost comparisons, but it does 
give a good general comparison of operational costs versus achieved goals within defined 
timeframes. This chapter also looks at types and numbers of abuses caused by PSC 
employees compared with those committed by UN peacekeepers. Finally, this chapter 
looks at other factors that affect the use of PSCs in different peacekeeping situations and 
compares them to government troops used under international mandates and finds that 
legitimacy plays a fundamental role in use determination. The chapter ends with a 
discussion on legitimacy and the role that effectiveness plays in intervention and human 
security. 
A. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES VERSUS PEACEKEEPERS 
1. Costs 
We lack the metrics to know if the global effort to privatize and outsource 
formerly inherently governmental functions is cost-effective.418         
                       Donald Rumsfeld, “War on Terror memo,” 16 October 2003 
                                                 
418 David Isenberg paraphrasing U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in “war on terror 
memo” to General Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, General Pete Pace, and Doug Feith. Donald Rumsfeld, 16 
October 2003; David Isenberg, “Getting Data for the Debate: All Hail DTM,” in Huffington Post Business 
Section (Washington, DC: Huffington Post, 5 October 2012). 
Senator McCaskill also recognized problems with subcontracting and lack of transparency:  “Well, as 
you know, we had a…problem in the LOGCAP contract where we have kickbacks with KBR, and that’s one 
of those large, duration-of-wartime contracts that is kind of the poster child for contracting gone badly. 
And the host trucking contract with multiple layers of subcontracts really had a security risk associated 
with it as it related to where the money was going. Clearly, we figured out that some of the money was 
going to the bad guys. So what we’re looking for here is, we don’t want to get away from the efficiencies 
that subcontracting might provide. But we’ve got to really get to a much more transparent situation.”  Sen. 
McCaskill (D-MO). See Contracting Oversight Subcommittee of the Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee, Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform Act of 2012, 17 April 
2012. 
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Cost must always be a consideration when making the decision whether or not to 
privatize or outsource anything, especially if that which is to be privatized has not 
previously been a commercial activity.419  As Doug Brooks, President of the 
International Stability Operations Association and the lead lobbyist for PSCs in the U.S., 
writes, “If the contractor does not provide faster—cheaper—better services than 
you, why would you hire them?”420  In the U.S. this decision-making first falls largely 
within the context of that which is “inherently governmental” and those activities which 
are not. Those functions which fall into the inherently governmental category are not 
permitted to be privatized.421  Combat and most combat-related military actions are 
considered to be “inherently governmental” since they fall under Department of 
Defense’s purview and as critical to “determining, protecting, and advancing U.S. 
economic, political, territorial, property, or other interests by military …action.”422  Once 
an activity is determined to be outside of that which is inherently governmental, cost 
becomes a factor for consideration along with things like efficiency and capability.   
So, what are the costs of a UN peacekeeper vs. the costs associated with 
contracting a private person?  It is unlikely that any PSC would agree to hire its personnel 
at the UN rate of U.S.$1,028 per month.  (Doug Brooks, the president of the ISOA also 
stated this during my interview with him on 3 Sept 2010.)423  On the face of the matter, it 
seems clear that there would either need to be higher pay for PSC peacekeepers or there 
would need to be other incentives for PSCs to agree to conduct peacekeeping even if the 
                                                 
419 Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing sovereignty : why privatization of government functions threatens 
democracy and what we can do about it  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 188–90. 
420 Zachary Karazsia, “Peace Inc.? The Role of Contractors in International Peace Operations,” 
University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs 11 April 2012. The ISOA 
claims to offer “vital services in conflict, post-conflict and disaster relief operations.” 
421 John R. Luckey and Kate M. Manuel, “Definitions of ‘Inherently Governmental Functions’ in 
Federal Procurement Law and Guidance,” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 24 January 
2012). See also United States Code, “Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act,” ed. U.S. 
Government (Washington, DC1998)., 31 U.S.C. §501 note, at §5(2)(A) and Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” ed. SIGAR 
(Washington, DC 30 April 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a76_incl_tech_correction.html. 
422 Code, “Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act.” U.S.C. §501 note, at §5(2)(B)(i)-(v). 
423 Doug Brooks, interview, 3 Sept 2010, ISOA offices, Washington, DC. 
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UN agreed to hire them. Another possibility is that PSCs could simply hire third country 
nationals (TCNs) at a fraction of the cost of UK or U.S. nationals for peacekeeping, i.e. 
something PSCs are notorious for doing in other contracts for security.  Depending upon 
the mission and mandate, this may be feasible; however, quality and training level of the 
hire becomes a primary concern. How well are PSC TCNs trained?  The answer is that it 
all depends on the company, its standards, its method(s) of hire, and myriad other factors. 
Why this is relevant is because the level of training of PSC personnel is critical to 
fundamental or entry-level capability. Without capability (based upon demonstrated skills 
and effective contract performance), there is no a priori reason to evaluate pros and cons 
or even consider PSCs for peacekeeping. However, if the UN required that all 
peacekeepers matriculate through the same training pipeline, then it could be assumed 
that skill levels would be equal. Even if this were the case, PSCs still need to make a 
profit and there would necessarily be a fee associated with finding candidates for training 
and duty as a privatized peacekeeper. Cost is a consideration that cannot automatically be 
assumed is less when governmental or international organization functions are privatized. 
Considering the problems which have occurred with UN peacekeepers, especially 
of late, for example, the alleged rape of a boy by Uruguayan peacekeepers in Haiti, the 
cholera epidemic blamed on Nepalese troops, human rights abuses in numerous African 
UN missions, existing training is not enough to ensure peacekeepers are qualified and 
suited for their roles. 
Direct cost comparisons do little in determining whether or not PSCs will be 
“cheaper” than traditional peacekeeping troops. In the end, a price tag is difficult to put 
on making R2P and humanitarian intervention determinations; effectiveness is what 
matters.424  (What is the cost of ending the “scourge of war?”)  Moreover, the cost of 
PSCs in Iraq or Afghanistan is not indicative of what costs may be when hired by the UN 
                                                 
424 For excellent discussions on both the responsibility to protect (R2P) and effectiveness as the 
dominant factor in humanitarian intervention and R2P, see both Gareth J. Evans, The responsibility to 
protect : ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all  (Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2008); Pattison, Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect : who should intervene? 
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for peacekeeping missions; contracts can vary widely and cannot be predicted for future 
possible use by the UN for peacekeeping services.  
To be clear, peacekeeping costs and the cost of hiring PSCs are not technically 
comparable line-for-line, but this does not mean that some inferences cannot be drawn 
from comparing some of the cost data that does exist from the accomplishment of 
specific missions or attainment of certain outcomes. Cost figures are reproduced and 
compared here as representative examples of what a peacekeeper costs versus a PSC 
employee for what might be similar tasks; there is no way to compare task-for-task or 
position-for-position since peacekeeping has not been outsourced to PSCs. UN figures 
used are current as of 2011. Since PSCs generally do not publish their contracts and 
specific employee salaries, PSC figures have been derived from the GAO, CRS reports, 
and multiple correlating second-sources.  For example, I have used Eeben Barlow’s 
account of the contracted amount for EO’s services in Angola and Sierra Leone, matched 
up to the government of Sierra Leone’s claimed contract amount, combined with 
published information by recognized experts such as Peter Singer, Debra Avant, Allison 
Stanger, and etc. 
These figures do not account for per diem payments to observers or officials on 
mission, which can vary by location and country contributing; UN staff also receives a 
per diem payment not accounted for specifically here. Moreover, the UN does not pay for 
uniforms, vaccines, training, or purchase of equipment for troop lending countries—these 
costs are borne by the TLCs. However, in the end, this only furthers arguments that PSCs 
may be cheaper since the UN might not be paying the PSCs for any of those things either. 
Since this dissertation is not an investigation into UN or PSC payment comparisons, 
general figures have been used and total amounts have been used for comparison 
purposes. When it comes down to paying for each peacekeeper or task-by-task payment, 
costs become the realm of contracts and the negotiation that will be necessary if the UN 
does choose to outsource peacekeeping (possibly similar to how it currently outsources 
PSCs for personal protection and protection of buildings and equipment/supplies). In the 
final analysis, total cost against effectiveness and accomplishment may be the best 
overall measure for comparison. 
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a. Peacekeeper Costs 
The UN pays for peacekeeping at a rate of U.S.$1028 per month per 
soldier regardless of rank425 out of the UN assessment account into which countries pay 
based upon their national budget assessment.426  The individual peacekeepers themselves 
do not generally get this amount. The money is directed from the UN to the nation in 
which the soldier is a citizen. The country receiving the UN funds can essentially do with 
the money as it wishes. Commonly, the soldier receives her military salary irrespective of 
what the UN has paid for her UN service. In some cases, such as in Fiji, the soldiers 
receive much less than what the UN pays per soldier supplied. UN payments are a 
substantial part of Fiji’s GDP. For example, in the thirty years that Fiji has been 
providing peacekeepers, the country has received more than U.S.$300 million, an average 
of U.S.$10 million a year.427  In fact, the way the UN budget is used, there are “those 
who pay” and “those who play” in UN missions. Table 3 addresses the levels of UN state 
involvement, the role of states in peacekeeping, and compares the pros and cons to the 
use of PSCs.  “The ‘players’ are reimbursed through the UN for their forces, and poorer 
countries like Bangladesh and Fiji make no secret that they profit from peacekeeping.”428  
For example, a recent news report notes that “Bangladeshi soldiers serving as UN 
                                                 
425 United Nations, “Financing Peacekeeping,” United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml. Experts on mission, HQ personnel, and 
other administrators may also be considered “peacekeepers,” but they receive varying amounts, including 
per diem, based upon location, mission, and other factors. These payments could far surpass the $1028 
standard peacekeeper payment. 
426 Assessment accounts were established in 1974 by UNGA, Resolution 1310, replacing the previous 
method of pulling peacekeeping money from the UN regular budget. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The 
political economy of NATO : past, present, and into the 21st century  (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 100.   
427 Since 1978 Fiji has provided approximately 25,000 peacekeepers to the UN. According to Fiji’s 
Ministry of Finance, Fiji brought in U.S.$11.1 million in 2010, and estimates U.S.$14.7 million in 2011 
from peacekeeping. Additionally, Fiji received U.S.$2 million in 2010 and U.S.$3.5 million in 2011 
donations from UNDP. Jon Fraenkel and Stewart Firth, The 2006 military takeover in Fiji : a coup to end 
all coups?  (Acton, A.C.T.: ANU E Press, 2009), 119; David Kolitagane, “Economic and Fiscal Update: 
Supplement to the 2011 Budget Address,” (Fiji: Republic of Fiji Ministry of Finance, 26 November 2010), 
36. 
428 Gowan, “Will UN Peacekeeping Fall Victim to Budget Cuts?,” 1-3. 
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peacekeepers have sent home nearly U.S.$1 billion (S$1.24b) during the past three years, 
the country’s envoy to the UN said on Thursday.”429 
The “payers” make up the majority of countries who do not provide 
troops, just money. These “payers” and “players” are categorized by their position within 
the UN and relative wealth as a nation. The UN categorizes the five permanent members 
of the Security Council (P5) as Level A; Level B is comprised by developed countries 
who are not permanent members of the Security Council; Level C includes wealthy 
developing nations; and Levels D and below (to J) include the lesser-developed countries 
(LDCs). Not surprisingly, the P5 in Level A pay the lion’s share of the peacekeeping 
budget, at 63%, with the United States alone taking on more than 22% of the UN’s 
regular budget, or U.S.$516 million over and above regular assessments.430  To put it into 
perspective, the U.S. ultimately budgeted U.S.$2.1 billion for the International 
Peacekeeping Activities Account (CIPA) of the Department of State; this money is 
further distributed not only to UN peacekeeping operations, but to 45 other 
intergovernmental organizations to which the U.S. also belongs.431  These contributions 
do not include other voluntary contributions toward UN special programs and funds—for 
example, in CY2007 the U.S. contributed more than U.S.$4.8 billion to the UN 
system.432  Levels C through J combined, by contrast, pay only 2% of the peacekeeping 
budget.433 
                                                 
429 Asia One News, “Bangladesh Peacekeepers Send Home $1.24b in Three Years,” Singapore Press 
Holdings, http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/World/Story/A1Story20120426–342317.html. 
430 Marjorie Ann Browne, “United Nations System Funding: Congressional Issues,” in CRS Report for 
Congress, ed. Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 14 
January 2011), 7–8; Sandler and Hartley, The political economy of NATO: 100. 
431 Browne, “United Nations System Funding,” 3. 
432 United Nations., “Budgetary and Financial Situation of Organizations of the United Nations 
System. Note by the Secretary-General,” (New York: United Nations Secretary-General, 30 July 2008); —
——, “Status of Contributions as at 31 December 2007,” (New York: United Nations, 2007). Cited in 
Browne, “United Nations System Funding,” 1. 
433 United Nations, “Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236 -- Effective 
Rates of Assessment for Peacekeeping, 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2012,” in Scale of Assessments for 
the Apportionment of the Expenses of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (New York: United 
Nations General Assembly, 31 December 2009). 
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Another cost to states in Levels A and B that is not factored in any 
analyses is that the peacekeeping troops the wealthier nations do actually send on 
missions are often paid far more by their countries than the U.S.$1028 per month 
collected from the UN for each soldier. Those salaries add to the cost to the wealthy 
nations along with their regular and special UN assessments as can be seen in Browne’s 
CRS Report on UN funding.434 
Because states within categories C—J also make up the majority of troop 
contributing nations, many rely on UN peacekeeping income to help economically 
sustain their countries.435  Consequently, the hiring of PSCs to conduct peacekeeping 
could create competition in the market for peacekeepers. While this may be perceived as 
a positive for ensuring numbers of peacekeepers are available when the need arises, it is 
certainly a negative for those countries relying on peacekeeping dollars if their 
participation is in any way limited or subsumed by PSC peacekeepers. This competition 
for peacekeeping dollars has led senior leaders at the UN as well as researchers on 
peacekeeping to comment that the countries receiving large amounts of money for 
providing peacekeepers might fight to prevent the UN from ever privatizing 
peacekeeping.436  There are also other incentives than financial when states choose to 
send peacekeepers to a mission, for example, a recent paper by Alex Bellamy and Paul 
Williams finds that there are four reasons why states send peacekeepers:  economic, 
security, institutional, and normative.437  Each of these rationales provides TCCs with 
                                                 
434 See for example, Browne, “United Nations System Funding.” 
435 All developing countries do not make a profit from peacekeeping; in fact, many, such as India, 
South Africa, Pakistan, and China, which are among the largest troop contributing countries, do not make a 
profit and actually incur additional expenses because they have higher operational costs. However, these 
countries may receive political capital and influence through their involvement and contributions, e.g., 
posts at the UN, influence in the SC or GA. For example, in an article by Arturo Sotomayor in which he 
cites Kimberly Marten Zisk, a good number of states find that UN peacekeeping operations offer “a niche 
that brings them greater respect and authority in international institutions, especially the UN, allowing them 
more voice in international security issues than they otherwise would [have].” (Also cited in text, see f/n 
440.) 
436 #1, “Interview with UNDPKO Official #1.”  Smith, “Interview with Adam Smith, Researcher, 
International Peace Institute.” 
437 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop-and-Police-
Contributing Countries,” International Peace Institute:  Providing for Peacekeeping No. 1(August 2012). 
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benefits for contributing troops, but as pointed out in a conclusion of an article by Arturo 
Sotomayor in which he cites Kimberly Marten Zisk, a good number of states also find 
that UN peacekeeping operations offer “a niche that brings them greater respect and 
authority in international institutions, especially the UN, allowing them more voice in 
international security issues than they otherwise would [have].”438  If PSCs were brought 
into the mix, there might not only be competition for financial resources, but the other 
three incentives to contributing troops as well (security, institutional, normative). See 
Table 3 for a comparison of contributing countries, roles, and pros and cons to PSCs 
assuming peacekeeping roles in relation to TCCs. 
While PSC peacekeepers would ostensibly charge much more for their 
participation in actual peacekeeping than state-provided troops, PSCs make the case that 
their “product” is one of much higher quality because of better training and therefore 
worth the additional cost.439  PSCs also make the case that they could be much more 
responsive to burgeoning need or crises that may develop, allowing them to deploy on 
much shorter notice. However, recent events with the 2012 Olympics and G4S (the 









                                                 
438 Kimberly Marten Zisk, cited in Arturo C. Sotomayor Velazquez, “Why Some States Participate in 
UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and It’s Effects on Latin 
America’s Contributions to Peacekeeping Opereations,” Security Studies 19, no. No. 1 (2010). Found in 
Williams, “Broadening the Base of UN TCCs.”  Adam Smith of the IPI seems to concur with this 
evaluation, granting that increased peacekeeper contributions leads to prestige and could potentially result 
in more positions at UNHQ, adding to influence in international security issues. 
439 Doug Brooks, 3 September 2010. See also Duelge, “Ethical Lessons On Contractor Value.” 
440 “G4S fiasco revealed limitations of private sector, admits Defence Secretary Philip Hammond.”  
G4S promised more than 10,000 security guards for the 2012 Olympics, but by the time the Olympics were 
set to begin, were only able to produce less than 7,000. 
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Table 3.   UN Contributors: Money or Troops (“Payers” and “Players”)441 
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actual peacekeepers. E.g. U.S. 
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“Payer”—1% of peacekeeping 
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With the exception of Singapore, 
these are wealthy oil-rich states who 
contribute very few troops and far 
less money than Level B states. 
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(local nationals and 
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Could be perceived by 
“peacekept” as Western 
encroachment into traditionally 






“Player”— 1% of peacekeeping 
budget; 90% of total troops 
 
Along with category C, these 
countries make up the majority of 
TCCs.   Economies rely on UN 
peacekeeping income. 
Could employ 
category C—J PSCs 
(local nationals and 
third country 
nationals) 
Competition in the “market” for 
peacekeepers  would remove 
money, prestige, & power from 
TCCs. 
 
Could be perceived by 
“peacekept” as Western 
encroachment into traditionally 
level  C—J  activity
                                                 
441 Multiple sources. United Nations, “Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of 
the United Nations,” in Sixty-fourth session (New York: General Assembly, 5 February 2012); ———, 
“Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations”; Williams, “Broadening the Base of UN TCCs.” 
442 Hunter, “Should we Prosecute the Protectors?,” 27. Cited in Sarah W. Spencer, “Making Peace: 
Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation by United Nations Peacekeepers,” Journal of Public and 
International Affairs 16(2005): 178. 
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b. Private Security Costs 
Private security firms readily admit a profit motive; however, they often 
tout their cost effectiveness and cost efficiency as superior to the public sector.443  For 
example, the president of Sandline wrote, 
 
 Sandline is not a charitable organization. What we do we do for money, 
and we expect to make a profit out of it. We would argue that PMCs, being 
profit-orientated, are necessarily cost-effective, unlike many UN 
operations. UN intervention in Angola cost $1 million a day--$365 million 
in one year—and achieved absolutely nothing. The South African PMC, 
Executive Outcomes, charged the Angola government $80 million over 
two years and got UNITA to the conference table, putting an end to the 
war in a matter of months. Readers may judge which amount of money 
achieved the better results.444   
 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office conducted a study that found 
“What has not been so well examined is the comparative cost of using civilian employees 
or military members versus the cost of using contractors, particularly private security 
contractors…” and David Isenberg points out in his own analysis (which is also 
supported by ISOA’s director of operations), “the simple truth is that nobody knows for 
sure.”445  He adds, “There are no empirical data to confirm such assertions, and there has 
been enough evidence of cost overruns, inflated invoices, fraud, and abuse to be 
somewhat skeptical.”446  While not focused on PSCs, the Project On Government 
Oversight (POGO) took on the task of evaluating the data on public versus private cost 
and found that the government overpays for private services that it could do more cheaply 
                                                 
443 See for example, numerous statements by Eeben Barlow of EO, Tim Spicer, of Sandline, now 
(AEGIS), and Doug Brooks of ISOA. Barlow, Executive Outcomes: against all odds; Spicer, An 
Unorthodox Soldier; Brooks, “Write a Cheque End a War Using Private Military Companies to End 
African Conflicts.” 
444 Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier: 23. 
445 Isenberg, Shadow Force : Private Security Contractors In Iraq: 161; Vogel, Jessica, email 
communication. 
446 Isenberg, Shadow Force : Private Security Contractors In Iraq, 89. 
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itself.447  Specifically, POGO found that the federal government pays contractors 1.83 
times more than it pays government employees for doing the same jobs. Additionally, 
POGO found that: 
 Federal government employees were less expensive than contractors in 33 
of the 35 occupational classifications POGO reviewed. 
 In one instance, contractor billing rates were nearly 5 times more than the 
full compensation paid to federal employees performing comparable 
services. 
 Private sector compensation was lower than contractor billing rates in all 
35 occupational classifications we reviewed. 
 The federal government has failed to determine how much money it saves 
or wastes by outsourcing, insourcing, or retaining services, and has no 
system for doing so.448 
POGO’s data goes against a U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
study that compared the costs of military, federal employees, and contractors for overseas 
logistics operations and found that using the U.S. Army would be approximately 90% 
more expensive than using contractors and that the cost of using State Department 
employees would also be far greater than using contractors for security.449  The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office conducted a study using similar data and came up 
with drastically different numbers. However, these cost estimates are imprecise measures 
of actual costs because data used is not accurate or based upon similar task evaluations. 
Finally, a recent report finds that when comparing government costs to contractor costs, 
there are many things left out which necessarily need to be taken into consideration. For 
example, it finds that,  
When military or DoD civilian personnel perform a function, their actions 
are covered by sovereign immunity. However, when a contractor performs 
                                                 
447 Project on Government Oversight, “Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring 
Contractors,” in Contract Oversight (Washington, DC.: Project on Government Oversight, 2011). 
448 Ibid. 
449 William Solis, “Warfighter Support: A Cost Comparison of Using State Department Employees 
versus Contractors for Security Services in Iraq,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), 4 March 2010); Douglas Holtz-Eakin, “Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces,” in 
A CBO Study, ed. Christine Bogusz and Loretta Lettner (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), October 2005). 
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a function, the contractor can be sued. To the extent the Government must 
indemnify or reimburse the contractor or its insurer, the Department of 
Defense incurs additional expenses and contingent liabilities that would 
not have to be paid if military or DoD civilian personnel performed the 
work. If the Department of Defense does not agree to pay these additional 
costs, the price of the contract would have to be increased to cover the 
contractor’s liability.  …These costs are not common costs because they 
would not be incurred if Government personnel performed the work. If 
practical and if data are available, the DoD Components should 
incorporate these costs into their estimates.450 
 
There are obviously many factors that weigh into this calculus, for 
example, training costs, salary, benefits, overseas costs, recruitment, background 
screenings, logistics, and support. Although it seems that as data are uncovered an equal 
number of conclusions can be drawn on both sides of this equation, the evidence 
indicates that when contracts are clearly written and followed, costs are lower; when 
contracts are extended or not monitored closely, costs escalate and the benefits of 
privatization are rapidly diminished.451  Because U.S. contractors were used so 
extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan, their use can provide a recent and comprehensive 
view into contractor costs versus the costs of using military or state employees. In fact, 
the U.S. GAO found performing the cost comparison analysis difficult because they 
could not acquire the requisite cost data from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). 
Instead, they compared Department of State (DoS) employees and associated costs for 
the same tasks performed by civilian contractors. Even in this case certain estimates were 
unable to be obtained or were not provided. For example, furnished equipment or the 
administrative costs incurred through awarding task orders, contracts, or oversight were 
unavailable or not provided for analysis.452   
                                                 
450 U.S. Secretary of Defense, “Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09–007, ‘Estimating and 
Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian and Military manpower and Contract Support’,” (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Pentagon, Change 4, 2 October 2012). Cited in Isenberg, “Getting Data 
for the Debate.” 
451 Solis, “Warfighter Support,” 3.   
452 Ibid. 
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Because one of the major uses of PSCs in UN peacekeeping to date has 
been in security of UN personnel, buildings, and equipment, U.S. PSC use in similar 
missions, e.g., embassy security, is relevant here and consistent with international private 
security use. One representative case analysis shows the estimated cost of using State 
Department personnel for Baghdad embassy security (static security) to be $858 million 
versus $78 million for contractors; whereas, the estimated cost of of using DoS personnel 
to protect DoS employees while in the region was $240 million, but $380 million for 
contractors because of the cost of obtaining security clearances.453  (This does not take 
into account the estimated $160 million that it would cost to recruit, train, and hire the 
necessary DoS security personnel for dynamic security.)  In four out of five cases, private 
security was found to be cheaper than using government or military personnel. Translated 
to potential costs that may be incurred by the UN when hiring PSCs for security missions 
or posts, it can be seen that the U.S. experience may be representative of the path the UN 
is heading down. 
Specific comparisons for five different private security contracts are 
provided in Table 4. 
                                                 
453 Ibid. 
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Table 4.   DoS vs. PSC Cost Comparison 
State Department versus 
Private Security Contractor 
Cost Comparison ($ in 








State Department annual 




Deployed Stateside     Total                           
Baghdad Embassy Static 
Security  
1,982 $77.6 $681.9  $176.5 $858.4 ($785.1)
Baghdad Region Personal 
Protective Services Task 
Order  
553 $380.4 $190.3  $49.2 $239.5 $140.9 
Basrah Region Personal 
Protective Services Task 
Order  
243 $61.6 $83.6  $21.6 $105.2 ($43.7)
Al-Hillah Region Personal 
Protective Services Task 
Order  
259 $71.9 $89.1  $23.1 $112.2 ($40.3)
Erbil Region Personal 
Protective Services Task 
Order  
128 $52.1 $44.0  $11.4 $55.4 ($3.3)
 
Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.  
*The contractor annual costs have been converted into fiscal year 2008 dollars. 
*The costs to recruit, hire, and train new employees are not included because the State Department would incur costs to acquire new employees before it 
would incur the additional estimated annual costs in this table.454 
 
                                                 
454 Ibid. 
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On the other side of the coin, POGO found contractors to cost 
substantially more than using federal or state employees. Although more extensive in its 
scope and coverage, POGO’s data revealed a much different story than the GAO, even 
though much of the same data were used. POGO reviewed thirty-five different areas 
outsourced by the U.S. government using Circular A-76 and the FAIR Act to determine 
areas not “inherently governmental” and therefore subject to outsourcing.455  In 
compiling POGO’s cost assessment, they used U.S. General Services Administration 
(GSA) listed contractor billing rates, federal databases, and government websites for their 
review. POGO faced similar limitations as GAO in acquiring data for their analysis, 
including sorting out differing methodologies among government agencies for tracking 
cost figures, numbers of employees, salaries, occupational positions, or detailed break-
downs of contracted versus U.S. government-paid amounts. In many cases, POGO found 
that the U.S. government paid listed billing rates rather than negotiating lower rates even 
though this was within the government’s power to do so.456 
Although POGO analyzed thirty-five different Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) occupations, the ones we are concerned with here are those relating 
to security. In the case of security guards, the government paid contractors an annual 
salary of $68,000, but federal compensation was $50,257--$18,000 more than keeping 
this task in-house.457  The case of police and corrections officers is not much different. 
Police contractors were paid $95,000, 1.34 times more than the full federal annual 
compensation for the same job, which is only $71,256; and corrections officers billed the 
government $83,803, 1.15 times the full federal compensation for the same job, which 
was $72,977.458  Interestingly, private sector comparisons were, on average, less than 
both the contractor’s billed the government and the federal rate by half. For example, the 
                                                 
455 Oversight, “Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring Contractors,” 10–12. 
456 Ibid. 
457 Ibid. 
458 Ibid., 15–19. 
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annual salary of an average private sector corrections officer is only $33,598, while a 
security guard in the private sector receives a mere $32,953.459 
In the case of security work such as diplomatic envoy and personnel 
protection specific to PSCs, POGO used the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report 
on contractors’ support of U.S. operations in Iraq which compared military units 
performing similar functions.460  What the CBO found was that approximately one-
eighth of the $85 billion in contracts awarded between 2003 and 2007 were for private 
security, an amount somewhere in the range of $6–8 billion.    461  While the CBO found 
that “the costs of a private security contract are comparable with those of a U.S. military 
unit performing similar functions,” POGO found that the CBO had included the cost of 
non-deployed (stateside) military personnel in a “rotational” status; what this means is 
that the cost comparisons were not based upon fair and equal information. To correct the 
disparity, either the costs of maintaining a “ready” force of contractors would have to be 
included or the costs of maintaining non-deployed military personnel would have to be 
excluded. POGO chose to exclude the cost of non-deployed military personnel and found 
that in one specific case, for example, Blackwater Worldwide charged the government 
$98.5 million, while the cost of a comparable U.S. military unit “performing similar 
functions” was $55.4 million.462  This is a substantial difference showing that the 
government paid 1.78 times more to outsource than had U.S. military personnel been 
used—a much different figure than the relative parity given in the 2008 CBO report and a 
far cry from the figures given in the 2005 CBO report stating that military personnel were 
90% more costly.463  
“Inherently governmental functions,” a term used by the U.S. to describe 
certain functions that can only be filled by government personnel, are similar to those 
                                                 
459 Ibid., 15. 
460 Peter Orszag, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq,” ed. Sherry Snyder (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Budget Office (CBO), August 2008). 
461 Ibid., 2. 
462 Oversight, “Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring Contractors,” 21–22. 
463 Ibid., 22; Orszag, “Contractors’ Support in Iraq,” 2; Holtz-Eakin, “CBO Logistics Support.” 
 149
positions or responsibilities which could also translate to functions that could be 
considered “inherently international.”  Since peacekeeping rather than peace enforcement 
is defensive in nature, similar to the U.S. view of services which are allowed to be 
contracted because they are not inherently governmental, should the UN consider the use 
of PSCs for other than peace enforcement missions?  Under the “inherently 
governmental” restrictions, if peace enforcement falls under tasks proscribed for PSCs 
because of the potentially offensive nature of enforcement, then there is no reason they 
should not be considered for all but Chapter VII peacekeeping. However, considerations 
for their use would necessarily have to take into consideration much more than cost or the 
criteria used by the U.S. government to determine activities eligible for privatization. For 
example, how would PSC peacekeeping personnel be integrated into the ranks of state-
provided peacekeepers?  What duties, if any, would PSC peacekeepers be prevented from 
performing?  How would PSC peacekeepers be held accountable for any violations they 
might commit? 
Similarly to the UN, peacekeeping is viewed by the U.S. as an “inherently 
governmental function” and within the purview of traditional military operations. As a 
consequence, PSCs have not been considered by either entity for peacekeeping proper—
logistics and support, yes, but peacekeeping, no. Moreover, as difficult as it is for a state 
to allow another nation’s military to conduct peacekeeping within sovereign boundaries, 
a state cedes much more if it allows corporations the authority to keep or enforce the 
peace on their own sovereign territory and not under their direct control. It is 
understandable that many nations do not want to essentially allow corporations to tell 
their citizenry what to do and what not to do. 
Although cost is a factor, it is clearly not the only factor in making 
decisions regarding security and in any recommendations on whether or not the UN 
should allow PSCs to conduct peacekeeping. As has been discussed previously, 
effectiveness, control, and efficiency also have to be considered.464  Weighing the merits 
                                                 
464 For an excellent discussion of the three requirements for outsourcing and inherently governmental 
functions, see Thomas C. Bruneau, “Contracting Out Security,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 1, no. 27 
(2012). Also ———, Patriots for profit : contractors and the military in U.S. national security. 
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of privatization or outsourcing over governmental or UN control of security forces cannot 
be done simply quantitatively. However, cost remains a major factor and must be 
considered when weighing the pros and cons of PSCs in international peacekeeping. 
2. Documented Abuses, Fraud, and Criminal Activity 
a. Private Security Companies 
The most comprehensive and detailed database on contractor fraud, waste, 
abuse, and criminal activity to date is the one compiled by the Project On Government 
Oversight (POGO).465  POGO’s database contains 1221 instances of contractor 
misconduct and abuse; however, of that number, PSCs are only responsible for 31 of 
those instances, or less than 1% of those contractors.466  However, human rights abuses 
make up 24 of the 31 cases of misconduct by PSCs, or 77 percent.467  Of the total 
contractor abuses, fraud, and criminal activity, “waste” is the number one problem 
identified, not human rights abuses. These are significant figures, but I do not think that 
anyone would find them surprising. 
To this point, “waste” is not a problem that the UN has necessarily has to 
deal with in any great proportion with respect to contracting. Of the abuses noted on the 
UN’s database of peacekeeper misconduct, human rights abuses and sexual assault make 
up almost half of the abuses committed by UN peacekeepers.468  That being said, 
knowledge of PSC abuses, fraud, and criminal activity is also useful as a factor in 
determining their fitness for peacekeeping since disruptive misconduct is not only sexual, 
classified as a human rights violation, or exploitative in nature.   
Some of the most notorious crimes committed by PSC personnel have 
been widely publicized and have only further damaged the reputations of PSCs and 
                                                 




468 United Nations Conduct and Discipline Unit, “Allegations of Misconduct Statistics,” United 
Nations, http://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/OverviewofStatistics.aspx. 
 151
deepened the perception of them as mercenaries, reckless, violent, and above the law. 
This perception of PSCs has proven, at least in the American case in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and the Balkans, to be partially true. There are quite a few cases of abuse that have gone 
unpunished, at least, in proportion to the severity of the crimes committed. However, 
what is infrequently noted in the press is that the American experience with PSCs and 
contractors in general has been one of a steep learning curve. It has only been since 2001 
that the U.S. has begun to use contractors to the extent that they are used today.   
A commonly used quick comparison of contractor use shows the number 
of contractors used in various wars and conflicts over time reflects the “rise of the 
privatized military industry.”469  (See Table 5.)  This table gives shows the presence of 
contractor personnel during U.S. military operations, but is easily translatable to many of 
the tasks performed in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. To argue that the 
recent U.S. missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, though considered military operations, are 
not in many ways the same as peacekeeping missions is to have ignored the 
transformation in peacekeeping toward security, protection, and enforcement, including 
offensive combat. The recent data in this table only includes Iraq and not Afghanistan; 
however, the Afghanistan data are similar in that, for example, in the ten years since the 
war in Afghanistan began, U.S. DoD contractor spending has grown almost three-fold, 
from $133.4 billion in 2000 to $367.8 billion in 2010.470  U.S. DoS contractor spending 
went from $1.3 billion on contracts and $102.5 million on grants in 2000 to $8.1 billion 
in contracts and $1.4 billion in grants in 2010. 
 
 
                                                 
469 A reference to Peter Singer’s book on the subject, Corporate Warriors. Singer, Corporate 
Warriors. 
470 Allison Stanger, “Book Discussion “Outsourcing War and Peace”: the Clash of market and Civic 
Values and Its Implications” (paper presented at the Symposium on Laura Dickinson’s book Outsourcing 
War and Peace: Preserving Public Values in a World of Privatized Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, 
2012). 
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Table 5.   Presence of Contractor Personnel during U.S. Military Operations 
Presence of Contractor Personnel During U.S. Military Operations 
                              
Conflict 
Estimated Personnel (Thousands) 
Contractor a                   Military 
Estimated Ratio 
of Contractor to 
Military 
Personnel 
Revolutionary War 2 9 1 to 6 
War of 1812 n.a. 38 n.a. 
Mexican-American War 6 33 1 to 6 
Civil War 200 1000 1 to 5 
Spanish-American War n.a. 35 n.a. 
World War I 85 2000 1 to 24 
World War II 734 5400 1 to 7 
Korea 156 393 1 to 2.5 
Vietnam 70 359 1 to 5 
Gulf War 9 b 500 1 to 55 
Balkans 20 20 1 to 1 
Iraq Theater as of Early 2008 c 190 200 1 to 1 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from William W. Epley, “Civilian Support of Field 
Armies,” Army Logistician, vol. 22 (November/December 1990), pp. 30–35; Steven J. Zamparelli, 
“Contractors on the Battlefield: What Have We Signed Up For?” Air Force Journal of Logistics, vol. 23, 
no. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 10–19; Department of Defense, Report on DoD Program for Planning, Managing, 
and Accounting for Contractor Services and Contractor Personnel During Contingency Operations 
(October 2007), p. 12. 
Note: n.a. = not available. 
a. For some conflicts, the estimated number of contractor personnel includes civilians employed by the U.S. 
government. However, because most civilians present during military operations are contractor personnel, 
the inclusion of government civilians should not significantly affect the calculated ratio of contractor 
personnel to military personnel. 
b. The government of Saudi Arabia provided significant amounts of products and services during 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 
Personnel associated with those provisions are not included in the data or the ratio. 
c. For this study, the Congressional Budget Office considers the following countries to be part of the Iraq 
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Could this massive growth of outsourcing occur in the same manner if the 
UN began contracting out peacekeeping functions?  One of the fundamental arguments in 
Laura Dickinson’s book, Outsourcing War, is that there is no reeling back the extent to 
which contractors are used today.   She does, however, propose four mechanisms of 
accountability and constraint. The four mechanisms are:  
(1) using litigation (both criminal and civil) to hold contractors responsible 
for malfeasance;  
(2) reforming the language of the government contracts themselves to 
mandate compliance with public values and providing for better contract 
monitoring to ensure this new contractual language is effective;  
(3) creating better transparency mechanisms regarding outsourcing 
decisions;  
(4) creating a web of formal and informal constraints by tweaking the 
organizational structure and institutional culture of the contract firms 
themselves.472 
Her argument is that, had these elements of control been in place for 
contractor use following the U.S.-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the incidences of 
fraud, waste, and abuse would not have occurred to the extent they had. She adds, 
however, that the sufficient controls are still not in place to the degree necessary to ensure 
effective accountability. As evidence she cites the example of Abu Ghraib. Out of that 
scandal, twelve active duty military personnel were convicted for violations of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).473  There were no prosecutions of any of the 
contractors acting as translators and interrogators implicated in the torture and abuse of 
prisoners. If the UN continues to contract more and more of its functions out to private 
agents, they would be wise to heed the proposed four mechanisms of accountability and 
constraint. 
                                                 
472 Dickinson, “Book Discussion “Outsourcing War and Peace”: The Rise of Private Military 
Contractors and the Importance of Public Values.” 
473 Ibid. 
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Douglas Wissing makes the case that one of the fundamental problems 
facing the U.S. at the outset of Iraq and Afghanistan is that just prior to 2001, as part of 
cost-cutting measures, the U.S. cut a major part of those who could actually monitor the 
contractors, that is, the Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs).474  This is further 
backed up by Dickinson’s contention in her book that not only were public controls 
reduced, but oversight itself was outsourced. She writes, “One of the core points of this 
book is that these public values ought to govern even when those acting are not 
governmental employees or representatives.”475  As Allison Stanger points out,  
“One might legitimately ask, is this a realistic aspiration when 
government’s default option is to privatize whenever possible, often 
outsourcing oversight as well as implementation? It is surely more 
challenging to uphold public values when government’s actions 
themselves undermine the public’s faith in the very legitimacy of public 
sector activity. Moreover, do we really want to treat public servants and 
private employees as functional equivalents, or do we instead lose 
something very dear in blurring that line? Who is to ensure that the public 
interest is upheld under such arrangements?”476 
So what does this mean for the UN?  In the end, it means that if the UN is 
to continue to privatize services (as it is doing), then the UN must carefully vet its actors, 
whether they be ultimately engaged in peacekeeping or simply providing logistics and 
security services. The role of the COR in U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is one 
that will need to be assumed by a UN agency with a sufficient number of monitors (the 
equivalent of CORs) capable of analyzing and preparing contracts for private 
corporations to sign (not the other way around). Self-interested corporations have proven 
only too happy to prepare contracts for the U.S. government to sign; what makes anyone 
think that contracting with the UN would be any different?  Dickinson is clear that what 
is needed in order to hold contractors accountable is “a broad-based, multifaceted 
perspective, one that does not seek to gloss over the significant threats posed by 
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Prometheus Books, 2012). 
475 Dickinson, Outsourcing war and peace : preserving public values in a world of privatized foreign 
affairs: 10. 
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privatization, but one that seeks creative responses rather than simply giving up.”  
Privatization of public services is not going away any time soon, preserving public values 
is essential for proper monitoring and accountability of PSCs, whether they be working 
for a state, a regional organization, or the UN. 
b. Peacekeepers 
I am afraid there is clear evidence that acts of gross misconduct have 
taken place. This is a shameful thing for the United Nations to have to say, 
and I am absolutely outraged by it.  
– Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General477 
Human rights abuses, specifically sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) 
make up almost half of the most serious misconduct allegations against peacekeepers.478  
Actual numbers from the UN’s database over the past five years (2007–2012) place 
misconduct allegations involving SEA at 503, where serious misconduct other than 
sexual abuse and exploitation numbers 1068. These serious abuses are classified as 
Category 1 by the UN’s Conduct and Discipline Unit. Category 1 misconduct includes all 
sexual exploitation and abuse offenses, “including rape, transactional sex, exploitative 
relationships and sexual abuse, cases involving risk of loss of life to staff or to others, 
abuse of authority or staff, conflict of interest, gross mismanagement, bribery/corruption, 
illegal mineral trade, trafficking with prohibited goods, life threat/murder, abuse or 
torture of detainees, arms trade, physical assault, forgery, embezzlement, major 
theft/fraud, use, possession or distribution of illegal narcotics, waste of substantial 
resources, entitlement fraud and procurement violations.”479  However, what the UN 
calls Category 2 misconduct is also harmful to the legitimacy and effectiveness to any 
                                                 
477 Kofi Annan, “United Nations Press Release: Sexual Abuse In Peacekeeping Report, ‘Hard and 
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(SG/SM/9778),” (New York: United Nations, 24 March 2005). 
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Exploitation and Abuse),” United Nations, 
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peacekeeping mission. Category 2 misconduct includes “discrimination, harassment, 
sexual harassment, abuse of authority, abusive behavior, basic misuse of equipment or 
staff, simple theft/fraud, infractions of regulations, rules or administrative issuances, 
traffic-related violations, conduct that could bring the UN into disrepute, breaking 
curfew, contract disputes and basic mismanagement.”480  Category 2 is the “catch-all” for 
misconduct that does not fit into Category 1.481 
The UN has focused intensely on peacekeeper abuses, especially those 
involving SEA. The UN’s efforts seem to have yieled positive results. Over the five-year 
period from 2007 to 2012, allegations of SEA (Cat. 1) have dropped from 127 in 2007 to 
22 in 2012—and statistics show a steady decline.482  If five-years of data is sufficient to 
show that UN training and enforcement efforts are working, then the UN is certainly 
making progress. In response to allegations of SEA the UN incorporated what it calls its 
“three-pronged strategy” to combat abuse. The three prongs of the UN’s strategy are 
prevention, enforcement of UN standards of conduct, and remedial action.483  Part of the 
prevention prong involves training on human security, human rights, and specifically, 
SEA, even though training on SEA was not included in the Core Pre-deployment 
Training Module, required for all prospective peacekeepers until 2005. SEA training is 
now mandatory for all peacekeepers upon arrival in a peacekeeping mission. 
Although results have been positive, there remain numerous cases of 
abuse which not only are harmful to those who are supposed to be protected, but these 
cases of misconduct bring great discredit to the UN. Acts of SEA by UN peacekeepers 
raise questions of legitimacy which ultimately harms the UN’s effectiveness. If the UN 
itself cannot provide human security, if they themselves are perpetrators of violence 
against the “peacekept,” mission success can be compromised.   
 
                                                 
480 Ibid. 
481 For a complete list of UN categories and associated crimes or misconduct, see Table 1 in Ch. III. 
482 United Nations Conduct and Discipline Unit, “Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.” 
483 United Nations Conduct and Discipline Unit, “UN Enforcement,” UN website, www.un.org. 
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B. CONTRASTS AND COMPARISONS 
Multilevel legal control and regulation of PSCs is an extremely complex and 
opaque area in which the international community, states, corporations, military, and 
civilians (and victims) must find common ground in order for accountability to exist.  
“Aspirational standards,” such as so-called self-regulation, are only as good as the those 
who enforce those standards.484  International norms such as the Montreux Document 
and the ICoC only become accepted and adopted after they have been effectively used. 
Thus, adoption of the principles, best practices, and lessons learned must continue to be 
inculcated at every level when contracting out security; otherwise, human rights abuses 
continue, waste, fraud, and abuse continues, and little more is done toward achieving UN 
goals. Leadership and political will are key to enforcing legislative instruments and 
regulations; just as they are key to enforcement of standards at the practitioner or 
peacekeeper level. 
Cost is clearly not the only factor in determining whether or not to privatize 
peacekeeping. In fact, many would argue that cost is a relatively minor factor when the 
stakes are as high as preventing genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes 
against humanity.485   However, the question of cost generally comes immediately after 
the decision to privatize or outsource is made. Therefore, determining which services 
are eligible for privatization is critical. The U.S. debate over those functions which are 
determined to be “inherently governmental” to decide what can and cannot be 
privatized is a useful tool that the UN could modify to apply to decision-making 
regarding peacekeeping. Despite the U.S. taking years toward attempts at finding a 
clear definition for the term “inherently governmental,” analysis has raised a number of 
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issues which beg exploration if the UN is to adopt a similar strategy for determining the 
extent to which they decide to use PSCs.486 
For the U.S., the definition of “inherently governmental functions,” (IGFs) can be 
found in at least four different guiding documents: First and most widely accepted is the 
Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act, which defines “inherently 
governmental” to mean, “a function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to 
require performance by Federal Government employees.”487  The FAIR Act will be used 
here for comparison to a possible use of the concept by the UN because it is the definition 
promoted by the Obama administration as the final policy meant to address the need for a 
“single consistent definition” of IGFs that would improve consistency among government 
contracting agencies.488  Under this definition, IGFs include the leadership of military 
personnel who are members of any combat role (including combat support), the conduct 
of foreign relations, and the direction and control of intelligence and counter-intelligence 
operations.489   
The Obama administration’s adoption of the FAIR Act definition included 
additional examples to the list provided in the FARS further winnowing PSCs from 
                                                 
486 The U.S. still struggles with a clear definition of what is and what is not “inherently 
governmental.”  Even after the Obama administration attempted to further clarify what inherently 
governmental functions are in 2009, questions still remain concerning specific applicability given the broad 
scope of the current definition. Resultantly, “it is unsurprising that United States policy has itself 
recognized that [PSCs] often blur the line in engaging in inherently governmental activity.”  Groth, 
“Transforming Accountability,” 74. For a discussion on problems and recommendations, see letter to OFPP 
of OMB, by contracting industry representatives, Office of Management and Budget: Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy (OFPP), “Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions,” 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Office of Management and Budget, 12 September 2011). In Bruneau, 
Patriots for profit : contractors and the military in U.S. national security: Appendix 2, 172–78. 
487 “FAIR Act,” ed. U.S. Government (19 Oct 1998). P.L. 105–270 § 5(2) 112 Stat. 2382 (codified at 
31 U.S.C. § 501 note, at § 5(2)(A)) See also FARS, “Title 48  C.F.R. Federal Acquisition Regulations 
System (FARS) § 7.503(a) & 7.503(c)(3–8),” ed. U.S. Government (Washington, DC); Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), “Circular No. A-76 (Revised),” (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1999). 
488 Barack Obama, “Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: 
Government Contracting,” (Washington, DC: The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, 4 March 
2009). For a reprint of the White House letter, see Bruneau, Patriots for profit : contractors and the 
military in U.S. national security: 167–70, Appendix 1. 
489 FARS, “Title 48  C.F.R. Federal Acquisition Regulations System (FARS) § 7.503(a) & 
7.503(c)(3–8).”  Cited in Groth, “Transforming Accountability,” 73. 
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certain functions:  1) Combat; 2) security operations in direct support of combat; or 3) 
when there is a significant potential for combat.490  Each of these is an area in which 
PSCs could ostensibly be used by the UN in peacekeeping, especially in Chapter VII 
missions which have become the norm in UN peacekeeping since the 1990s. This is why 
a review of the pros and cons directly affects whether or not certain functions should fall 
into the realm of possibilities for privatization; and once considered for privatization, the 
costs and benefits will necessarily need to be constantly reviewed. Despite the fact that 
the U.S. definition still remains vague, even after Presidential attempts at clarification, 
the UN does not even have a similar definition or policy in place.491  Considering the 
legal morass, political complications, cost, and alleged human rights violations that the 
U.S. encountered with PSC use in Afghanistan and Iraq, it seems only reasonable that the 
UN would want to address and identify critical peacekeeping functions well before using 
PSCs for any task associated with peacekeeping or UN projects. 
Of course the UN would not call them inherently “governmental” functions. A 
concept similar to the U.S. government’s concept of IGFs could work toward 
development of a policy that would isolate critical tasks that could only be performed by 
UN representatives or state-sponsored peacekeepers. For purposes of this discussion, 
these functions could be called “inherently international functions” (IIFs); and anything 
permissible to be outsourced could be considered “allowable private functions” (APFs). 
For starters, lists of critical peacekeeping tasks could be broken down by IIFs and APFs, 
and then a unitary policy document could define the policy with regard to the filling of 
these functions or positions. 
The UN already has a vast pool of data from which to pull mission essential tasks. 
As an example, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) used a chart developed as 
part of a Swedish study to identify important peacekeeping tasks. Table 6 shows these 
categories: 
                                                 
490 (OFPP), “Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions.” 
491 For an explanation  of further problems of IGF definition even following President Obama’s letter 
on government contracting, see Bruneau, Patriots for profit : contractors and the military in U.S. national 
security: 171–78 Appendix 2 (Letter to OFPP of OMB, by Contracting Industry Representatives). 
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Table 6.   Peacekeeping Tasks492 
Category A: 
–Dampen disturbances through a presence 
–Conduct “on-the-spot” diplomacy/mediation 
Category B: 
–Carry out measures to repel attackers 
–Carry out measures to separate fighting parties 
–Establish and man buffer zones between parties’ troops 
–Monitor a cease-fire zone 
–Monitor regrouping and demobilizing forces 
–Clear away ammunition and mines 
–Collect weapons 
–Guard arms depots 
–Monitor and assist in disarming military companies and paramilitary groups 
Category C: 
–Control riots and disturbances 
–Intervene against armed “gangs” 
–Maintain civil law and order 
–Discover and prevent crimes 
–Maintain order and security during election preparations 
–Monitor and assist in disarming civilians 
–Escort civilians in violence prone areas 
–Protect refugees in refugee camps from armed elements 
Category D: 
–Monitor the local police system 
–Participate in education of the local police force 
–Give advice and support in the establishment and restructuring of a new local police system 
Category E: 
–Assist in taking care of refugees and homeless people 
–Integrate disarmed forces into civilian life 
–Promote repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons 
–Provide humanitarian help in connection with reconstruction 
–Give support in rebuilding of a judicial system and other administrative functions 
–Monitor human rights 
–Coordinate support for economic recovery and rebuilding 
–Monitor elections 
                                                 
492 Adapted from Nils Gunnar Billinger, “Report of the Special Swedish Commission on International 
Police Activities,” in Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, ed. 
Michael Dziedzic Robert Oakley, and Eliot Goldberg (Washington, DC: National Defense University 
Press, 1998). Cited in Karen U. Kwiatkowski, African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI): Past, Present and 
Future?  (Carlisle: Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 
46–47. 
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It is impossible to evaluate pros and cons without determining exactly what tasks 
PSCs currently perform and how those tasks translate to tasks required of enforcement or 
peacekeeping operations. Moreover, knowing what tasks fall into the capability spectrum 
of PSCs is essential if the pros and cons for their use are to be properly understood. What 
the Swedish study found was that only military units can carry out tasks in Category B, 
and some of those tasks would require Chapter VII Security Council authorization. When 
ACRI combined Category B with what they considered “battalion critical tasks” they 
found that the category made up “about eighty percent” of the peacekeeping tasks which 
required military units.493  These would be the IIFs. Incidentally, a careful review of the 
elements in category B of the study reveals that there are already a number of tasks which 
PSCs are already performing, for example, mine removal and aspects of DDR. The other 
four categories contain tasks that PSCs or other contractors already are performing for the 
UN or could ostensibly perform in the future. These would be the APFs.   
In a letter from contracting industry representatives, a decision chart was 
recommended for use in determining which functions were to be accomplished by 
government employees or supervised by government employees. This same chart has 
been adapted below (Figure 4) as one method the UN might use toward determining 
which jobs must be performed by peacekeepers or UN personnel or jobs which could be 
let out to the private sector. 
                                                 
493 Kwiatkowski, ACRI: Past, Present, or Future? 46–47. 
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Figure 4.   Decision Tree Regarding Performance of Functions of UN Personnel, 
Peacekeepers, or Others494 
Stepping through this decision tree: 
1) Inherently international functions must be performed by UN personnel 
or peacekeepers 
2) If a function is not critical, that function can be performed by either UN 
personnel or the private sector 
3) If a function is critical, the agency must ensure that UN personnel fill 
critical positions to oversee that function.  “Criticality” is determined by 
the function or position’s impact on agency missions or operations. A 
position may also be treated as critical if it is needed to provide the agency 
with organic expertise and technical capability. 
Note:  No positions are reserved or presumed to be filled by contractor 
employees.495 
                                                 
494 Figure adapted from (OFPP), “Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions.”  
As reproduced in Bruneau, Patriots For Profit : Contractors And The Military In U.S. National Security: 
Appendix 2, 173. 
495 Adapted from (OFPP), “Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions.” 
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Just establishing these IIFs and APFs certainly does not mean that the UN must 
use PSCs for certain non-critical aspects of peacekeeping, but what this would do is 
create clear guidelines for when their use is acceptable or allowed and when it is not. As 
it stands now, there is a real risk of PSCs being mistaken as peacekeepers, especially 
when their use in protecting UN buildings, offices, and personnel has increased as 
drastically as it has over the past few years. A number of lines in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation System (FARS) recognize that this could be a problem and address these 
functions that approach being inherently governmental, for example:  “Services that 
involve or relate to analysis, feasibility studies, and strategy options to be used by agency 
personnel in developing policy”; “[c]ontractors providing information regarding agency 
policies or regulations,…or conducting agency training courses”; “[c]ontractors 
participating in any situation where it might be assumed that they are agency employees 
or representatives.”496  This could become a serious problem for UN legitimacy 
especially if PSCs act in a way that could be potentially embarrassing for the UN, for 
example SEA crimes. The reason this is so important is because the UN currently does 
not have a unitary policy with regard to the hiring of PSCs. Hiring often goes through the 
UN Procurement Division, but is listed generally as “security services”; moreover, 
Experts on Mission also have a certain amount of latitude when hiring security. A single 
SOP does not exist for hiring security services, e.g., who to hire, when, who has been 
vetted, training, certifications and licenses, conditions that must be met, etc. This ad hoc 
hiring has been the subject of criticism by U.S. agencies Special Inspector General for 
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
(SIGAR), and the Commission on Wartime Contracting, as well as other non-
governmental watchdog groups, such as the Project on Government Oversight (POGO).   
 
 
                                                 
496 48 C.F.R. § (d)(13) 
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C. UN CHARTER CHAPTERS VI & VII AND PRIVATE SECURITY 
COMPANIES 
 
We need action not only to end the fighting but to make the peace. 
       Lester B. Pearson497 
 
In the field of peacekeeping, combat-related actions would generally fall under 
Chapter VII peace enforcement activities. Purely defensive actions, for the most part, fall 
under Chapter VI.   If peace achieved under Chapter VI were threatened, the offensive 
pursuit of aggressors or spoilers would require an approved shift to Chapter VII and 
troops to enforce the modified mission. It is the transition to Chapter VII where many 
states draw the line because of the risk to their national troops. On the pro-PSC side, the 
use of PSCs would avoid the political accountability for sending national troops into 
harm’s way, since those aspects of peace enforcement could be contracted out. On the 
anti-PSC side, the contracting out of peace enforcement shows that approving states are 
not willing to risk their own troops for a mission, which begs the question of commitment 
and political will.   
Since other peacekeeping types are defensive in nature, the UN might consider 
the use of PSCs for other than peace enforcement missions. However, considerations for 
the use of PSCs would necessarily have to take into consideration much more than cost or 
criteria similar to the “inherently governmental” used by the U.S. government to 
determine peacekeeping activities eligible for privatization. Peace operations are by 
design different from combat operations. In one aspect, a difference can be found in the 
motivations for action. Military force may be used at the discretion of a state in order to 
carry out political will or achieve some objective which may or may not include peace. In 
the case of UN forces acting under the Charter, peace is the primary goal. Consequently, 
the factors used to make “inherently international” determinations will need to be 
carefully reviewed if they are to be used in making decisions to use PSCs for any aspect 
of peacekeeping operations, not just peace enforcement. 
                                                 
497 Spoken by Lester B. Pearson in 1956, these same words are also on the side of the Peacekeeping 
monument in Ottawa, Canada. 
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The use of PSCs for non-peace enforcement missions goes directly contrary to 
what private military companies (PMCs) such as Sandline International and Executive 
Outcomes determined to be their strongest suit. It is largely possible that it may be that 
many of their activities fell outside of the boundaries of what would have been acceptable 
behavior for UN troops. Aggressive pursuit and violent prosecution of enemy soldiers has 
never been a UN mission. In fact, even though the UN now conducts “robust” 
peacekeeping, it does not normally conduct actual peace enforcement—this is generally 
left to regional organizations, multinational forces, and member states or state troops, 
often called “coalitions of the willing.”498  Until recently, peace enforcement has not 
been a mission for traditional UN peacekeepers. It has been a mission for military 
personnel trained in combat operations. 
Both EO and Sandline acted in capacities which fall squarely into the category of 
what might be considered “inherently international,” that is, within the realm of 
traditional military operations—essentially they carried out military missions that 
nations’ military troops could not or would not perform. However, even if these PMCs 
were effective for the governments that hired them, this does not automatically mean that 
those features that made them effective would or could work for different forms of UN 
peacekeeping. Accountability—legal, national, political, and even personal 
accountability—play key roles in whether or not PMC effectiveness is translatable to the 
UN. 
D. COST 
Although cost is a factor, and PMCs acting in Angola and Sierra Leone claim to 
have been cost-efficient, it is clearly not the only factor in making decisions regarding 
security. As has been discussed previously, effectiveness, control, and efficiency are also 
                                                 
498 Although the “Security Council may take enforcement action without the consent of the main 
parties to the conflict, if it believes that the conflict presents a threat to international peace and security,” 
“since the mid-1990s, enforcement action has been carried out by ad hoc coalitions of Member States or 
regional-organizations acting under United Nations Security Council authorization.”  See “Secretariat, 
“Peacekeeping Operations: Capstone Doctrine,” 43, f/n 20. One exception is Haiti, where the mandate 
(SCR 1542) authorized a Chapter VII mission and an increase in UN troops under UN force commanders to 
provide a secure and stable environment, support the political process, and protect human rights. 
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considered.499  Weighing the merits of privatization or outsourcing over governmental or 
UN control of security forces cannot be done simply quantitatively. Numerical weights 
cannot be assigned to each determinant and decisions made purely based on previous 
capacities; numerous peacekeeping analyses on success and failure bear this fact out—
each mission is different and must be carefully observed and reviewed on its unique 
qualities. 
While cost is a major consideration in decisions to privatize, questions of waste, 
fraud, and abuse also need to be weighed for decisions regarding the proper actors for the 
task. In the case of private security companies, there are myriad documented and 
anecdotal illustrations of PSCs acting badly, including waste, fraud, human rights abuses, 
and other criminal activity. However, there are also just as many, if not more, cases of 
peacekeepers acting badly. Control and accountability of the personnel conducting 
peacekeeping is an essential part of the UN’s responsibility for protecting the 
“peacekept.”  Although criticisms of PSCs include the fact that, in many cases of 
misconduct, the perpetrators were sent back to their country by the company that hired 
them and action was never taken against them, there is no international assurance that UN 
peacekeepers will be held accountable by their parent state either. 
In evaluating the pros and cons of cost and criminal conduct, there is no clear line 
that shows that privatization is more or less expensive and there is also no clear division 
between private and public actors and who, between the two of them, commit more 
human rights abuses. If peacekeeping is ever to be privatized, it will be up to the UN to 
ensure all the proper controls and accountability are in place beforehand and that all 
peacekeepers are monitored for proper behavior under pre-established standards of 
conduct. 
                                                 
499 See for example, Bruneau’s discussion on this topic, as well as institutional dimensions of public 
and private national security and defense, Bruneau, Patriots for profit : contractors and the military in U.S. 
national security: Chapter 2 and Table 7.1.  
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E. LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy plays a major role in determining whether or not an agent or 
institution will be successful. There are, however, various approaches to determinations 
of legitimacy and there is a vast literature that explains different notions of what 
legitimacy is, what it means, and how it is achieved. In international relations, actions are 
legitimate when they conform to “internationally held norms, rules and understandings 
about what is good and appropriate.”500  However, legitimacy is also tied to power and 
the state or agent (or institution) who seeks to intervene or act. This can work, both in 
favor or against, ultimate efficacy of an intervention by an agent or institution. Hans 
Morgenthau makes the case that  
[l]egitimate power, which can evoke a moral or legal justification for its 
exercise, is likely to be more effective than equivalent illegitimate power, 
which cannot be so justified. That is to say, legitimate power has a better 
chance to influence the will of its objects than equivalent illegitimate 
power.501 
Therefore, legitimate power is more effective than illegitimate power.502  By 
extension, the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of an actor can factor into the effectiveness of 
an intervention, or more specifically in this case, peacekeeping. If an actor’s motives and 
interests are collective in nature, and that actor is perceived as adhering to 
“internationally held norms, rules and understandings about what is good and 
appropriate,”503 then the likelihood is that the exercise of power in an intervention (or 
peacekeeping) would be more effective than if that actor’s motives and interests were  
 
 
                                                 
500 Martha Finnemore, National interests in international society, Cornell series on studies in political 
economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 2–3. 
501 Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among nations : the struggle for power 
and peace, Brief ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 32. 
502 Heinze, Waging humanitarian war : the ethics, law, and politics of humanitarian intervention: 
115. 
503 Finnemore, National interests in international society, 1. 
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selfish.504  Using this logic, it can be seen that PSCs’ motives and interests are selfish—
profit, which, at least on one level, decreases their legitimacy to conduct interventions or 
peacekeeping.   
Another view on legitimacy comes from the English School of international 
relations where legitimacy can be gained through membership in international societies, 
such as the UN, or NATO, or ECOWAS, etc., and adherence to the norms, rules, or 
structure of the organizations to which states may belong.505  For Ian Hurd, legitimacy 
“refers to an actor’s normative belief that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.”506  
This view implies, however, that the members reinforce and enhance their legitimacy 
through the actions they take and how power is exercised with regard to their 
standards.507  PSCs are clearly not members of international societies in the same manner 
that states may be. A trade association, such as the ISOA or BAPSC, may appear similar, 
but the fundamental interests are different from those of collective organizations of states. 
Collections of states can claim national security (or human security for that matter, as 
does the UN) as their aim; collections of companies can contribute to those aims, but they 
are not the central focus of the organization or association. Another major difference in 
the legitimacy of PSCs versus international societies is that, in the latter, consensus 
among members plays another large role in determinations of legitimacy.  But a PSC 
does not gain legitimacy from other PSCs.  Competition is not the driving factor between 
collections of states, where competition often exists between like companies, e.g. PSCs, 
who may be members of an association still vie for contracts. 
                                                 
504 Heinze, Waging humanitarian war : the ethics, law, and politics of humanitarian intervention, 
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505 For excellent discussions on legitimacy and international society see Ian Clark, Legitimacy in 
international society  (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Martin Wight, “International 
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Legitimacy can be achieved through legal means, politically, socially, through 
moral actions, or through agreements or contracts. Legitimacy can also be acquired 
through effectiveness. Eric Heinze argues that there are three primary factors in 
conferring legitimacy on an agent and that characteristics of each factor not only enhance 
legitimacy, but also effectiveness.508  The first factor he cites is multilateralism. It is a 
commonly held notion that for any form of humanitarian intervention or peacekeeping to 
be legitimate, it has to be multilateral;509 however, there may be times when speed and 
efficiency dictates that a state might act unilaterally.510  Waiting for a multilateral 
coalition of states to reach a consensus and act can take a great deal of time, as can be 
seen in examples such as the UN and NATO’s responses to ethnic cleansing, mass rape, 
murder, and other R2P crimes in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, or in the UN’s 
response to the genocide in Rwanda. Despite examples of failures of multilateral 
interventions, the pursuit of multilateral intervention remains worthwhile, considering the 
fact that unilateral intervention and the “dangers of partisan abuse are still great enough 
to prefer that the agent of intervention be a multilateral coalition.”511 
The second factor he points to in legitimation of any actor or organization 
intending to intervene is “humanitarian credentials.”512  This factor deals specifically 
with the way the actor or organization conducts itself in accordance with prevailing 
norms of human dignity and human rights. Consequently, generally the only legitimate 
interveners are those governments, or collections of governments, who respect the rights 
and dignity of their own citizens.513  Any collective body of governments that shows 
respect for human rights would be legitimate interveners. Consent plays an important role 
                                                 
508 Ibid. 
509 See for example, Secretariat, “Peacekeeping Operations: Capstone Doctrine.”; Martha Finnemore, 
The purpose of intervention : changing beliefs about the use of force, Cornell studies in security affairs 
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513 Fernando R. Tesón, A philosophy of international law, New perspectives on law, culture, and 
society (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 59. Cited in Heinze, Waging humanitarian war : the 
ethics, law, and politics of humanitarian intervention: 121. 
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in deciding which governments are legitimate because as liberal democratic theory 
contends, a sovereign is legitimate when it “conforms to democratic standards of good 
governance and respects the rights of its citizens.”  Clearly, PSCs are not elected, nor are 
they holding public office, but does making them proxy agents of the government grant 
them legitimacy?  This would be a difficult argument to support considering that they are 
neither bound by the same rules as the military acting as representatives of the 
government, nor are they public officials, responsible to a democratically elected 
government. If PSCs are to find legitimacy, it is more likely that they will find it in 
adherence to established norms of dignity and human rights over time, something they 
have not yet been able to do.   
The third factor Heinze points to as necessary for legitimacy is “prevailing 
political context.”514  What he means is that even with the first two requisites of 
legitimacy met, prevailing international political context can delegitimize an actor, 
negatively affecting their ability to conduct humanitarian intervention, or a mission such 
as peacekeeping. Heinze argues that, in many ways, the U.S. delegitimized themselves 
through the decisions that led to the invasion of Iraq (WMD), and even more so after 
evidence of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib was revealed.515  Among other things, these 
actions diminished U.S. credibility as a standard-setter of international human rights 
norms and reduced U.S. legitimacy as agents of humanitarian intervention. PSCs’ actions 
in places like Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and others have certainly not earned them 
credibility as carriers of human rights norms, or the requisite “prevailing political 
context.”516 
So, even if PSCs could “maintain the requisite military capability, possess 
relevant humanitarian credentials, and act multilaterally, their diminished normative 
position in international society may still render them ineffective as humanitarian 
                                                 
514 Heinze, Waging humanitarian war : the ethics, law, and politics of humanitarian intervention: 
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interveners”517 (or peacekeepers). Additionally, the profit motive of PSCs is viewed as 
selfish, negatively affecting their legitimacy. Moreover, if PSCs are benefiting or based 
in U.S. or Western states, intervention (or peacekeeping) by them could be perceived as 
having other than a humanitarian motive—similar to problems the UN is having with 
some of its peacekeeping operations.518  But if no one is willing to act to uphold 
internationally agreed-upon standards of protection of human rights and human security 
(such as R2P crimes), can the actions by a willing, yet illegitimate actor, be acceptable at 
least until a legitimate actor can engage or take action? 
As pointed out above, multilateralism and humanitarian credentials are two areas 
where PSCs have had a difficult time securing legitimacy, hurting perceptions that they 
could be used as peacekeepers in the same capacity as IOs or ROs. But should this 
prevent PSCs from intervening as agents of legitimate governments when their function 
is to serve in a specific and necessary capacity in cases where governments refuse to 
intervene—genocide or ethnic cleansing for example?  Heinze offers an analogy of a 
drowning swimmer and asks if there are any practical reasons for preventing a murderer 
from saving the person.519  The issue of practicality versus a Kantian adherence to 
universal dictates of who can intervene based upon strict (moral and political) codes of 
legitimacy is addressed in greater detail in the following paragraphs on thresholds and 
measures of legitimacy and effectiveness.   
James Pattison makes the case that legitimacy is based primarily on 
effectiveness.520  His argument is that if an actor can prove to be effective, they are, for 
all intents and purposes, legitimate. If private security companies can prove to be 
effective, then their legitimacy will be improved as they are increasingly used. If PSCs 
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begin to encounter problems, similar to those that they had created in places like Bosnia, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan, then their legitimacy will be called back into question. According 
to Pattison there are varying degrees of legitimacy. Certain actors are fully legitimate, 
whereas others are moderately legitimate, and still others are only adequately 
legitimate.521   
In cases of intervention, the most legitimate actor is clearly the first choice. 
However, the most legitimate actor is not always willing to intervene. In the case that the 
most legitimate actor is not willing to intervene, then the next most legitimate actor has 
an obligation to intervene, and so on.522  One of the problems with this theory of 
legitimacy and interveners is that certain actors, that is, the most legitimate actors, will be 
encouraged to intervene first in all cases. For reasons such as the most legitimate actors 
being already engaged, overstretched, or seen as imposing their will on weaker states, 
then the next most legitimate actor may have an obligation to take on the responsibility to 
intervene. There may be cases when the next most legitimate actor may not have the 
capacity or resources to intervene in a manner that would fulfill the responsibility to 
protect or protect civilians or reduce human suffering.   
Based upon effectiveness, Pattison argues that the order of legitimacy is first, 
NATO; second, states or coalitions of the willing; third is the UN; fourth is regional and 
subregional organizations; and last is PSCs.523  Even though they are last, they still have 
a position in the ranking because of their ability to be effective in reducing human 
suffering, protecting human rights, and protecting civilians (R2P, PoC, human security). 
There is also a difference between the right to intervene and the duty to intervene. 
While a state may have the right to intervene legally or through Security Council 
authorization, the state may not be the most legitimate actor, or even have adequate 
legitimacy. By the same token, an actor may have adequate legitimacy, may also have the 
duty to intervene, but not have the right to intervene, for example, if SC authorization is 
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absent, the duty may exist, but the right may not. There are two central questions that 
arise from this difference between a “right” and a “duty” to intervene: 1) “Who has the 
right to intervene?” and 2) “Who has the duty to intervene?”524  Pattison argues that in 
response to the first question, “any intervener that possesses an adequate degree of 
legitimacy has the right to act (providing that they have just cause and are engaged in 
humanitarian intervention).”525  In response to the second question, “it is the most 
legitimate agent of humanitarian intervention that has the duty to act. The most legitimate 
agent will often be NATO or a hybrid operation that pairs a major Western power with 
the UN.”526  Finally, from the previous discussion, it can be seen that if the most 
legitimate agent fails to intervene, “the duty falls on the next most legitimate intervener, 
and so on.” 
The married concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy are critical to actions that 
impinge upon human security. If an agent, for example the UN, has the legitimacy of 193 
member states behind its actions, but fails to protect human security, then it is not 
effective; this ineffectiveness ultimately deteriorates the UN’s legitimacy. In fact, part of 
the problem that the UN is having in many C/PC states is that it is perceived as an 
illegitimate intervener and not representative of what is necessary for PoC, protection of 
human rights, and human security.527  Recent UN reports address the UN’s problems 
maintaining itself as a credible and legitimate agency, especially in light of failures to 
protect its own personnel in places like Angola and Iraq, or in its ability to protect 
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525 Ibid. 
526 Ibid. 
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civilians in places like Haiti or Syria.528  While the UN may be working on improving its 
legitimacy and effectiveness as an intervener, other interveners, such as NATO, ROs, or 
states, have an obligation to intervene under the collectively agreed-upon ideals of R2P, 
PoC, human rights, and human security. When the UN is not capable of being effective; 
and when none of the above are willing to step in, is there a point where PSCs (as long as 
they have an adequate degree of legitimacy)529 have a duty or a right to intervene, 
especially if they are the last (or only) actor willing to do so in the interests of PoC, R2P, 
human rights, or human security?  This returns us to the discussion surrounding the 
question of the drowning swimmer—are there practical reasons for preventing a murderer 
from saving the person?  A thorough review of the pros and cons of PSCs in 
peacekeeping points to one possible answer:  the swimmer should be saved by the 
murderer and the murderer should be held accountable for her crimes.   
This dissertation uses a consequentialist logic in determining legitimacy; one that 
combines elements of both Heinze’s and Pattison’s theories; one that holds that if a 
peacekeeping mission is justified and intervention is necessary, it must be to save people 
from imminent harm and the intervening agents must be able to accomplish their task 
(effectively protect people and maximize human security) while doing more good than 
harm. Simply refusing to allow a willing actor to prevent R2P crimes and maximize 
human security based upon a failure to meet a minimum threshold of legitimacy may be 
morally superior as a position, but it does nothing for those suffering aggravated 
violence. Thus, legitimacy, as a consequence of effectiveness, may be a sufficient, but not 
necessary factor in conducting peacekeeping. 
                                                 
528 The UN has increasingly found itself between and rock and a hard place when it comes to 
increased interventions in conflict areas and protection of its personnel. Reinforced security can create 
more of a buffer between UN personnel and those whom the UN is supposed to be helping, resulting in an 
“us versus them” environment. Increased security can also cause UN personnel to appear more as occupiers 
and less like partners. Finally, increases in security can create a perception of greater threat than may exist, 
resulting in a sort of security spiral. See for example,  Ibid. See also United Nations Human Rights Council, 
“Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and 
impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination,” (New York: United Nations General 
Assembly, 5 July 2010). 
529 Pattison, Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect : who should intervene?: 199. 
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F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed cost comparisons, abuse, fraud, and criminal activity, and 
the concept of legitimacy as it applies to agents acting in the capacity to protect, e.g., 
peacekeepers, or as some PSC employees sometimes refer to themselves, “human 
security specialists.”  Findings show that in the above areas, there is no clear answer or 
determination that pros outweigh cons for either peacekeepers or PSCs. However, it is 
clear that when the concept of human security is used to aid in making determinations of 
whether or not to use PSCs for peacekeeping, there are advantages that PSCs have that 
cannot be avoided: PSCs have a speed advantage over the UN. They can deploy more 
rapidly than can UN troops; there is only a contract to sign and a check to write. 
Based on the findings in this chapter and earlier parts of this dissertation, it is 
recommended that the UN establish clear criteria for hiring PSCs in every contingency so 
that when contracts are required to be let, there is no question which PSCs are acceptable 
and which are not, to whom they report, what tasks they are to perform, and where their 
function or position ends. A policy on hiring PSCs has been debated at the UN, but it has 
seemed to stall and will likely take many years to come into effect, if it ever does.530  If 
the UN is ever to use PSCs for actual peacekeeping and potentially “robust” 
peacekeeping, it would certainly be advisable that hiring criteria be in place first, and not 







                                                 
530 Draft Convention on PSC use by the UN has been in debate since 2010, when it was first proposed.   
Council, “UN Report on Use of Mercenaries.” 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/15session/A.HRC.15.25_en.pdf 
 176
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 177
VI. CASE STUDIES—PLAUSIBILITY PROBE 
This chapter contains case studies of Angola, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia from 1991 
through 2001.  The cases describe peacekeeping in its many different forms through the 
use of various actors, from local to regional organizations and PSCs and militias to UN 
peacekeepers.  The cases describe and compare the performance of PSCs and the UN 
through different phases of peacekeeping from observing to enforcing and engagement in 
and attempts to stop civil war. 
The case studies presented here are not an exhaustive analysis of the conflicts 
they review. They are used to provide a basis for evaluation of the pros and cons in cases 
where PSCs have performed tasks similar to those of UN peacekeepers. It was important 
to use cases where PSCs showed their greatest strengths, or at least the ones that are 
argued to have demonstrated the most of their strengths in the literature. This way we can 
see PSCs at their best and use those metrics to compare, since it is those qualities that are 
argued could potentially improve human security. If PSCs still come up short, or more 
relevantly, are seen as detrimental to human security, even at their best, then these case 
studies should serve as examples for comparison whenever PSCs are considered for 
peacekeeping or peacekeeping-related tasks.   
It is also important to show cases where the UN was involved, failed then 
recovered, or was supported by other organizations so that the full range of UN capability 
could be reviewed and compared to claimed capabilities of PSCs. If, as Howard argues, 
the UN needs to be a learning organization for peacekeeping missions to be successful, 
then over the course of each of the cases I have chosen, it can be seen that the UN learned 
and modified its behavior institutionally, fundamentally, and practically.531  The three 
cases chosen occurred all during mainly the same timeframe, the nineties, which was a 
period of transition for both PSCs and the UN. Following the Cold War, and beginning 
                                                 
531 One of Howard’s fundamental arguments in her book (referenced here) is that in order for the UN 
to achieve success in peacekeeping it must be a “learning organization.” Howard, UN peacekeeping in civil 
wars. 
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with EO’s intervention in Angola, the world of PSCs expanded rapidly. At the same time, 
the UN was making radical shifts in how it conducted peacekeeping—from traditional 
Chapter VI consensual missions to more robust Chapter VII intervention missions, all in 
the interest of halting war, preventing human suffering, and protecting human security.532   
Angola offers a case which finds itself at the cusp of changes in UN peacekeeping 
operations as well as in the birth and growth of a new industry. Angola was chosen 
because it demonstrates the first use of a PSC [PMC] engaging in the closest thing to 
peacekeeping (peace enforcement) that a private company has ever found itself 
conducting. In Angola, the conflict had been going on for thirty years. It took just two 
years for a PSC to forcefully secure peace, but only weeks for it to fail following their 
departure. The UN failed initially in Angola; however, eventually, along with Western 
commitment and involvement, made strides toward long term peace. 
In Sierra Leone, “three distinct attempts to maintain peace [two of which were 
brought on with the assistance of PMCs] allow for comparison in a single setting of both 
failed and (so far) successful peacekeeping attempts.”533  PSCs brought belligerents to 
the peace-making table twice, but failed to provide long-term and sustainable peace. 
Finally, a British military operation (Operation Barras) provided the necessary impetus 
toward sufficient UN peacekeeping involvement and ultimate peacekeeping success 
(UNAMSIL). The tactics used by the British SAS in Operation Barras were practically 
identical to those efforts taken by PSCs years earlier. The difference was UN support and 
effective UN cooperation, collaboration, and coordination following the British military’s 
successful enforcement operation. 
                                                 
532 Shifts in the way the UN conducts peacekeeping can be seen in many UN policy documents 
following the Cold War, as well as statements by both Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan in the early-
to-mid nineties. This shift can also be seen in the Human Security Reports and the UN’s core document on 
principles and guidelines. See, for example,  Centre, “Human security report: war and peace in the 21st 
century.”; Secretariat, “Peacekeeping Operations: Capstone Doctrine.”; Boutros-Ghali, An agenda for 
peace : preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-keeping : report of the Secretary-General pursuant 
to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992; Annan, 
“Intervention.” 
533 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?, 14. 
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Bosnia offers examples of extreme human rights abuses perpetrated by both UN 
peacekeepers and PSC personnel; it also offers a view to intervention by coalitions of the 
willing and regional organizations. The Bosnia case is one where PSCs and the UN both 
failed, but they both failed together, demonstrating that one is not necessarily better than 
the other, but that they failed because they failed to protect human security. Only once 
human security was protected and violence was ended, could real peace begin to take 
shape. Considering all the pros and cons compared, success or failure is not dependent 
upon one specific force, but the effectiveness of the force used in guaranteeing human 
security. 
The case studies are not comprehensive cases from which conclusions will be 
drawn about the overall record of peacekeeping.  For my purposes in this dissertation, the 
three case studies are plausibility probes, that is, does it make sense to use the narrow 
view of human security as a metric for determining PSC worthiness to conduct 
peacekeeping?   
 Using the fundamental goals of the UN, each case study offers a lens 
through which PSCs can be evaluated on their ability to improve (or degrade) human 
security. 
A. ANGOLA 
EO gave us this stability. In a perfect world, of course, we wouldn’t need 
an organization like EO, but I’d be loath to say that they have to go just 
because they are mercenaries.   
        UN negotiator534 
1. Historical Summary 
After the Portuguese left Angola in 1975, three factions grew to prominence—all 
seeking power:  the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Frente 
Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and the União Nacional para a Independência 
                                                 
534 Herbert M. Howe, “Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive 
Outcomes,” The journal of Modern African Studies 36, no. 2 (1998): 315. 
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Total de Angola (UNITA).535  The MPLA, a Marxist movement, took over the capitol of 
Luanda, and in 1976, soundly defeated the FNLA, leaving essentially two rivals for 
power in Angola.536  UNITA, however, controlled major parts of the country. On either 
side of these two movements were also two Cold War superpowers and their allies. The 
United States and South Africa sided with UNITA and the Soviet Union and Cuba sided 
with the MPLA. As a consequence of both sides being matched almost evenly in 
weaponry and support, the fighting between UNITA and the MPLA continued for almost 
fifteen years until the end of the Cold War and attempts at peace via the UN and the 
United Nations Angola Verification Mission. (UNAVEM). 
 UNAVEM was launched in December 1988, out of which came a multinational 
agreement that included Namibia’s independence, the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops 
in Angola in support of the MPLA, and peace between UNITA and the MPLA. Without 
the removal of the Cuban troops, South Africa (U.S. ally and supporter of UNITA) would 
not accept Namibia’s plan for independence. The agreement also called for South Africa 
to abrogate support for UNITA.537  It was a long negotiation process but UNAVEM I 
concluded in May 1991 after the withdrawal of the Cuban troops and the few remaining 
South African troops. Peace appeared to be on the horizon, as both the recognized 
government of Angola, the MPLA, and the rebel group UNITA had been continuing 
peace negotiations with Portugal as mediator. At the head of the MPLA was President 
José Eduardo dos Santos and at the head of UNITA was Jonas Savimbi. The Peace 
Accords included:  1) a ceasefire agreement; 2) fundamental principles for the 
establishment of peace; 3) concepts for resolving “issues still pending between the 
                                                 
535 Paris, At War’s End : Building Peace After Civil Conflict, 63. 
536 United Nations, “Angola - UNAVEM I - Background,” United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unavem1/UnavemIB.htm.  website, accessed 14 July 12. Kaye 
Whiteman and Douglas Yates, “France, Britain, and the United States,” in West Africa’s Security 
Challenges: Building Peace in a Trouble Region, ed. Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2004), 359. 
537 United Nations. and United Nations. Dept. of Public Information., The Blue Helmets : A Review Of 
United Nations Peace-Keeping, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: United Nations Dept. of Public Information, 
1996), 234–36. 
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Government and UNITA”; and 4) the Protocol of Estoril, which was essentially the 
signed peace accord between the two leaders under Portuguese mediation.538 
With the peace accords in place, the government of Angola requested support 
from the UN to monitor the ceasefire. In response, the UN sent 350 unarmed military 
observers and up to 90 UNAVEM police observers. The observers were deployed to 
critical locations throughout the country, as well as 46 locations where both sides’ troops 
had assembled.539  In addition to ceasefire monitoring troops, Angola requested UN 
technical assistance in preparing for elections. In response to the request, the Security 
Council created resolution 747 (1992) enlarging the mandate to include observation of 
elections.540 
Both sides had agreed to “free and fair” elections as well as monitoring by 
Portuguese, U.S., and Soviet observers. The MPLA and UNITA were to supervise the 
elections along with monitoring and implementing the peace accords. A number of other 
humanitarian aid organizations also assisted in providing support to both parties in order 
to keep the peace and ensure proper conduct of the elections, to include the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).541   
In October, 1992, despite what were considered by the international community 
and the UN to be “free and fair” elections by international observers (including the 
UNDP), Savimbi’s UNITA disputed the results before they were even posted. Instead of 
going to the required second round of voting because dos Santos had not won more than 
50 percent of the vote (he won 49.57 to 40.07), Savimbi began to occupy government 
                                                 
538 United Nations, “Angola - UNAVEM II - Background,”  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/Unavem2/UnavemIIB.htm. website, accessed 14 July 
2012. 
539 Ibid., sections 2 & 3. 
540 Ibid., section 4. Resolution 747 can be found at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,RESOLUTION,AGO,,3b00f15750,0.html, accessed, 14 July 
2012. 
541 Fen Osler Hampson, Nurturing Peace : Why Peace Settlements Succeed Or Fail  (Washington, 
DC.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 124. Cited in Paris, At war’s end : building peace after 
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offices and take over entire municipalities.542  Within twenty-four hours of the UN 
declaring support of the election results, heavy fighting broke out in the capital of Luanda 
between the MPLA’s Angolan Armed Forces (FAA--Forças Armadas Angolanas) and 
UNITA forces. In less than two months the UNSG was forced to admit that “Angola has 
returned to civil war, and is probably in an even worse situation than that which prevailed 
before the Peace Accords were signed in May 1991.”543 
Fighting throughout the country continued to worsen. The FAA regained the 
capital, Luanda, but UNITA was taking over the majority of the countryside and 
municipalities outside; this included the majority of roads and the diamond producing 
region, one of Angola’s primary means of income. In the next two years, as fighting 
intensified, the UN chose to reduce its strength instead of increasing it in order to stop the 
bloodshed.   While the UN and the international community “abandoned Angola at this 
critical moment in the country’s history,” and “merely” observed, approximately 300,000 
people were killed in fighting.544   
Decreasing interest by the West to intervene in African affairs was never more 
evident than in crises throughout Africa during this period in time.545  There were also 
rumors that because of Western influence, the UN was “turning a blind eye to UNITA’s 
activities while condemning every action taken by the FAA.”546  In the midst of the 
fighting, in 1993, the South African Defense Force volunteered to train the FAA to fight 
against UNITA. Suspicious that the SADF’s offers to help train the FAA were a ruse to 
actually help them lose the war, General Luis Faceira of the FAA began a dialogue with 
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Eeben Barlow, a former South African Defense Force soldier and the director of a new 
private military company, Executive Outcomes (EO).547 
What makes this civil war so complex is that during the Cold War, the conflict in 
Angola was a considered a proxy war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.548  After 
the Cold War, the U.S. found itself still partially aligned with a rebel group, UNITA, but 
UNITA was not the recognized government. Moreover, UNITA’s aggression toward the 
MPLA was beginning to gather international attention due to the massive numbers being 
killed—nearly 3 percent of the population had been killed by 1994, less than two years 
after the peace agreement and “free and fair” elections.549  “More Angolans died as a 
result of the war in the two years between October 1992 and November 1994 than in the 
sixteen years of conflict before 1991.”550  When UNITA began to take over the oil fields, 
restricting the flow of oil to Western nations, and especially the U.S., alliances began to 
shift away from UNITA, but major powers still did not want to get directly involved to 
stop the fighting. 
Another problem was that until 1991 and the peace accords, South Africa had 
been on the side of UNITA (as had the U.S.). After fighting broke out again following the 
elections, there were many South African Defence Force (SADF) soldiers sympathetic to 
UNITA, so in 1994 when the SADF was dissolved and integrated into the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF), a good number of former soldiers found themselves 
out of work. Many of them, unable to use their skills at home in South Africa, began to 
hire themselves out as mercenaries throughout Africa. Of those, some found themselves 
on the side of UNITA, a force with whom they had worked previously. However, UNITA 
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did not represent the legitimate government of Angola. When EO came on the scene, the 
company had not only “legitimized” itself through incorporation and previous security 
work in Pretoria, but had begun contract negotiations with the recognized government of 
Angola, the MPLA.551  Initial discussions focused on how to train the FAA and enable 
them to fight effectively against the UNITA rebels. Talks quickly progressed to 
accompanying them into the field and ultimately to joining them in combat.552 
Neither UN reports nor many scholarly articles on Angola covering the years 
between 1992 and 1994 discuss what occurred to effect a turnaround in the civil war (in 
favor of the MPLA) and bring the parties in conflict to the Lusaka peace accords. In fact, 
Roland Paris does not even break paragraphs when he writes that, “Fighting continued for 
the next two years…In November 1994, after the MPLA had reversed UNITA’s 
territorial gains, the parties signed a new cease-fire and peace agreement in Lusaka, 
Zambia…”553  After Paris provides a careful and detailed analysis of factors influencing 
the shifting political, military, and international positions in Angola, private actors 
receive no mention. The UN’s UNAVEM reports from the same period also do not make 
mention of how Angola’s government turned the tide on UNITA and brought them to 
peace negotiations. 
Unable to seek help from the Soviet Union or Cuba in a post-Cold War world, the 
MPLA had few places to turn. The UN had, by most accounts, abandoned Angola to its 
civil war at this point, acting as observers, standing by when and if parties could make it 
to the bargaining table. By 1993 Joseph Savimbi controlled 80-percent of the countryside, 
and was continuing to advance on the capitol.554  It is suspected that diamond, oil, and 
gas interests, and specifically Tony Buckingham, president of the Branch Group (which 
includes Heritage Oil and Gas), introduced the MPLA government to EO hoping that 
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dual interests could be served: 1) maintain control of oil, gas, and diamond fields; and 2) 
preserve the MPLA government and push UNITA towards peace.555 
EO was able to operate more cheaply than the UN.  While the UN authorized 
$383 million in funding for one year’s worth of observation, EO was hired to train and 
accompany the FAA in pushing UNITA back for the sum of $40 million.556  EO’s 
contract was extended beyond the first year and Eeben Barlow, the president of EO 
claims that the MPLA government paid them a total of $60 million for four years’ work 
(1993–1997);557 other accounts put EO’s payment at $40 million per year (including 
weapons), which supposedly included untold amounts in mineral concessions.558  In 
contrast, the UN spent more than $1.5 billion for the same time period during UNAVEM 
III, and did very little to stop the violence or end civil war.559   
UNITA’s gains were reversed through the involvement of EO.560  It is widely 
accepted that EO’s efforts, though guided by monetary reward (and possibly mineral 
concessions), are the primary reason that the FAA was able to push UNITA back and get 
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Savimbi to agree to the Lusaka Accords.561  However, there is a paucity of coverage of 
EO’s role in the peacekeeping literature. 
2. Role of PSCs 
EO’s successes in fighting alongside the FAA against UNITA granted them a 
certain legitimacy and strengthened their credibility with not only the Angolan 
government (MPLA), but other governments, such as Sierra Leone and Papua New 
Guinea.562  EO operatives, under contract with the FAA, and at a cost of perhaps $40 
million per year, forced UNITA to the negotiating table. EO also assisted the MPLA to 
regain the diamond and oil fields by pushing UNITA out and allowing production in 
support of the state to resume. Claims to be protecting civilian populations were quickly 
dismissed as secondary to EO’s desire for monetary gain.563  EO set a precedent of 
effectiveness as a military force for hire, prepared to create or regain security, but at a 
price. Although they were able to end violence and restore order, any successes that EO 
achieved were only temporary, and in the end, EO failed to create long term peace and 
security in Angola. 
3. Role of International Peacekeepers 
The UN spent $1.5 billion with a maximum strength of 7,000 troops in an effort 
to bring peace and stability to Angola.564  Unlike EO, the UN was committed to Angola 
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for the long term, and ultimately was able to create human security. The disadvantage to 
the UN’s approach in Angola was that human rights abuses and violence continued until 
UN peacekeepers could become sufficiently aligned on ROE and engage and stop those 
committing the abuses. Had the UN engaged sooner and more robustly, it is possible that 
UNITA-inflicted violence could have been stopped as quickly as EO had done—the UN 
also had something that EO did not have: credibility. Unfortunately for the Angolan 
people, this was not the case. The Angolan conflict is one where it is clear that the UN’s 
intervention was too little too late, and because the UN did not intervene early, at the time 
when EO was first hired, the MPLA believed that it had no choice but to hire a private 
military company to save its failing government. 
4. Use of PSC Pros and Cons 
Table 7 presents my conclusions regarding the various pros and cons of PSC 
involvement suggested by the foregoing review of Angola.  The side in the table 
italicized in bold shows heavier weighting toward a specific pro or con.  I elaborate 
below on my reasons for drawing these conclusions. 











a. Adherence to Contracts 
 Pro 
EO did what it was contracted to do. A private company cannot be 
expected to act outside the bounds of its contracted obligations just as UN personnel 
cannot be expected to act outside the bounds of the SC mandate or their orders. Broadly 
written contracts that spell out the “what,” but not the “how,” can work to give a private 
contractor flexibility in fulfilling the contract. The advantage to this type of contract is 
that it can ensure the accomplishment of specific objectives. The problem with this type 
of contract is that there is a good deal of room for waste, fraud, and abuse.   
In the case of Angola, expediency was of utmost importance not 
only to the MPLA government likely to be overthrown, but to the oil and diamond 
industries. Restricting the activities of EO or limiting their involvement might have 
allowed UNITA to take over the country. It is not possible to know whether this would 
have actually degraded matters. The fact is, the big money interests of Tony Buckingham 
and Branch Energy were closely aligned with the government of Angolan President José 
dos Santos. EO’s objectives were clear: push UNITA out of the oil and diamond fields 
and force them to the bargaining table with the legitimate and democratically elected 
government of Angola—EO accomplished this. Had the UN followed up with 
peacekeeping forces and enforced a mandate based upon the Lusaka Accords, human 











EO adhered to both of their contracts in Angola and was paid in 
full for their services to Sonangol (the nationalized oil company), the other oil 
companies, and the MPLA.565  One of the problems, however, was that their contract was 
vague enough that although their contracted mission was to train the FAA, they were also 
to accompany them to the field to combat UNITA. Because they were to be placed in 
potential danger, they had a choice, to carry weapons or leave themselves vulnerable and 
dependent on the FAA to protect them. Barlow decided to allow his operators to arm 
themselves to “ensure that their chances of survival would be as high as possible.”566  
The contract did not disallow the use of their weapons to support the FAA. The 
disadvantage is that because EO operators had chosen to fight alongside the FAA, and 
were in the field with AK-47 assault rifles and PKM machine guns, the media classified 
them as mercenaries.567 
Insinuation that these newly-formed private military companies 
were bands of mercenaries or were soldiers of fortune under a new label discouraged any 
UN cooperation or collaboration, regardless of whether or not the companies forwarded 
UN goals. The conflict in which EO found itself took place in an environment where 
political interests and former Cold War ties were not always aligned with EO’s 
objectives.568  Without the requisite coordination between EO and the UN, any successes 
                                                 
565 Sonangol paid $80K for EO’s services in retaking the oil fields; Branch Energy had interests in the 
diamond fields being returned to the MPLA, so there is a good likelihood that Branch Energy supported EO 
(not supported by solid evidence). The Angolan government paid the majority of the bill ($60M). 
566 Barlow, Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds, 107. 
567 Barlow spends a good bit of time in his book discussing the negative press his company (EO) got 
from their operations in Angola, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere. His contention is that much of the negative 
press was either outright lying, exaggeration, or directed at his company by jealous rivals. Barlow commits 
a good deal of time in later chapters of his book in defense of EO’s actions, reprinting media stories and 
refuting them. See Ibid. 
568 The U.S. had previously supported UNITA; USSR and Cuba supported the MPLA. After the 
Portuguese pulled out, the war for Angola became essentially a proxy war until the MPLA was 
democratically elected under UN supervision in 1992. Business interests were also tied to who was to win 
the country. Since U.S. and S.A. interests were aligned with UNITA, political and business interests did not 
welcome EO’s involvement, especially when it was seen that EO was turning the tide of the conflict in 
favor of the MPLA. Rightly or wrongly, EO was accused of mercenary activity and had made enemies with 
previous allies in both the S.A. government and the SADF. 
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EO claimed were lost when they left, putting the country back in danger of falling back 
into civil war (which is exactly what happened). Hiring PSCs protects human security for 
only as long as a contract is in place, and unless protecting people is in the contract, 
PSCs’ interests are a function of profit, not human security. Long term support and 
human security was not in the interest of EO—it remained the domain of the international 
community and the UN. However, as long as EO was operating in Angola, the UN was, 
in a sense, relieved of their responsibility to act. Moreover, as was mentioned earlier, the 
UN during this time was viewed by many as abandoning African states like Angola.569 
b. Cost 
 Pro 
Cost can be considered a pro in this case when compared directly 
against costs borne by the UN, the SADF, and the CIA. UNAVEM III cost the UN $135 
million for a single year (1996–1997), the SADF spent $30 million per month and $80 
million per year in aid and weapons, and the CIA an estimated $15–20 million per year 
from 1986 until 1991 in covert aid. See Table 8 for a breakdown and comparison of costs. 
The military assistance provided by EO, which turned the tide of the conflict in favor of 
the MPLA, cost an estimated $40 million per year.570  EO initially used a small team of 
less than thirty operators backed by two Angolan battalions to secure the Soyo 
oilfields.571  This was a deal brokered by Tony Buckingham, supported by the dos Santos 
government, and paid for by a consortium of oil interests including Chevron, Texaco, Elf-
Fina-Gulf, and Petrangol.572  According to Barlow, EO’s president, EO received $80,000 
from the oil companies to secure the oil fields. After defeating UNITA in the oilfields, 
                                                 
569 See for example, (USIP), “Special Report on Angola.”; Pycroft, “The Forgotten Tragedy.” 
570 David Shearer, “Outsourcing War,” Foreign Policy 112(1998): 73, 79; Barlow, Executive 
Outcomes: Against All Odds, 540. 
571 EO used no more than 28 men for this operation and completed it within two months. Weiss, 
“Weak Governments in Search of Strength,” 70–71. Other accounts place the number between forty and 
eighty men. Singer, Corporate Warriors: 108; Venter, War Dog : Fighting Other People’s Wars : The 
Modern Mercenary In Combat, 358–59. 
572 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, 205; Howe, Ambiguous Order: 
206–10. 
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the MPLA hired EO to work alongside the FAA to force UNITA out of the diamond 
fields (a critical source of revenue) and cities throughout the country and bring them to 
the bargaining table. EO did what it was paid to do. Following success in the oil and 
diamond fields, EO brought in 500 operators, signed a contract with the MPLA, and 
stayed within agreed-upon costs, bringing UNITA to peace accords. This time it was the 
Angolan government footing EO’s bill, but again, EO remained within costs and met 
their contract. 
 Con 
When compared directly against the costs of the UN operations in 
Angola (UNAVEM I, II, III), EO’s costs were small. But considering that their efforts 
resulted in nothing more than a prolonging of the conflict, their cost was a waste of the 
MPLA’s limited finances. Another factor to consider when weighing costs is where the 
money came from. The money paid to EO came directly from Angola’s coffers; the 
money the UN spent on the UNAVEM missions came from the international community 
and was returned to primarily developing nations through peacekeepers or was spent on 
infrastructure and stabilization efforts within Angola. None of the money EO collected 
was directly reinvested in Angola. EO may have helped the FAA force UNITA to the 
bargaining table but they certainly did not have the resources, capabilities, or staying 
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573  Cost table adapted from Barlow, Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds: Appendix B. Figures 
within table are readily available and have been compiled from numerous sources, see for example, 
William J. Durch, The Evolution of UN peacekeeping : Case Studies And Comparative Analysis  (New 
York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 393–94; Nations, “UNAVEM II”; Nations, “UNAVEM III Facts and 




Some have argued that legitimacy can be equated with 
effectiveness.574  This is also associated with the “favorable-outcomes approach,” as put 
forward by Ian Hurd, in After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations 
Security Council.575 A security force (or peacekeeping force) that fails to protect people 
or cannot accomplish what they were sent to do does not earn legitimacy. Questions of 
legitimacy were not initially a concern when EO first entered Angola. Effectiveness was 
all that mattered to the oil companies who contracted EO to come in and recover the Soyo 
oilfields from UNITA, which was using the extraction and refining facilities for its own 
gain. Of key importance was their expertise as former SADF soldiers (most of whom 
were special operations forces (SOF)) and the potential that they could do the job when it 
was clear that the FAA could not. Legitimacy was established through their success in 
retaking the oilfields, and then their follow-on contract with the MPLA government. 
Pattison, who writes extensively on legitimacy in his book, Humanitarian Intervention 
and the Responsibility to Protect, convincingly argues that “[t]he most important factor 
for the legitimacy of an intervener is its effectiveness.”576  From the point of view of 
Sonangol and the Western oil companies, EO was effective since they accomplished 
exactly as they were hired to do. The de Santos government was certainly thankful that 
UNITA had not overrun the capital and overthrown the regime. From a human rights 
point of view, the MPLA and many Angolans were thankful that EO had stepped in, 
since their presence stopped the war (if only temporarily) and brought the parties to peace 
accords. By other determinations of legitimacy, EO can be said to have earned 
“humanitarian credentials” through stopping the violence and killing, as well as having 
                                                 
574 Broadly discussed throughout his book, Pattison places effectiveness in a position of prime 
importance for determinations of legitimacy. See Pattison, Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility 
to protect : who should intervene? 
575 Hurd, After Anarchy, summary. 
576 Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention And The Responsibility To Protect : Who Should Intervene?: 
32, 182–85. Pattison discusses legitimacy as “morally justifiable power,” and that interveners must have at 
least an adequate degree of legitimacy as long as it is effective.  “The only necessary condition of 
legitimacy is effectiveness.” 
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achieved positive “prevailing political context,” since they were perceived as having 
saved a government from an almost certain demise.577 
 EO’s operations in Angola and with the FAA “established it as an 
effective PMC able to supply security specialists to governments to help train their 
security forces and provide military protection against local insurgencies. It also proved a 
PMC could have a positive impact on a country’s security situation.”578  It is likely that 
EO’s successes in Angola are the reason Valentine Strasser’s newly formed NPRC 
looked to hire EO to stop the advances of the RUF in Sierra Leone. EO’s effectiveness, as 
well as their “humanitarian credentials” and “prevailing political context” (though 
fleeting) legitimized EO, at least to those who were doing the hiring.579 
 
 Con 
Any legitimacy EO had was undermined by the fact that they were 
not there for the long term and they were not supported by the international community in 
their intervention. Additionally, they lost legitimacy through an inability to work with 
their home government of South Africa or members of their home military (SADF) who 
also offered to help train the FAA. Though EO may have had the “prevailing political 
context” and limited “humanitarian credentials” immediately after they stopped the 
violence which ultimately brought the parties to the negotiating table, these legitimating 
factors were quickly lost when EO exited and the country returned to civil war.580  In 
fact, when EO left and the fighting got worse, they proved that they were not there to 
help Angolans, but there only to make a profit.   
                                                 
577 Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War : The Ethics, Law, And Politics Of Humanitarian Intervention. 
578 Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers And International Security : The Rise Of Private Military 
Companies, Contemporary security studies (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 62. 
579 This is a combination of both Pattison and Heinze’s arguments for what creates legitimacy in 
humanitarian intervention, as discussed in Ch. IV. See Pattison, Humanitarian intervention and the 
responsibility to protect : who should intervene; Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War : The Ethics, Law, 
And Politics Of Humanitarian Intervention. 
580 ———, Waging Humanitarian War : The Ethics, Law, And Politics Of Humanitarian Intervention, 
117–25. 
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If, as Pattison argues, effectiveness is the ultimate determinant of 
legitimacy, then although EO may have been effective in the short term, they were 
certainly not effective at creating peace or security in the long term.581 
d. Human Security and Human Rights 
 Pro 
EO’s focused efforts with the FAA in attacking UNITA soldiers 
and positions prevented much collateral damage and forced UNITA out of populated 
areas, reducing violence to non-combatants. Additionally, their rapid advance on 
UNITA’s forces disallowed UNITA’s integration in communities where civilian deaths 
could have potentially been much higher. Unlike future engagements by PSCs in other 
countries, allegations of human rights abuses in Angola were minimal. 
EO’s president, Eeben Barlow, does admit, however, that some of 
his men had attempted to secretly buy and sell diamonds by smuggling them out of the 
country during their trips abroad. As he writes, “I was also painfully aware that the 
smuggled diamonds were fuelling and paying for the bloody and protracted war we were 
trying to stop…”582  Certainly, this behavior is not exclusive to privatized soldiers, but if 
it was ever perceived as behavior countenanced by EO’s leadership, EO’s reputation, 
now aligned with the MPLA and FAA, would be damaged and gains against UNITA 
would be compromised, ultimately prolonging the war. Barlow worked with the Angolan 
government to plant informants within his operation and the FAA and soon arrested or 
fired individuals suspected of smuggling. After this event, Barlow claims that he 
“appointed his own security staff to search all personnel boarding aircraft bound for 
South Africa.”583  There is no doubt that illegal diamonds and unscrupulous buyers were 
contributing to the conflict and immiseration of many Angolans.  Efforts to address 
smuggling and other illicit business activities by a PMC are necessary especially if states 
                                                 
581 Pattison, Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect : who should intervene?: 185. 
582 Barlow, Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds, 181. 
583 Ibid. 
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or international organizations such as the UN are to use them. When reputations are tied 
to effectiveness, proper maintenance of accountability is necessary. 
 Con 
EO failed to prevent the country from devolving back into war 
after their departure from the country. Preventing the resumption of war was not in their 
contract with the MPLA, but from a perspective that creating peace necessarily involves 
securing sustainable protection to persons and communities, they were unable to 
accomplish this essential mission. More people were killed in the period between when 
EO “brought peace” through forcing parties to the bargaining table than during any other 
time in the country’s more than twenty-year war. This is one of the fundamental flaws of 
private companies with regard to long-term support and sustainability: when the contract 
is over, and unless it is renegotiated or extended, they will leave.584  Humanitarian 
principles do not guide action; contracts and profits do. 
To conclude, as many have written, that EO brought peace to 
Angola, but that the international community failed to follow-up with credible 
commitments or support neglects the fact that not one successful peace mission has had 
peacekeepers leave before the effects of peace agreements could be at least initially 
monitored or enforced.585  The UN may not always be successful at keeping the peace, 
but there is a system in place that evaluates the likelihood of sustainable peace following 
departure, especially when states are vulnerable, or when security is tenuous. This system 
of humanitarian principles and “good practices” is part of the UN’s policy of “how to 
stay,” rather than “when to leave.”586   
                                                 
584 Cockayne, “Interview with James Cockayne, Co-Director, Center on Global Counter-Terrorism 
Cooperation.” 
585 See for example Howard, UN Peacekeeping In Civil Wars; Jett, Why peacekeeping fails; Durch, 
Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 
586 “Good practices” comes from the Montreux Document—the word “good” versus “best” was used 
because no one could agree on “best” practices. The UN’s ethos has become “how to stay” rather than 
“when to leave,” in an effort to show long-term support and conduct the full meaning of the word 




PSCs can be both efficient and effective. For a discussion on 
efficiency and effectiveness, see Bruneau, Patriots for Profit, in which he addresses and 
describes differences between the two.587  Essentially, effectiveness is “the ability to 
achieve stated goals”;588 efficiency is a more difficult concept, but includes the 
responsible and cost-effective use of resources to fulfill assigned roles and missions.589  
PSCs can be efficient in the role of peacekeeping (all forms) for many of the reasons that 
governments and international organizations cannot:  they are usually smaller, can 
respond more quickly when contracted, and they can be less costly both dollar-wise and 
politically. Efficiency can be found through offering services which, on the face, could 
only be met by much larger multinational or national forces after a process of standing up 
and training units for missions which can take a great deal of time and carry significant 
costs. Compared to multinational military forces, PSCs have fewer employees who are 
often a fairly cohesive unit because they are recruited from people who speak the same 
language and have similar customs.  Moreover, the PSC’s role is to respond and meet the 
requirements of its contract while maximizing profit.  Doing this ostensibly keeps PSCs 
competitive and ultimately earns them more business. EO’s effectiveness and efficiency 
in achieving their objectives apparently impressed the MPLA government because soon 
after their successes in the Soyo oilfields they were hired to train and assist the FAA in 
taking back the diamond fields from UNITA. The diamond fields were critical since 
diamonds funded whichever side controlled the mines.  Once EO and the FAA took back 
the oil and diamond fields, returning them to the control of Western interests and the 
MPLA, the loss of income and battlefield defeats forced UNITA to the Lusaka Accords 
                                                 
587 Bruneau, Patriots For Profit : Contractors And The Military In U.S. National Security, 31–41. 
588 Ibid., 33. 
589 Efficiency is more problematic than effectiveness since, where public security is concerned, the 
“so-called bottom line doesn’t apply, there is no market mechanism to assign a value to whether an activity 
is being done efficiently—that is, making a profit or not.” Ibid., 38. 
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in November 1994. As Singer notes, “Defense Strategists…credit EO with being an 
essential component in reinvigorating the FAA and turning the war’s tide.”590 
 Con 
William Reno writes that reliance on PSCs ultimately undermines 
the possibilities of reform.  This is because “foreign firms and mercenaries that take over 
conventional state functions”591 relieve pressure on the state to deal with the problems it 
confronts.  Once this occurs, the underlying issues are covered over, waiting to resurface 
at the first sign of advantage for one side or the other. In the case of Angola, when EO 
and the FAA backed off after recapturing the oil fields in Soyo, UNITA immediately 
went back in and took them back. Similarly, within months after EO and the FAA forced 
a ceasefire and coerced UNITA to the Lusaka peace accords, fighting broke out again—
this time the heaviest of the entire civil war. 
Measuring effectiveness in the short term is less meaningful if the 
claimed effectiveness does nothing in the long term toward stability and peace. EO’s 
contract may have been to bring UNITA to the bargaining table, but without any 
communication of intent or coordination with the UN or regional or major powers, efforts 
toward peace were ineffective.   
f. Speed and Flexibility 
 Pro 
EO’s initial force in Angola was quite small. A contingent of 
around thirty soldiers was deployed to retake the Soyo oil fields from UNITA and place 
them back under control of the oil companies that owned the rights and the equipment. 
Their quick success earned them credibility with the FAA and the MPLA and soon they 
were hired by the government to train the FAA in fighting against UNITA. Very quickly 
this relationship changed from one of training to one of fighting alongside the FAA. EO 
was able to rapidly deploy around five-hundred operators to Angola in order to begin 
                                                 
590 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 110. 
591 William Reno, “The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States,” Development and Change 33, no. 
4 (2002): 837. 
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executing their plan. Within months of being hired, EO, alongside the FAA, was able to 
rout UNITA from key cities, as well as oil and diamond fields, removing a vital source of 
income to UNITA and returning it to the MPLA government. 
EO’s ability to rapidly deploy effective combat-ready operators, as 
well as the necessary logistics and equipment in protecting a recognized government did 
not go unnoticed by other fragile countries seeking protection from rebel elements or 
factions. It was these initial successes by EO and subsequently other private companies 
that helped launch the explosion of growth of the international private security industry. 
 Con 
There were no significant disadvantages to the speed and 
flexibility of EO’s execution of their contract in Angola. The only criticism with their 
speed was that their actions disallowed for any sort of resolution to the conflict through 
peaceful means, thereby preventing anything but coerced consent on the part of UNITA. 
A fundamental feature of peace negotiations is voluntary consent and compromise. This 
is not to say that the outcome would have been different had EO taken longer to 
accomplish their aims. It is only to say that the means by which “peace” had been 
achieved at the Lusaka Peace Accords was through force. As soon as EO left the country 
as demanded by Savimbi as part of the agreement, UNITA renewed its attacks against 
FAA forces and fighting resumed. The newly deployed UN forces were unable to do 
much to secure peace. 
 
g. Public Relations 
 Pro 
Public relations has been and remains a challenging area for PSCs. 
PSCs do not automatically carry legitimacy with them wherever they go as the UN does 
(at least to a certain extent).592  PSCs have to earn legitimacy through cost-efficient and 
                                                 
592 UN legitimacy comes from the fact that 193 member states have agreed to common principles 
which aim to promote global peace and security. 
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effective action that protects lives; not only do they have to sustain this behavior, but they 
have to do it each time they are engaged somewhere new. Because PSCs have 
consistently been referred to as mercenaries, a generally negative moniker that is 
technically incorrect, they have had to work to improve their image through involvement 
in humanitarian efforts and positive media campaigns. One way PSCs have found to 
improve their image is through trade associations such as the ISOA. Continually working 
to distance themselves from mercenaries, ISOA claims that “[a]ll of our members use 
ISOA to network, identify business trends and areas, commit to high standards of conduct 
and accountability (via the ISOA Code of Conduct), and perform outreach to 
stakeholders with a wider industry voice.”593 
EO did not have a trade organization or effective public relations 
team when they engaged with the MPLA. However, time was on EO’s side. The world 
had never seen an organization like EO—a modern-day corporation hired by a legitimate 
government using military force alongside the state’s army. In Machiavelli’s day, these 
would have been the Conditierri, a true mercenary force, out for hire to the highest 
bidder, without corporate guidelines and without shareholders. Unsurprisingly, 
Machiavelli found mercenaries to be “useless and dangerous,” adding that “[a]ny man 
who founds his state on mercenaries can never be safe or secure, because they are 
disunited, ambitious, undisciplined, and untrustworthy—bold fellows among their friends 
but cowardly in the face of the enemy; they have no fear of God, nor loyalty to men.”594  
EO transitioned so quickly from being a training partner to the FAA to being a combat 
partner battling UNITA, that the world did not have time to see what was happening until 
EO and the FAA achieved success in liberating mining areas, oil fields, and cities. By the 
time EO and the FAA brought UNITA to the bargaining table, EO was being praised by 
the MPLA for their quick and efficient work. It was this efficiency and effectiveness that 
got EO noticed by a new government, the NPRC in Sierra Leone, who was battling a 
                                                 
593 Vogel. 
594 Niccolò Machiavelli and Peter E. Bondanella, The prince, Oxford world’s classics (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005), Ch. XII. 
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different rebel element, the RUF. The positive public relations for EO in Angola was its 
swift and effective action against a recognized enemy of the government. 
 Con 
EO conducted military training and combat operations, not 
peacekeeping. It could be argued that EO conducted peace enforcement, but it is an 
incorrect comparison to place direct costs of EO and UN operations side-by-side, citing 
effectiveness of a specific mission the UN was not mandated to conduct. The UN was not 
conducting peace enforcement, they were not fighting UNITA soldiers, and they were not 
providing training or weapons to the FAA. The UN was still basing operations off of 
outdated concepts that were effective during the Cold War. Consent, impartiality, and 
non-use of force were all still important features of successful peacekeeping; however, 
these were not features that were effective in Angola because there was no fundamental 
agreement between parties to end the conflict—neither wanted peace unless on their own 
terms. Compromise was at the end of a rifle instead of through shared goals of peace and 
stability. 
If PSCs like EO are to be used as “transitional” organizations, 
there has to be something to transition to. Without credible commitments from the UN, 
other IOs, regional organizations, NGOs, and local political leaders, the underlying 
causes are not resolved and peace is only temporary. In the case of EO in Angola, EO’s 
singular focus on winning and carrying out a narrow contract was only one piece of a 
complex puzzle. Following EO’s departure (and the arrival of an American advisory firm, 
MPRI) in 1995, it still took seven more years and the death of UNITA’s leader Dr. Jonas 
Savimbi, to bring tenuous peace. Despite huge cost, the UN’s inconsistent and meager 
efforts were not enough to bring peace to Angola. Though he credited his company for 
bringing the two factions to peace accords, Barlow himself admitted, “…there can be no 
peacekeeping if there is no peace.”595 
                                                 
595 Barlow, Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds: 307. 
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5. Summary of Case and Conclusion 
The PSC, Executive Outcomes, accomplished its contracted mission in Angola 
with effectiveness, efficiency, and a great deal of success. But did it improve human 
security in Angola?  The answer is no. Did EO end the “scourge of war” in Angola?  No. 
Did the UN do any of these things in Angola?  The answer is also no. Angola was a failed 
peace operation. Although EO did secure the oil and diamond fields and, alongside the 
FAA, did defeat UNITA, reducing their capacity to operate, and did bring the parties to 
the bargaining table, the peace secured was unsustainable. The reasons for this are 
numerous, to include the commonly cited reasons for peacekeeping failure:  lack of 
political will; lack of consent; no credible agreements with international support for 
peace implementation;596 questionable “impartiality”;597 no resolution of the underlying 
conflict; and certainly no “limitation of armed conflict.”598  Additionally, U.S. post Cold-
war involvement continued to keep UNITA supplied with arms and resources, prolonging 
the conflict.599  The thirty-year conflict in Angola demonstrates that great power 
influence and international involvement (or lack thereof) can play a major role in the 
peace process. 
As Sean Cleary writes, “There is no doubt that EO’s engagement by the FAA in 
1993 contributed to the prolongation of the war—greatly worsening the suffering by 
Angola’s civilian population.”600  PSCs must be able to do more than stop violence and 
bring parties to the bargaining table. For effective UN utilization, they must be able to 
support the UN’s mission in the long-term through coordination, cooperation, and 
possibly even collaboration (the three Cs) where possible. This sort of engagement will 
help to ensure the continued protection of civilians remains a priority and human security 
                                                 
596 Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War,” 129. 
597 Secretariat, “Peacekeeping Operations: Capstone Doctrine.”  Numerous articles cite that the UN 
was influenced by great power politics and showed partiality by not acting when they should have done so 
to stop violence or acts by spoilers. 
598 Diehl, International Peacekeeping: 33–40. 
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600 Ibid. 
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is protected. Clear contracts, contract enforcement, and the three Cs (above) can help to 
guarantee that the work of both the UN and PSCs “will be more effective when its work 
is done in the context of broader organizational integration.”601 
Without international involvement, political will, and a transition strategy, 
temporary (and coerced) stops to violence only serve to foment further and increased 
violence in the long-term.   A PSC can be legitimate, accountable, efficient, effective, and 
well-controlled by a recognized government and still utterly fail to bring peace. Success 
depends on proper integration, communication, and interrelationships between all parties 
involved, including the international community, local politicians and leaders, NGOs, 
private actors, military and police. As the UN has shifted to calling all peace operations 
essentially “peacebuilding,”602 there is need for integrated involvement during every 
stage of peacebuilding from initial intervention to DDR and SSR measures. 
B. SIERRA LEONE 
What difference does it make if a hundred thousand rifles fire in Africa?  
Europe does not hear them. 
 King Louis-Philippe of France speaking at the 
authorization of the formation of the French Foreign 
Legion on 9 March 1831603 
    
   
1. Historical Summary 
The brutal civil war in Sierra Leone had been going on for four years before the 
new dictator, Captain Valentine Strasser, decided to bring in a private security company. 
Only 25 years old in 1992 when he took the presidency of Sierra Leone by military force, 
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he was already paranoid about the possibility that he himself would be overthrown, either 
by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), or his own soldiers. His insecurity did not end 
there; he also knew that international military support was unlikely—because Sierra 
Leone was a former British colony, Strasser’s predecessor, Joseph Momoh, had requested 
military assistance from the British government in 1991 and was turned down.604  In 
1992, just after his coup d’état which removed Momoh from power and while lounging in 
the State House, Strasser asked, “A wan know if America go recognise we gobment?”605  
This was an important question since it was commonly believed in Africa that Western 
governments and international financial institutions privately approved of mercenary 
organizations that could overthrow governments in order to pave the way for safe 
investment. Mercenary armies were the proxies by which Western nations could do their 
“dirty work” without getting their own hands dirty through direct intervention.606 
Strasser’s government was in a sense “legitimized” by U.S. acceptance of his 
coup that overthrew Momoh. The U.S. reasoning at the time was that “in general [the 
U.S.] did not acknowledge regimes installed by force but, in this instance, because the 
previous government had also not been democratically elected and considering the dire 
condition of the country, it was prepared to make an exception.”607  With his position 
relatively secure with the West, Strasser focused on the incursion of RUF rebels, many of 
whom were coming into Sierra Leone from Charles Taylor’s Liberia. The RUF was led 
by a former corporal in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), Foday Sankoh, and was tacitly 
supported by Charles Taylor, the leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, in order 
to secure diamonds and other resources which Taylor could use to buy weapons for his 
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own insurgency.608  In 1992, before Strasser’s coup, the Republic of Sierra Leone 
Military Forces (RSLMF) had already been fighting the RUF unsuccessfully. Part of 
Strasser’s motivation to take over the government was to improve RSLMF capability 
against the rebel force through better government training and support of troops.609  
However, Strasser’s vision was never realized, and as time went on, the RUF made 
increasingly deeper penetration into Sierra Leone. By May 1995 they were less than 20 
miles away from the capitol and poised to invade Freetown.610  By this time, most 
foreign nationals had evacuated the city and the government had lost control of the 
diamond mining areas in the eastern Kono district, as well as the Sierra Rutile titanium-
dioxide mine and the Sierra Leone Ore and Metal Company’s (SIEROMCO) bauxite 
mine.611  At this point, nearly two-thirds of the country’s export earnings were in the 
hands of the RUF.612 
RSLMF soldiers were ineffective, poorly trained, and corrupt.613  The majority of 
the army had been hastily recruited to fight the RUF, but because the budget was so 
limited, many soldiers had to resort to banditry for food or pay. These soldiers were often 
referred to as “sobels,” soldiers by day and rebels by night.614  There are also reports that 
RSLMF conscripts received daily rations of rum and “jamba” (marijuana), affecting their 
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fighting performance.615  Poorly paid and not well taken care of by the government, their 
commitment to fighting the RUF rebels only went so far and many revolted or defected. 
In contrast, the RUF used terror as a tool; they regularly cut off ears, limbs, genitals, 
gouged out eyes, or slashed the tendons in the ankles or necks (causing victims to be 
unable to hold their heads up) of their enemies, or even of their own soldiers as 
punishment for desertion.616  “Many of the victims have been eaten.”617   
Out of fear and in the face of this brutality, the RSLMF soldiers would often just 
turn and run even though the RSLMF outnumbered the RUF by almost four to one.618  
To get an idea of the numbers, the RSLMF counted approximately 13,000 soldiers while 
it is estimated that the RUF had around 3000 guerrillas.619  The RUF used their numbers 
very wisely, however, often through quick attack and retreat ambushes, using maximum 
brutality to inflict fear. As a result, the majority of RSLMF soldiers who were already not 
getting paid very much (if at all in some cases), saw no benefit in exposing themselves to 
risk of RUF attack and atrocities. Beaten back to Freetown and city centers, government 
forces were ineffectual and seemingly preparing for the worst. 
Toward the end of 1994 and in the face of defeat, Strasser’s National Provisional 
Ruling Council (NPRC) hired Gurkha Security Group (GSG) to train the RSLMF and 
assist in pushing back the rebel RUF. GSG’s commander, an American, Colonel Robert 
MacKenzie, was a former Vietnam veteran and Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) 
officer. The majority of his contingent was made up of Nepalese ex-British army troops. 
Upon their arrival, MacKenzie was told he would have three weeks to prepare the 
RSLMF troops; after three days of evaluation he informed the NPRC that he would need 
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six months—after a conference with senior commanders, he was told he had three 
weeks.620       MacKenzie’s wife Sibyl, who accompanied him to Sierra Leone, wrote that 
the RSLMF troops “couldn’t walk quietly through the bush, set up or maintain an 
observation post, lie in ambush or even conduct small group discipline,” and that many 
would wear their civilian clothes under their uniforms so that at the first signs of rebels 
approaching they could “shuck their uniforms, hurl their weapons into the bush and sneak 
back into the camp as civilians.”621  Within a few months of their hire, in February 1995, 
MacKenzie was killed in an RUF ambush; questions remain over whether he was 
betrayed by RSLMF forces he was meant to be assisting.622  Subsequent reports, 
corroborated by nuns who were held hostage in the camp where MacKenzie was taken, 
state that he was tortured by children, then his heart was cut out and eaten, and finally the 
rest of him was dismembered, cooked, and eaten.623  More than 21 GSG soldiers and 
RSLMF infantry were killed in the ambush; none of the bodies were ever recovered.624  
This news only increased fear of the RUF in both RSLMF troops and GSG “trainers.”  
GSG quickly fell apart.  “At the first shot—almost as if it had been rehearsed—the 
African troops panicked, discarding their weapons. The Gurkhas followed in their tracks, 
but at least they held on to their arms.”625   
GSG was brought in to train Sierra Leone’s officer corps “…in the very basics of 
protecting their civilian population and economic assets from the depredations of armed 
bandits.”  As GSG’s accountant, Nick Bell, pointed out, they were “…not in Sierra Leone  
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in an offensive role.”  If the RSLMF was not prepared to take on the RUF themselves and 
training was not enough to defeat them, a new plan was necessary if Strasser’s tenuous 
regime was to survive the RUF. 
In March, after the GSG debacle, Executive Outcomes (EO) was contacted by the 
Strasser government to help train RSLMF troops to better enable them to beat back the 
RUF advances. EO’s recent success in Angola brought the rebel National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to the bargaining table with the recognized 
government of Angola, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 
which led to the Lusaka Accords. EO’s effectiveness in “providing peacekeeping 
services…for recognized governments” brought a good deal of credit to EO.626  
Moreover, the fact that UNITA saw EO as a threat and stipulated their departure from 
Angola as part of the agreement only bolstered EO’s reputation as a PMC that could 
bring parties to the negotiation table.627 
With the NPRC facing certain defeat at the hands of the RUF, Strasser’s 
government turned to EO, the company that had decisively persuaded UNITA to seek 
peace with the MPLA.628  Because most of its force was relatively close by, and because 
their contract with the Angolan government had been concluded with the Lusaka 
Accords, EO was able to quickly transition from their mission in Angola to assist in 
Sierra Leone. EO’s contracted objectives were: 1) Secure Freetown and evict the RUF 
from the peripheral districts; 2) regain control of critical resources, in particular, the 
Rutile mine and diamond fields; 3) destroy RUF headquarters; and 4) clear remaining 
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areas of RUF occupation.629  By May, EO had 80 operatives on the ground and began 
operations against the RUF. One of the first things EO did when they got to Sierra Leone 
was enlist the support of the “hunters” or Kamajor tribesmen,630 a group that had also 
been terrorized by the RUF. Along with the Kamajors and the RSLMF, EO executed its 
plan swiftly, within the first couple of months pushing the RUF away from Freetown and 
the suburbs. In just three days in June, EO and the RSLMF secured the Koidu diamond 
fields. By August, 1995 they retook the Kona district, and by the end of January 1996 
they had recaptured the rutile (titanium dioxide) and bauxite mines belonging to Sierra 
Rutile and the Sierra Leone Ore and Metal Company (SIEROMCO).631  After the 
diamond fields, Kono district, and ore mines were secure, the government was able to 
regain revenue allowing it to buy more political support through cash and distributions of 
mining concessions. Reciprocally, because they no longer controlled the diamond fields, 
the RUF lost a major portion of its funding for weapons, ammunition, and food. Because 
ammunition and small arms were in such short supply, many RUF soldiers were armed 
only with knives or machetes. In one attack by the RUF on a convoy, “…of the attacking 
rebel force of about 40 men, only half had automatic weapons. Some of them were down 
to two rounds of ammunition. Two-thirds of the fifteen civilians who died had been 
stabbed to death.”632  Although food remained a problem for the RUF, numerous reports 
state that RUF rebels had no qualms about eating their victims. 
In February and March of 1996, Sierra Leone had experienced its first stability 
since 1991, allowing democratic elections to take place. By mid-1996 Sankoh and his 
RUF reluctantly agreed to peace talks, and on 30 November the RUF signed the Abidjan 
Peace Accord with the newly elected government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.633  
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Many in country and outside Sierra Leone lauded EO’s success in bringing about peace, 
if only temporarily. However, one of the conditions of the Abidjan agreement, similar to 
the Lusaka agreement in Angola, was that EO leave the country. The Kabbah government 
agreed to the withdrawal of EO based upon promises of a UN peacekeeping troop 
deployment. Before leaving, EO offered Kabbah a contract that would allow them to stay 
in country until the UN arrived. Whether through confidence in the regional 
peacekeeping organization, ECOMOG, or deterred by EO’s cost, Kabbah never agreed to 
renew EO’s contract.634  Without the materialization of the UN troops on the horizon, 
and no one but their own ill-prepared troops to defend the existing government, EO’s 
officers predicted that the country would fall to the RUF rebels within one hundred days. 
Ninety-five days after EO’s departure, a coup removed Kabbah from power.   
Between 1995 and 1996, EO had used between 250 and 350 personnel to conduct 
their mission; RUF rebel numbers ranged from 3000–4000 but were continually 
maintained at that level through impressing child soldiers and captives into service.635  
As far as casualty comparisons go, in a year and a half of combat, EO had experienced 
only two casualties; it is estimated that RUF casualties were in the thousands.636  
Regarding mission success, although EO had successfully fulfilled the requirements of 
their contract, they were reviled in the press and the UN held them in low regard.  
“Despite us having cleared out a brutal group of cannibalistic murderers, the media, 
particularly in South Africa, were bitterly angry at this latest blow to the rebels. The UN 
was equally concerned. Condemnation towards us grew—along with their hopes that we 
would be swiftly evicted from Sierra Leone by the UN or some other force.”637 
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Three months after the peace accords were signed and following the coup that 
overthrew the democratically elected President Kabbah, the RUF regained all the ground 
that EO had made, plus they invaded Freetown and terrorized the residents, pillaging and 
looting in an operation they called “Operation Pay Yourself” since they were not 
receiving funding from the RUF.638  In the midst of the mass killing, and in fear for their 
own lives, ECOMOG retreated to their base camps and UN and government personnel 
took refuge in the protection of private security companies such as LifeGuard, which was 
also an associate of both EO and Sandline International.639  It was at this time that the 
deposed Kabbah contacted Sandline for assistance. 
Sandline was a private military company very similar in structure to EO, except 
that it was London-based and not South African-based. LtCol Tim Spicer, the head of 
Sandline, and his operators began by immediately gathering intelligence and enlisting the 
support of the Kamajors, one of the groups targeted by the RUF and eager to see Kabbah 
restored to power. Sandline also served as tactical advisors to the RSLMF and 
ECOMOG, the primarily Nigerian-led regional organization, who took the offensive in 
Freetown. Sandline’s mission was nearly identical to that of EO’s, that is, secure 
Freetown, regain control of vital resources, and destroy RUF attack bases. Through 
Sandline’s coordination, the RUF were quickly driven from the city of Freetown and 
back into the bush. Within a few months, and after rallying ECOMOG and the Kamajors, 
Sandline aided in the reinstatement of Kabbah as rightfully elected President and pushed 
the rebels to the negotiating table to sign another treaty between the RUF and the Kabbah 
government–this time it was the Lomé Peace Accords. The agreement was very similar to 
the Abidjan Accord, in that one of the articles of the agreement, article 17, stipulated that 
“[a]ll mercenaries, in any guise, shall be withdrawn from Sierra Leone immediately upon 
the signing of the present Agreement.”640  As could have been predicted, with Sandline 
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out of the country and UN peacekeepers nowhere on the horizon, within months, 
Freetown was under siege yet again by the RUF. ECOMOG was still on station after 
Sandline departed the country in accordance with the Lomé Accords. However, 
ECOMOG forces were not enough to prevent a coup and stop the RUF and newly 
forming gangs calling themselves the “West Side Boys” as they resumed terrorizing the 
population, murdering, raping, hacking limbs, looting, and regaining territory and 
resources that would only serve to refuel their rebellion.641 Private companies brought 
security, but it was not lasting. 
The UN had sent observers and helped arrange elections before the Abidjan 
Accords in November, 1996. EO, working with the RSLMF and the Kamajors, had 
brought the RUF to the treaty table. But following the signing of the accords, without the 
promised UN peacekeeping troops on station, and as Kabbah himself put it, “…with this 
outfit gone [Executive Outcomes], there remained no credible and dependable military 
force to oppose and resist their [RUF’s] advance.”642  The UN claimed that it needed $47 
million in order to deploy troops, but they were unable to get the necessary donations 
from the international community. ECOMOG deployed, but UN peacekeepers did not, 
and ECOMOG alone was not prepared to take on what came next. The government was 
overthrown in a military coup by Major Johnny Koroma in collusion with the RUF in 
May, 1997. Koroma set up what he called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC), which was controlled by the Sierra Leone Army and was combined with RUF 
forces; factions of these groups became the infamous West Side Boys. Consequently, 
these groups promptly resumed attacks in Freetown and in the mining districts throughout 
Sierra Leone. 
The second time the RUF was brought to the bargaining table it was a different 
private military company responsible for getting them there. Sandline International 
coordinated efforts between the RSLMF, the Kamajors, and ECOMOG to create the 
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conditions necessary for a second “peace.” After the Lomé Accords were signed in July 
1999, the UN again agreed to send in peacekeepers to ensure the safety of Sierra Leone’s 
government and people. However, once again, the UN did not get the necessary funding 
to deploy troops in time to prevent the RUF from recommencing violence and ultimately 
retaking parts of Freetown and mining areas once again. 
Eventually the UN was able to begin to deploy the 13,000 troops authorized by 
the Security Council. Unfortunately, they did not accomplish much in the way of 
protection until much later, and only with much more support. This only further supports 
the pro-side of using PSCs, since in contrast with UN peacekeepers, PSCs acted more 
quickly and efficiently at accomplishing their objectives. These failures of the UN to 
protect Sierra Leone after two separate peace accords were embarrassments to the UN. 
An article in The Philadelphia Inquirer brought negative attention to the UN in a story 
entitled “In Sierra Leone, hard lessons for peacekeepers,” in which some of the following 
criticisms were leveled:   
Slow to deploy and unprepared for hostile forces, some of the first UN 
troops to arrive in January were disarmed by battle-hardened Sierra 
Leonean rebels. In May more than 500 peacekeepers were taken hostage 
and the UN sparked panic when it erroneously announced that rampaging 
rebels were on the outskirts of Freetown. 
The United Nations moved into one of the city’s largest hotels and 
hundreds of new white UN sports utility vehicles fill the parking lots of 
Freetown’s beachfront bars and restaurants. ‘My 14-year-old son talks 
about UNAMSILing,’ said Zainab Hawa Bangura, head of Freetown’s 
Campaign for Good Governance, a leading civic group. ‘That means 
getting drunk, going to parties. UNAMSIL has the best cars. They have a 







Annan has asked the Security Council to increase the number of troops to 
20,500 from the 13,000 authorized now. The new request would be more 
than triple the 60,000 called for 13 months ago. The enlarged force would 
cost $780 million a year, making it the most expensive UN intervention. 
Annan, in a July postmortem, said the mission suffered from poor 
communication, inadequate logistics, bad planning and no support.643 
Constance Freeman, an Africa expert at the Centre for Strategic and International 
studies, is cited as stating, “I’m not sure the international community is in a position to 
say they can’t [hire mercenaries] if it has nothing to offer as an alternative.”644  At the 
end of Elizabeth Rubin’s article in the New York Times, she writes:  “In the future, 
perhaps, the fear that more private military armies could be loosed upon the world will 
inspire the major powers to invent a more palatable solution. Until then, given the horror 
in Sierra Leone today, and the fact that no ‘legitimate’ knight in shining armour is on the 
horizon to replace the Nigerians, is it wrong to let the Sierra Leoneans keep their limbs 
by keeping their mercenaries?”645 
It was not until 2002 that a UN force, strongly bolstered by British support, a 
revitalized Sierra Leone Army, and assistance from the Guinean army could suppress the 
RUF enough to allow elections to once again be held, years after EO and Sandline had 
both already brought the RUF to the peace table twice.   
2. Role of PSCs 
Our company’s goal in Sierra Leone as it was in Angola is to give support 
to a country moving towards democracy. No one can dispute that we have 
been a stabilizing factor in Africa.646 
Eeben Barlow, President of Executive Outcomes 
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Smack ‘em! Smack ‘em again and then hit the fuckers once more, just to 
be sure…that’s the only way to do it!647 
Neall Ellis, Mi-17 pilot working for Executive Outcomes 
explaining his approach to warfare in Sierra Leone. 
 
The role of any force that was to work with the government of Sierra Leone to 
stop the RUF was simple in its initial mandate: create security for the government of 
Sierra Leone and its citizens. After stopping the atrocities, focus could be placed on 
democracy and aspects of governance, economy, and development. Carrying out the 
mandate proved to be much more difficult than knowing exactly what needed to be done. 
Sierra Leone had appealed to the international community for assistance in bringing the 
RUF to negotiations and end the terror campaign. However, the UN sent only an 
exploratory detail which did not serve to help the RSLMF protect the population from the 
increasingly brutal RUF attacks. The UN was still dealing with the humiliation of a 
number of recent debacles, including:  the failed effort in Somalia where dead American 
soldiers were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu; the “impunity with which the 
Bosnian Serb Army had taken UN peacekeepers hostage and used them as human 
shields”; and the murdered Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda, another UN embarrassment 
that was ongoing.648   
The growing chaos in Sierra Leone was an issue that the UN and Western states 
were not prepared to support with troops. In desperation, Valentine Strasser, the young 
dictator of Sierra Leone, first called Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) to help train the 
RSLMF to fight the RUF. In an early training mission, the GSG commander, Bob 
MacKenzie, was killed by RUF forces and dragged into the jungle along with 17 other 
GSG employees. This was, in effect, a mission kill for GSG since following this event 
they refused to venture out into the jungle to train or assist RSLMF forces. Desperate to 
stop the RUF, Strasser sought out EO, a company that GSG’s head claimed was hired 
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because not only were they less expensive, they were “prepared to undertake offensive 
action,” something GSG was not prepared to do.649 
Once EO arrived in Sierra Leone with an initial team of 80 operators, they got 
straight to work training the RSLMF, forming alliances with the Kamajors, and 
establishing their mission and plan of attack. Based upon a strong foundation of training 
received in the South African Defense Force (SADF) and clearly understood tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs), their military tactics were successful against the 
similarly armed but far superior in numbers RUF. Instead of sticking to protective 
security and training for defense against RUF attack and ambush, EO trained the RSLMF 
and the Kamajors to initiate attacks and follow-up with continued search-and-destroy 
action. This method of fighting was extremely effective against the RUF who were not 
used to being pursued into the jungle or hit at their deep-jungle bases. 
Between 1995 and 1999 Sierra Leone hired three separate PMCs: GSG, EO, and 
Sandline International; all three are now defunct. GSG failed to attract any business after 
the company was effectively fired by Strasser in Sierra Leone.650  EO went out of 
business shortly after their business was concluded in Sierra Leone. Sandline shut its 
corporate “doors” in 2004: 
Sandline International wishes to announce that the company is closing 
down its operations forthwith.  
The general lack of governmental support for Private Military Companies 
willing to help end armed conflicts in places like Africa, in the absence of 
effective international intervention, is the principal reason behind 
Sandline’s decision. Without such support the ability of Sandline (and 
other PMCs) to make a positive difference in countries where there is 
widespread brutality and even genocidal behaviour is irretrievably 
diminished.651 
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Some argue that it was negative media attention that drove these companies to 
cease operations; others argue that it was the tightening of restrictions on private military 
companies that drove them out of business.652  But the former owners of the now-closed 
companies disagree. In the midst of a great deal of controversy over the use of PMCs in 
African countries, Tim Spicer’s given reason for closing Sandline was lack of 
governmental support; Eeben Barlow’s reason for closing EO was “due to a difference in 
opinion amongst those to whom I had given the company.”653  GSG claimed that the 
company was moving in a different direction, that of a charitable organization.654  In any 
event, for this case study, the roles each company played were critical to their evaluation 
as positive agents toward peace or negative ones which only prolonged conflict and 
violence.    
Some of the questions that arise from this specific review are whether or not 
there was sufficient international buy-in to the activities of these companies in order for 
them to be successful at their version of “peacekeeping.”  In each instance where these 
PMCs were hired, the relations between these companies and Sierra Leone were 
without guidance or support from the international community. They informed the UN 
and their home offices of their activities, e.g., the FCO (Sandline) and South African 
government (EO), but in both cases where these companies brought the same parties in 
conflict to negotiations and ultimately peace accords, there was no sufficient follow-up 
by the international community to ensure the accords held. In both cases, EO and 
Sandline each suspected that without a military force to back up enforcement of the 
peace agreement, the country would return to a state of unrest. Consequently, both 
                                                 
652  See for example, Africa, “Foreign Military Assistance Bill No. 54.”  Peter Singer also discusses 
reasons for PMCs ceasing operations, see Singer, Corporate Warriors: 117–18. Sarah Percy writes that 
their “disappearance…suggests that these companies were only marginally legitimate and were far from 
accepted actors on the international stage.”  Sarah Percy, “Morality and Regulation,” in From Mercenaries 
to Market: The Rise and Regulationi of Private Military Companies, ed. Simon Chesterman and Chia 
Lehnardt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 14. 
653 Barlow, Executive Outcomes: against all odds: 516. 
654 Vines, “Gurkhas and the Private Security Business in Africa,” 133–34. 
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companies offered to extend their contracts until UN or regional troops could arrive on 
station in sufficient numbers to maintain stability.655   
What EO and Sandline both provided was a blend of skill in military intelligence, 
managing assets, communications, logistics, and tactics. They also had exceptional 
working relationships amongst everyone on their teams, and as was often the case, many 
of them had worked, trained, or fought together in previous operations or while on active 
duty. A strong ethos of looking out for one another and knowing how each other operates 
was developed over years together. Christopher Spearin argues in a recent article that this 
element of camaraderie and a legacy of working together, common to many PMCs 
through the nineties, no longer exists in present-day PSCs and that they could not 
produce the same results that EO or Sandline produced in Sierra Leone.656 
As pointed out previously in this dissertation, the two PMCs with primary roles in 
the conflict in Sierra Leone, EO and Sandline, are now defunct. The fact that they were 
PMCs means that they conducted military training along with military operations 
alongside their clients. The fact that they were contracted by the state, they had the 
authorization and the rules of engagement (ROE) to kill enemy combatants harmful to the 
state. Their mission was to stabilize the country for peace, fulfill their contract and 
depart. Not unlike peace enforcement missions, once aggressors and those committing 
abuses were stopped, others representing the international community were to step in and 
complete the process. At least that is how the PMCs viewed their role.657 On the one 
hand, they can be commended for adhering to their contracts, especially since detractors 
have argued that “these companies are not interested in the speedy and successful 
                                                 
655 Barlow, Executive Outcomes: against all odds: 386; Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier: 201–02, 32–
34. 
656 Spearin, “UN Peacekeeping and the International Private Military and Security Industry.” 
657 There are numerous examples of PSCs justifying limited tactical or operational successes in the 
short-term with rhetoric that claims an expectation of UN or regional peacekeeping collaboration, 
cooperation, or follow-on. See Alexandra, Baker, and Caparini, Private military and security companies : 
ethics, policies and civil-military relations; Barlow, Executive Outcomes: against all odds; Spicer, An 
Unorthodox Soldier; Steven Brayton, “Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of 
Peacekeeping,” Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 2 (Spring 2002). 
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completion of their contracts, and may even possibly prolong violence…”658  On the 
other hand, if their intentions had been other than purely for monetary gain, there is no 
clear record that they did anything substantial to prevent the country from devolving into 
chaos upon their departure. Simply saying “we told you so” does nothing to encourage 
international participation, let alone create legitimacy, e.g. EO officers said that the Sierra 
Leone government would fall within 100 days of their departure.659  This sort of post-
coup self-aggrandizement only bolsters arguments against the use of private companies 
since it portends a reliance on private services as a requirement to preserve public 
security.660   
In any event, two out of the three PSCs hired by Sierra Leone fulfilled their 
contracts and performed the role they were hired to accomplish. This raises an important 
benefit to privatization that does not translate to international organizations in the same 
way:  when GSG failed, market forces enabled Strasser’s government to hire another firm 
willing to take the job. In the case of international organizations like the UN, failure 
cannot be met with simply choosing another international organization that may be more 
effective—it is not an option.661  The UN is forced to review and modify its mandate, 
troop numbers, policies, procedures, and operations—all things that take a good deal of 
time and require bureaucratic approval. Organizational structures like the UN’s have not 
been proven to be as flexible in responding to international crises for many reasons, 
including political will, member state agreement on action(s) to be taken, troop 
contributing countries, host nation approval of UN actions, etc.   
                                                 
658 Francis, “Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone,” 333. 
659 Singer, Corporate Warriors: 114. 
660 This also relates to economists’ arguments regarding asset specificity and another reason why 
privatization of violence may not be a good idea. See Williamson, “Public and Private Bureaucracies: A 
Transaction Cost Economics Perspective.”; Fredland, “Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost 
Perspective on the Role of Military Companies.” 
661 It is possible for specific peacekeepers to be spelled out in a memorandum of understanding or 
nations to request only specific peacekeepers, for example, Sudan purposely requested only African 
peacekeepers. However, the UN cannot order a nation or group of nations to serve as peacekeepers or 
change them out at will. 
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PSCs themselves admit that they lack the combat power for major intervention.662  
The PSCs that responded in Sierra Leone performed their role exceptionally well for 
what they were hired to do; it is not in dispute that they accomplished their contracted 
missions. What is in dispute are their methods of carrying out those tasks, their 
motivations for doing so, and their intentions, i.e., did these companies go to Sierra 
Leone with the intent to help Sierra Leone?  To be clear, intentions and motives differ, in 
that motives are the underlying reason for acting and intentions are the purpose or 
objective of action.663  But if PSCs’ were merely self-interested, they are not necessarily 
delegitimized. Self-interest plays a role in what Ian Hurd calls the “favorable-outcomes 
approach,” whereby “states accept as legitimate those…institutions that generate 
outcomes from which the stand to benefit.”664 
Deane-Peter Baker and James Pattison, who write extensively on the moral 
implications of PSCs and humanitarian intervention, hold that although PSCs’ underlying 
motives may be profit driven, “[a] strong system of contracts and oversight mechanisms 
might then be able to ensure that PMSCs have humanitarian intentions.”665  EO and 
Sandline, both companies that were successful in Sierra Leone, claim to have had 
humanitarian intentions; both also state that although they wanted to help the legitimate 
government of Sierra Leone, they were not doing it for free. However, how can it be 
determined that they had humanitarian, and therefore moral, intentions?  Baker and 
Pattison claim that the key determinant is effectiveness. Were these two companies 
effective in their humanitarian aims?  In the case of Sierra Leone, this can be argued two 
ways: 1) EO and Sandline were effective—they stopped human rights abuses, atrocities, 
and war crimes during their tenure in country; or 2) they were ineffective—immediately 
after their departure, the country devolved into as serious a situation (or worse) than 
                                                 
662 See for example, Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier. 
663 Deane-Peter Baker and James Pattison, “The Principled Case for Employing Private Military and 
Security Companies in Interventions for Human Rights Purposes,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 29, no. 1 
(2012): 4. 
664 Hurd, After Anarchy: 67–68. 
665 Pattison, “The Principled Case for PMSCs.” 
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when they arrived—they merely delayed the horrors of the RUF, and as some argue, 
prolonged war beyond what its course would have been. In the end, I contend that the 
value of PSCs’ speed and efficiency could have enabled UN peacekeeping success and 
protected human security had the two worked together rather than distinctly separate. The 
pros PSCs offer outweigh the cons when properly utilized, integrated, and controlled. 
3. Role of International Peacekeepers 
Of the many attempts at peace in Sierra Leone, several were unsuccessful. 
“including the Abidjan cease-fire of 1996 with no peacekeepers present, and the Lomé 
agreement of 1999, when peacekeepers were deployed.666  The conflict in Sierra Leone 
forced the UN to critically review its procedures for bringing peace to a country wracked 
by war. As Eric Berman and Melissa Labonte put it, “When Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) rebels took more than 400 UN peacekeepers hostage in May 2000, not only that 
operation but also UN peacekeeping as a whole faced a critical choice: learn to use force 
effectively against those who violently disrupt the peace, or find another line of work.”667  
A robust UN peacekeeping force willing to intervene in the interest of human security, 
following the UN’s responsibility to protect (R2P) guidelines, can negate the need for 
PSCs in any aspect of peacekeeping. However, this proposition takes a great deal for 
granted: that the political will to intervene will be there; that R2P tenets can be met 
(proven); and that a UN force will be willing to aggressively pursue and stop the 
perpetrators of R2P crimes. 
Nearly a year after the Lomé Accords were signed, violence was still rampant 
throughout Sierra Leone. The British intervention in May 2000, Operation Palliser, 
officially purposed as a noncombatant evacuation, became much more than simply an 
evacuation and more of a “mixture of five imperatives: to protect British citizens; to avert  
 
 
                                                 
666 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?, 14. 
667 Labonte, “Sierra Leone,” 141. 
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a humanitarian crisis; to defend democracy; to live up to its stated foreign policy 
principles; and to support the UN operation.”668  Operation Palliser’s successes provided 
the UN the impetus it needed to send sufficient troops, modify the mandate, and turn 
UNAMSIL into the mission it should have been from the start, one that protected people 
and communities from violence.669   
The British intervention gave UNAMSIL, the government, and the people of 
Sierra Leone the support it needed, “both psychologically and strategically,” to turn 
things around.670  Although it took another nine months before UNAMSIL made 
significant strides in deploying to the outer areas held by the RUF, they were successful 
in securing the Abuja cease-fire agreements with the RUF in November 2000 and May 
2001 (Abuja and Abuja II671). The Secretary-General also directed significant changes to 
operational and tactical procedures. Instead of scattering troops throughout the country, 
he positioned sufficient forces (16,500 total by this time) in key positions such that they 
could not only deter attacks, but effectively respond to armed attacks commensurate with 
a “strong peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter.”672  Many of the 
tactics used that resulted in success against the RUF were very similar to those used by 
the PSCs and subsequently the British troops. The advantage the British troops had, and 
one that made the difference in turning the tide in the conflict, was that the British were  
 
                                                 
668 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, Understanding peacekeeping: 38. Citation in Paul Williams, 
“Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone,” Contemporary Security Policy 22, 
no. 3 (2001). 
669 “On 22 October 1999, the Security Council established UNAMSIL to cooperate with the 
Government and the other parties in implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement and to assist in the 
implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. On 7 February 2000, the 
Council revised UNAMSIL’s mandate. It also expanded its size, as it did once again on 19 May 2000 and 
on 30 March 2001.”  UNAMSIL website, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/, 
accessed 14 March 2012. 
670 Labonte, “Sierra Leone,” 181. 
671 Abuja I, 10 November 2000, website, http://www.sierra-leone.org/ceasefire1100.html, accessed 14 
March 2012. Abuja II was an extension of the original ceasefire agreement. 
672 Kofi Annan, “Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone,” (New York: United Nations Security Council, 19 May 2000), paras 23, 86–89, and 100. See also 
Labonte, “Sierra Leone,” 182. 
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able to work jointly with the UN and the GoSL. PSCs seemed to only be able to work 
with the GoSL and the Kamajors; there was no coordination, cooperation, or 
collaboration with the UN. 
Once the UN had the impetus and provided enough properly positioned and 
enabled troops in support of the UNAMSIL mission, it quickly saw successes, not only in 
the protection of people, but in promoting elections which took place on the 10th and 
14th of May, 2002. DDR and SSR finally began in earnest, fully supported by the World 
Bank, the UK Department for International Development, the UNDP, and NGOs (earlier 
efforts in 1999 and 2000 were poorly supported, planned, and executed and resultantly 
failed). Clear and consistent communication between agencies, member states, and the 
UN also facilitated reinforcements to troop contingents and missions of disarmament and 
reintegration of combatants. In addition to receiving weapons, the demobilization centers 
also provided food and education programs so that newly disarmed soldiers with no skills 
other than fighting could find work in civil society. Properly funded this time, a 
Reintegration Opportunities Program was established that prepared the huge number of 
ex-combatants for roles within their home communities.   
In addition to preparing ex-combatants for life other than war, there remained the 
problem of as many as 10,000 child soldiers (“many were used as combatants, but others, 
especially RUF children, served as bush camp laborers, porters, spies, miners in the 
eastern diamond districts, sex slaves, or war brides.”)673  Reintegration of children was 
especially difficult since many of them had been forced to commit atrocities on members 
of their home communities; therefore, returning them to those same communities was not 
always prudent.   Moreover, there were questions over whether or not children would be 




                                                 
673 ———, “Sierra Leone,” 188–89. See also Annan, “Fourth Report of the UNSG on Sierra Leone,” 
paras 26, 27, 49, 50. 
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Special Court Prosecutor in his press release exonerating child soldiers for crimes 
committed during the conflict, and instead, making it clear that he plans to prosecute the 
“people who forced thousands of children to commit unspeakable crimes” those who bear 
“the greatest responsibility” for abuses.674  By July 2003, the World Bank estimated that 
6,845 children (approximately 98%), “were disarmed, demobilized, and ‘discharged’ 
over the course of the DDR program.” 
In the end, it is clear that the role of peacekeepers, properly assigned, in sufficient 
numbers, and guided by effective policies and a robust Chapter VII mandate aided every 
part of the UN and government of Sierra Leone’s mission to solve the underlying causes 
of conflict and create peace. A single agency, be it the UNDPKO or a PSC is very 
unlikely to have been able to accomplish this broad and complex mandate with the same 
level of success that UNAMSIL eventually achieved. The progression of UNOMSIL and 
UNAMSIL from utter failure to relative success provides an excellent case for 
comparison of leadership and management, control, efficiency, and effectiveness. The 
Sierra Leone case also allows for a review and comparison of the broad scope of forces 
used over the ten year conflict, from Sierra Leone Army forces, to private soldiers and 
local militias, to British troops and multinational UN peacekeepers. 
4. Use of PSC Pros and Cons 
Table 9 below shows the various pros and cons discovered in a review of PSC 
actions in Angola. The side italicized in bold shows heavier weighting toward a specific 






                                                 
674 David Crane, “Special Court Prosecutor Says He Will Not Prosecute Children,” (Kabala: Special 
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The late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was right: it doesn’t matter 
whether a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice.675 
Thank you for calling the British Army. If your crisis is small and close to 
the sea, press 1 for the Royal Marines. If your problem is distant and can 
be solved by one or two low-risk bombing runs, press ‘hash’ for the RAF. 
This service is not available after 1600hrs or at weekends. If your problem 
is not urgent, please press 2 for the Allied Rapid Reaction Force. If you 
are in real trouble, please press 3 and your problem will be rerouted to 
Sandline International. 
    Spoof script circulating at UK MoD.676 
 
The activities of mercenaries has [sic] affected deeply the political 
stability of Africa. The situation is very bad in Angola, the two Congos 
and Sierra Leone. 
  Enrique Ballesteros, the UN Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries677 
 
 
                                                 
675 Stanger, One nation under contract : the outsourcing of American power and the future of foreign 
policy: 177. 
676 Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier: 224. 
677 Ballesteros, “Press Briefing on Question of Mercenaries.” 
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These new ‘Dogs of War’ are hired not just for cash, but for diamond and 
oil concessions. In effect, this ‘new kind of business’ is not different from 
the traditional preoccupation with ‘killing for profit’. 
  David J. Francis, Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone678 
a. Adherence to Contracts 
 Pro 
EO and Sandline International both fulfilled their contracts in Sierra 
Leone. Both companies departed the country once their contracted requirements were 
complete, even though by all accounts their continued presence, at least until other 
peacekeepers could arrive on station, likely would have prevented the country from 
falling back into the “reign of terror” caused by the RUF.   
There was no “mission creep.”  Neither EO nor Sandline created a 
situation of asset specificity such that they transformed their services to create a 
monopoly on accomplishment. The UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)679 
had the troops, the resources, and the capability to do everything that both EO and 
Sandline had done; they did not, however, have the political will or support. Costs of 
services were clearly laid out at the commencement of operations and were not modified 
as time went on. 
 Con 
GSG’s adherence to their contract was a negative with regard to their 
effectiveness in Sierra Leone, not because they deviated from it, but because they refused 
to adapt to changing circumstances as required by the situation on the ground.  “The 
contract instrument is useful for delivering a product, not for taking instructions.”680  
GSG was hired to train the RSLMF, Special Forces, and officer cadets; however, once 
their commander was killed, they refused to accompany forces into the field at all and 
their limited training failed to improve the state’s security. GSG adhered rigidly to its 
                                                 
678 Francis, “Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone,” 322. 
679 Later, in 2002, the OAU was replaced by the African Union (AU). 
680 John D. Donahue, The privatization decision : public ends, private means  (New York: Basic 
Books, 1989), 39. Cited in Avant, The market for force : the consequences of privatizing security: 85. 
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contract and ultimately was effectively fired by the Strasser government. Some argue that 
GSG made a calculated decision not to agree to a modified contract for fear that they 
would be perceived as mercenaries if they engaged in more offensive roles. GSG had 
been hired by a British corporation, Lonrho, to conduct de-mining in other parts of 
Africa; if seen as mercenaries, they believed that they would lose future contracts 
brokered through the British government.681  
b. Cost  
 Pro 
The final contract cost of EO’s operation in Sierra Leone came to $35.2 
million for 21 months. EO claims to have only been paid $15.7 million to date.682  The 
UN cost for UNAMSIL, the only force other than PSCs to bring peace, was 
approximately $607 million per year.683  From 1999 until UN peacekeeping efforts drew 
to a close in mid-2006, the United Nations spent about $2.86 billion in assessed funds.684  
Within the 21 months EO was in country, government forces, Kamajors, and ECOMOG 
troops, supported by EO:  
1) drove the RUF back 80 miles into the bush from the capitol of Freetown 
(they were within 20 miles and preparing to attack)—this took the EO-led forces nine 
days;  
2) seized back from the RUF the Kono mining district which provided 57 
percent of Sierra Leone’s export earnings from titanium dioxide (rutile) and bauxite, as 
well as from diamond deposits—a zero sum game since these were the same resources 
RUF soldiers were using to buy weapons—this operation took 4 days;  
                                                 
681 Vines, “Gurkhas and the Private Security Business in Africa,” 128–31. 
682 Barlow, Executive Outcomes: against all odds: 390. 
683 Stuart McGhie, “Private Military Companies: Soldiers, Inc.,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 22 May 
2002, 2. This figure is representative of the years of greatest UN troop involvement (UNAMSIL); however, 
costs were drastically different each year from 1999–2006 and the end of UN peacekeeping efforts. 
684 Labonte, “Sierra Leone,” 166. This figure includes both UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL. 
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3) attacked the key RUF base in the Kangari hills which ultimately 
persuaded the RUF to negotiate and sign the Abidjan Peace Accord with the Sierra Leone 
People’s Party, as well as members of the OAU, the UN, and the Commonwealth 
Organization. 
 Sandline International entered Sierra Leone following a coup which 
occurred just under four months after the Abidjan Accords were signed. Sandline’s 
contract was for $10 million and included similar obligations as EO’s contract: train the 
SLA, support the Kamajors, and work with ECOMOG to defeat the RUF and rout them 
from Freetown. One difference for Sandline was that part of their mission was re-
installing democratically elected president Kabbah into office. Within three months, 
Freetown was liberated primarily by ECOMOG troops working with the RSLMF and 
Sandline. While the RSLMF, the Kamajors, and ECOMOG could not seem to accomplish 
defeating the RUF or bringing them to negotiations on their own, under the training, 
guidance, and combat support of EO and Sandline, they were able to quickly accomplish 
their goals and return peace to Sierra Leone.  
 Con 
Cost of EO’s and Sandline’s services has often been used as one of the 
“bottom line” determinants of the benefit of using PSCs over traditional UN 
peacekeeping. As a point of reference, EO’s services cost the Sierra Leone government 
approximately $35M for 21 months service;685 Sandline International charged $10M for 
three months’ service; and the two UN missions’ average cost was $408.6M/year.686  
However, the figures compared rarely take it into account that the UN was not merely 
bringing the parties in conflict to the negotiation table—as EO and Sandline both claim to 
have done in Sierra Leone. Peacekeeping means much more than aggressive eradication 
and coercion of a rebel group to peace. A lion’s share of peacekeeping involves 
assistance with, preparing for, and conducting elections, DDR, SSR, resettlement and 
                                                 
685 EO’s president claims that the bill was $33M and that much of it remains unpaid to this day; see 
Barlow, Executive Outcomes: against all odds: 390. 
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repatriation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, security for relief 
agencies, and “restoration of basic social services, as well as the medium-term 
reconstruction necessary to lay the foundation for long-term growth and 
development.”687   
A more realistic comparison would be to review the role of British soldiers 
in Operations Palliser and Barras for their intervention, where offensive operations were 
necessary not only to defend peacekeepers, civilians, and aid workers from RUF attacks, 
but to rescue hostages and evacuate personnel from Freetown.688  The UK would not 
place their troops under UN control and the mission was funded entirely by the UK 
government, which makes actual costs difficult to pin down. The British used an entire 
Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) centered on the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean 
along with two fleet landing ships to carry approximately 1,200 British troops to Sierra 
Leone for an evacuation mission. However, part of this mission ultimately included 
stopping the RUF from taking over Freetown, preventing the overthrow of the President, 
rescuing hostages and restore order. The British forces did what they set out to do within 
two months and, along with Sierra Leone government troops, added the capture of Foday 
Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, and placed him in solitary confinement.689  The British 
used very similar tactics, techniques, and procedures as EO and Sandline had used in 
their effective operations against the RUF:  intelligence, proven counter-insurgency 
doctrine, efficient logistic stream, and operational processes honed through generations of 
working together and combat experience.690  Although direct cost estimates are not  
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689 Mark Tran, “New Imperialism in Sierra Leone,” The Guardian, 14 May 2004 14 May 2002. 
690 The British used the skills Spearin claims are necessary for success in interventions such as these, 
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International Private Military and Security Industry.” See also Patrick J. Evoe, “Operation Palliser: The 
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calculable, it is fairly evident that the cost of deploying an entire ARG, troops, 
equipment, and supplies is substantially higher than that of EO’s cost for two months of 
similar operations. Unlike PSCs, the British also did not bill the struggling government of 
Sierra Leone. Another significant difference is that the British government worked 
closely with the UN, coordinating operations and movements so that UNAMSIL’s efforts 
were complemented. EO and the UN failed to work effectively together at all, so 
although EO may have stopped the RUF from invading Freetown as did the British 
troops, the British troops stayed as long as necessary until the UN was able to resume 
control. 
Although the above mission is but one example of British troops 
accomplishing similar goals as a PSC in a limited scope of time, a cost comparison that 
can be made relates to the UK’s ten-year memorandum signed with the Sierra Leone 
government in which Britain promised to assist with long-term political, economic, and 
security sector reform. The UK has committed “£15M annually for an International 
Military Advisory Training Team (IMATT),” which is to transform the “Republic of 
Sierra Leone armed forces into an accountable, self-sustaining, and professional 
force.”691  Not surprisingly, this statement is very similar to what the EO commander, 
Brigadier Burt Sachs, stated was their goal in Sierra Leone:  “[R]eorganising the RSLMF 
into a proper military structure and …retraining its forces to a level where it could uphold 
the government without external assistance.”692 
 
                                                 
691 Krahmann, “Transitional States In Search of Support,” 102. See also UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, “Africa–Security Sector Reform,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 
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6372310.  
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PSCs offering their services to the desperate government of Sierra Leone 
may not have initially had perceived legitimacy. However, the primary PSCs that 
operated in Sierra Leone did have the proper licenses, their plans and procedures were 
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approved before engagement, and they were hired by the legitimate government of Sierra 
Leone. For there to be an adequate degree of legitimacy, according to Pattison, these 
legitimating qualities must be cumulatively evaluated, and in the end, an important 
determinant and necessary factor is effectiveness.694   Therefore, by this definition, GSG 
was initially a legitimate intervener, but lost legitimacy when the company failed to 
effectively carry out their mission; because of their effectiveness, EO and Sandline were 
legitimate interveners, they had an adequate degree of legitimacy, even if indirectly they 
did not have “perceived [italics mine] legitimacy at the local and global levels.”695   
Of those with the adequate legitimacy, who had the duty to act?  “It is the 
most legitimate agent that has the duty to intervene. If this agent fails to intervene, the 
duty falls on the next most legitimate intervener, and so on.”696  In this case, the UN 
could have claimed to be the most legitimate agent (even in light of recent failures in 
Somalia, the Balkans, Angola, and Rwanda); however, the UN was not effective in 
previous operations and therefore, because effectiveness is a primary determinant of 
legitimacy, the UN’s legitimacy had been eroded.697  The regional organization 
ECOMOG also had legitimacy, but was unable to turn the tide of the conflict in favor of 
the NPRC. Whether or not the UN or ECOMOG were the most legitimate agents or not 
may be beside the point initially because they had perceived legitimacy—Strasser’s 
government went first to the UN for help. When the UN and regional actors did not help 
the government of Sierra Leone, their options were limited:  1) accept the status quo, that 
is the RUF murdering, killing, raping, and moving ever-closer to taking over the  
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government through mass atrocity and terror; or 2) find a legitimate agent to act on behalf 
of the government to help train and mobilize the RSLMF, defeat the RUF and bring 
peace. 
Strasser’s NPRC saw no alternatives but to hire a private firm to help them 
defeat the RUF. His was a somewhat Hobbesian choice: he could have security, but at a 
cost—the international community was not offering any assistance. Steven Brayton asks 
a poignant question at the beginning of his article, Outsourcing War, “If other nations, 
individually or collectively, are not willing to contribute to multilateral peacekeeping or 
peacemaking forces, why should a state not have the right to hire a force able to keep 
order?”698  It was clear to many in his nascent government that without military support 
to stop the RUF, he would not keep power for long. Adequate legitimacy was all that was 
needed to justify the use of private companies, and PSCs met this minimum condition, 
since EO had been recently “effective” in Angola. Sandline, however, had only their 
recent failure in Papua New Guinea as their resumé. The fact that relatively untested 
PSCs were considered by the government of Sierra Leone only further affirms Sierra 
Leone’s desperation. But again, this does not change the fact that these were legitimate 
corporations offering services that no one else was willing to provide. 
 Con 
Based upon the earlier discussed definition of legitimacy, none of the 
PSCs that entered Sierra Leone had the full measure of legitimacy going in. Without the 
stamp of legitimacy that the UN or primarily Western nations could have given to PSCs, 
legitimacy was something that the PSCs had to earn. Unfortunately, negative press, 
claims of torture, human rights abuses, and an overly-aggressive force did not lead to 
legitimacy that could be respected by the international community or Western powers. As 
a result, neither EO nor Sandline had “humanitarian credentials” or “prevailing political 
context” in their favor.699  Had the PSCs been able to change public opinion and garner 
support from the UN and Western powers, there may have been real cause for support 
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leading to lasting peace as opposed to the transitory peace that EO and Sandline brought. 
For Pattison, effectiveness is the critical element in legitimacy, and if there are other 
legitimating factors in place, it can be a sufficient determination of legitimacy. However, 
calling the PSCs in Sierra Leone “legitimate” does not necessarily make their actions just. 
Pattison argues that PSCs can even violate principles of jus in bello yet remain legitimate 
if they are “(1) responding to a serious humanitarian crisis and (2) [are] likely to be 
successful.”700  The problem is that in this case, their perceived legitimacy never 
improved, and their likelihood of success was in question from the start. Whether or not 
they stopped the violence, they were perceived by many in the media and in the 
international community as thugs killing rebels in order to steal precious mineral rights 
from a President willing to mortgage his country’s sovereignty. 
d. Human Security and Human Rights 
 Pro 
“In both Angola and Sierra Leone, EO conducted itself professionally and 
compiled a respectable human rights record, especially relative to other African 
armies.”701  Eeben Barlow, EO’s president, claimed that “EO takes the human rights 
record of the potential employing country into consideration before accepting a 
contract.”702  Tim Spicer of Sandline makes a similar claim, but adds that the presence of 
a PSC actually “raises the standards of behavior of indigenous forces” because PSC 
personnel will not stand for those sorts of abuses that seem to be common in third world 
countries.703  Though it may be true that atrocities and human rights abuses were 
committed by troops (RSLMF and Kamajors) on the side of the Sierra Leone 
government, EO and Sandline both contend that their personnel were not responsible for 
the trophy taking and mutilations ascribed to them in their actions against the RUF. 
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Patrick Muana remarks that “many Kamajors had lost relatives to the RUF and were 
looking for revenge.”704  Since the Kamajors and EO personnel were working closely 
together, it is possible that Kamajor-inflicted atrocities could have been attributed to EO 
personnel. However, Barlow comments in his autobiography that there were occasions 
where EO personnel had to stop the villagers and RSLMF from mutilating the RUF dead, 
that this behavior was viewed as repulsive by EO soldiers and not tolerated.705  A senior 
UN advisor commented, “Throughout our intensive investigations over the next one year, 
i.e. 1995–96, we did not come across any concrete information or evidence which would 
implicate EO in any of the allegations leveled against [EO].”706  There is no record or 
evidence to substantiate a claim that either EO or Sandline personnel committed human 
rights abuses or atrocities while carrying out their contracted tasks in Sierra Leone. 
 Con 
The UN report on the use of mercenaries stated that the “Special 
Rapporteur has been informed of appalling acts of cruelty committed by mercenaries on 
captured rebels and on civilians suspected of collaborating with the insurgents.”707  
Specific incidents cited involve two of the three key PSCs active in Sierra Leone. GSG 
sent a military offensive to attempt to recover CDR MacKenzie’s body after he was killed 
in an ambush. A senior officer associated with the operation claimed that, in their 
attempt, captured rebels were tortured and killed indiscriminately.708  The actions of 
GSG caused a great deal of resentment within the RSLMF and the NPRC, which was at 
least part of the reason GSG left the country early.709  A second rescue-type mission was 
conducted by EO when three members of their sister company, Lifeguard, who were 
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carrying out their duties protecting the Mobimbi Rutile mines had had been taken hostage 
by the RUF. Though the mission to recover the three employees was successful, the 
offensive produced “very high civilian casualties,” according to David Francis. Francis 
adds that because EO was considered part of the government’s military and security 
apparatus, they were not held accountable for any abuses that they may have 
committed.710 
The UN report mentioned above also stated that “[h]iring private 
companies providing security and military assistance and advice is no substitute for 
maintaining a collective regional security system and genuinely professional national 
armed forces and security forces loyal to the democratic legal order. It is a false solution. 
When companies of this type leave the country, they also leave behind the structural 
problems they found when they arrived unsolved, if not actually worse.”711  This latter 
statement is exactly what happened in Sierra Leone; none of the underlying issues had 
been addressed by any of the private companies engaged there. In fact, there is a good 
possibility that more violence occurred after their departure because deeper divisions 
were created between groups such as the Kamajors, the RSLMF, the RUF, and the 
civilian population. Civilians were forced to take sides and the untrained RSLMF was 
unable to effectively protect either civilians or themselves from RUF attacks. Instead of 
bolstering the military for the long-term support of the government (which may have 
been the initial, but failed, goal of using private firms to train the RSLMF), private firms 
increased the lethality of the Kamajors and the “so-bels” (government troops also 
working with the RUF or the AFRC), both of whom were actively causing many of the 
atrocities against each other. Once the effective command and control of tactically 
efficient PSCs like EO and Sandline was gone, atrocities grew dramatically worse and 
were attributed to lethal offensive training provided by private companies. 
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Over the span of four years, all but one of the PSCs hired in Sierra Leone 
completed their contract as they were hired to do. GSG failed to fulfill its contract with 
Sierra Leone and was quickly replaced by a PMC prepared and willing to do what the 
government asked it to do. When the event which spurred GSG’s departure from Sierra 
Leone occurred, the UN already had an exploratory mission on station in Sierra Leone. 
The murder of GSG’s commander and 17 of his men while setting up a forward training 
base led GSG to pull its personnel back and refuse to engage the RUF. This was a clear 
sign that a more aggressive force was going to be necessary in order to stop the RUF and 
bring them to negotiations. Though UN officials in country agreed more force was 
necessary, the will at UN headquarters and of the Security Council was not sufficient to 
garner the necessary troop support. EO, and later Sandline, filled in for the international 
community and answered the pleas of the legitimate government of Sierra Leone. Two 
times, PMCs were critical in bringing the belligerents to peace accords (Abidjan and 
Lomé Accords), and both times the UN reneged on providing promised peacekeeping 
troops. If, as the saying goes, a stitch in time saves nine, robust engagement by the UN at 
either of these brief moments of peace, rather than years later, is likely to have brought 
this protracted conflict to a resolution much sooner, reducing immiseration and saving 
countless tens of thousands of lives.   
EO, Sandline, and later Lifeguard (which was a commercial security 
company closely associated with Sandline and tasked with guarding diamond mines, 
industrial concerns, and the Bumbuma Dam712) accomplished the tasks they were hired 
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 Con 
Violence erupted soon after the end of both of EO and Sandline’s 
contracts. Even if the PMCs’ actions created momentary stability, they were not able to 
do any more than what they were contracted to do. As Elke Krahmann points out, “the 
fundamental problems and weaknesses within their national security sectors had not been 
addressed.”713  David Francis notes that EO’s intervention “could hardly be expected to 
address the permanent security concerns of the government because of the undisciplined 
army and the collapse of the state apparatus…EO was hired by a desperate government 
struggling for its regime’s survival, and functioned as a quick fix security at whatever 
price.”714  But this does not change the fact that their effectiveness in the short-term did 
nothing to help Sierra Leone solve its deeper problems with the RUF and anti-
government forces. The UN Special Rapporteur on mercenarism, Enrique Ballesteros, 
noted that EO did not help avert the coup d’état on 25 May 1997, nor did they assist in 
averting the formation of an alliance between the RUF, the AFRC, and the Koroma 
government after the coup.715  (However, it should also be noted that EO was required to 
leave the country as part of the peace agreement.)716  Ballesteros also added that 
“Executive Outcomes was supposed to have provided Sierra Leone with effective 
protection and security. Obviously, these claims were nothing but propaganda. The deep-
lying problems remained untouched.”717  If effectiveness is based upon the long-term 
attainment of peace, then the PSCs failed.718   
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Stephen Stedman argues that mission success is operationalized “by 
scoring two variables: (1) whether large-scale violence is brought to an end while the 
implementers are present; and (2) whether the war is terminated on a self-enforcing basis 
so that the implementers can go home without fear of the war rekindling.”719  Using 
Stedman’s method of appraisal, both PSCs accomplished the former while failing at the 
latter goal. Arguments for effectiveness generally tend toward the long-term “resolution 
of the underlying conflict,” one of two of Paul Diehl’s measures of success.720 However, 
this definition does not take into consideration the fact that many conflicts change over 
time from what triggered the conflict to what sustained it or re-ignited it.721  His second 
measure is “limitation of armed conflict,” which both EO and Sandline accomplished, but 
only for the duration of their contract.722  In the case of Sierra Leone, there were multiple 
and shifting causes of the conflict over its decade-long run; therefore, Diehl’s standards 
are not sufficient for measuring effectiveness (since one of his two measures would 
contend that they were effective and the other would find that they were not).   On the 
whole, sustained peace and resolution of the underlying causes of conflict are consistent 
themes throughout the peacekeeping literature and both are argued as fundamental 
requirements for determinations of peacekeeping success. Based upon these 
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f. Speed and Flexibility 
 Pro 
Both EO and Sandline were able to respond immediately to the 
government of Sierra Leone’s requests for assistance. Within days of requesting help, 
Eeben Barlow, EO’s president, immediately began transferring personnel from their 
recently completed contract in Angola. Contrary to many media reports that allege EO 
brought massive firepower and cutting-edge technology to bear on the RUF, the fact is 
that EO used the equipment provided by the Sierra Leone Army (AKA RSLMF). The 
areas in which they exercised the greatest deal of innovation were training and tactics. It 
was EO’s ability to use the weapons and troops available that made them so efficient in 
pushing the RUF back. In the case of Sandline, their services were requested by the 
democratically-elected President Kabbah who had been ousted in a coup. With the 
knowledge of the Foreign Commonwealth Office in the UK (where Sandline was based), 
and the understanding that they were supporting the legitimate government of Sierra 
Leone, Sandline’s president, LtCol Tim Spicer began sending personnel as soon as the 
contract was signed. 
 Con 
Speed and flexibility can certainly be critical factors when human security 
is at stake. When R2P crimes are being committed, human rights abuses are occurring, or 
violence has become unrelenting and unstoppable within or between countries, 
intervention is often the last resort. The UN Charter authorizes intervention in these 
circumstances, and since the nineties, intervention has become the norm rather than the 
exception. However, intervention by the UN during the Sierra Leone civil war was not to 
happen for years after the RUF began its attempts to overtake the NPRC government and 
tens of thousands of civilians were mutilated or murdered. Desperate, the NPRC turned to 
a private company for protection. At first gloss, this may seem like an obvious answer, 
especially if the government is legitimate and has a genuine belief that they will be 
ultimately supported by the international community in saving themselves from certain 
demise.   
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Intervention by the PMC EO (after GSG’s failed attempt) was swift. The 
operatives employed were seasoned soldiers who had fought in other wars in Africa, and 
were therefore able to adapt quickly to Sierra Leone’s unique combat environment. As 
Howe, Brooks, Schwartz, and others describe them, EO was a “force multiplier”723 for 
the RSLMF and acted to quickly regain ground for the government and private 
businesses (whose profits tended to support whoever happened to be in power). As a 
force multiplier, EO’s “specialized skills enhance[d] the effectiveness of a much larger 
force.”724  However, this speed and flexibility had drawbacks that, myopically, were not 
envisioned by the threatened NPRC. First, in an interview with a high-ranking former 
U.S. diplomat, Howe was told that “EO’s presence may have exacerbated Sierra Leone’s 
security dilemma” because 1) the RUF began resorting to more ruthless tactics as 
retaliation; 2) negotiations were potentially postponed because of “EO’s pressure on the 
RUF”; and 3) the fact that the NPRC had called on so-called “mercenaries” negatively 
affected the government’s legitimacy.725 
Although EO had a generally positive relationship with the civilian public 
in Sierra Leone (at least as compared to the actions of many sobels and RSMLF soldiers), 
their intervention was seen for what it was, a hired force, there at the will of a tenuous 
government. Reno contends that Kabbah’s hire of EO “gave him a measure of autonomy 
vis-à-vis local rivals and the global economy.”726   This autonomy led to resentment and 
a belief by many that the money paid to EO could just have easily been used to improve 
the RSLMF (better equipment, better pay). By 1997, a coup overthrew Kabbah, and as 
Kayode Fayemi contends, it was motivated by EO’s high salaries and the assistance 
(primarily financial) they gave to the Kamajors.727  “What they do not do is address the 
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root causes of the conflicts they’ve been involved in. They scratch the surface. The 
minute [EO] left Sierra Leone—what they drove underground rose up when they left.”728 
With regard to speed and flexibility, as quick as EO was to arrive, they left, without ever 
addressing any underlying causes of instability or conflict, and without any long term 
commitment to the country. 
g. Public Relations 
 Pro 
Companies like Executive Outcomes and Sandline International were the 
innovators in the international privatized security world. Their qualified successes in 
places like Angola and Sierra Leone set the stage for the future use of PSCs in everything 
from conflict to reconstruction, stabilization, humanitarian operations and disaster relief. 
The dynamic business model of a corporation with the capability to provide a single 
source for military support, security, logistics, transportation, training, intelligence, 
support to police, operational and C/PC resolution services was unprecedented. From this 
model grew the giants we know now as DynCorp, MPRI, G4S, Armor Group, 
Blackwater Worldwide (now “Academi”), L3, Securicor, Securitas, Bancroft, AEGIS, 
Triple Canopy, and others.   
Until EO and Sandline participated in these brutal conflicts, hired by 
governments, private security services predominantly stayed within their area of 
expertise, for example, guarding buildings and acting as bodyguards, often subcontracted 
by corporations protecting resource extraction facilities in conflict-ridden or dangerous 
places. Once EO and Sandline demonstrated their capabilities, governments noticed, and 
whether it was the allure of cost-efficiency, effectiveness, avoidance of political 
accountability, or out of expediency and regime survival, the PSC industry commenced 
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its explosive growth.729  Early PSCs did not include public relations departments, and 
maybe they should have, considering the wealth of misinformation out there regarding 
the distinctions between PSCs and mercenaries.730  Public relations departments aside, 
PSCs’ initial media attention may have been overwhelmingly negative,731 but the 
demand for their services has increased drastically over the span of fifteen years to the 
present.732 
 Con 
Not one of the PSCs involved in Sierra Leone had an effective public 
relations team. If the PSCs operating in Sierra Leone were acting wholly above-board and 
observing human rights, as they claimed, then they did a poor job making it apparent to 
the world. As a result, their PR failure meant that these PSCs were unable to productively 
work with the public, international organizations, or the international media community 
in order to properly convey their actions or their humanitarian intent—if in fact they had 
humanitarian intent as they claims, rather than being purely driven by profit. Both 
positive and negative dialogue between the PSCs and the world would have added 
transparency that may have led to intervention by the international community sooner. 
Any abuses or misconduct might have been discovered sooner as well, rather than after 
the fact and nearly impossible to prove or disprove (which is beneficial to neither party).   
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EO operatives claimed that they only engage in defensive pre-emptive 
strikes. They also claimed that they only conducted training for legitimate governments 
and not rogue regimes.733  These assertions fell on deaf ears because during their 
engagement in Sierra Leone they were not actively providing the UN or the international 
media reports of their activities. What journalists and UN observers often saw were the 
post-battle remains where, in many cases, hundreds of civilian men, women, and children 
were left slaughtered and mutilated, usually by the retreating RUF. As is current common 
practice, EO and Sandline might have recorded their activities or conducted regular press 
briefings in order to show that they were, in fact, respectful of human rights and acting 
with humanitarian intent. Recording or reporting their operations may have served two 
purposes: 1) proven they were not responsible for the atrocities; and 2) had they 
communicated better with the world through the media, the UN, and political channels, 
the need for international assistance and action in Sierra Leone may have been conveyed 
more clearly and answered more expeditiously. EO and Sandline were both generally 
distrustful of the media. As Doug Brooks, president of the ISOA, has remarked, many 
journalists are only after a “spicy mercenary” story.734 
5. Summary of Case and Conclusion  
The utility of the Sierra Leone case is that there is a wealth of data on which to 
base analysis; it provides for review of a broad spectrum of “peacekeeping” forces, as 
well as their tactics, techniques, and procedures. Not only were PSCs involved, but so 
were local militias, national troops, regional troops, and UN forces, all ostensibly in 
Sierra Leone to bring peace to a war-wracked country.   In the final analysis, long-term 
peace was not achieved until a large, multi-faceted peace operation was able to address 
the vast array of problems which had beset the country. Regional operations such as 
ECOMOG, the British troops, and the PSCs only covered a small, yet important, part of  
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that array—the security sector. Another important note is that certain methods that led to 
success in one mission may not work in another when the circumstances of the mission 
are substantially different.735 
EO and Sandline fought the RUF alongside the RSLMF, Kamajors, and 
ECOMOG, pushed rebels out of capitol of Freetown, secured the diamond and rutile 
mining areas, destroyed bases from which RUF could attack capitol or mining areas and 
made possible the peace agreements of November 1996 (Abidjan) and July 1999 (Lomé). 
British troops acting alongside the UN and ECOMOG forces did the same thing more 
than a year later after a British security patrol and more than 400 UN peacekeepers were 
taken hostage by violent RUF rebels and anti-government forces in direct defiance of the 
peace agreement signed by them and the government of Sierra Leone.736 
It is clear that both EO and Sandline were effective at carrying out their contracts 
in Sierra Leone. Whether or not their actions were beneficial to the country as a whole as 
the PSCs’ directors claim, and in the long run, is certainly debatable. Not only did the 
bloody civil war last until sufficient number of regional and international troops arrived 
on station, but some argue that EO and Sandline’s presence in Sierra Leone “influenced 
Western governments to not get involved militarily in the country’s civil war.”737  Even 
if the U.S. and UK tacitly agreed with the PSCs’ presence (and possibly because of their 
presence), they found no reason or benefit from sending military assistance. 
A lesson that can be derived from this case study that has not been discussed in 
depth elsewhere is that there was a lacuna of coordination and cooperation between PSCs 
and the UN, the OAU, the government of Sierra Leone (from Presidents Strasser to Bio 
to Kabbah to Koroma, and back to Kabbah) and ECOMOG, the RSLMF, and the 
Kamajors from the time GSG was first hired in late 1994 to the moment when Sandline 
left in early 1998. The fact that GSG had failed to successfully push the RUF back and 
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stop the violence was an early indicator that either more force was necessary or 
significantly more international intervention was necessary. Because the UN did not 
intervene after GSG’s demise and retreat, and the GoSL did not have the organic military 
capability to defeat the RUF, Strasser’s NPRC had very few places to turn for assistance. 
Word of EO’s effectiveness in Angola had an appeal that was hard to ignore, if for no 
other reason than EO’s intervention could serve as a stop-gap until the UN or national 
“allies” could rally sufficient will to assist. Unfortunately for tens of thousands of citizens 
of Sierra Leone, the international community did not intervene until after the British used 
military force to stop the violence until the UN could get a foothold. In the end, there was 
no sharing of information, communication between intervening elements only existed in 
negative form, e.g., harsh media attacks on all parties, and there was no continuity of 
effort toward creating peace in Sierra Leone. It is because of failures such as occurred in 
Sierra Leone that the UN has shifted to attempting a more robust approach to 
peacekeeping, one that no longer separates out distinct stages or phases of effort. As 
Adam Smith from the International Peace Institute told me, “The UN has defined nearly 
all the tasks of a mission—and the overall goal of a mission—as peacebuilding. 
Everything the UN does is presumably peacebuilding.”738  This statement also relates to 
ideas discussed by Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, whereas drawing a distinct line 
between types of peacekeeping marred success in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and Bosnia 
(UNPROFOR) because the use of force was not part of a wider, more comprehensive, 
strategic plan.739  Finally, the Brahimi Report emphasized that the military part of 
peacekeeping must be robust in order for peacekeepers to have the flexibility to move 
between peace enforcement and what was considered previously to be traditional 
peacekeeping in order to be effective.740  It was these failures of the effective use of force 
by the UN in Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Bosnia that contributed to the Brahimi Report’s 
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740 William Durch, “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations.”; United Nations, 
“Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,”  
http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/summary.htm. For a discussion on moving across 
the spectrum of peace support operations, see Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, Understanding 
peacekeeping: Ch. 6. 
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findings. Sierra Leone’s initial peacekeeping failure stemmed from many causes, not the 
least of which was that efforts were poorly coordinated (if at all) between the private 
sector, the UK MoD (sent intervening troops not integrated with UN troops), the UN, and 
the NPRC, and distinct ideas of peace enforcement versus peacekeeping delayed the 
UN’s arrival because of questions of consent, use of troops, and ROE. 
The only periods of peace within that almost five-year span between when GSG 
initially engaged and British troops were able to stop violence and reestablish elements of 
human security occurred when PSCs were present. Lasting peace was not secured until 
more than a year after the Lomé Accords were signed in 1999, and only after the 
aforementioned successful British intervention, when the UN finally made good on their 
promise to send sufficient peacekeeping troops and support. This case shows that clear 
C2, communication between agencies, sufficient troops and equipment, and sufficient 
political will is necessary to address the broad spectrum of issues at the root of conflict. 
As Eric Berman and Melissa Labonte note in their analysis, “it should not take a hostage 
crisis to elicit a proper demand from DPKO for accountability in a mission 
headquarters.”741  In accordance with the agreed-upon norms of the responsibility to 
protect (R2P), it should also not take genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes 
against humanity for the United Nations and the world to act to prevent any of those 





                                                 




One day someone at UN HQ will commission an official report about [the 
Srebrenica disaster] … But for me there’s only one lesson … If blue-
helmeted UN peacekeepers show up in your … village and offer to protect 
you, run. Or else get weapons.  …I’ve had it with our humanitarian 
hubris. Andrew Thomson, Serb-held Bosnia, 1996742 
 
The peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia were the most costly the 
UN had ever undertaken.743  The details of the operations and tragedies of UN 
peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have been covered in great detail. 
Therefore, rather than rehash the details of the many aspects of this complex conflict, 
focus will be on the intervening actors and their roles in attempting to secure peace and 
human security. The other two cases demonstrate individual PSC and UN peacekeeping 
forces acting independently of one-another. The significance of this case study is that it is 
a rare example of conflict and post-conflict peacekeeping (and peacebuilding) where the 
UN, regional organizations, states, and PSCs all worked in the same space and over a 
fairly short span of time. In the final analysis, this dissertation finds that the best scenario 
is one where protection of human security will be accomplished through the use of hybrid 
organizational responses:  PSCs will be acting as part of the peacekeeping “team” under a 
UN mandate. The Bosnia case displays some of the pros and cons to this approach, but 
finds that it will likely be closer to the future of peacekeeping than the other two cases.  
 
                                                 
742 Cain, Postlewait, and Thomson, Emergency Sex And Other Desperate Measures : A True Story 
From Hell On Earth, 252, 54. 
743 According to Howard, “The total operational costs in Bosnia and Croatia were approximately $5 
billion—more than twice as expensive as any previous peacekeeping mission.” Howard, UN Peacekeeping 
In Civil Wars. 
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1. Historical Summary 
The purpose of NATO’s operation “Deliberate Force,” was launched to halt 
suffering, “ostensibly in support of Security Council resolutions.”744  Following the 
initial and successful air strikes, NATO took over management of the entire military 
component of peacekeeping operations being conducted in Bosnia. Ultimately, it was 
NATO forces that halted Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbs from continuing their ethnic 
cleansing, rape, and murder of Bosnian and Croatian Muslims. It was also NATO forces 
who were responsible for bringing the parties of the conflict to the negotiating table, 
resulting in the Dayton Accords. But this was not without prior failures to halt the 
violence on the part of the international community and the UN. In 1992, through the 
Petersberg Declaration, the European Community (EC, now EU) attempted to help 
through its defense arm, the Western European Union (WEU), by sending policing forces 
to assist in monitoring the UN arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.745  However, 
this effort by the EC and the WEU was not nearly enough to stop the progression toward 
war; and in the beginning, “when the inability of the European Union and the 
unwillingness of NATO failed to stop the slide towards war in the region, the resulting 
conflicts were dumped on a reluctant United Nations.” 
The unsuccessful efforts of the EC followed the secession of Croatia and Slovenia 
from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1991. Bosniaks and Croats 
were in favor of secession from the SFRY, but the Serbs, who made up twelve percent of 
the population of Croatia, and backed by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), opposed 
secession. The Serbs fought to establish their own republic once the referendum of 
independence had been passed in February 1992. Since the breakup of the Yugoslav 
federation left the Serbs without a geographical state within the newly formed Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbian leadership sought to create a republic on their own, Republika 
Srpska (RS) and establish a geographically bound, sovereign state. By April 1992, 
                                                 
744 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, 43. 
745 Ibid. 
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Bosnian Serbs and the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS),746 backed by the JNA, began 
their offensives on Croat and Bosniak people in an effort to carve out their own territory. 
Particularly violent, the VRS used rape, attacks on civilians, and ethnic cleansing to 
accomplish its goal of a Serbian state. The UN, recognizing in 1991 that tensions were 
escalating as a consequence of the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, 
began drafting the proposal to intervene. Although there were concerns with probabilities 
of success through intervention, the UNSG “stressed that, in his view, the danger that a 
United Nations peace-keeping operation would fail for lack of cooperation from the 
parties was less grievous than the danger that delay in its dispatch would lead to a 
breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new conflagration.”747 
UN operations in the former Yugoslavia began in February 1992 as UNPROFOR, 
the UN protection force, and included essentially three areas of deployment:  Bosnia, 
Croatia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).748  The UN’s 
mission was very broad, in that UN peacekeepers “were sent to Croatia to freeze the 
situation in order to prevent war, to Bosnia in order to protect humanitarian relief 
operations, and to FYROM in order to prevent the conflict from spreading south into this 
area.”749  In order to accomplish all of this, the Security Council authorized 39,000 troops 
(45,000 UN personnel total) over the length of the mission (February 1992—December 
1995). With such a broad mandate and so much to accomplish, UNPROFOR’s future 
success was uncertain, but one thing was clear, if civilians in the former Yugoslavia were 
to be protected from imminent harm, the international community had decided that it 
needed to do something as the region slid into war. 
                                                 
746 AKA Bosnian Serb Army. 
747 United Nations Department of Public Information, “Former Yugoslavia--United Nations Protection 
Force--Completed Operations Background,” (New York: United Nations, September 1996). 
748 UNPROFOR’S operational mandate included the five Republics of the former Yugoslavia:  
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, and had liaison presence in 
Slovenia. See UN’s website:  www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_b.htm, accessed 24 
August 2012. 
749 Biermann and Vadset, UN peacekeeping in trouble: lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia: 
peacekeepers’ views on the limits and possibilities of the United Nations in a Civil War-like conflict: xxi. 
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UNPROFOR started as a mission in Croatia to protect certain areas designated as 
UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) and to assist in maintaining the ceasefire which was in 
place in February 1992. The three UNPAs were: Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, and 
Krajina and were divided into four sectors (East, North, South, and West). Initially, 
UNPROFOR was to supervise the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia and the 
demilitarization of the UNPAs, while maintaining local police and judicial structures; 
however, UNPROFOR’s mission continued to expand along with the conflict. As the UN 
notes on its website report on the mission twice in two sentences “[t]he mandate was later 
extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the delivery of humanitarian relief, 
monitor ‘no fly zones’ and ‘safe areas.’  The mandate was later extended to the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for preventive monitoring in border areas.”  This 
continuing mandate expansion required more and more resources that were not 
available.750  Annan’s idea that just getting in there was better than doing nothing at all 
may be correct, except that just getting in there creates the perception that something is 
being done, but does nothing to affect the reality. Because of the continued lack of 
resources, UN forces were being spread thinner and thinner and the situation continued to 
get worse in the former Yugoslavia until NATO (and PSCs contracted by the UN, 
NATO, and the U.S. stepped in). 
NATO initially provided air support for the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia in 
order to protect civilians and UNPROFOR forces from attacks by Bosnian Serbs firing on 
civilians into the city of Sarajevo and in Gorazde, but ended up taking over the mission 
when indications that a limited mandate would restrict NATO’s ability to provide 
meaningful protection. NATO’s bombing campaign began in an attempt to stop and 
prevent attacks on civilians in or around Gorazde, Sarajevo, and the six UN protected 
areas (UNPAs), which had been increasingly attacked by Bosnian Serbs beginning in 
                                                 
750 Not only were authorized troop numbers not being met, but equipment and other resources were in 
short supply, and to top it all off, UNPROFOR was underfunded with many member states in arrears on 
their assessments. The UN’s intervention was a recipe for disaster (which occurred in the form of mass 
atrocities on civilians months later in Gorazde and Srebrenica). See Information, “UNPROFOR 
Background.” 
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March 1994.751  Because NATO’s early involvement took place at UN request, there was 
concern that UNPROFOR would be targeted for NATO’s actions, that is, UN personnel 
would be attacked because of NATO’s bombing of Serb positions. As 1994 was drawing 
to a close, and despite repeated promises of a cease-fire by all sides, hostilities continued, 
and in fact, continued to worsen. The culmination and extent of the serious nature of the 
conflict was brought to the world’s attention when one of the UN protected “safe areas” 
in Srebrenica was taken over by Bosnian Serbs and the Dutch contingent of around 400 
UN peacekeepers watched as more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys were marched to 
their deaths in a move of deliberate ethnic cleansing. 
                                                 
751 There was resistance to allowing NATO to support UNPROFOR through air support, since many 
believed that the battle had to be won through political means and on the ground through physically 
stopping soldiers from committing atrocities; however, situations such as Bosnian Serbs committing ethnic 
cleansing against Muslims in Srebrenica led to a more liberal approach to using air power to stop the 
predominantly Serb aggressors.  “[T]he Security Council adopted resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May, in which 
it declared that, in addition to Srebrenica, Sarajevo and other such threatened areas, in particular the towns 
of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and their surroundings, should be treated as safe areas by all the parties 
concerned. The Council further declared that in those areas armed attacks must cease, all Bosnian Serb 
military or paramilitary units must withdraw and all parties must allow UNPROFOR and the international 
humanitarian agencies free and unimpeded access to all safe areas.”  See Ibid. 
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It is generally agreed by peacekeeping analysts and researchers, including the UN, 
that the UN’s efforts in Bosnia were an overall failure.752  The various cease-fires and 
peace plans which had been agreed to by all sides never amounted to much as fighting 
continued throughout UNPROFOR’s tenure from 1991–1995. Humanitarian assistance 
was difficult to provide because aid agencies, such as UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM), ICRC, and donor organizations had a 
difficult time accessing many areas where victims needed help, either because the areas, 
the aid workers themselves, or UNPROFOR peacekeepers were under attack. Although 
lives were saved through the use of safe areas, it could be argued that the ineffectiveness 
of the UN to halt the violence more effectively led to a prolonging of the war, ended only 
by aggressive air strikes by NATO, which forced the Bosnian Serbs to the Dayton 
Accords in November 1995. The UN was unable to resolve critical issues, e.g., 
geographical boundaries, ethnic divisions, or recognition of warring groups (such as 
Republika Srpska). Lack of resolution on some of these fundamental issues led to 
dissatisfaction of all parties and seemingly only prolonged the conflict, or at least held it 
at bay, only to be interrupted by horrific scenes like the massacre at Srebrenica or the 
                                                 
752 See, for example, Steven L. Burg and Paul Shoup, The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina : ethnic conflict 
and international intervention  (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999). Burg and Shoup discuss the historical 
background and details of the war, as well as provide an excellent overview of the dilemmas of intervention 
– many of which were known prior to ever sending UN forces into the former Yugoslavia. See also, 
Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, Ending civil wars : the implementation of peace agreements: 50–51. 
Stedman, et al code peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia as a partial success, not because the 
peacekeepers ended the violence—in this regard they failed—but because they stayed until a peace 
agreement was in sight. The two variables they used to determine success or failure were: “(1) whether 
large scale violence was brought to an end while the implementers are present; and (2) whether the war is 
terminated on a self-enforcing basis so that the implementers can go home without fear of the war 
rekindling.”  Additional resources include, Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, Understanding peacekeeping: 
168; Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi A. Annan, “Address of the Secretary-General to the UN 
General Assembly,” (New York: UNGA, 20 September 1999). Annan outlined a number of areas where the 
UN, and specifically the UNSC, failed:  there was a lack of political will on the part of the SC; not enough 
resources were allocated to protect the safe areas—there was a lacuna between mandate and means; 
misunderstanding/miscommunication with regard to ROE; problems with understanding the necessity to be 
partial (not always impartial) when halting aggression under Chapter VII (see also Annan’s discussion on 
neutrality v. impartiality in the Ditchley Park speech on intervention, 1998); and finally, that the UN had 
serious institutional and doctrinal failings. Finally, see, Howard, UN peacekeeping in civil wars. Howard 
codes Bosnia as a failure for the UN and notes that the UN was not a learning organization, failing to 
connect the mandate with soldiers with actual events—headquarters (and the UNSC) was not able to 
properly appraise the situation and respond accordingly. There are many more resources that support the 
notion that UNPROFOR was a failure; however, of primary importance here is that UNPROFOR did fail to 
protect civilians from violence; the UN and the international community did not provide human security, it 
took NATO and military force to accomplish that aim. 
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shelling of Gorazde.   Divisions remained based upon ethnic and un-agreed upon 
geographical boundaries; cease-fires did little to appease any of the parties to the conflict, 
and UNPROFOR peacekeepers were able to do little more than stand by or retreat in the 
face of overwhelming force.  “UNPROFOR’s nature as a highly dispersed and lightly 
armed peace-keeping force that was not mandated, equipped, trained or deployed to be a 
combatant” prevented real protection for civilians under attack.753  Had the UN been able 
to back its PoC mandate and protect the safe havens through the legitimate and efficient 
use of force, genocide may not have been one of the horrors of this war. In this case, 
NATO proved pivotal in providing a capable military force that ultimately brought 
belligerents to the bargaining table and a lasting (if tenuous) peace. Cooperation between 
the UN, NATO, the U.S., NGOs, and PSCs was critical to any eventual success claimed. 
Only PSCs and UN peacekeepers will be reviewed here. 
2. Role of PSCs 
 MPRI and DynCorp are two companies who played major roles in the 
conflict and subsequent stabilization efforts in the former Yugoslavia. Both served as 
replacements for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was part of the UN’s 
move toward the use of coalitions, regional organizations, and the increased use of 
policing and security sector reform (SSR) to reinforce the rule of law and protect human 
security. In 1995 the UN had three military officers and 2,000 civilian police—IFOR 
brought more than 20,000 U.S. military personnel and the capabilities of three massive 
U.S. military contractors, DynCorp, MPRI, and BRS (predecessor to KBR).754  MPRI 
provided advising and consulting to the Croatian Army (HV) prior to its successful 
offensive, Operation Storm, into Bosnian Serb-held territory. MPRI also provided 45 
security professionals to monitor the border with Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and helped 
assist in Croatia with admission to NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. DynCorp 
provided police and police trainers to the UN for BiH and the entire Balkan region under 
                                                 
753 Information, “UNPROFOR Background,” website, www.un.org. 
754 Eric George, “The Market For Peace,” in From Market for Force to Market for Peace: Private 
Military and Security Companies in Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Sabelo Gumedze (Pretoria: Institute for 
Security Studies, 1 November 2011), 25. 
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the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF) program. BRS provided logistics and 
support with a contract valued at more than $546 million (USD).755 









 Note:  Bolded and italicized areas identify whether stronger as a pro or as a con. 
3. Role of International Peacekeepers 
Peacekeepers’ role in this multi-ethnic, multi-national, multi-lateral conflict was 
fundamentally one of PoC, a task that UN peacekeepers failed to effectively do.756  The 
idea of “robust” peacekeeping and intervention was fairly new to UN peace operations 
and many at various levels misunderstood the mandate. To what extent did “robust” 
peacekeeping mean that peacekeepers use force only in self-defense?  Did self-defense 
include defense of the mandate or only of the peacekeepers themselves?  The UNGA and 
the UNSC wrestled with questions like these which had a direct effect on ROE on the 
ground while the conflict was ongoing. Moreover, the intensity of the conflict and the 
                                                 
755 Ibid. 
756 The massacres in Srebrenica, Bihac, and in and around Sarajevo, as well as indiscriminate shelling 
of cities by the Bosnian Serbs (e.g. Gorazde) are evidence of the inability of UN peacekeepers to protect 
civilians from known aggressors (and spoilers to the peace process). As Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 
state that: “…the safe-areas policy (and ‘wider peacekeeping’ more generally) was badly conceived 
because UNPROFOR, and the Dutch battalion in Srebrenica in particular, did not have the means to 
accomplish their objectives.”Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, Understanding peacekeeping.  
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consequences of failure were drastically underestimated by the Security Council, so the 
urgency to send the authorized troop levels was not existent. Consequently, the severity 
and far-reaching effects of mishandled attempts at peace by the UN were not fully 
realized until years later.757  Poor planning, insufficient resources and troops, 
incompetence, misunderstanding of the conflict, and lack of political will are all part of 
what made the UN’s initial role in the Balkans a failure, or at least, a failure for human 
security.758 
4.  Use of PSC Pros and Cons 
a. Adherence to Contracts 
 Pro 
PSCs such as MPRI and DynCorp International performed 
exceptionally well under their contracts and both companies experienced massive growth 
following their contracts in the Balkans. MPRI was initially contracted by the U.S. State 
Department to serve as border monitors under UN sanctions against Serbia. They were 
subsequently hired by the Republic of Croatia to advise the Croatian military on 
becoming a professional military force.759  The idea was that, developed as a professional 
military force, the Croatian Army (HV), along with the Croatian National Guard (ZNG), 
would be able to better protect Croatian citizens. Bound by a 1991 UN arms embargo 
which included proscriptions against military training and advising (an international 
embargo to which the U.S. signed on to in the SC), MPRI provided “classroom 
instruction in democratic principles and civil-military relations to officers previously 
                                                 
757Burg and Shoup cover the Bosnian conflict in great detail in their book, outlining many of the 
problems identified in hindsight. Burg and Shoup, The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina : ethnic conflict and 
international intervention. 
758 Numerous resources cite the UN mission in the Balkans a failure for the reasons stated (see 
citations at the end of this note); however, two things stand out from a review of the literature: 1) lack of 
political will to help through provision of resources and troops; and 2) failure to clearly state and ensure 
understanding of ROE. See, for example, Howard, UN peacekeeping in civil wars: 189–90; Biermann and 
Vadset, UN peacekeeping in trouble: lessons learned from the former Yugoslavia: peacekeepers’ views on 
the limits and possibilities of the United Nations in a Civil War-like conflict; Jett, Why peacekeeping fails; 
Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, Peace Operations and Global Order  (New York: Routledge, 2005).  
759 Singer, Corporate Warriors: 125. 
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accustomed to the Soviet model of organization” as part of the Democratic Transition 
Assistance Program (DTAP), begun in April 1995.760  Following MPRI’s training, the 
Croatian Army launched an offensive, “Operation Storm,” that pushed the Serbs back, 
regaining all but four percent of the land previously taken; additionally, they now came to 
occupy twenty percent of Bosnia.761  Although it is still in dispute whether or not MPRI 
provided military assistance or training, in violation of the embargo, what is not in 
dispute is that the Croatian Army had been transformed from a “ragtag militia into a 
highly professional fighting force” from the time MPRI arrived in January 1995 to when 
Operation Storm took place in August 1995.762  MPRI did fulfill their contracts with the 
U.S. State Department and the Republic of Croatia and many credit their instruction and 
advising with the Croatians’ successful operation against the Serbs. This success earned 
them future high profile contracts in the region, beginning with the Train and Equip 
program designed to help build the Bosnian Federation military; this contract was valued 
at around $50 million.763  The defensive instruction provided by MPRI ultimately saved 
lives by enabling the Croatian Army to defend itself, its territory, and its citizens. As per 







                                                 
760 Marco Mesic, “Croats Trained by Pentagon Generals,” Balcanica, Journal of the Institute for 
Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. 27(May 1996). Cited in Singer, Corporate 
Warriors: 126. 
761 Singer, Corporate Warriors. 
762 Ibid. See also Paul De La Garza and David Adams, “Military Know-How Finds Niche--And Some 
Critics,” St. Petersburg Times 3 December 2000. 
763 Singer, Corporate Warriors: 127–28. 
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DynCorp was able to provide civilian police (CIVPOL) and UN 
police force monitors to BiH enhancing human security and protecting human rights 
within the towns and villages. CIVPOL and the police force monitors made up a large 
proportion of the capability for PoC, supporting the UN mandate.   
 Con 
MPRI may have overstepped the bounds of its contracts with 
Croatia in direct violation of the UN embargo against providing arms and military 
training. It is commonly believed that MPRI did much more than “classroom instruction” 
with the HV for them to have performed as well as they did against well-trained Krajina 
Serbs during Operation Storm.764  Perhaps because the Serbs had been aggressors and 
had violated ceasefires in the past (as well as having committed human rights violations), 
it is not commonly promoted that the HV was itself violating the UN ceasefire, tacitly 
supported by the U.S.765 
Many of the police officers DynCorp used were either trained as 
police officers in the U.S. or were currently serving in the law enforcement community in 
the U.S. when they were offered positions with DynCorp under the UN’s civilian police 
program (the IPTF). Their training did not necessarily prepare them for employment as 
police force monitors in Bosnia and the Balkans.   Unlike peacekeeping missions where 
there is an international standard of training for peacekeepers (see, for example, PET and 
ACOTA), “corporate standards” do not have the same standards of accountability that  
 
 
                                                 
764 Ibid., 126–27. 
765 Ibid., 126. 
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national military representatives serving in peacekeeping roles are required to uphold.766 
Although there are corporate training programs that have international recognition, their 




Costs for both MPRI’s and DynCorp’s contracts were borne by 
Croatia, the UN, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Brunei, United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
and Malaysia from the beginning in late 1994 through 1996 and beyond.  (MPRI 
remained in the Balkans and retains numerous contracts from various sources including 
DoS, DoD, and NATO countries.)  Bosnia’s Train and Equip program, primarily run by 
175 MPRI employees was contracted at $50 million, but this did not include the $100 
million in arms to Bosnia’s military. However, in this case, cost was neither a significant 
pro nor a significant con. If MPRI’s role in Croatia’s success in Operation Storm, a 
pivotal point in the war in the former Yugoslavia, then it could be argued that MPRI’s 
cost of somewhere between $50 million and $100 million was well worth the price if 
their involvement brought parties to the Dayton Accords, resulting in peace and human 
security (ended the scourge of war).767   
 
                                                 
766 The “standard” for training peacekeepers is one where there are guidelines for training 
peacekeepers, but the UN does not conduct the training. Nations are responsible for training their own 
peacekeepers in accordance with UN standards. There are, however, UN-sanctioned training courses, such 
as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program and the UN’s own 
Policy Evaluation and Training (PET) division which develops, coordinates, and delivers standardized 
training to UN members and external partners. See www.state.gov/p/af/rt/acota/index.htm and 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/. In the United States, the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) applies to active duty service members serving in any capacity; however, in the majority of cases, 
the UCMJ does not apply to civilian contractors or PSC employees (as covered in detail in this 
dissertation). Similar military justice regimes exist in every UN TCC.   
767 There are certainly parallels that can be drawn between MPRI’s involvement in BiH and EO’s 
involvement in both Sierra Leone and Angola; however, the similarities end there. EO, as one of the first 
PMCs/PSCs, was an anomaly not easily accepted by the UN, and resultantly, for myriad reasons, there was 
poor coordination between the UN and EO and zero collaboration. Had EO had the support of the 
international community (or coalitions of nations) that MPRI or DynCorp enjoyed in BiH, the extended 
conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone (effectively ended at the termination of EO’s contracts) could possibly 
have ended much sooner, saving hundreds of thousands of limbs and lives. 
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 Con 
If MPRI was merely conducting classroom instruction on 
democratic transitions and principles, then $50 million seems a high price to pay for 175 
former military instructors, even if many of them were retired U.S. generals. Although 
cost was not a major factor in the hiring of either DynCorp or MPRI, effectiveness and 
capability was. Both MPRI and DynCorp were able to deploy their contracted employees 
quickly and efficiently in order to fill the requirements of their contracts. However, just 
showing up on time and with the right numbers of people is not always enough. In the 
case of DynCorp, there were questions of training and preparedness for missions in the 
Balkans and war. Even though the majority of the police force monitors hired by the UN 
were Western-trained police, they were not trained in international operations. In this 
case, the additional cost of training may have been well worth the price, had the UN been 
able to avoid the loss of legitimacy, credibility, and forward momentum that resulted 
from UN police and soldiers engaging in SEA and TIP. The cost incurred may not have 
been directly translatable to dollars, but the UN, the U.S., and peacekeeping and 
intervention in general, suffered from the criminal actions of contracted employees. The 
question will ever remain whether or not this sort of thing could happen again, and if it is 
really worth it to privatize certain aspects of peace. 
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768  Cost table adapted from Barlow, Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds: Appendix B. Figures 
within table are readily available and have been compiled from numerous sources, see for example, 
Information, “UNPROFOR Background.” 
769 Accurate figures are hard to come by; estimated figure provided has been derived from multiple 
sources. Exact figures on the contract are private information between Republic of Croatia and MPRI. 
Sources include annual reported income/profit from 1995–1997 and figures from the following scholarly 
journals/papers/books: Fredland, “Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the 
Role of Military Companies.”; Jakkie Cilliers and Ian Douglas, “The Military as Business--Military 
Professional Resources, Incorporated,” in Peace, Profit, or Plunder?: The Privatisation Of Security In 
War-Torn African Societies, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (South Africa: Institute for Security 
Studies, 1999); Emma Holager, “The impact of the private security industry on peace-building efforts in 
Africa: An assessment of Executive Outcomes, MPRI and DynCorp” (Stellenbosch University, March 
2011). 
770 “Indeed, the commonly accepted belief is that the MPRI operation started in in October 1994, 
rather than later in January 1995, and included training not only in democratic principles, but also in basic 
infantry tactics (such as covering fields of fire and flanking maneuvers), and medium-unit strategy and 
coordination as well.”  Singer cites Halberstam, 335–336; Singer, Corporate Warriors: 127. 
771 Various sources cite the positive performance of MPRI in Bosnia; however, two that discuss MPRI 
specifically and in detail include, Shearer and International Institute for Strategic Studies., Private armies 
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772 Steven R. Bowman, “Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations,” in Reports for Congress (Congressional 
Research Service, 2003); Tomás Valásek, “NATO at 50,” in Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) (Washington, 
DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1 March 1999). The NATO mission in Bosnia was spurred, financed, and 
led primarily by the U.S with the support of the UN and EU following epic failures by both of them to 
bring peace. As Brigadier General John S. Brown, Chief of Military History wrote, “Efforts by the United 
Nations and the European Union were ignored, cease-fires were not honored, civilians were massacred, and 
entire villages were destroyed.” R. Cody Phillips, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army’s Role In Peace 




Legitimacy pros and cons will not be covered in great detail here, 
as the primary pros and cons of legitimacy covered earlier in greater detail can be 
projected and apply to this case. However, the pros for the use of PSCs in BiH (alongside 
the UN and NATO) were that they provided necessary security functions for buildings, 
NGO and IGO workers, and resupply/logistics, where the use of ISAF, NATO, or UN 
troops would have pulled needed resources from combat capability. Simply put, PSCs 
earned legitimacy by adhering to contracts and conducting the roles they were paid to 
perform effectively, and as many hold, efficiently, that is, using resources cost-effectively 
in a manner that affects fulfillment of assigned roles and missions.773  There is also the 
idea that PSCs, in some regards, were working multilaterally alongside other forces to 
affect peace and security. It is this multilateral working together that reinforces 
legitimacy according to Heinze,774 and when combined with other factors, can aid in 
legitimizing PSCs. It was this legitimacy (and the fact that U.S. troops were not on the 
ground in combat or serving in the “protective” security role that PSCs had adopted) that 
helped increase U.S. and NATO reliance on their use.   
 Con 
As is covered in greater detail in this case study and elsewhere in 
this dissertation and through numerous examples of PSC failure, the use of PSCs in BiH 
is one of the most commonly and broadly cited examples of PSC failure due to human 
rights abuses, including SEA and TIP, as well as waste, fraud, and lack of accountability. 
Because of the ubiquitous nature and the sheer number of allegations against PSCs in 
BiH, legitimacy was not earned. In fact, no amount of effectiveness could overcome and 
balance out the damage done to the public perception of PSCs in C/PC environments. 
Until Blackwater’s well-publicized abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan, PSCs such as 
DynCorp led the headlines with scandals such as the contractor-run prostitution ring. 
                                                 
773 Bruneau, Patriots For Profit : Contractors And The Military In U.S. National Security, 32–33. 
774 Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War : The Ethics, Law, And Politics Of Humanitarian Intervention, 
117–20. 
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Regardless of the damage to legitimacy and the public’s perception of PSCs, Americans 
(primarily) were still reticent to send U.S. troops on the ground to fight in BiH. The 
“Somalia effect” still lingered, and the effectiveness of PSCs, though not sufficient to 
produce real credibility, outweighed the political will to use the numbers of ground troops 
necessary to provide the protective and security support that UN military troops and 
Bosnian police could not muster. 
d. Human Security and Human Rights 
 Pro 
MPRI and DynCorp, two of the largest PSCs involved in the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, were sent to support UN and NATO efforts in support 
of the mandate, which was primarily to protect civilians and help ensure human security 
and human rights.   
 However, in DynCorp’s case, an SEA scandal by a few employees 
had deeply negative effects on both the company, the U.S. (DynCorp is a U.S. company), 
and the UN. PSCs, and contractors in general, lost a great deal of credibility when the 
now famous SEA scandal involving a prostitution ring, buying and selling sex slaves 
(including underage girls), and TIP came to light, such as is portrayed in the movie “The 
Whistleblower.”775  Scandals such as these detracted from the mission and certainly 
affected not only the companies’ abilities to perform their duties, but consequently added 
scrutiny, which can slow operations and reduce effectiveness. SEA by contractor 
employees (or UN peacekeepers for that matter) also has the effect of producing distrust 
among the local population, the very people who are supposed to be helped through their 
intervention. Therefore, it is essential that PSCs and contractors in peace support, C/PC, 
and humanitarian operations take these abuses seriously and work with national and 
international authorities in ending SEA and other criminal acts by contractor employees. 
PSCs and the trade organizations that support them, e.g. ISOA or BAPSC, have 
committed diverse resources to prevent this sort of bad behavior, such as member training 
                                                 
775 Larysa Kondracki, “The Whistleblower” (USA: Samuel Goldwyn Films, 2010). 
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workshops, annual summits, and the creation of codes of conduct to which members must 
agree to adhere.776  Working closely with UN working groups, governments, the ICRC, 
IPI, IPA, and other groups focusing on improving peace operations, these trade 
organizations have improved vetting and training of their employees, have instituted 
codes of conduct required for membership in their associations, and have agreed that 
clear regulation and transparent contracts make for better integration with other agencies 
and performance, improving effectiveness. 
 Con 
MPRI’s involvement with the HV, though claimed to only be part 
of democratic transition training (the Democratic Transition Assistance Program 
(DTAP)), seemed to “professionalize” the HV within a matter of months to the point 
where there are not many who believe that MPRI did not do a little more than “classroom 
instruction.”  Ken Silverstein puts it well in his article on PSCs: 
No country moves from having a ragtag militia to having a professional 
military offensive without some help. The Croatians did a good job 
coordinating armor, artillery and infantry. That’s not something you learn 
while being instructed about democratic values.777 
Whether or not MPRI overstepped their bounds on their contract is 
in dispute; however, what is not in dispute is that just after receiving “instruction” from 
MPRI, the HV broke the UN ceasefire and launched an offensive against the Krajina 
Serbs creating 170,000 refugees. There were also numerous reports of human rights 
violations which include the murder of elderly Serbs who were unable to move out ahead 
of the offensive. Based upon their actions, the Croat commanders who launched the 
offensive were indicted by the ICTY and prosecuted for crimes against humanity.778 
                                                 
776 The workshops and summits that I have attended are quite well run, with a large variety of subjects 
and broad scope of discussion by industry professionals, NGOs, IGOs, IOs, and government employees. 
Panel discussions focus on topics that range from contractor behaviors, recent developments, and current 
events to regulatory structures, contracting laws, and accountability. 
777 Retired U.S. Marine Colonel working as a military researcher, quoted in Ken Silverstein, 
“Privatizing War: How Affairs of State are Outsourced to Corporations Beyond Public Control,” The 
Nation, 7–28/8–4 1997 1997. 
778 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 126. 
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DynCorp’s response to the prostitution ring, SEA, and TIP was to 
fire the offending employees and whisk them out of the country; this included the 
whistleblowers, Kathryn Bolkovac and Ben Johnston, who reported the sex crimes that 
were taking place. David Isenberg wrote an article on PSC SEA for the Asia Times in 
which he describes how there was no accountability either by the perpetrators or by 
DynCorp: 
The CID began an investigation, but quickly determined that the American 
military did not have jurisdiction over UN contractor employees. Alerted 
by CID, the Bosnian police began an investigation, but mistakenly 
believed that they, too, lacked jurisdiction to arrest UN Task Force 
contractor employees. By the time the Bosnian police did move to make 
arrests, the employees in question had been transferred beyond the reach 
of local authorities. Like Bolkovac, Johnston was fired. His supervisors 
claimed that he had discredited the company by bringing unsubstantiated 
charges against his coworkers and that he had “brought discredit to 
[Dyncorp] and to the U.S. Army.”779 
Of the nine employees suspected of committing the criminal acts, 
including rape, torture, and TIP, seven were fired and quickly transported through 
Germany (for the Army’s cursory investigation) and back to the U.S., never to be 
prosecuted for their crimes. In this case, human security and human rights were violated 
without any real punishment or accountability. Had this event the signaled the need for 
real change and created the impetus and mechanisms of accountability, it is possible that 
the ethnic cleansing, rape, and SEA that followed in Kosovo a few years later would have 
been mitigated. Despite DynCorp’s behavior in the Balkans, the company continues to 
receive contracts from the U.S. State Department in peace support operations, such as 
Kosovo, Somalia, Columbia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In fact, DynCorp is 
now under an umbrella contract with the State Department—a means of contracting 
which greatly reduces the possibility of competition.780 
                                                 
779 David Isenberg, “Sex and Security in Afghanistan,” Asia Times 6 October 2009. 
780 Chris Tomlinson, “U.S.: DynCorp Hired for Somalia Peacekeeping,” Forbes 7 March 2007. For a 
detailed discussion on other DynCorp interests and business activities, see also Holager, “The impact of the 





MPRI was extremely effective in “professionalizing” the Croatian 
Army (HV). As was discussed earlier, their actions were pivotal in the Croatian military’s 
offensive against the Krajina Serbs—an event which was not only the “first major victory 
of the war against the Serbs,” but could be considered the turning point in the war.781  
Along with the NATO air strikes, Operation Storm is credited with reversing Serbian 
gains and strengthening Croatia’s position at the Dayton Accords. 
DynCorp was effective in their ability to provide Western-trained 
police as police force monitors under the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF) 
program. Actions by employees marred their reputation and created distrust of 
contractors in general by the Bosnian public. Following the actions of employees of the 
company, DynCorp developed training similar to the training required of peacekeeping 
soldiers: pre-deployment training as well as standardized in-mission training.782  
DynCorp’s credibility never fully recovered from the actions of a few employees, but the 
majority of police force monitors did excellent work and ensured the safety of thousands 
of Bosnians during their tenure. 
 Con 
MPRI’s effectiveness in training the HV was not without its 
criticisms. One of the more negative of these (which has not been substantiated but must 
be mentioned here since misperception can have an effect on pros and cons) is that MPRI 
was more than just an “adviser” or “consultant” to the HV, and acted more in the capacity 
                                                 
781 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 126. 
782 For a discussion on recommended training for peacekeeping soldiers and some of the obligations 
of TCCs, e.g. SOFAs, MOUs, etc., which could be incorporated into contracts with PSCs, see Vanessa 
Kent, “Protecting civilians from UN peacekeepers and humanitarian workers: Sexual exploitation and 
abuse,” in Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Cedric de Coning and Ramesh 
Thakur Chiyuki Aoi (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007), 60–63. 
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of military planning and training troops for combat.783  If these allegations are correct, 
then it could be said that MPRI assumed a responsibility which should have fallen to the 
coalition of forces (NATO) and military troops. This overstepping of the boundaries of 
responsibility by PSCs (whether MPRI did or did not overstep their bounds) illuminates 
one of the strongest arguments (presented earlier) against the use of PSCs in international 
conflicts, and that is that if states are willing to increasingly give up control of elements 
of combat preparations, planning, or training, where does it end?  David Shearer notes the 
crux of this argument in his Adelphi Paper 316: 
EO has been directly involved in combat; MPRI claims to work only in a 
training capacity. A senior MPRI employee compared the two companies 
thus in July 1997: “When a fire is raging a government may call in EO. 
But when the fire has been put out, we…install the necessary precautions 
to ensure it won’t start again.”  Others believe the distinction to be less 
clear-cut. A U.S. State Department official notes, “The only difference is 
that MPRI hasn’t pulled the trigger—yet.”784 
 
f. Speed and Flexibility 
 Pro 
MPRI was hired by the U.S. State Department initially to provide 
border monitors in support of UN sanctions against Serbia in 1994. However, during the 
same timeframe they were also contracted by the Republic of Croatia to help them 
transition their army (HV) into a more professional force.785  Within months of signing 
contracts with the Croatian Ministry of Defense, MPRI was on station and providing 
assistance to Croatia toward “strategic long-term capabilities” and establishing the 
Democracy Transition Assistance Program (DTAP) which was meant to transition the 
                                                 
783 A French commander commented on MPRI’s presence in the former Yugoslavia that “If they are 
not involved in military planning, then what are they doing there?  Are we supposed to believe Sewall 
[former General and head of MPRI at the time] and his people are tourists?”  Ken Silverstein and Daniel 
Burton-Rose, Private warriors  (New York: Verso, 2000), Ch. 4, “Mercenary, Inc..” 
784 Shearer and International Institute for Strategic Studies., Private armies and military intervention. 
Cited in Singer, Corporate Warriors, 119. 
785 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 125. 
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Soviet-trained officers to a more Western model of military organization. MPRI was able 
to quickly assist the HV into becoming a professional Western-style military which led to 
massive successes in Operation Storm during which Croat forces led a sophisticated 
assault against the Krajina Serbs, defeating them handily, securing the entire Serb 
territory within a week. 
DynCorp was responsible for hiring many of the UN police force 
monitors under the CIVPOL program, IPFT, and through extensive networks throughout 
the U.S. was able to rapidly fill the UN’s requirements for police monitors in BiH. 
Ultimately, DynCorp’s contract expanded to include transitional police monitors and 
DynCorp retains contracts in the Balkans to this day assisting with security and police 
training. Both MPRI and DynCorp provided the services they were contracted to perform 
in quick fashion and achieved their objectives in months in a manner that the UN was 
unable to accomplish over a four year time-span before NATO took over. 
 Con 
MPRI and DynCorp both have the same interest in accomplishing 
their assigned mission: profit. Speed and flexibility may be proclaimed as key 
components to their advantage over government or international intervention, but they do 
not retain the same advantages of credibility or international support that the UN or other 
international or regional organizations enjoy. Deploying quickly as an agent of the U.S. 
or NATO or the UN is not the same as military representatives deploying to support a 
nation in trouble. Additionally, costs of monitoring and evaluation have to be considered, 




for overcharging, overstaffing, or equal opportunity violations, such as occurred with 
Brown and Root Services (BRS) in the Balkans.786  As Peter Singer states,  
                                                 
786 Ibid., 140–41. 
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The conclusion that can be drawn from these episodes is that although the 
firm’s mission is certainly not to oppose the goals of American policy, 
sometimes concerns for the corporate bottom-line have led to make [sic] 
business decisions that are not always so clear-cut in a political sense.787 
Speed and flexibility comes at a cost which has been evidenced by 
contracting failures in contingency operations wherever they are supported by private 
contractors. In the U.S. example, more than $30 billion has been lost to waste, fraud, and 
abuse by contractors in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan because contracting was not 
well managed.788  If speed and flexibility are essential features for success in any 
operation, then proper preparedness dictates that the groundwork for contracting be in 
place well before deploying private agents to do the work normally (or previously) done 
by government or military forces. 
g. Public Relations 
 Pro 
MPRI was extremely effective with its PR in Bosnia. Founded in 
1987 by eight former U.S. military senior officers, MPRI got its biggest break in its 
contracts with Croatia in 1995 in the Bosnian War. The company’s involvement 
instructing the Croatian Army’s democratic transition indirectly (or directly, depending 
upon who one asks) led to the overwhelming success of Operation Storm against the 
Krajina Serbs.789  MPRI’s discretion and control of information allowed them to reap the 
benefits of Croatia’s massive success against the Serbs and into Serbian-occupied 
territory, while also allowing them to disavow that they had conducted “military 
training,” which would have been a violation of the UN embargo (an embargo to which 
the U.S. had agreed). MPRI’s contracts (primarily with the U.S. government) increased 
                                                 
787 Ibid., 141–42. 
788 Neil Gordon, “Commission on Wartime Contracting Final Report: A Decade’s Lessons on 
Contingency Contracting,” (Washington, DC: Project On Government Oversight, 31 August 2011). See 
also Oversight, “Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring Contractors.” 
789 MPRI denies conducting any military or combat training which would have violated the UN 
embargo. 
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significantly after the Balkan crisis and MPRI continues to be one of the most successful 
PSCs in the business.790 
 Con 
DynCorp was not so fortunate with their PR efforts in the Balkans. 
Far from taking any sort of corporate responsibility for their employees’ actions, 
DynCorp quickly fired 7 employees who were accused of running a prostitution ring. 
Once the employees were fired, they were returned to the U.S. where they did not face 
charges for the sex crimes they allegedly committed. Far from the scene of the alleged 
crimes, and weeks after the crimes had been allegedly committed, Bosnian local police, 
the UN, and the U.S. Army were unable to conduct investigations sufficient to prosecute 
the 7 implicated employees. DynCorp’s actions appeared secretive and protective, a 
stance that raised more questions of their legitimacy and their ability to train and monitor 
Bosnian police. Associated both with the UN and the U.S., DynCorp’s actions led to 
general mistrust of UN peacekeepers and UN-sanctioned police.791 
5. Summary of Case and Conclusion 
Were there lessons learned from peacekeeping and the use of PSCs in the 
Balkans?  There were certainly lessons, but whether or not they were learned is 
questionable; the crisis in Kosovo occurred a few years after the Dayton Accords, but in 
spite of international condemnation of ethnic cleansing, mass rape, and the horrors of the 
Bosnian War, the same crimes were once again committed while the international 
community slowly and initially ineffectively responded.792 
 
It is clear that the UN and NATO used PSCs extensively throughout the crisis in 
the former Yugoslavia. What is not clear is whether or not the impact to human security 
                                                 
790 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 130–35. 
791 Cain, Postlewait, and Thomson, Emergency sex and other desperate measures : a true story from 
Hell on Earth. 
792 Jean-Christophe Cady, “Establishing the rule of law: the U.N. challenge in Kosovo,” Focus 
Strategique No. 34 bis(June 2012). 
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through the use of PSCs was mainly positive or negative. This is one of the primary 
reasons why an investigation into the pros and cons of PSC use in peacekeeping is so 
critical:  it cannot be said that PSCs should always be used in every case, but they should 
be used where they can best protect human security; the mix will be different in each 
intervention. Under a UN mandate, the UN will always be held responsible for the risks 
of any intervention (and in the court of public opinion) regardless of the mix. To believe 
that PSCs are not being used in support of peacekeeping now is to be naïve. The fact is, 
they are being used (as noted above in certain roles), the question is the extent to which 
they are being used and the manner of their use. Herein lies the critical issue: decision-
making; policy guidance; limits of use; accountability; political impact, and again, there 
is no single right answer. To write, as many do, that the UN is just not ready to use PSCs 
for peacekeeping or that the mechanisms of regulation and legal accountability are not 
yet in place, is to be blind to the fact that the UN is already using PSCs (as has been 
shown in numerous reports including the UN’s) in peacekeeping missions, just not as 
actual peacekeepers. This is the defining line. The evidence does not bear out that a clear 
policy exists with regard to the use of PSCs. Without a clear policy on PSC usage, the 
UN will head down a path very similar to the U.S. experience with PSCs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan: one where waste, fraud, and abuse (SEA, human rights, resources) was 







Technically the UN did not use PSCs for peacekeeping in BiH; NATO acted 
under UN authorization and used PSCs for policing, security, and advising. When NATO 
entered into the crisis in the Balkans, it was made clear that U.S. soldiers would not be on 
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the ground fighting; this fact led to the decisions to rely heavily on air power, bombing, 
and NATO allies, but it also led to the massive use of PSCs to carry out policing 
functions, stability operations, and advising. Is this much different from the UN using 
PSCs for peacekeeping?  Maybe not in the practical sense, but it is vastly different when 
the mission statements of each organization, i.e. NATO and the UN, are compared. PSCs 
were essential to NATO’s ability to carry out its mission in BiH. Questions remain as to 
whether or not they overstepped their bounds in the use of PSCs and the extent to which 
responsibilities were handed over to companies such as DynCorp and MPRI. In the end, 
peace was secured and has been relatively stable since NATO took the mission over from 
the UN, ended the war through massive air strikes and heavily armed NATO troops, and 
then handed it back over to the UN.793  In this case, what appears to have been needed 
was a fast-acting, flexible, and overwhelmingly superior combat capability to end the 
violence and restore order. NATO accomplished this aim. PSCs claim similar capabilities 
but on a smaller scale.794  Although forces such as NATO can end wars (through the use 





the intensity of conflicts, peacekeeping alone is not able to eliminate the cause of 
                                                 
793 The Allied Rapid Reaction Force (ARRF) was created in June 1995 and by July, The London 
Conference authorized massive airstrikes against Serb forces leading to the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA). 
IFOR succeeded UNPROFOR on 20 December 1995, and not only did green helmets replace blue helmets, 
but the mission was defined more robustly, allowing for a force of 50,000 heavily armed troops , heavy 
weapons in designated cantonments, and authorization to demobilize warring militaries of the Bosnian 
Federation in order to create a more secure environment. Francine Friedman, Bosnia and Herzegovina : a 
polity on the brink, Postcommunist states and nations (London ; New York: Routledge, 2004), 65. 
794 See for example, the writings of Brooks, “Write a Cheque End a War Using Private Military 
Companies to End African Conflicts.”; Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier; Barlow, Executive Outcomes: 
against all odds. See also Eeben Barlow’s (founder of EO) blog where he argues that the UN actually 
perpetuates conflict so that it can continue to sustain its massive budget and the salaries of UN officials: —
——, “Eeben Barlow’s MILSEC Blog,” in Eeben Barlow’s Military and Security Blog, ed. Eeben Barlow 
(2012). 
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conflict.795  What ultimately worked to create human security and stability in BiH was a 
vast array of support from international agencies, NGOs, regional actors (such as 
Turkey), private interests, and political groups working together to encourage 
participation in government and implement democracy rather than declaring it.796  PSCs 
were, and continue to be, a major part of the existing stability in BiH and all of the former 


















                                                 
795 This is the conclusion drawn by Jean-Christophe Cady in his article on UN peacekeeping in the 
Kosovo crisis. Cady, “Establishing the rule of law: the U.N. challenge in Kosovo.” 
796 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) supported in multiple ways 
including overseeing preparation and conduct of elections. UNHCR oversaw the return of refugees and 
IDPs. The Council of Europe, UNHCR, and the European Court of Human Rights had oversight of human 
rights provisions. The ICRC handled missing persons. The World Bank took the lead on postwar 
reconstruction. The EU worked to restore stability to the divided city of Mostar. Public corporations, 
media, the Constitutional Court, Central Bank, human rights agencies, and other international actors were 
coordinated by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Friedman, Bosnia and Herzegovina : a polity 
on the brink; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, Ending civil wars : the implementation of peace 
agreements: 540–41. 
797 This includes Serbia and Republika Syrpska, two Bosnian entities that will need to continue to 
work together toward a stable future, integrated more fully into Europe, and on a path toward EU 
acceptance. This stable path will necessarily mean continued assistance and support from the UN, NATO, 
the EU, OSCE, nearby nations such as Turkey, and non-governmental and private organizations, including 
security firms. Without this support, it is likely that BiH, Serbia, and Republika Syrpska will be one filled 
with conflict, adversity, and renewed human insecurity. Friedman, Bosnia and Herzegovina : a polity on 
the brink. 
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VII. ANALYSIS OF THEMES 
A. COMPARISON OF ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE USE OF 
PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES FOR PEACEKEEPING 
As General Ian Douglas, a former UN mission commander in Sierra 
Leone put it: ‘In a perfect world, we wouldn’t need them [PSCs] or want 
them…But the world isn’t perfect’.798 
 The United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last 
decade, [that] no amount of good intentions can substitute for the 
fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in 
particular, is to succeed.799 
Mercenaries loot, plunder and sometime [sic] kill indiscriminately, 
leaving in their wake ‘chaos, death and destruction’.800 
The Good Mercenary is neither logically impossible nor psychologically 
implausible.801 
 
1. Pros and Cons: Arguments For and Against the Use of Private 
Security Companies for Peacekeeping 
Specific questions were used to guide research in order to evaluate the arguments 
for and against the use of PSCs for peacekeeping (all types). A comprehensive review of 
case studies, interviews, government, academic, and institute reports, as well as a 
comparison of the arguments for and against PSCs in peacekeeping has been conducted. 
Case studies serve to provide a useful reference, or “plausibility probe” into the analysis 
                                                 
798 BDA Kite RCD Dangerfield, DJ Robinson, and AJI Wilson, “Private Military Companies: Options 
for Regulation: A Response to the UK Government Green Paper” (Cranfield University, 2002). Cited in 
Singer, “Humanitarian Principles, Private Military Agents,” 12. 
799 Nations, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.”  website, accessed 17 March 
2012. 
800 United Press International, “Iraq Bans Security Firms on Oil Fields,” in UPI (United Press 
International, 19 March 2012). Cited in Francis, “Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone,” 332. 
801 T. Lynch and A. J. Walsh, “The good mercenary?,” Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 2 
(2000): 134. 
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presented here. The three cases are not comprehensive case studies in the sense that they 
serve to function solely to address the issues presented in this dissertation; they are part 
of the totality of sources from which inferences and conclusions have been drawn.   
The available evidence finds that the only real advantage to the use of PSCs for 
peacekeeping is their demonstrated speed and flexibility. Other advantages or 
disadvantages to the use of PSCs in peacekeeping do not weigh overwhelmingly on one 
side or the other. As a consequence, their use must be determined based upon at least one 
significant factor that overrides the common notions of why or why not to use PSCs—
speed and flexibility may be necessary in certain cases, but it is not sufficient. There are 
obviously many factors that may affect the decision to use PSCs; however, if there is one 
factor that stands out among them, then that factor should be used as a primary tool for 
determining the use of PSCs in peace support operations. Through the use of all available 
metrics evaluating the use of PSCs and peacekeepers, and considering all factors, one 
significant factor does stand out that supports the primary aim of peacekeeping; that 
factor is human security. Therefore, if PSCs are capable of improving human security, as 
defined here, then they must be considered for use by the UN in peacekeeping operations. 
Each of the following questions was used to guide research throughout this dissertation. 
Questions here are addressed in different ways and to varying degrees throughout the 
review of the advantages and disadvantages of PSCs in peacekeeping operations; 
however, each is relevant in summarizing the pros and cons and making a final 
determination on PSCs’ impact on human security and their potential as international 
peacekeepers: 
1) If state-sponsored peacekeepers are better suited for peacekeeping than 
private agents, what makes them better? 
2) Is there merit to the PSCs’ claim to be “better, cheaper, faster” and more 
flexible than UN peacekeepers? 
3) What do the pros and cons tell us about whether or not certain 
peacekeeping missions or mandates may be better suited to the use of PSCs? 
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4) Are state-sponsored peacekeepers perceived as legitimate by the “peace-
kept?”  What determines legitimacy? 
5) What accountability mechanisms are in place for PSCs?  What 
accountability is in place for current UN peacekeepers?  Are these regulatory 
mechanisms effective? 
6) If force is authorized, are PSCs more efficient in its use than UN 
peacekeepers?  Are PSCs better suited to Chapter VI or Chapter VII missions? 
7) What effect does training have on peacekeeping? 
8) Are peacekeepers neutral?  Are peacekeepers impartial?  What are the 
arguments for and against PSC neutrality and impartiality? 
9) What are the regulatory mechanisms that hold peacekeepers accountable?  
If human rights violations occurred, were perpetrators held criminally accountable? 
11) Was human security (narrow view) improved or degraded by 
peacekeepers’ presence?  (That is, did violence or threat of violence to persons increase 
or decrease with peacekeepers’ presence?) 
These questions, along with a review of case studies, interviews, government and 
UN documents, and the scholarly literature on the subject, directly address hypotheses 
presented and find that there are six fundamental areas in common for the evaluation of 
pros and cons of PSCs in peacekeeping:   
1) Adherence to Contracts/Intervention 
2) Cost/Outsourcing 
3) Effectiveness/Speed and Flexibility 
4) Accountability 
5) Legitimacy 
6) Human Security/Human Rights 
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A summary review of the fundamental areas, with the pros and cons of each is 
discussed below: 
a. Adherence to Contracts/Intervention 
 Pro 
When Executive Outcomes (EO) received the contract to intervene in 
Sierra Leone in 1995, they immediately set a timetable for action. Their contracted 
mission was to restore the democratically-elected government headed by President 
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, halt the atrocities, secure order in Freetown, and regain control of 
the diamond fields from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).802  There was no need to 
seek out contributors to their force as in a UN case where troop contributing countries 
(TCCs) must be determined and troops (turned over) before any action can occur. EO 
claimed a database of more than 2000 trained soldiers that could be called upon on short 
notice. Moreover, many of EO’s soldiers were nearby, as they had just completed a 
contract securing peace in Angola (if only temporary). In situations where atrocities or 
genocide are being committed or about to be committed, time is critical and there is little 
time to seek out troop donations.     
Once EO was called in by the NPRC, the recognized government of Sierra 
Leone, they quickly took control of the situation, immediately stopped the marauding 
RUF rebels, restored order to Freetown, and regained control of the diamond mines. One 
account summarizes EO’s activities in Sierra Leone as follows:   
…200 men were despatched to Sierra Leone where RUF rebels, chopping 
off people’s limbs and engaging in cannibalism, were marching on 
Freetown. EO smashed the rebels and this led to free and fair elections 
with a new government being elected. Pressures were again exerted which 
resulted in EO’s withdrawal. In the place of its 200 troops the UN 
deployed 18,000 soldiers at a cost of U.S.$1 billion per year. The rebels 
regrouped, frequently taking UN troops as hostages, and the country 
again sank back into an orgy of cannibalism and limb chopping.803 
                                                 
802 Barlow, Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds. 
803 Singer, “Peacekeepers, Inc.,” 63. 
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After the UN took over the operation, and despite a budget and personnel 
size nearly twenty-times EO’s force, it took several years and intervention by the British 
military to even approach similar results.804  In contrast, EO’s services cost $35 million 
in total, which ended up averaging around $1.5 million per month for the twenty-one 
months they were in Sierra Leone.805 
When no one is willing to act due to political will on the part of the UN, 
ROs, or states to save lives and protect civilians and human rights, is there a case to be 
made for using PSCs for intervention, if only temporarily?  Many believe so, for 
example: “Even if they did work for profit, I do believe Executive Outcomes saved more 
innocent lives in Angola and Sierra Leone with AK-47s than the United Nations did with 
paperwork, sanctions and protests. Too bad Rwanda only had the UN. Same for 
Darfur.”806  Statements like these reflect an attitude that there is a need for someone to 
act when the UN cannot quickly garner the political will or consensus to stop atrocities or 
nations are unwilling to provide troops. PSCs, hired by IOs or the UN can be that 
someone. As Anna Leander states, “the potential (and proven capacity) of PMCs to break 
vicious circles of violence weighs heavily in their favour.”807  However, the UN seems 
ambivalent on the issue. Secretary General Kofi Annan seems to have made contradictory 
statements regarding the use of PSCs and armed intervention. Shearer writes that at a 
press conference in 1997 “Annan bristled at the suggestion that the United Nations would 
ever consider working with “respectable” mercenary organizations, arguing that there is 
no “distinction between respectable mercenaries and non-respectable mercenaries.”808  
However, SG Annan noted three years later in his millennium address that, “[a]rmed 
                                                 
804 Ibid. 
805 Singer, Corporate Warriors: 112. 
806 “Grumpy,” El Monte, California, USA – Comment from a reviewer of Eeben Barlow’s book, 
Executive Outcomes: Against All Odds, found at www.galago.co.za/CAT1_025_b.htm., accessed 19 Jan 
2012. 
807 Anna Leander, “The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of 
Private Military Companies,” Journal of Peace Researchf 42, no. 5 (2005): 608. 
808 Shearer, “Outsourcing War.” 
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intervention must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder, 
it is an option that cannot be relinquished.”   809   
The conundrum is that Annan seems to acknowledge that there is a 
contradiction here. Continued inaction in the face of ethnic cleansing, genocide, war 
crimes, or crimes against humanity810 seems to demonstrate a sort of rationalized 
hypocrisy. To write in the Millenium Report that, “[t]he fact that we cannot protect 
people everywhere is no reason for doing nothing when we can,” only begs the question 
of why all available options are not considered, especially when states are unwilling to 
provide necessary assistance.811  Is it immoral to provide human security under contract 
and for a fee? 
 Con 
What used to be called warlord militias are now Private Security 
Companies. 
     Kandahar City Municipality and Dand District, 
     District Narrative Analysis ISAF, 
     Regional Command South Stability  
     Operations Information Center, March 30, 2010812 
       
William Reno refers to Martin van Creveld when he discusses the notion 
that intervention forces that “beat down the weak” ultimately lose the support of the 
populations they are trying to help, citing examples from Africa’s oppressed and conflict-
ridden past.813  Numerous recent examples show that PSCs acting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (as well as worldwide in a variety of capacities) showed little or no concern 
                                                 
809 Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi A. Annan, “We the Peoples: The Role of the United 
Nations in the 21st Century,” in Report of the Millenium Assembly and the Millenium Summit (New York: 
United Nations, 2000), 48. 
810 Ibid. E.g. Rwanda, Srebrenica, Darfur, DRC (ongoing) – all atrocities that are clear examples of 
when to invoke the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P),” leading to intervention. 
811 Ibid. 
812 Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, “Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of 
Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, 28 September 2010), i. 
813 Martin van Creveld, “Power in War,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 7.1(2006): 1; Reno, “Persistent 
Insurgencies and Warlords: Who Is Nasty, Who Is Nice, and Why?.”  
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for anyone not directly tied to their mission as stipulated in their contract. Although there 
are myriad examples of UN peacekeepers disregarding human rights or breaking the law, 
none are so brazen (and as yet unpunished) as PSCs have demonstrated themselves to be 
in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It does not take an incident such as occurred 
in Nissoor Square in 2007 by Blackwater employees or the torture at Abu Ghraib, 
participated in by CACI and TITAN employees, to remind us that PSCs have operated in 
a manner inconsistent with the principles and culture of UN peacekeeping. Moreover, 
peacekeepers have their national military code of justice to which they have to answer if 
they are found to be violating human rights or committing criminal acts. Current laws 
concerning PSCs are not as clear as sending an employee back to his “home state” to 
receive punishment under his or her national system.814 
Increased interventions by the UN have led to a dramatic rise in the use of 
PSCs prior to and alongside peacekeeping missions.815  When UN officials enter a 
country to evaluate and observe what they believe may be the beginnings of a conflict (or 
after one has begun), but prior to a mandate being issued by the SC, they often require 
security to protect themselves, offices, or equipment/vehicles. Since these are not yet 
sanctioned peacekeeping missions, UN peacekeepers cannot be used. The predominant 
(and most simple to acquire) options that remain are PSCs, local security, or soldiers on 
loan from member states under special agreement, for example, memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs). As a result, PSCs are often chosen because they are perceived as 
well-trained, efficient, and effective. However, there are three negative consequences of 
                                                 
814 These injustices also affect a PSC’s legitimacy since their failure to follow laws not only 
delegitimizes them, but also that their own procedures are often shrouded behind the “corporate veil” 
making their procedures opaque and unfair. Both the procedural approach and fairness are key arguments 
in establishing legitimacy for any agency or organization. Hurd, After Anarchy: Ch. 3. 
815 Pingeot, “Dangerous Partnership,” 27–38. 
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choosing private security, especially armed security:  1) self-perpetuating 
“securitization”; 2) “bunkerization”;816 and 3) increased threat to UN personnel. 
The first negative consequence of the increased use of PSCs for UN 
operations, self-perpetuating “securitization,” occurs because although there are threats to 
UN personnel, especially in conflict/post-conflict (C/PC) states, the use of private 
security creates an us-versus-them environment, further separating UN personnel from 
the community and the people they are there to protect. The 2008 Brahimi Report argues 
that “the ‘UN fortress’ approach—a model of protection perceived as being based on 
over-reliance on physical security tools like ‘T’ walls and heavily armed military 
escorts—associates the Organization with military powers, and potentially distances it 
from the public it was founded to serve. This physical profile […] has a direct negative 
impact on UN image.”817  Moreover, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) found that PSCs were “also increasingly becoming a target.”818  As a 
result, as security is raised, the threat increases, and as the threat increases, PSCs respond 
by recommending heightened security measures. 
The second negative consequence is “bunkerization,” a condition that can 
be a result of the increased securitization of UN missions or offices. As compounds 
become reinforced and security hardened to protect the UN inhabitants, UN personnel 
become less likely or able to get outside the wire (literally razor wire) and conduct proper 
observations or meet with community members without fear of attack. In fact, an OCHA 
report mentions that even the “strategy of ‘showing the flag’ is not sufficient in ensuring 
                                                 
816 The UN has recently begun to address “bunkerization” through what they are now calling, in a 
2011 OCHA report, “smart protection.” Under the concept of “smart protection,” the UN uses much more 
discreet protection measures, such as placing their facilities away from roads, using concrete planters, or 
reinforcing buildings from the inside. They are also creating “diplomatic enclaves,” areas which separate 
international or UN personnel outside population centers instead of concentrating them in retro-fitted 
buildings within cities. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Guidelines for 
Humanitarian Organizations on Interacting With Military and Other Security Actors in Iraq,” (New York: 
United Nations, 20 October 2004), 28–29. Pingeot, “Dangerous Partnership,” 38. 
817 Brahimi, “Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability.” 
818 (OCHA), “Guidelines for Humanitarian Organizations,” 5. 
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the security and safety of humanitarian personnel.819  On the contrary, it could even 
attract attacks.”  In one case in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 2009–2010, a heavily reinforced 
and hardened UN security compound did lower its flag in an effort to become more 
anonymous. However, this tactic backfired because the local community began to think 
that it was a Blackwater compound making it even more of a threat.820  The UN ended up 
re-raising the UN flag.821 
The final negative consequence is that the association with PSCs can in 
and of itself be a cause of an increased threat to UN personnel. PSCs have been 
associated with human rights abuses, aggressive behavior, and complete disregard for 
anyone except their client. They often also are equated with Western influence and 
dominance—to place them alongside UN officials and practitioners only further promotes 
the idea that, as the 2008 Brahimi report notes, “at the core of this issue is the perception 
that the United Nations has become an instrument of powerful Member States to advance 
agendas that serve their own interests, rather than those of the global community of 
nations.”822  The increased separation from the community in which they are working, 
combined with “bunkerization” and the use of PSCs to protect themselves, only serve to 
promote the us-versus-them mentality, making UN actors more of a target and less safe. 
b. Cost/Outsourcing 
 Pro 
Outsourcing peacekeeping will reduce cost to the international community 
and increase the effectiveness and efficiency of peace operations.823  Because private 
firms do not have to rely on troop contributing countries to decide whether or not a cause 
                                                 
819 Ibid., 4. 
820 Pingeot, “Dangerous Partnership,” 38. 
821 Ibid. 
822 Brahimi, “Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability,” 70. 
823 This dissertation uses the definition of effectiveness as “the ability to achieve stated goals.”  
Efficiency, as used here combines cost-effectiveness with speed, flexibility, and “use of resources to fulfill 
the assigned roles and missions.”  Bruneau, Patriots For Profit : Contractors And The Military In U.S. 
National Security: 33–34.  
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is in their interest enough to donate troops, they can identify the best employees and 
locate the best equipment in order to fulfill the mission. Efficient contract 
accomplishment and therefore maximizing profit requires that companies find the most 
capable personnel and employ them quickly to get the job done, get paid, and move to the 
next contract. PSCs have the flexibility and expandability that large organizations cannot 
match.824  Unlike the UN, PSCs do not have to consider politics, political will, and are 
not forced to beg for forces. PSCs also do not have the same “…procedural hang-ups that 
hamper international organizations; they are less threatened by the internal tensions that 
plague multinational forces and can take quicker and more decisive action.”    825  As 
Brooks of the ISOA is quoted as saying, PSCs can do peacekeeping “faster, cheaper, 
better.”826 
A commonly argued view that outsourcing reduces public cost and 
encourages economic growth lends support to the argument that privatization of 
peacekeeping could actually be cheaper in the long-run.827  The two most cited examples 
of PSCs doing it “faster, cheaper, better,” reference the two companies EO and Sandline, 
who engaged in numerous operations for the governments of Papua New Guinea, Angola, 
and Sierra Leone. In each of these three cases, both companies adhered to their contracts, 
and either brought the rebels to the bargaining table, or left when asked by the 
government or as part of the negotiated agreement. Though none of these contracts was 
without controversy, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the two PSCs acted in 
good faith and in accordance with their contracts. 
                                                 
824 Brooks, “The Business of World Peace: Military Service Providers (MSPs) Revolutionize 
International Peace Operations.” 
825 Singer, “Peacekeepers, Inc.,” 63. 
826 Doug Brooks and Gaurav Laroia, “Privatized Peacekeeping,” The National Interest(2005), 
www.nationalinterest.org/ME2/Segments/Publications/. See also, Brooks, “Ruthless Humanitarianism: why 
marginalizing private peacekeeping kills people,” 120. 
827 Paul Starr, “The Limits of Privatization,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 36, no. 
3 (1987). 
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There is currently a partially privatized peace operation which has been 
ongoing since 1981 and it has remained effective, efficient, and successful.828  The 
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) was the replacement to the successful UN 
Emergency Force (UNEF), both I and II, following the Suez Crisis in 1956 and then the 
Yom Kippur War (or October War) in 1973. Though tensions had diminished, they still 
existed; however, a threat of veto by the USSR (under pressure by Syria) prevented a 
continuation of the UN’s involvement. In an effort to ensure the peace was kept, former 
U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat began negotiations to set up a separate peacekeeping organization 
external to the UN. The result was the Protocol to the Treaty of Peace, signed on 3 
August 1981, which set up the Multinational Force and Observers mission.829 
Similar to any Chapter VI UN peacekeeping operation, the primary 
function of the MFO mission is to supervise the “implementation of the security 
provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace and employ best efforts to prevent any 
violations of its terms.   Article II of Annex I to the Treaty of Peace establishes four 
security zones, three in the Sinai in Egypt and one in Israel along the international border. 
Limitations on military forces and equipment within each zone are stipulated in Annex I 
to the Treaty.”830  Accomplished with a mix of soldiers from twelve countries and 
contracted civilian observers, the requirements for civilian observers are very similar to 
the position description for employees of PSCs. For example, from the MFO website 
under “Employment”:   
Requirements: Former military officer with a college degree as well as 
experience in a combat arms branch or similar, techniques of air/ground 
reconnaissance including map reading, air and ground navigation, 
knowledge of military equipment, organization and weapons systems, and 
HF/VHF radio communications procedures. U.S. citizenship is 
                                                 
828 The MNO is effective, in that they have been able to “achieve stated goals”; they have been 
efficient, in that they have expediently and flexibly used their “resources to fulfill the assigned roles and 
missions.”Bruneau, Patriots For Profit : Contractors And The Military In U.S. National Security, 33–34. 
829 Staff, “Joint Pub 3–07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations.” 
830 Multinational Force and Observers, “Multinational Force & Observers,”  
http://www.mfo.org/index.php. Accessed 30 June 2012. 
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mandatory. Ability to live and work with soldiers from more than 11 
different countries in a relatively Spartan environment. Middle East Area 
Specialist experience and some Arabic/Hebrew is highly desirable. 
Graduation from a U.S. military staff college is a plus. 2-year, 
unaccompanied contract, attractive salary, benefits and housing, food and 
medical care included. May be eligible for tax free status.831 
It is not a stretch to suggest that a PSC employee with similar 
qualifications could integrate with UN peacekeeping forces under clear and effective 
control such as the MFO has exercised since 1981. Working together successfully for 
thirty-plus years proves that contracted civilians and multinational peacekeepers can be 
successful at keeping the peace. 
 Con 
As opposed to a commonly-argued belief that privatization is cheaper and 
leads to increased productivity and economic growth, Paul Starr argues that “contracting 
out expands the set of claimants on the public treasury,” increasing costs.832  For 
peacekeeping this could ultimately mean that funding states (read as predominantly 
Western states) will be required to pay the ever-expanding costs associated with 
increased privatization of elements of peacekeeping. If peacekeeping is costly now, 
privatization is likely to make it even more so. And unlike nations, contractors have an 
interest in manipulating incentives for better performance (as defined by achieving stated 
goals and maximizing efficiency and effectiveness) to their own advantage—or if not 
intentional manipulation, allowing an asymmetry of information to exist such that they 
are benefitted or preferred for future contracts. Moreover, some PSCs are large enough 
and ingrained into the political machinery deeply enough that they are capable of 
influencing political will or decisions, either “illegitimately through bribery or legally 
through campaign contributions and lobbying.”833  The strongest proponent of  
 
 
                                                 
831 Ibid. See “Employment.”  Accessed 6 July 2012. 
832 Starr, “The Limits of Privatization,” 128. 
833 Ibid. 
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privatization of peacekeeping is the lobbying organization ISOA. Many of the members 
of the ISOA have deep and wide roots in the military, politics, government, and big 
business.834 
It is naive to assume that there is no influence by powerful international 
corporations on both national and international decision-making. In fact, Enrique 
Bernales Ballesteros (acting in the capacity as Special Rapporteur on the question of the 
use of mercenaries) has said that “attitudes appear to be changing towards the mercenary 
issue,” which is “partly ‘because influential sectors in the corridors of power of important 
States insist on denying or minimizing the existence of mercenaries in contemporary 
society.’”835 
In a recent report by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), the 
cost of outsourcing in general was found to be 1.83 times more costly than paying 
government employees for the same jobs and more than 2 times what non-contractor 
private-sector personnel receive for the same jobs.836  In the specific area of security 
work abroad, by using a 2008 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on cost-
comparisons, POGO found that the average pay for private security contractors was 1.78 
times more than paying a federal employee to do the same job. A comprehensive report, 
compiled over three-year period by the U.S. Commission on Wartime Contracting 
(CWC) found that a conservative estimate of the waste and fraud from contracting cost 
the U.S. between $31 and $60 billion over a nine year span from 2002–2011.837  Jessica 
Vogel, ISOA’s Director, Programs and Operations, told me “There has never been 
comprehensive and accurate data published on this topic.”  The claim that PSCs are 
                                                 
834 Personal experience attending the ISOA Annual Summit, meeting industry, government, and 
international officials and executives. Also evidenced by obvious connections between government and big 
business, e.g. Dick Cheney and involvement with Haliburton, Joe Schmitz’s position as DoD IG, then as 
COO of Blackwater Worldwide, former Ambassador David Litt, now Chair for ISOA Annual Summit, etc. 
835 UN, “UN General Assembly Report on the Use of Mercenaries,” Sections 97 & 83. Cited in 
Leander, “The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military 
Companies,” 607. 
836 Oversight, “Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring Contractors.” 
837 Commission on Wartime Contracting, “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, 
Reducing Risks - Final Report,” in Final Report to Congress: Findings and recommendations for 
legislative and policy changes (Washington, DC: Commission on Wartime Contracting, August 2011), 5. 
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“cheaper” (made by Doug Brooks, the president of her organization and others), is 
difficult to believe in light of this recent data.838  (The CWC and POGO’s reports are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter III of this paper on cost-comparison and analysis.) 
Not only does outsourcing cost more, but two people I interviewed, one a 
researcher at the International Peace Institute, and the other a legal scholar who writes on 
PSCs, told me that the global South (TCCs—those who provide the peacekeepers) would 
never allow PSCs to conduct peacekeeping since it supplies them both money and 
prestige.839  In my interview with James Cockayne, he gave other reasons given for why 
the UN will never outsource peacekeeping to PSCs:   
1) PSCs do not bring political capital—”peacekeeping missions are 
not military interventions pure and simple: they are political operations. TCCs bring 
political capital to that process, helping to underwrite and secure it. PSCs do not and 
cannot.”  
2) There is still not sufficient control of private contractors for 
member states to agree to allow them to conduct peacekeeping. 
3) Introducing multi-jurisdictional contractual arrangements into 
multi-jurisdictional peacekeeping settings adds a level of complexity that could be 
problematic for managerial and functional control.  “Not just military commanders, but 
also civilian leadership, in peace operations may not have contractual leverage and may 
therefore struggle to control private contractors.”  
4) The United Nations will not risk its legitimacy—it is one thing for 
the UN to use PSCs in an ad hoc fashion where they are not necessarily under direct UN 
control, but contracted to perform a job and doing it under their own management; it is 
quite another for the UN to claim PSCs as part of a peacekeeping contingent. 
                                                 
838 Vogel, Jessica, Director of Operations, International Stability Operations Association, email 
communication. 
839 James Cockayne discussed the payments to TCCs for peacekeeping; Adam Smith discussed the 
prestige that goes along with having representation at the UN through holding posts and providing 
peacekeepers. Cockayne, “Interview with James Cockayne, Co-Director, Center on Global Counter-
Terrorism Cooperation.”; Smith, “Interview with Adam Smith, Researcher, International Peace Institute.” 
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5) Global South wants to continue to receive the money for the troops 
it provides.  [PSCs could create competition shifting money away from the TCCs.]  
6) Many lesser developed or weaker states prefer to provide 
peacekeepers because “keeping troops away from home and conducting peacekeeping 
keeps them from committing coups [at home].” 
7) PSCs are a commodity to be bought; there will be no long-term 
commitment to human security by PSCs—they will leave when their contract expires. 
Examples include East Timor, Afghanistan, and Liberia; effects of the development of 
the private security market in those areas have not made them safer.840 
Given these arguments against outsourcing peacekeeping to PSCs, there 
are other negative implications that could be drawn:   
 The large majority of member states are not likely to allow 
competition between public and private interests, diverting needed 
money from LDCs. 
 A civilian contract does not bind a contractor in the same way as a 
soldier is bound to follow orders. Command and control (C2) at the 
contingent commander level could be difficult to enforce—PSC 
employees could drop and run, refuse or disobey orders. 
 
Another reason that outsourcing peacekeeping is a problem is because the 
UN’s own system for outsourcing security is flawed.841  According to an interview 
conducted with a UN Department of Safety and Security (DSS) official, there is a “lack 
of clear policies and procedures.”842  Although there is a UN Field Security Handbook, 
which notes that “under such rare and exceptional circumstance, the organizations of the 
United Nations system may protect their offices, premises and personnel by employing 
security service companies providing armed guards,” the Handbook has no provision for 
how to choose private security contractors, nor does it include any guidance on verifying 
                                                 
840 Cockayne, “Interview with James Cockayne, Co-Director, Center on Global Counter-Terrorism 
Cooperation.” 
841 Østensen, “UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies.” 
842 Ibid., 40–41. 
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training, weapons certifications, or whether or not employees have criminal records.843  
Given that there is no standard procedure in place for hiring PSCs, it is staggering to note 
that UN spending on “security services,” increased 73 percent from $44M in 2009 to 
$76M in 2010.844  These amounts are only a partial list from UN websites and account 
for less than the actual UN spending on security services.845  
Åse Østensen, who has done extensive research into UN practices and 
policies regarding PSCs, writes that, “Presumably, guidelines drafted particularly for the 
contracting of PMSCs to perform armed security services are non-existent.”846  Not only 
that, often, PSCs hire large numbers of third country nationals (TCNs) or local nationals 
(LNs) for a host of reasons, to include cost, political direction, local laws, contribution to 
local society, or because an LN may have a better understanding of the local population, 
thus enabling a company to be more effective than competitors. To give an example of 
how diverse the use of LNs or TCNs can be, Mark J. Lumer, the Pentagon official 
responsible for overseeing Army procurement contracts in Iraq, stated that 95% of PSCs 
are LNs in Afghanistan, while less than 1-percent of PSCs in Iraq hired LNs.847  
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for large conglomerates to subcontract to smaller firms 
who often subcontract to even smaller, more specialized firms, and in the end, there could 
be multiple layers of subcontracting and sub-sub-contracting.848  Consequently, not only 
does this complicate the problem of regulation from the moment of an incident.  (E.g. 
who is responsible for the investigation?)  But selecting which laws apply to which PSC 
employees and when is difficult, especially in conflict zones and especially when PSCs 
                                                 
843 United Nations Department of Safety and Security, “Field Security Handbook,” in Annex O (New 
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844 Pingeot, “Dangerous Partnership,” 27–42. 
845 Much of this data can be found on the UN Procurement Division’s website 
(https://www.un.org/depts/ptd/) and the UN Global Marketplace’s website 
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are not willing to expose themselves to negative press which could ultimately launch 
investigations into their activities, resulting in penalties or a damaged reputation and 
hence reduced future contract opportunities. 
This phenomenon of sub-sub-contracting by PSCs has led to the hiring of 
warlords and their followers in Afghanistan among other problems of oversight, 
accountability, and control of PSCs. In a report by the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, evidence was uncovered of U.S. PSCs “funneling U.S. taxpayers [sic] dollars to 
Afghan warlords and strongmen linked to murder, kidnapping, bribery, as well as Taliban 
and other anti-Coalition activities.”849  Even if companies subscribe to ISOA’s code of 
conduct or the international code of conduct (ICoC) and adhere to the Montreux 
Document’s “good practices,” how can they guarantee that these same standards of 
conduct are being adhered to if they are sub-sub-contracting and fielding personnel from 
other companies?850  “Aspirational standards” such as the ICoC and self-regulation are 
meaningless if they cannot be monitored or enforced, if they are “toothless.”851 
Similar to what has happened in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is likely that if 
outsourced peacekeepers were used, they would be getting paid substantially more than 
their traditionally supplied national contingent soldier counterparts. The problem of pay 
disparity has been a factor since the early days of peacekeeping and continues today. 
Charles Moskos writes of an example in his seminal work, Peace Soldiers, of a British 
officer complaining,  
How do you think my men feel?  A British soldier makes £10 a week, and a 
Swede two miles down the road makes £30 a week for doing exactly the 
same thing. How do I explain to my men about making the world safe for 
peacekeeping?  They want to know why they’re not getting paid what the 
Swede is getting paid. And I don’t know what to tell them myself.852 
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851 Joseph Schmitz, PowerPoint Slide, 7 June 2012. 
852 Moskos, Peace Soldiers : The Sociology Of A United Nations Military Force, 72. 
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Today this scene has played itself over and over again in various contexts: 
for example, when American troops have compared themselves to their PSC 
counterparts; or when Iraqis working in security observed corporate security guards 
earning more than they. It also continues in Afghanistan with the Ministry of Interior’s 
Afghan Private Protection Force (APPF): “…in a poor nation such as Afghanistan, 
resentment built quickly when it was discovered that the Afghan army was getting paid 
much less than the private militias.”853  In the end, whether or not this disparity in pay 
affects effectiveness or performance has not been studied in depth, but the anecdotal 
evidence that it affects morale is overwhelming.854  What this means for peacekeeping 
has not yet been studied nor evaluated, but there is already a disparity in pay for 
peacekeepers if only because national governments pay their peacekeepers according to 
national standards. For example, the pay of a Canadian sergeant conducting peacekeeping 
beside an Italian sergeant is substantially more at approximately U.S. $6000 per month 
versus U.S. $1690 per month.855 
Finally, given that the policies necessary to contract private security 
services to conduct peacekeeping are not even in place at the UN, it can be inferred that 
outsourcing peacekeeping itself would not be advisable without first establishing clear 
security contracting procedures and practices across all UN agencies. Not only would 
DPKO and the DPA be effected, this would involve major institutional changes, 
including incorporation of a legal framework that could tap into existing law regarding 
the regulation of PSCs and PSC employees. A number of scholars have proposed  
 
 
                                                 
853 Al-Akhbar, “Afghanistan: The Business of War in Afghanistan,” in The American Journal of 
International Law (The Muslim News, 26 April 2012). 
854 See for example, Molly Dunigan, “Testimony submitted to the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting: Considerations for the Use of Private Security Contractors in Future U.S. Military 
Deployments,” (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 18 June 2010); Ulrich Petersohn Sarah K. Cotton, 
Molly Dunigan, Q Burkhart, Megan Zander-Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, and Michael Webber, “Hired 
Guns: Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” National Security Research Division 
(Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 2010), Ch. 3. 
855 See military pay scales for Canada and Italy:  http://www.forces.ca/en/page/payscales-
131#ncmsregular-3 and  http://www.difesa.it/Pagine/default.aspx. 
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methods of regulating PSCs—few appear to be applicable to the UN; most relate solely to 
national or international systems of regulation of PSCs or employees and do not consider 
the institutional and multinational nature of UN peacekeeping.856  While some argue that 
when dealing with any private or commercial venture, the contract is key, Cockayne 
points out that it is a “very thin read to say that contracts will control contractors for the 
UN.”857  His contention is that the UN has no real power to enforce the contracts. Unlike 
a government, such as the U.S., which could have a bilateral contract with a PSC, 
contract enforcement through the UN would require third-party accountability—which is 
just not legally enforceable.858 
c. Effectiveness/Speed and Flexibility 
 Pro 
The UN’s “system for launching operations has sometimes been compared to a 
volunteer fire department, but that description is too generous. Every time there 
is a fire, we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before we can 
start dousing any flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last 
minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision 
of civilian personnel even more so than military. 
Although we have understandings for military standby arrangements with 
Member States, the availability of the designated forces is unpredictable and very 
few are in a state of high readiness. Resource constraints preclude us even from 
being able to deploy a mission headquarters rapidly.859 
 
                                                 
856 See for example Sheehy, Maogoto, and Newell, Legal Control Of The Private Military 
Corporation; Avant, The market For Force : The Consequences Of Privatizing Security; Caparini, 
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857 Cockayne, “Interview with James Cockayne, Co-Director, Center on Global Counter-Terrorism 
Cooperation.”  Benedict Sheehy, Laura Dickinson, Doug Brooks, Joe Schmitz, and others across the 
spectrum from academic to government to private argue that the contract is the single best instrument for 
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858 Ibid. 
859 Kofi A. Annan, “We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century,” 49. 
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States have shown that they are unwilling to provide ready reserve troops 
for use in any mission as the UN sees fit. Member states are often selective about the 
missions on which they will embark troops, and ever since the U.S. debacle in Somalia, 
Western states have been very hesitant to send troops, especially on intervention or 
Chapter VII missions. 
PSCs have shown their ability to deploy large numbers of capable security 
forces in weeks after receiving a contract. The two most famous cases are those of EO 
and Sandline in Sierra Leone. In 1995, EO, while still in western Africa with the majority 
of its personnel and equipment, was able to quickly mobilize within weeks and move 
from Angola to forward operating areas around Freetown where the RUF were preparing 
to invade. Three years later, in 1998, Sandline too was able to get the majority of its 
forces in Sierra Leone within weeks to confront the RUF. This process takes much longer 
with UN troops. Even from the moment the Security Council agrees to intervene, UN 
peacekeeping missions take between six and nine months to get troops on the ground and 
into service.   
In the case of the use of regional peacekeeping troops, such as ECOMOG 
in Sierra Leone, there are added complications with which PSCs do not have to deal. 
Regional organizations such as the AU often come with political baggage. The troops 
used may have ethnic or tribal biases against the population in the country in which they 
are intervening. Or worse, there may be geo-political reasons that participating states may 
want to get a foothold in certain other countries. These political interests may drive 
outcomes largely beneficial to the intervening state or group of states who have provided 
troops, and not beneficial to long term peace and stability. 
The innovation, speed, and flexibility that PSCs claim to be able to bring 
is not just based upon the examples of EO and Sandline in Sierra Leone. PSCs today are 
able to provide security forces to a myriad of different crisis situations quickly. Unlike 
the PMCs of old, PSCs today use associations like the ISOA to partner capabilities 
quickly and respond effectively and efficiently. Competition amongst contractors to 
provide personnel, services, and logistic support is fierce and as a result, the ones that act 
the quickest and most effectively get the most contracts. The contracts of today mostly 
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deal with protection of diplomats (personal protection details, or “PPDs”), or provision of 
security for NGOs, INGOs, private companies, and even the UN during humanitarian 
crises such as is currently ongoing in Haiti. Moreover, the ISOA and its members provide 
services to international peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian rescue, 
stabilization efforts and disaster relief, security sector reform, medical services, and 
training.860  This is the reason that the ISOA, previously known as the IPOA (exchange 
“peace” for “stability”) changed their name. 
 Con 
An area where PSCs claim advantage over traditional peacekeeping forces 
is their ability to deploy quickly and efficiently, something the UN has traditionally been 
unable to do in emergency situations. In fact, this capability was one of the focuses of a 
point paper written by Doug Brooks for presentation in support of the UN organization 
mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). He argues that not only would 
PSCs operate in the same manner as any national UN contingent, but that PSCs could 
deploy in 30–90 days and cost 25% less.861  This argument seems to be regurgitated 
every time a comparison is made between traditional UN troops and PSCs.862   
However, as Christopher Spearin argues, PSCs no longer have the 
capabilities, range of experience, or skill levels required to conduct the full scope of 
peacekeeping as often advertised.863  His contention is that the PSCs of the nineties, such 
as Executive Outcomes, were bands of soldiers who had spent years together and trained 
together in a full range of military operations making them extremely capable as peace 
enforcers and potentially as peacekeepers. Nowadays, PSCs neither have the 
combinations of skilled and coherently trained personnel nor do they have the range of 
skills required to conduct peacekeeping commensurate with the requirements of a UN 
                                                 
860 See ISOA website: http://stability-operations.org/index.php 
861 Brooks, “Supporting the MONUC Mandate with Private Services in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.” 
862 See for example, Scott Fitzsimmons, “Dogs of Peace: A Potential Role for Private Military 
Companies in Peace Implementation,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 8, no. 1 (2005). 
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peacekeeping contingent.  “[I]t would be difficult for PMSCs to respond effectively, 
quickly, and robustly should the UN turn to them for enforcement operations today.”864  
Moreover, he claims that PSCs today have far too specialized training in defense and 
protection rather than offensive operations which could detract from their ability to 
conduct enforcement, and potentially offensive, peace operations.865 
Combat operations or even the potential that combat may occur is an 
entirely different matter. Responses need to be immediate, effective, and correct. 
Mistakes can have catastrophic international consequences, in addition to the problems 
that may occur within affected communities. Excessive use of force, failure to understand 
rules of engagement, and unclear lines of accountability remain problems with 
outsourcing armed security in specific and peacekeeping in general. Outsourcing 
peacekeeping, which is essentially the military arm of a political mission, to a PSC with 
employees who may not have ever trained together, who may not know each other, or 
may not even speak the same language, carries with it a great deal of risk, especially 
when then effectiveness and legitimacy of the UN is placed on the back of its 
peacekeepers.866 
The UN has the speed and flexibility to act quickly once a peacekeeping 
operation is authorized by the SC; no one at the UN wants to see a repeat of what 
occurred in Rwanda or Bosnia. The fact is, even if PSCs were carefully vetted and placed 
on standby as a rapid reaction force when needed, the SC would still have to authorize 
them to deploy. It is true that large PSOs take time to amass the necessary troops. 
Countries have to be solicited for donors, resources have  to be found to support the 
operation, and logistics such as supply lines and transportation have to be created in order 
to get the peacekeepers to the field; this can take between six and nine months. This 
                                                 
864 Ibid., 197. 
865 Ibid., 200–02. 
866 As a naval officer with more than twenty eight years in the Navy, having served on four different 
ships with thousands of Sailors and Marines, my experience has consistently been that crews must be fully 
indoctrinated into the organization and have trained together for weeks or months in order to perform even 
routine military tasks effectively.   
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timeframe is one reason the UN has increased its focus on an idea of peacebuilding as all 
peacekeeping—tying together all elements in an effort to be proactive and engaged rather 
than reactive and attempting to intervene after conflict. The UN has learned a great deal 
from the Rwanda and Bosnia debacles over the past fifteen years and has attempted to 
apply those lessons toward employing forces more quickly and “robustly” in order to 
save lives and enforce human security. The results have not all been positive, as can be 
seen in the continuing conflict in DRC and various failures in Haiti. However, the idea of 
“robust peacekeeping” and well-trained and experienced forces intervening into conflict 
situations has resulted in a much more capable fighting force that can respond more 
quickly to emerging conflicts or prevention of R2P crimes until the main peacekeeping 
body can get on station. These peacekeeping operations have garnered criticism for their 
aggressiveness, but they are necessary if the UN is to fulfill its promises of protection of 
civilians (PoC) and human security in the face of violent aggression. 
d. Accountability 
 Pro 
Accountability is one of the biggest areas of concern whenever PSCs are 
mentioned. One of the most common claims is that there is no way to hold these private 
firms accountable for criminal offenses or misconduct overseas. Some have also claimed 
that U.S. national security interests have been undermined by “the failure to establish a 
meaningful system of accountability.”867  There are, however, according to legal scholar 
Laura Dickinson, four mechanisms of accountability and constraint: legal; contractual; 
public participation; and organizational.868  Within these mechanisms can be found the 
necessary means by which PSCs could be held accountable; however, the will to do so 
must exist.   
 
                                                 
867 First, “PSCs at War,” iii. 
868 Laura A. Dickinson, “Outsourcing Covert Activities,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy 
5(February 2012): 525–27. 
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Dickinson writes that “Providing contracts to private employees serves the 
illusion that ‘government is not big’ or ‘is getting smaller.’ As a consequence, the starting 
point for my argument is that we should accept the reality of outsourcing and seek to 
control it better. We are in a brave new world, and we cannot ignore it. Accordingly, our 
best way forward is not to rail against the use of contractors in toto, but to provide better 
accountability for the contractors upon whom we increasingly rely.”869 
 
Most of the money Washington devoted to contractor support was well-
spent. In fact, it would have been impossible to conduct either conflict 
without the private sector. However, in the opinion of the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting, between $30 and $60 billion of the money spent was 
lost to waste and fraud. There were many reasons for this problem 
including high security costs, poor project planning and management, 
lack of adequate oversight by an overburdened acquisition workforce, the 
absence of well-defined requirements and performance metrics and the 
attitude that this was war and “damn the costs.” A few individuals went to 
jail for outright criminal fraud and a number of companies had charges 
amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars disallowed.  
 
It all sounds very simple: greedy companies trying to take advantage of 
the U.S. government and cheat our men and women in uniform. The truth 
is a lot more complex. In some cases, in fact, it is the government that is in 
the wrong and the companies that are right.870 
 
The question of accountability of PSCs, and contractors in general, has 
been a major sticking point in the debate on whether or not to privatize. The lion’s share 
of the problem is that oversight itself is often either negligible or nonexistent. The oft-
quoted Ronald Reagan line applies, “Trust, but verify,” as does the phrase, “expect what 
you inspect.”  The oversight mechanisms are in place, and some argue, are becoming 
excessive, increasing cost to the contractors, which in turn increases cost to the client. 
However, what has been argued by the PSCs themselves and is now borne out in the U.S. 
                                                 
869 Ibid., 524. 




Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) report is that responsibility for 
accountability must be shared equally between the U.S. government and contractors. The 
American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan produced an explosion in the use of PSCs 
in both of these conflicts. Unfortunately, there were not enough Contracting Officer 
Representatives (CORs) to monitor the contracts and provide the necessary oversight. In 
some cases, contractors simply abided by their contracts waiting for government direction 
which never came, leading to waste. In other cases, there was outright fraud by 
contractors or federal employees.   
The CWC’s report identified between $31 and $60 billion dollars of waste, 
or one out of every six taxpayer dollars.871  The CWC does not place the responsibility 
for this waste squarely on the shoulders of the contractors, but largely on the U.S. 
government for not using the mechanisms in place to monitor contractor performance. In 
many cases contractors with subpar performance were hired repeatedly. The CWC found 
poor planning by the government, “vague and shifting contract requirements, inadequate 
competition, substandard contract management and oversight, lax accountability, weak 
interagency coordination,” and unclear lines of responsibility which were not made clear 
in contracts.872 
In the U.S., accountability mechanisms are in place, from the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)873 which functions as the primary method of 
holding contractors accountable, to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) which 




                                                 
871 Contracting, “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks - Final 
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872 Gordon, “Decade’s Lessons on Contingency Contracting.” 
873 Major Joseph R. Perlak provides an excellent analysis of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
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such as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).  (See Table 13 below for a sample list of examples 
of international and U.S. rules, regulations, and policy with regard to contractor 
accountability. The list of international instruments and domestic legislation, including 
non-U.S. legislation is extensive.)  Additionally, criminal laws still apply to these 
contractors within the countries in which they are working and at home. Unfortunately, 
criminal laws have been difficult to enforce because the areas in which PSCs are 
operating often have little if any rule of law or justice system in place and investigations 
of criminal wrongdoing is not the responsibility of contractors. 
Finally, there is the recent Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA) 
which has not yet been passed by the U.S. Congress, but is meant to compensate for some 
of the inadequacies of MEJA, and as many argue, will be a “meaningful step towards 
closing the accountability gap and preventing future abuses by contractors deployed 
[abroad].”874  What all of this means for the possibility that the UN will increase their use 
of PSCs to include peacekeeping is that they will need to heed the lessons of the U.S. 
experience with contractors in general and PSCs in specific if they are to achieve real 







                                                 
874 Brenda Bowser-Soder, “Nisour Square Anniversary Reminder of Need to Close Accountability 
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Table 13.   Contractor Accountability:  List of International Treaties and Laws,  
U.S. Statutes, and U.S. Regulations/Policy Statements.875   
International Treaties and 
Laws 
U.S. Statutes U.S. Regulations/Policy 
Statements 
–Geneva Conventions (all) Human Rights Awareness: –International Traffic in 
Arms & Export 
Administration Regulations 
–Hague Conventions (II 
and IV) 
 –The Anti-Torture Statute –DFARS §252.225–7040 
“Contractors Supporting a 
Force Deployed for 
Contingency, Humanitarian, 
Peacekeeping or Combat 
Operations” (June 2005) 
–Convention for the 
Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa, 3 
July 1977 
 –U.S. War Crimes Act of 
1996 
–DoD Instruction 3020.41 
“Contractor Personnel 
Authorized to Accompany 
the U.S. Armed Forces” 
(October 2005) 
Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance, 2 
September 1947 
 –Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act 
–General Order No. 1–
United States Central 
Command, as amended 9 
August 2003 
International Convention 
against the Recruitment, 
Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries, 4 
December 1989 
–Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 
2000, Public Law 106–386, 
codified at 22 U.S.C. §7102 
(as implemented by NSPD-
22 and the proposed DFARS 
225.70XX–Combating 
Trafficking in Persons, 70 
Fed. Reg. 35,603 (June 21, 
2005) 
General Order No. 1–Multi-
national Corps Iraq, dated 
12 February 2005 
Convention on the Safety of 
United Nations Personnel 
and Associated Personnel, 9 
December 1994 
Defense/Export-Related: –General Order No. 1–
Combined/Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) 76, dated 15 May 
2004 
Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal 
Court 
–The Inspector General Act 
of 1978 
 
                                                 
875 Schmitz.   These are just examples of some of the most common legislative measures. For a 
comprehensive list of International Instruments and Domestic Legislation, see Christine and Sossai Bakker, 
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International Treaties and 
Laws 
U.S. Statutes U.S. Regulations/Policy 
Statements 
UN General Assembly Res 
217 (III), Universal 
Declaration of Human 
Rights, 10 December 1948 
–The Gun Control Act of 
1968, as amended 
 
Draft of a possible 
Convention on Private 
Military and Security 
Companies (PMSCs) for 
consideration and action by 
the Human Rights Council, 
2 July 2012* 
–The Defense Base Act  
Montreux Document* –The National Firearms Act  
International Code of 
Conduct for Private 
Security Providers* 




*International norms such as the Montreux Document or the International Code of 
Conduct for PSCs are not binding and are not considered “hard” law. 
  
Internationally, the Geneva Conventions apply to “persons who 
accompany the armed forces without being members thereof, such as…supply 
contractors, members of labor units or of services responsible for the welfare of the 
armed forces.”876  The Geneva Conventions also protect contractors working with 
military units who have fallen prisoner, “provided that they have received authorization, 
from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose 
with an identity card similar to the annexed model.”877  It can be seen that civilian 
contractor observers working under the MFO are held accountable and protected by IHL, 
it is not a stretch to argue that PSC employees would be similarly protected while 
conducting peacekeeping (in any form) for the UN. 
According to Dickinson, Sheehy, Schmitz, and others, the laws and 
regulatory mechanisms are on the books to hold PSCs and their employees 
                                                 
876 Geneva Conventions, “Convention III relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,” (Geneva12 
August 1949). See Article 4 (4). 
877 Ibid. 
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accountable.878  Increased regulation and new or more restrictive laws are not the answer. 
The answer is found in using the existing laws, regulations, and policies in place. If made 
illegal or if too much scrutiny is placed on PSCs, they may turn to more covert business 
practices and actually become more dangerous and increasingly “mercenary-like.”  This 
is similar to the argument that if abortion is made illegal in the U.S., and not openly 
regulated, many women will resort to illegal abortions, resulting in worse problems.879  
The South African Foreign Military Assistance Act (FMA) (AKA “anti-mercenary act”) 
against mercenaries is so restrictive that not only is it mostly ignored, but very few 
persons have been punished under the law since it was enacted in 1998.880 
Executive Outcomes had always claimed to operate fully within the law, 
and although EO had applied for and gotten a license to operate from the South African 
government after the new anti-mercenary law had been passed, Eeben Barlow, the 
president of EO, decided that the environment had become too restrictive to properly 
function, especially in light of the number of unsanctioned or illegal firms popping up at 
a rapid rate throughout the world, and especially in conflict-ridden Africa. These actual 
mercenary firms, operating illegally and in violation of the FMA, created a level of 
competition that legitimate PSCs could not match. O’Brien states that EO announced 
their termination of operations because they were “no longer able to operate in a climate 
conducive to doing business due to on-going negative publicity and national regulation in 
the form of the 1998 Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act,” which led to actors 
who worked for EO previously to operate without the same level of scrutiny.881   
                                                 
878 See for example, Dickinson, Outsourcing War And Peace : Preserving Public Values In A World 
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legislation.”  Howe, Ambiguous Order: 226. 
880 Len le Roux, “South African Mercenary Legislation Enacted,” Institute for Security Studies (2008). 
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In the end, the larger companies, like EO, who had demonstrated degrees 
of self-regulation, accountability, and transparency, were now closing shop, giving way 
and opening the market to much shadier elements. O’Brien goes on to write that by 
“engaging in dialogue with these private military companies, the government could have 
successfully co-opted them into legitimate operations. Now, the closure of EO may well 
signal the end of this effective dialogue and the emergence of much more covert–and 
therefore much more potentially damaging–firms engaging in entirely unregulated 
activities outside of South Africa’s borders.”882  Increased legislation and regulation is 
not the answer. Enforcement of existing laws and regulations is. 
Even though the laws and regulations may be on the books, they are much 
more difficult to enforce if contracting procedures are not clear or if there are not 
sufficient resources to monitor the contracts. In Iraq and Afghanistan, numerous 
government and independent panel reports document the lack of Contracting Officer 
Representatives (CORs) and the excessive ad hoc contracting of private contractors in 
general and PSCs in specific. This dire lack in the ability to monitor resulted in massive 
cost overruns, waste, and fraud in the use of contractors, as reported by SIGIR, SIGAR, 
CRS, OMB, and the Commission on Wartime Contracting (which found between $31 and 
$60 billion to have been lost due to waste).883    
Ad hoc contracting and monitoring of security services, similar to the way 
the U.S. contracted PSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan, is hardly the best way for the UN to 
contract PSCs. Clear and comprehensive laws, regulations, and policy guiding the use of 
PSCs would benefit the UN (and PSCs) as it expands the use of armed and unarmed 
private security services into peacekeeping operations worldwide.884  As Santayana wrote 
in 1906, “Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness… Those who 
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883 Contracting, “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks - Final 
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cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”885  In this case, the past is recent 
(Iraq and Afghanistan) and should be difficult to forget. The UN is currently using and 
increasing the use of PSCs886—it would be wise to incorporate comprehensive 
accountability measures and a unitary policy before increasing their use. Reputable PSCs 
claim to be in favor of clear regulation and lines of accountability.887 
 Con 
PSCs have made a point of creating an image of self-regulation. Lobbying 
groups, such as the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) and British 
Association of Private Security Contractors (BAPSC), promote codes of conduct and 
have made their acceptance a requirement for membership to their trade organizations.888  
Recently in a continuing effort to improve its image, Academi (previously Blackwater 
Worldwide, then Xe Services) recruited and hired former Attorney General John Ashcroft 
as their lead ethics agent. Public relations efforts to show that PSCs are responsible actors 
and can self-regulate have grown stronger in light of the increase in allegations of 
misconduct or human rights abuses by contractors. Dickinson recommends that 
governments or contracting authorities “…require contract firms to install internal 
accountability agents with a role comparable to that of uniformed lawyers in the military. 
Such agents should be responsible for training employees, monitoring their actions, 
tracking abuses, and imposing sanctions in the case of such abuses.”889   Whether or not 
former AG John Ashcroft is the best person to add credibility to Academi has yet to be 
determined. 
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As previously noted, Dickinson’s four mechanisms of accountability and 
constraint may be sufficient; however, they are rarely used in regulating PSCs or their 
employees.890  It is not a lack of laws or federal statutes—more laws will not solve the 
accountability problem.891  As Dickenson writes, “…the problem of legal accountability 
is not so much a deficiency of law on the books as it is a failure of law in action.”892  
Although private contractors have gotten a good deal of press on misconduct, abuses, 
fraud, and criminal activity, there are very few examples of prosecutions for this well-
documented misbehavior. For example, it was not until 2006 that the first U.S. civilian, 
David Passaro, a former CIA contractor, was convicted of prisoner abuse.893  Although 
the military guards who committed abuses at Abu Ghraib were punished under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), none of the private contractors conducting 
interrogations there were convicted of any wrongdoing. Federal authorities indicted the 
Blackwater private security personnel who killed 17 civilians in Nisour square, however, 
charges were eventually dismissed because it was discovered that the prosecution relied 
on compelled statements during a prior inquiry.894  Even though the Iraqi government 
and U.S. military officials found the shootings to have been unjustified, combined with 
five separate investigations, including one by the FBI, and there was a large amount of 
evidence against the Blackwater shooters, including a good deal of eyewitness testimony, 
not one of the shooters was ever convicted of a crime. 
Criminal proceedings against other contractors accused of wrongdoing 
have also never made it to trial. In fact, other than Passaro, the only three contractors 
convicted of crimes relating to abuses committed while under contract were prosecuted 
under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA) and the UCMJ; two 
                                                 
890 Legal; contractual; public participation; and organizational constraints. See Ibid., 525–27. 
891 Dickinson, Outsourcing War And Peace : Preserving Public Values In A World Of Privatized 
Foreign Affairs, 43. 
892 Dickinson, “Outsourcing Covert Activities,” 525. 
893 Michael Hayden, “Statement to the CIA Workforce by Director Hayden On the Conviction of 
Former CIA Contractor David Passaro,” in Statement On Conviction of Former CIA Contractor Passaro 
(Langley: Central Intelligence Agency, 17 August 2006). 
894 U.S. District Court, “U.S. v. Paul A. Slough, Nicholas A. Slatten, Evan S. Liberty, Dustin L. 
Heard, and Donald W. Ball,” (Washington, DC: District Court for the District of Columbia, 2009). 
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were convicted for stabbing co-workers and one for possession of child pornography.895  
Based upon the sheer magnitude of allegations as well as documented cases of abuse and 
criminal activity perpetrated by contractors overseas, there are very few cases of 
contractors being held accountable for criminal activity or abuses.896  As Melina Milazzo 
of Human Rights First points out, “It defies logic that a U.S. soldier who commits a crime 
abroad can be held accountable under U.S. law, but a private contractor who commits the 
same exact crime may not.”897  This many years after the Nisour Square incident of 2007, 
U.S. courts still do not have criminal jurisdiction over all PSCs hired by the U.S. 
Government who commit crimes abroad.898   
The increase in the coming-to-light of criminal acts committed by PSC 
personnel over the past ten years, from torture at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay 
(GTMO) to the “rape and enslaving of young girls in the Balkans,”899 has created public 
outrage resulting in worldwide demands that those responsible be brought to justice. 
Even though there have been a “host of reforms to improve coordination and control over 
P[S]Cs in Iraq,”900 criminal accountability has failed to produce any convictions, but 
Jenny Lam argues that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been underutilized.901  The ATS 
(also called the “Alien Tort Claims Act” (ATCA)) is the primary mechanism by which 
aliens may receive relief in U.S. courts from human rights violations committed against 
                                                 
895United States, “United States v. Aaron Bridges Langston,” in CR-07-PHX (Arizona: Indictment, 27 
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897 Bowser-Soder, “Need to Close Accountability Gap,” article, website, www.humanrightsfirst.org. 
898 Ibid. 
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them outside the United States. Two cases connected to PSC personnel have gone before 
U.S. courts under the ATS and both have been dismissed; however, as Price points out, it 
is jurists’ decisions which will stand to begin to establish international legal norms.902   
Although ATS is a U.S. statute and not international law, the more cases 
that can be filed and prosecuted under the ATS, the more that a foundation of customary 
law can be established with regard to PSCs, contributing to international legal norms. 
Because the United States has shown complicity in agreements which regulate PSCs, and 
has shown a willingness to make the necessary modifications to domestic law to reign in 
PSCs and hold them accountable (e.g., the “amendment to the UCMJ to subject military 
contractors supporting the Armed Forces during contingency operations to court-martial 
jurisdiction, and…the extension of MEJA to cover certain non-DoD contractors working 
with the military overseas,”903) it would be difficult for the United States to claim 
persistent objector status to any developing treaties or instruments which would allow the 
United States to be excluded from customary law.904  Even if the United States could 
claim a position of persistent objector, as Price notes, “[a] rule need not be universally 
followed, just widely defended to establish international customary law.”905  Once 
established as customary international law, enforcement will have the “teeth” that so 
many are demanding since the International Criminal Court will have jurisdiction over 
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creation of the necessary legal norms which will result in soft law with the transformative 
power to become “internalized” finalizing into both domestic and international hard 
law.906   
e. Legitimacy 
 Pro 
Because determinations of legitimacy have normative dimensions, 
especially with regard to interveners such as the UN, regional organizations, states, 
militias, or PSCs, it is necessary to review legitimacy with regard to humanitarian 
intervention. According to James Pattison, “legitimacy is used to mean that humanitarian 
intervention is legal, accepted by the international community, procedurally justified, 
authorized by the Security Council, and/or morally justifiable.”907  But this definition 
opens up a can of worms since every proposition needs to be analyzed for every case in 
order to determine legitimacy for each case of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, a 
once-and-done determination does not qualify as carte blanche for an intervener to 
operate without guidance from those who grant legitimacy, e.g., government, 
international community, civil society. As was noted earlier in this dissertation, 
determinations of legitimacy as a consequence of effectiveness may be a sufficient, but 
not necessary, factor in conducting peacekeeping.908 
Because of this normative dimension of legitimacy, as well as perception 
and misperception of what PSCs are (and are not), PSCs have not earned themselves a 
name for legitimacy. One of the PSC industry’s biggest complaints is that, as David 
Isenberg, author of Shadow force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq, puts it, PSCs 
have a “pity-me-pity-me-the-big-bad-mainstream-media-is-out-to-get-us attitude.”909  He 
                                                 
906 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization (The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 52, no. 4 
(Autumn1998): 895. 
907 Pattison, Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect : who should intervene?: 30. 
908 Legitimacy as a consequence of effectiveness also falls under Ian Hurd’s expanded concept of the 
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909 David Isenberg, “Chapter 12,” in Huff Post Business (Huffington Post, 29 April 2012). 
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bases this on claims by PSC industry leaders that PSCs are “mischaracterized by the 
media (albeit sometimes intentionally to ensure a sensational impact).”910   
However, much truth there is to the “blame the contractors” perspective, 
there appear to be a greater amount of abuses by UN peacekeepers than by all U.S. 
contractors combined, not just security contractors.911  For example, the UN database on 
“Allegations for all Categories of Personnel Per Year (Sexual Exploitation and Abuse)” 
reveals 498 cases of sexual exploitation and abuse over a five-year period.912  The 
Federal Contractor Misconduct Database reveals only seven human rights abuses by 
contractors for the same five-year period.913  This number does not, however, include 
contractor instances of misconduct other than human rights abuses. For all cases of 
misconduct, there were 521 instances of contractors acting badly.   
Generally, reported abuses alleged against peacekeepers involve human 
rights abuses, where abuses by contractors are more often in the waste, fraud, and abuse 
categories.914  Even considering this fact, the UN still maintains a legitimacy factor that 
PSCs do not. Whether this is attributable to intentionally mischaracterization by the 
media for a sensational impact against PSCs is debatable.915  However, merely placing 
                                                 
910 Duelge, “Ethical Lessons On Contractor Value,” 349. 
911 UN database on Human Rights Abuses, 
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914 See the following Oversight, “Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring 
Contractors.”; Gerstenfeld, “What about UN crimes?”; (POGO), “Federal Contractor Misconduct 
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915 See Doug Brooks’s discussion in Duelge, “Ethical Lessons On Contractor Value.”; Isenberg, 
“Chapter 12.”  Isenberg’s review  
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the UN stamp on PSCs does appear to have the effect of granting legitimacy.916  In the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, when PSCs were expanding into conflict/post-conflict (CPC) 
areas commensurate with the growth of intervention peacekeeping, one company, 
ArmorGroup (previously Defence Systems Ltd. (DSL)) was one of only a few PSCs to 
have contracts with the PSC-shy UN.917  And as Brooks confidently writes, “The UN 
contracts “legitimize” ArmorGroup in the eyes of many African governments, indicating 
a rosy future for the company on the continent.”918  This declaration of a “rosy future” 
has certainly proven true as ArmorGroup is now one of the largest and most active PSCs 
operating in Africa with contracts worth millions. As has been previously discussed, there 
are a variety of ways through which PSCs could gain legitimacy.919  Working with the 
UN could also function to confer a sense of legitimacy to PSCs since they then take on 
the symbols that derive from the UN.920  Whether or not PSCs can continue to learn  
 
lessons from the past and apply them to present and future operations will directly affect 
their legitimacy, regardless of whether or not they are effective at carrying out their 
contract(s)  
 Con 
Because legitimacy and PSCs was covered in much greater detail in 
Chapter IV, I will only summarize here. PSCs do not have the legitimacy that the UN or 
ROs or governments have (especially democratically elected governments who adhere to 
human rights norms). PSCs may in certain circumstances demonstrate effectiveness; 
                                                 
916 Kevin O’Brien, “Freelance Forces: Exploiters of Old or New-Age Peacebrokers?,” Jane’s 
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March 2000. 
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etc. Heinze, Waging humanitarian war : the ethics, law, and politics of humanitarian intervention; Pattison, 
Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect : who should intervene? See Ch. VI of this 
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however, PSCs do not have the humanitarian credentials that international organizations 
or collections of states retain. Nor do PSCs conduct their operations multilaterally in the 
same manner in which international organizations or ROs conduct operations, working 
together non-competitively, and toward common humanitarian goals. One of the primary 
reasons for this is that PSCs’ motives are selfish, that is, they are profit-seeking; their 
final interests do not lie in peace, stability, or human security. Their ultimate goal is to let 
contracts that make them money; if peace, stability, and human security are in the 
contract, PSCs will work to achieve those obligations—to the limits of the contract.   
Effectiveness is one way in which PSCs can earn legitimacy, but unlike 
governments, PSCs are far less permanent and do not have the same level of international 
backing that a collection of states retain. Moreover, the extent to which PSCs may be 
effective is often offset by criminal acts and human rights abuses that go unpunished, 
such that human security overall may be degraded by their presence in C/PC areas; this, 
in turn can result in the creation of a negative prevailing political context.921  Lack of 
accountability (or perceived lack of accountability) not only affects legitimacy, but as 
Melina Milazzo of Human Rights First states, “…it also alienated local populations and 
undercut the United States’ military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.”922  Moreover, for 
the UN to confer its own legitimacy on to PSCs is risky since this “laundering” of what 
may be perceived as unethical actors through the “legitimating machine” of the Security 
Council could actually further deteriorate the UN’s own legitimacy. The UN certainly 
does not need further questions of credibility or damage to their legitimacy through hiring 
PSCs for peacekeeping.   
There are those who argue that the globalization of PSCs has made them 
in many ways above the law—that they are able to bypass local or national regulation 
because of their transnational nature and scope.923  Peter Singer has noted that “given the 
ability of [PSCs] to globalize and escape local regulation, [a system to regulate PSCs] 
                                                 
921 For a discussion on three necessary factors for legitimacy, see Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War 
: The Ethics, Law, And Politics Of Humanitarian Intervention, 117–25. 
922 Bowser-Soder, “Need to Close Accountability Gap.” 
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must be international to be effective.”924  It is within the realm of international regulation 
and consistency of practices that the Montreux Document, the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC), and other international legal norms seek 
to solve many of the problems inherent in a system where private citizens can carry out 
“legitimized” acts of force or violence (or both) across state boundaries. However, 
making it increasingly difficult, in many cases, these actions by individuals and 
corporations are mired in multiple levels of contracts and subcontracts, shifting personnel 
and employment records, and intermingled between government and private industry. 
Until the accountability gaps can be closed, either through enforceable laws, or through 
consistent and aggressive monitoring and evaluation, legitimacy will continue to prove 
elusive for PSCs—even if they are effective. 
f. Human Security/Human Rights 
 Pro 
PSCs are doing good things worldwide in stability, reconstruction, and 
humanitarian operations. Working with NGOs, IOs (such as the UN), ROs (such as 
NATO), states, and other private organizations, the work of PSCs has spread to nearly 
every C/PC, SSR/DDR, and HA/DR mission there is. PSCs can be found guarding 
embassies, food distribution networks, logistics trains, and IDP camps, or they can be 
found in private security details (PSDs) guarding in-country assessors and diplomats. Not 
every PSC is a Blackwater or a G4S, failing in their contracted mission(s).925  The 
majority silently and effectively carry out their contracted missions, provide services at 
competitive prices, and adhere to international codes of conduct as well as their own 
aspirational standards of self-regulation. 
 Con 
                                                 
924 Singer, “War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatised Military Firms and the International 
Law,” 544.   
925 Blackwater’s failings are notorious primarily because of the Nisour Square incident which left 17 
innocent civilians dead. G4S, the largest PSC in the world (and one of the largest companies in the world), 
failed to provide even half of the contracted security for the 2012 Olympics. See for example, “G4S fiasco 
revealed limitations of private sector, admits Defence Secretary Philip Hammond.” 
 314
It would be redundant to reiterate previously discussed human rights 
abuses by PSCs here, since they can rightly be assumed to be cons to human security and 
human rights. Therefore, attention here will be instead paid to a considerable human 
rights problem in which PSCs have been embroiled:  trafficking in persons (TIP)—and 
not just for sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), as many might expect.926  A number of 
allegations hold that PSCs have been hiring TCNs, promising them large sums of money 
for out-of-country work, then transporting them to the host state (the state in which they 
will be conducting security duties), confiscating their passports, withholding pay, and 
restricting them from leaving, and holding them essentially “hostage.”927  These 
allegations are also supported by a 2012 State Department report on TIP, in which it 
reports that TCNs from countries such as “Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Pakistan, Georgia, Jordan, and Uganda …are 
subsequently subjected to involuntary servitude as construction workers, security 
guards,…”928  Following allegations in 2006 of TIP in Iraq, the DoD conducted an 
investigation which found that labor trafficking and human rights abuses were 
widespread. From the investigation, DoD issued a policy statement to “ensure the U.S. 
employs a ‘zero tolerance’ policy against human trafficking.”  Following the 
investigation that found that, Najlaa, a company which included security services 
alongside catering services, construction and other jobs, had confined more than 1,000 
Sri Lankan, Nepali, and Indian TCNs “to a windowless warehouse without money or 
work for three months,” the Department of Justice (DoJ) reviewed the case and found 
that “while certainly disconcerting, the facts and circumstances did not suggest that 
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Human Trafficking Violations had occurred.”929  As a result, the prime contractor, KBR, 
retained its contract with the U.S. government and Najlaa still operates to this day under 
contract to KBR. As Isenberg writes, “Is it really ‘zero tolerance’ when there are no 
repercussions?”930 
When one thinks of PSCs committing human rights abuses, TIP is not 
usually the first one that comes to mind; however, the practice of promising big salaries, 
then paying very little, if anything, once in country, has become quite prevalent.931  In 
interests of efficiency and cost savings, PSCs have resorted to not only sub-sub-
contracting as has been discussed earlier in this paper, but outsourcing their own services 
at the lowest levels and for the least cost. Estimates of the percentage of LNs and TCNs 
used by PSCs overseas range between 90 percent and 99 percent.932  What results are not 
only offenses to those doing the work for very little if any pay, but this practice also 
raises questions about the quality of security, and to whom they are ultimately 
accountable. Although it is true that many of the TCNs used in security services are 
unarmed—most guard buildings or equipment—their responsibilities are no less 
important.   
Retired Ambassador Kenneth P. Moorefield, a deputy inspector general at 
the Defense Department, testified recently on prosecuting contractor-related TIP cases, 
and his comments are germane to all crimes which may be committed by contractors 
working overseas, whether they be security contractors or merely providing logistical 
support. In written testimony, he stated, “There have been systemic obstacles which have 
hindered successful TIP criminal investigations, including jurisdiction limitations, foreign 
law enforcement capabilities, command investigative standards of evidence, and the 
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challenges of evidence collection in contingency operation contracting environments.”933  
As an example of how difficult prosecution is, just with regard to TIP cases, “since 2006 
the Defense Criminal Investigative Service of the DoD Office of Inspector General has 
investigated 21 TIP-related allegations worldwide, resulting in five cases being referred 
to the Department of Justice, of which one was accepted for prosecution.”934  The ACLU 
recently authored a report on the extensity of TIP and SEA crimes and found that: 
[A]ccountability exists in theory but not in practice: to date, the U.S. 
government has yet to fine or prosecute a single contractor for 
trafficking—or labor-related offenses. Despite having the authority to 
suspend and terminate contracts with both prime and subcontractors, 
government agencies have never exercised this authority.935 
With the increase in PSCs around the globe came new problems:  A lack 
of standardization; inability to monitor, as well as questions of who is doing the 
monitoring; poor or inconsistent enforcement and legislation—both at the state and 
international levels; and lastly, and not least important, were questions of human rights 
violations which arose regarding the methods by which PSCs conducted business. It is 
the responsibility of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to “monitor the impact of 
the activities of  [PSCs] on the enjoyment of human rights and to prepare draft 
international basic principles that encourage respect for human rights on the part of those 
companies.”936  But what actual power over these multinational firms does the UNHRC 
really have anyway?  It does not have a great deal of actual power or control over them; 
to “encourage” is not the same as “hold accountable.”  A good start would be to begin by 
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standardizing and reinforcing regulatory mechanisms, establishing clear contracting 
guidelines, and operationalizing effective monitoring and control. 
2. Conclusion 
These pros and cons clearly do not represent every problem or every benefit that 
there may be to hiring private security contractors for peacekeeping. However, I have 
included a representative sample of both sides of the issue which exemplifies the crux of 
the debate, where it stands among different groups, and where it is leading. The increase 
in the use of PSCs by the UN, especially in recent years, is part of a much larger trend 
toward creating a “culture of security,” not only for the populations and communities in 
which the UN is working, but for UN officials and personnel working in dangerous or 
C/PC environments.937  In the wake of UN failures to respond effectively in places like 
Rwanda or Bosnia, the UN’s shift in the late 1990s from merely “observing,” to peace 
enforcement and robust peacekeeping in order to prevent R2P crimes and protect 
civilians has placed them more in harm’s way than ever before. At the same time, greater 
intervention has brought the UN more criticism from those claiming that it has become a 
puppet of Western domination.938  The UN will continue to be the lead organization for 
intervention into sovereign states through peacekeeping, but its continued relevancy and 
legitimacy will constantly be up for reevaluation by the states that support or are 
supported by it; effectiveness is a key factor in perceptions of legitimacy. If the UN is 
unable or unwilling to act to stop violence against persons or any of the R2P crimes when 
states are not taking action (for whatever reason, e.g., will, capability, etc.), then its 
power and legitimacy can become eroded, contributing to the UN’s marginalization as a 
valuable instrument of foreign policy. 
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One of the main things this dissertation has shown is that human security must be 
a critical factor in determining how to conduct peacekeeping and how the protection of 
civilians is vital in situations where potential for harm or violence exists. The literature 
bears this out in UN reports ranging from the annual Human Security Reports to the 
Capstone Document to the UN’s ten rules: code of personal conduct for blue helmets. 
PSCs will not be going away any time soon and their use by the UN organization is not 
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VIII. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH 
OPPORTUNITIES, POLICY APPLICATION, AND CONCLUSION 
A. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This dissertation is limited in that PSCs have not conducted peacekeeping for the 
UN. Therefore, evaluating them in order to come up with an answer one way or another 
would be based upon insufficient data. The available data finds that traditional, state-
sponsored, peacekeepers have committed more sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) 
human rights violations than have PSC employees, but that PSCs have committed far 
more waste, fraud, and abuse violations than have peacekeepers. This does not mean, 
however, that if PSCs were accepted by the UN to conduct peacekeeping they would not 
commit a similar (or proportional) number of SEA or TIP abuses. This also does not 
mean that peacekeepers are better stewards of resources than PSCs. Moreover, a 
sufficient number of studies have not been conducted to show definitively that one group 
commits more human rights abuses or wastes resources more than another.   
UN peacekeeping operations are costly, and using figures from numerous 
missions shows that, frequently, costs seem excessive especially when success can take 
much longer than expected and when compared alongside the costs of short-term PSC 
operations. The efficiencies that PSCs claim have not been sufficiently tested in order to 
show that they are, in fact, cheaper than government or public forces. Moreover, the long-
term commitment of PSCs to human rights has also always been questioned since, it is 
argued, they are driven by one thing, profit. But if this is the case, then they should be 
free of bias and most likely to live up to the UN’s credo of impartiality and neutrality, 
therefore enhancing their legitimacy and ultimately their effectiveness.   
PSCs claim to have brought peace to countries such as Angola and Sierra Leone. 
But it was not lasting peace; and in the end, human security was negatively affected 
because conflict resumed and was prolonged by PSC actions. Some UN peacekeeping 
missions have failed, like Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, allowing extreme violence to 
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occur unchecked. But many peace support operations have brought peace to countries 
like El Salvador, Namibia, and Timor Leste.940   
Can PSCs do peacekeeping with legitimacy, accountability, impartiality, and 
neutrality effectively all while recognizing and respecting human security and protecting 
human rights?  These are all things that cannot be known based upon existing data. But 
what can be known is that human security is the one measure that the UN must use when 
deciding what the right actions to take are in response to crisis, conflict, or disaster. As 
the Secretary-General stated in a report in 1999, “The protection of civilians…is 
fundamental to the central mandate of the organization.”  
Sufficient empirical data does not exist in order to make a determination of 
whether or not PSCs can conduct peacekeeping for the United Nations, but if there is a 
question of stopping a genocide and no state is willing to provide troops or the UN cannot 
get troops on the ground quickly enough, PSCs should be considered. However, it is clear 
from my interviews with UN officials, researchers, and scholars that the UN is a long 
way from considering the use of PSCs in actual peacekeeping missions. This is in spite of 
the fact that it has been acknowledged to me in interviews with senior UN officials and 
Security Officers at UNDSS that PSCs have increasingly been used to protect UN 
officials, personnel, and equipment, especially when working in crisis areas where a 
sanctioned mission has not yet been authorized by the Security Council.941  Procurement 
                                                 
940 Howard, UN Peacekeeping In Civil Wars, 21–51. 
941 #1, “Interview with UNDPKO Official #1.”  UNDSS Official #1, “Interview with United Nations 
Department of Safety and Security Official #1,” in United Nations Interviews, ed. CDR Daniel G. Straub 
(United Nations Complex, New York, NY 21 June 2012). UNDSS Official #2, “Interview with United 
Nations Department of Safety and Security Official #2,” in Interview with UNDSS Official #2, ed. CDR 
Daniel G. Straub (United Nations complex, New York, NY20 June 2012). 
All interviews with United Nations officials were based upon an agreement of non-attribution due to 
the subject nature of my research. None were willing to answer questions that could potentially be 
interpreted as speaking to (or in contrast to) UN policy/guidance. In cases where responses fell along UN 
policy guidelines, the citations and references used were official UN documents, the UN website, 
authorized UN publications, or media releases.   
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and contract data available on the UN’s website shows a drastic shift in the increased use 
of security services after 2008—when the UN report, “Towards a Culture of Security and 
Accountability” came out.942  This increased use may ultimately lead to a wealth of data 
on the use of PSCs by the UN. Since PSC personnel are working closely with the UN in 
so many locations and in so many capacities, this increased contact may lead to further 
enmeshment of PSCs in the peacekeeping process. Data on evaluation of the capability of 
PSCs to work within the UN system, with UN troops, for UN officials, or in joint 
operations/ventures may provide deeper insight than was available when this dissertation 
was written. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
As PSCs learn to navigate the UN system as they learned to navigate the U.S. 
system, adapting quickly to changing requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is likely 
that PSCs will adapt to fit into peacekeeping. As this occurs, policies for PSC-use by the 
UN will emerge, regulations will be created or modified, and an entirely new area for 
study will grow from the increased privatization of previously UN-only functions. 
There is no question that PSC motives will remain as they have always been: 
profit. But this may not be necessarily a bad thing. PSC executives make no excuses for 
the fact that what they do is for money.943  They do, however, claim that just because 
they work for financial gain does not mean that they have no integrity or loyalty or sense 
of right and wrong. In-depth research on whether profit can be a morally sound motive 
                                                 
The UN has also acknowledged recent increases in the use of PSCs to protect officials on mission, 
personnel, equipment, and buildings in unstable environments where peacekeeping missions have not (yet) 
been authorized by the SC. See Brahimi, “Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability.”  
Additionally, Østensen and Pingeot discuss the increased use of private security by the UN in their reports, 
see Pingeot, “Dangerous Partnership.” & Østensen, “UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: 
Practices and Policies.” 
942 Brahimi, “Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability.” 
943 For example, Eeben Barlow, former president of EO, Tim Spicer, former president of Sandline and 
AEGIS, and Doug Brooks, president of the International Stability Operations Association, all make this 
claim and readily acknowledge that profit is a motive. In fact, the name of one article by Brooks is “Write a 
cheque, end a war.”  Brooks, “Write a Cheque End a War Using Private Military Companies to End 
African Conflicts.” 
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for using PSCs to stop genocides or ethnic cleansing or war crimes or crimes against 
humanity is an interesting proposition and could certainly use further investigation. 
C. POLICY APPLICATION, OPTIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
If the United Nations chooses not to use every available tool in order to stop the 
“scourge of war,” then it is likely that it will continue to fail in missions that require a 
robust set of instruments in order to secure peace.  Moreover, the countries that have the 
most to lose—and the most to gain—may seek other means to achieve successful peace, 
or at least, an end to conflict. Based upon UN statements, interviews, and recent reports, 
there is a strong likelihood that regional organizations will take on a greater share of what 
were previously UN missions. Regional organizations do not have the same restrictions 
on intervention and “robust” peacekeeping or the same restrictions that the UN has 
placed on privatization of services. In order to accomplish varying goals in conflict, post-
conflict, HA/DR, unstable and fragile areas, privatization of security may be necessary 
since the UN and the West have become much more selective in choosing engagements. 
In too many cases, engagement by the UN and the international community has been too 
little too late, and has been offered only after human rights abuses and atrocities 
committed on a massive scale have occurred or crisis has reached out-of-control 
proportions.  
Many argue that recent events in Syria have far surpassed the threshold for 
intervention. Unfortunately, the time to engage is before the fighting, ethnic cleansing, or 
genocide begins, not after the sheer brutality and gruesomeness of the conflict brings 
international attention. If the UN is to remain a relevant, legitimate agency capable of 
responding effectively to crises worldwide, it will need to consider all resources available 
and begin to accept that in a changing world, one where Western countries are not 
supplying troops, budgets are being slashed, and resources depleted. The answer is not to 
reduce international effect, but to seek new ways to address problems collectively. The 
less the UN intervenes, the more regional organizations, other states, and other actors will 
get involved; this may be to the detriment of international stability. Splintered efforts at  
 
 323
conflict reduction through the use of various, non-aligned factions who are not 
representing the international community portends increased conflict and political 
instability. 
In addition to drawing out findings that support the arguments for and against 
PSCs in peacekeeping, it can be seen across all case studies that conducting one method, 
one force, or one type of peacekeeping is rarely effective in the long-term.  What the case 
studies bear out as necessary is an adaptable force that understands and adjusts to 
changing political, social, and economic landscapes.  This force does not need to be one 
drawn only from national militaries or provided by the UN or “coalitions of the willing.”  
In the case of PSCs in Angola and Sierra Leone, they were successful not only because 
they understood the physical terrain, but because they understood the human terrain; they 
understood Africans and how Africans live and how they fight.  These PSCs used local 
tribesmen, the Kamajors, to assist them, and in turn, they provided the Kamajors 
protection from the rebel soldiers, many of whom were not native to either Angola or 
Sierra Leone.  These PSCs were extremely well-trained in combat and the use of force—
this benefitted them when they needed to protect villages or assist the government troops 
in driving rebels out of villages and towns.  They were also well-trained in working with 
the population.  Many reports credit EO and Sandline for saving lives; some add that they 
were hailed as heroes and welcomed by the villagers when they made their way through 
towns.  It was this integration of capability that enabled their success—in the short-term.  
What PSCs did not have was the staying power or the full spectrum of capabilities that 
the UN has at its command.  Had these two very capable groups been able to work 
together toward one common goal, human security, failures such as Angola, Sierra 
Leone, Rwanda, Darfur, etc., may have never reached the epic proportions that they did.  
Even today, the capabilities of PSCs are being ignored in favor, in some cases, of doing 
little or nothing.  The ISOA, representing a large number of PSCs (and other stability and 
reconstruction companies), drew up a proposal to help stop the ongoing genocide in 
Democratic Republic of Congo more than five years ago, but none of the extensive 
experience and capacity of those companies has been utilized.  UN peacekeepers are 
failing to stabilize the country and they are failing to protect human security. 
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The findings of this dissertation show that a capable force can succeed at 
protecting people from violence in both the short- and the long-term, and that each is 
susceptible to failings of accountability, legitimacy, cost controls, and human rights 
violations.  It is when the best that the world has to offer is used that positive results are 
achieved and human security can be perpetuated.   When it has been made clear that the 
end goal is the protection of people and communities from violence, then every available 
option must be exhausted in securing that goal. 
At this point in history, considering the pros and cons of PSCs in peacekeeping 
and the relative and objective weight of each, it becomes apparent that in the interest of 
human security and in the overall protection of human rights, using PSCs to take over 
entire peacekeeping operations is not recommended. However, this does not assume that 
there will not be a time when the UN may not again consider their use to stop R2P 
crimes, for PoC, and in the interest of human rights and human security. It may be that 
PSCs are used as part of a “coalition of the willing” as is mentioned in the Capstone 
Document as an option under Chapter VII when troops are not available or political will 
is insufficient to stop violence. Moreover, as has been seen in places such as Darfur, 
Rwanda, Bosnia, DRC, and now Syria, the costs of waiting, doing little, or doing nothing 
can be catastrophic.  Rephrasing Kofi Annan’s famous statement as a question, “Is the 
world ready to privatize peace?”944  William Shawcross, author of Deliver us from evil, 
wrote of the Sierra Leone crisis: 
If we want to put the world to rights, and we’re not prepared to risk our 
own forces in doing so, then we should consider the employment of private 
security forces…If the South African mercenaries had been allowed to stay 
in Sierra Leone from ‘96 onwards a lot of children in Sierra Leone would 
still have their hands today.945 
  
                                                 
944 Paraphrased reference to the oft-quoted Annan statement that the world may not yet be ready to 
privatize peace. 
945 William Shawcross, “Interview with William Shawcross, author of “Deliver Us From Evil,”“ 
(ABC TV, 29 August 2000). 
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PSCs are willing to step in whenever there is a need; however, this does not 
ameliorate, or worse, negate the responsibility of the state and the international 
community to exercise control.946  In fact, most PSCs welcome clear legal structure and 
guidance.947  PSCs need to be contracted by legitimate states in order to continue to gain 
contracts. Their corporate nature is such that they are not yet ready to take over entire 
missions; they do not claim the capacity to be able to carry out the full spectrum of 
foreign policy implementation and execution from cradle to grave of an entire peace 
support operation. One of the biggest contentions regarding PSCs is that their actions, 
especially with regard to combat, remove the monopoly of force held by the state. The 
Weberian notion that the use of violence and physical force is exclusively within the 
domain of the state is not challenged by the use of private security companies. The 
monopoly of force remains with the state as long as the state is controlling the force 
used.948  If legitimacy is derived from the state or recognized international organization, 
and it is states which form and empower international or regional organizations such as 
the AU, NATO, ASEAN, the EU, or the UN, and if PSCs are hired by legitimate states or 
organizations legitimized by states, then PSCs become legitimate actors.949  However, 
just because they are legitimate actors does not mean that they necessarily have perceived 
legitimacy, nor does this mean that their actions are legitimate. One argument holds that 
legitimacy is dependent upon effectiveness.950  Another holds that multilateralism, 
humanitarian credentials, and prevailing political context comprise the key factors to 
                                                 
946 See Bruneau’s discussion on control: Bruneau, “Contracting Out Security.”  
947 See Brooks, Spicer, Barlow, and the majority of recognized private security providers. 
948 Max Weber, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology  
(New York,: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78–79. 
949 This may be “laundering legitimacy” to some extent, but the UN is very involved with protecting 
its reputation and values its legitimacy. Attempts to “launder” legitimacy have stimulated massive debates 
on the relevancy and value of the UN as an international organization; examples include Russian 
“peacekeepers” seeking UN validation even though the operations the Russians were conducting were 
military-based and self-interested; there is also the case of the U.S. seeking legitimacy for the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. See Hurd, After Anarchy. 
950 See Moderate Instrumentalist Approach. Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention And The 
Responsibility To Protect : Who Should Intervene?, 72–93.   
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legitimacy.951  In the end, myriad factors play a role in determining whether PSCs can be 
a legitimate and effective tool used by states or organizations to fill gaps unmet by 
military or police forces. Whether or not they should be used is a question that needs to 
be applied to specific circumstances and is reserved for future research projects or 
analysis. What is most likely is that their use will be a hybrid one, where their 
demonstrated strengths, generally speed and flexibility are used to maximize 
effectiveness of instituting SC-mandated peacekeeping. Ideally, this use will be above-
board, well-regulated, monitored, and controlled, not ad hoc and ill-planned, as much of 
the use of PSCs has been in the past. 
The cons to the use of PSCs for peacekeeping have not gone away; the pros 
toward their use in peacekeeping have not gone away either. There will remain crises that 
need professional forces to keep the peace or create it if it is not there. The UN has 
proven that it does not always have the resources to accomplish the full measure of what 
it would take to create or sustain peace. As has been mentioned by too many authors to 
count, successful peacekeeping involves a multi-faceted approach that does not rely on a 
single prescriptive doctrine from which steps can be checked off until a peaceful 
conclusion is reached. There do not seem to be final definitive answers when it comes to 
finding “what works” in peacekeeping. It may be that the best answers lie in knowing the 
risks and weighing costs and benefits to each action taken. If that means the possible use 
of PSCs for peacekeeping, then eliminating them out of hand is an unacceptable 
proposition. The pros and cons must be fully understood in order to make informed 
decisions that ultimately protect people and create the foundations for sustainable human 
security. If PSCs can never be a part of that equation, then the reasons for not privatizing 
peacekeeping should be clear. However, if PSCs could conduct peacekeeping in a way 
that positively affects human security while being effectively controlled and held 
accountable, then it would be a travesty not to consider their use. Nikolaos Tzifakis, a 
researcher at the Centre for European Studies, sums it up well: “The implications of 
outsourcing security services to private agencies are not a priori positive or 
                                                 
951 Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War : The Ethics, Law, And Politics Of Humanitarian Intervention. 
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negative…Ultimately, everything boils down to the way public and private actors deal 
with the questions of ‘when’ and ‘how’ to go about contracting out security services.”952 
The UN is moving beyond R2P and toward protection of civilians (PoC), the idea 
of “Protect, Respect, and Remedy,”953 and human security, but it is clear that success is 
only found through mutual understanding and respect of these concepts. If contracted 
peacekeepers can: 1) effectively and efficiently perform the missions/mandates presented 
to them; 2) be effectively controlled and held accountable; 3)  reinforce the legitimacy of 
the UN; 4) achieve those missions while enforcing and demonstrating respect for human 
rights and with the end-goal of peace and human security; then, PSCs should be 
considered. However, not one of the above four requisites have been demonstrated or 
proven, and the risk of testing theories of effectiveness or efficiency through privatization 
of peacekeeping just might not be something the world is ready for yet.954 
 
Smart development policy and practice should leverage the best that 
America has to offer, whether it comes from non-profit organizations, 
large companies, small business, universities, think tanks, or the 
government. The best talent and ideas reside in all those places, often 
times working together. It’s not about who, it’s about how well.955  
 
This statement holds true, not just for America, but for other states, the 
international community, and the United Nations. Working together and utilizing all that 
                                                 
952 Tzifakis, “Contracting Out to PMSCs,” 54–55. Initially cited in David Isenberg, “The Devil Is 
Always in the Details,” (Washington, DC: Huffington Post, 25 July 2012). Peter Singer seems to concur 
with this statement as well when he writes, “The U.N. should also seriously explore the possibility of using 
the private market to get a better bang for its buck out of existing peacekeeping units,” see Singer, 
“Peacekeepers, Inc..” 
953 John Ruggie, UN Secretary General’s Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, cited 
in White, “Regulatory Initiatives at the International Level,” 13–14. 
954 I paraphrase Kofi Annan, who in 1996 actually said, “…the world may not be ready to privatize 
peace,” after considering the use of PSCs to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Also see Ranganathan, 
“Constructing Governance, but Constructive Governance?  The Emergence and Limitations of a Dominant 
Discourse on the Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies.”; Annan, “Intervention.”   
955 Betsy Bassan M. Charito Kruvant, Richard Dreiman, Asif Shaikh, Indira Ahluwalia, Jim 
Boomgard, Stan Soloway, “CIDC Statement on Divisive Policy Piece (Response to 18 July 2012 Foreign 
Policy article titled “Hired Gun Fight”),” (Washington, DC: The Coalition of International Development 
Companies (CIDC), 20 July 2012). 
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the world has to offer to reduce immiseration, improve human security and protect human 
rights are fundamentals to securing peace. If PSCs serve only to reduce human security 
and increase suffering, then their services should not be considered by the United 
Nations. But if more effective multilateral regulation or stronger political will is the cost 
to utilize one more potential means of preventing conflict or lessening suffering, then 
efforts need to be made to acquire those means. 
This dissertation has presented a comprehensive review of pros and cons for the 
use of PSCs in peacekeeping. It has also presented a case for human security as the 
referent object of evaluation for determining the ultimate effectiveness of intervening 
actors. Using the concept of human security to answer the question of whether or not 
PSCs should be used in peacekeeping, this dissertation finds that they should be used 
when conditions require speed and flexibility and the UN is unable to provide troops to 
stop violence. What is required is a responsive and effective mix of intervention options 
to enable human security, and the right approach is to figure out what the mix looks like, 
i.e., where PSCs have a role and when, not if they are involved or not. The effective 
integration of PSCs is the UN’s responsibility, and with effective integration, PSCs can 
have a useful role in peacekeeping. Without the right integration, it will not work. 
Referring back to the UN as a learning organization—the UN must develop a plan to best 
integrate and use the private sector to accomplish what needs to be done.956  This 
integration will require discussion and thought about the issue of PSC-use as an 
interactive problem; that is, with the right formal and informal institutions in place, PSCs 
in peacekeeping would work.957  The decision to use PSCs is best made by those who 
fully understand these advantages and disadvantages, have applied them to the situation 
at hand, and have the power to save lives through effective management of resources and 
provision of the best that the world can offer towards peace and security. 
                                                 
956 The UN as a learning organization is a concept that Page Fortna outlines in her book as an element 
fundamental to peacekeeping success. See Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 
957 Thanks to Dr. Nick Dew for his help with this last paragraph. His summary contained in his 
comments to me on my draft helped clarify my position; much of what he wrote is reproduced in this final 
paragraph. 
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In 2001, Secretary-General Kofi Annan told world leaders: 
The world’s peoples will judge us by our ability to perform specific 
tasks…and of the service we provide. For the sake of all those whom we 
hope to save—whether from terrorism, from war, from poverty, from 
disease, or from environmental degradation—let us resolve that only the 
best is good enough. And let us equip ourselves so that, in future, the best 
is what we give.958 
 
  
                                                 
958 Annan, “The Secretary-General Address to the General Assembly,” 1. 
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APPENDIX.  LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
1. Doug Brooks president, International Stability Operations Association (ISOA), 26 
October 2011 & 3 September 2012 at ISOA offices, Washington, DC. 
2. Timothy Byrne, Program Manager, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Global 
Peace Operations Initiative; 16 July 2012, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA. 
3. Patrick Cammaert, Major-General (Ret.), former force commander, Eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo; 10 May 2012 and 12 May 2012 at Center for 
Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
4. James Cockayne, Co-Director, Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation; 
18 June 2012, New York, NY. 
5. Molly Dunigan, political scientist at RAND Corporation; conversation at ISOA 
Annual Summit, Washington, DC, 26 October 2011. 
6. Lindy Heinecken, former researcher and Deputy Director of the Centre for 
Military Studies (CEMIS) at the South African Military Academy, currently 
Associate Professor of Sociology at Stellenbosch University; discussion following 
presentation at ISOA Annual Summit, Washington, DC, 26 October 2011. 
7. David Isenberg, specialist in private security contracting; 10 July 2010 & 9 
August 2011, Washington, DC. 
8. LtCol Chris Jacobs, Royal Army, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (UNDPKO) Military Planning Service; 19 June 2012, New York, NY. 
9. Mark Lumer, former Asst Deputy Asst Secretary of Army (Policy and 
Procurement), Iraq; seminar on Logistics Cooperation for Stability and 
Reconstruction (LCSR), Center for Stabilization and Economic Reconstruction 
(CSER) and Institute for Defense and Business (IDB) at Duke University; 28 
October 2011, Durham, NC. 
10. Åse Gilje Østensen, Researcher, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control 
of Armed Forces (DCAF); 7 July 2012, Skype, Monterey, CA to Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
11. Deane Peter-Baker, Professor of Ethics; 10 August 2011 at Naval Academy, 
Annapolis, MD. 
12. Lou Pingeot, Program Coordinator, Global Policy Forum; 3 July 2012, telephone 
interview, Monterey, CA. 
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13. Joseph Schmitz, former Department of Defense IG and former COO Blackwater 
Worldwide; 7 June 2012, telephone interview, Monterey, CA. 
14. Adam Smith, Researcher, International Peace Institute; 5 July 2012, New York, 
NY. 
15. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) Senior 
Official #1; 22 June 2012, United Nations Complex, New York, NY. 
16. United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) Senior Official #1 
United Nations Complex; 22 June 2012, New York, NY. 
17. United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) Senior Official #2, 
United Nations Complex; 4 July 2012, New York, NY. 
18. Jessica Vogel, Director, Programs and Operations, International Stability 
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